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Trajectories of Change in Post-2011 MENA : Challenges and Prospects

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Trajectories of Change in Post-2011: Challenges and Prospects

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Table of contents

Editor's Note <i>Jochen Lobah</i>	6
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Change, Dynamics and Continuities in the MENA-Region

Revolutions or Reactions? The Changes of the Arab World through the Lenses of the Tradition, Communitarianism and Production Paradigms <i>Stéphane Valter</i>	12
Tunisian Democratic Transition: What Role for Political Islamists in Reconstructing Tunisia? <i>Ayfer Erdogan</i>	28
The Constitutional Institutions in the 2011 Constitution <i>Hicham Khalfadiri</i>	46
The Wave of Change in MENA - Between Arab Spring and Arab Destruction <i>Ana-Maria Gajdo</i>	58
Renewed Authoritarianism - Chasms between state and society in the aftermath of the Arab spring <i>Ingrid Heidlmayr-Chegdaly</i>	74

Civic Activism and Social Movements

Metamorphoses of Civil Society Activism in Morocco: Converting Social Capital to Political Capital <i>Rachid Touhtou</i>	90
Digital Activism vs Digital Surveillance: Who Wins? The Case of the February 20th Movement in Morocco <i>Oualid Bakkas</i>	106
Informal Social Institutions and Mechanisms of Change in the Countries of the MENA Region <i>Bertold Schweitzer</i>	116

Feminism and Gender Equality

Challenging Gender Paradigms in Cyberspace <i>Soumaya Belhabib</i>	132
The Moroccan Constitution & Gender Equality: Issues of Implementation in Education <i>Ilham Bettach</i>	140

Arab Feminists' Sexual Revolution and Social Activism After the 2011 Arab Spring: Aicha Ech-Channa's À Haute Voix as a case study **158**
Fatimaezzahra Abid

Gender Relations and Social Values in Morocco: Prospects of "Third way" Islamic feminism after the "Arab Spring" **174**
Ilyass Bouzghaia

Bits and Tits: The Dialectics of Bodily Encounters in Moroccan Politics **180**
Abdelilah Bouasria

Security, Migration and Refugees

Mediterranean Security: New Trajectories after 2011 **194**
Patricia Bauer

Syrian Refugees in Morocco: Realities and Prospects **210**
Mohammed Yachoulti

Syrian Refugees in Turkey: A Tale of Two Countries **222**
Esra Tasdelen

Countering Radicalization: A Public Health Approach **228**
Rachel Santarsiero / Hamza Tayebi

Identity, Conflicts and Reconciliation

The Confessionalisation of Conflicts in the Arab World – Syria, Lebanon and Iraq **248**
Martin Pabst

Perspectives on Arab Muslim Identity (En)Countering Globalization and Change - "The Arab Spring" and Morocco as a Case-Study **256**
Yahya Yechouti

Testimonies that Matter: On Writing Torture in Morocco **266**
Aziza Brigui

State-Sponsored Sufism and Political Expression in Morocco **280**
Meriem El Haitami

Jochen Lobah

Editor's Note

Jochen Lobah has a PhD in philosophy. He worked as a project coordinator for North Africa and expert for Islamic issues in the Africa Division of the German Hanns-Seidel-Stiftung in Munich. He has been appointed since 2014 as the Foundation's Regional Representative for Morocco and Mauritania, based in Rabat.

Editor's Note

Since the outbreak of the upheavals in the Arab world at the end of 2010, the whole region has undergone a painful process of change. The historical overthrow of persevering authoritarian regimes and widespread grass-roots mobilization prompted Western mainstream media in particular to label the phenomenon prematurely as the Arab Spring. Afterwards, Mideast experts, journalists and Western politicians heralded the beginning of a new historical era of democracy, freedom and liberty in the Arab world. Many hoped that Arab populations would embrace a liberal-democratic worldview with the same enthusiasm as most Eastern Europeans after the fall of the communist autocracies in the late eighties and perhaps yet again fulfill, despite the war on terror after 9/11 and the financial crisis of 2008, Fukuyama's utopia of the end of history. So far, all these expectations have proved to be a wishful projection of Eurocentric "rationality" and biased thought patterns. Instead, the caesura of 2011 revealed that the 20th century postcolonial dream of building up modern states in the Arab world, inspired by a national ethos and cohesiveness, had come to an abrupt end. Today, there is a prevailing awareness that throughout the entire region and despite its population's revolutionary efforts, there was an immense lack of democratic prerequisites from the beginning of the turmoil. Serious shortcomings on the level of education, economic and participative structures were deeply rooted and nevertheless well-known deficiencies in most countries of the region.

For a majority of Arab populations, the promises of modernity unfolded itself as an anticlimactic paradigm. With the exception of the smaller and wealthy Gulf States, nearly all other Arab countries were unable to tackle the challenges of political, social and economic modernization during the second half of the last century. Apart from some oligarchic elites, most of the MENA populations have been prevented from participation in the benefits of modernity. The tumultuous events of 2011 denote rather the inception of a widespread, heightened awareness among the region's population with regard to their exclusion from typically modern and democratic achievements like adequate education, economic prospects and personal freedom. Unfortunately, many Arab states cannot yet satisfy these rudimentary requirements of their citizens. Consequently, North Africa and the Middle East, along with sub-Saharan Africa, have the weakest development indicators worldwide, particularly concerning the *Human Development*, *Gender Gap* and *Gini Index*. Furthermore, the former cradles of civilization - Yemen, Syria and many parts of Iraq - are buried under a wave of devastating civil war and human tragedy to which the rest of the world has been for the most part a powerless bystander. The sole countries which coped relatively well with the aftermath of the Arab uprisings are still the monarchies and emirates as well as Tunisia, albeit the latter at the expense of domestic security and economic prosperity. At the same time, the crisis of identity and cohesion within the European Union has deepened, characterized by a renaissance of nationalism, forms of separatism and political resignation. Since the aggravation of the Syrian war, the massive amount of refugees arriving in Europe has proved to be fertile soil for growing xenophobia espoused by right-wing populists who are questioning Europe's open society and pluralism.

Taking into account all these enormous political, social and economic challenges around the Mediterranean, the German Hanns-Seidel-Stiftung organized an international conference on the *Trajectories of Change in the Post-2011 MENA: Challenges and Prospects* in March 2017 in Marrakech, together with its partner in Moroccan academic civil society, *Takamul*. The event drew more than fifty outstanding MENA experts from the Arab World and other regions for an in-depth

analysis regarding the challenges and prospects for the whole region. The papers covered all relevant topics, from political, social and economic, to gender and religious issues. They provided not only a comprehensive and detailed research of the subjects at hand, but also thoughtful and measured recommendations for strategies and solutions, hopefully paving the way towards more peace, development and prosperity in Europe`s most important neighborhood region.

It is a distinct pleasure for the German Hanns-Seidel-Stiftung to present the detailed results of the researchers' noble endeavors to the public within the following pages.

As the editor, I would like to thank all academics and experts very much for their efforts in carrying out this project. I would like to stress my special gratitude to Ingrid Heidlmayr-Chegdaly, the Scientific Coordinator of the Hanns-Seidel-Stiftung in Morocco as well as to Lars Wenzel, the Evaluator of the Hanns-Seidel-Stiftung in Rabat and Hamza Tayebi, the director and idea generator of our partner organization *Takamul* for their strenuous and outstanding devotion in selecting and revising all these insightful articles.

Change, Dynamics and Continuities in the MENA-region

Stéphane Valter

Revolutions or Reactions? The Changes of the Arab World through the Lenses of the Tradition, Communitarianism and Production Paradigms

Are the Arab world's recent changes revolutions or rather disorganized crises, insurrections which turned out violent, or civil wars with tribal or sectarian connotations? Although 'revolution' is a polysemous and ambiguous term, it clearly means a change of political system. Yet one has witnessed authoritarian regimes replaced by others which were as brutal, or a return to the starting point, when not chaos. As far as gender relations are concerned, they have not ranked high in the different political agendas, and the issue of women's role in society has been completely shelved, for reasons related to religion and tradition. For its part, the freedom of the individual, emancipated from the bonds of the community system, has vanished into oblivion (with the possible exception of Lebanon). Does the fact that multiple identities exist within a particular society constitute, or not, a precondition for conflicts in which identity would be a dividing issue? And on the socio-economic level (one of the main reasons for the protests and upheavals), things have not changed a lot: inequalities remain high, objectively (corruption, etc.) and subjectively (arrogance of the rich, etc.). Moreover, injustice, as a visible and unpunished phenomenon, has in many occurrences been amplified by sectarian factors. The aim of this paper is to look at all the recent changes – through the three paradigms of tradition, communitarianism, and production – in order to see whether they may be dubbed revolutionary or, on the contrary, reactionary. Egypt, for its geographical centrality and demographical importance, will be the main case study.

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Revolutions or Reactions? The Changes of the Arab World through the Lenses of the Tradition, Communitarianism and Production Paradigms

Introduction

One has to wonder whether the Arab world's recent changes are revolutions, or rather disorganized crises, insurrections which turned out violent, or civil wars with tribal or sectarian connotations. Although 'revolution' is a polysemous and ambiguous term, it clearly means a change of political system. Yet one has witnessed authoritarian regimes replaced by others which were as brutal, or a return to the starting point, when not chaos. As far as gender relations are concerned, they have not ranked high in the different political agendas, and the issue of women's role in society has been completely shelved. For its part, the freedom of the individual, emancipated from the bonds of the community system, has vanished into oblivion (with the possible exception of Lebanon). On the socio-economic level (one of the main reasons for the protests and upheavals), things have not changed a lot, and inequalities remain high, objectively (corruption, etc.) and subjectively (arrogance of the rich, etc.). Injustice, as a visible and unpunished phenomenon, has in many occurrences been amplified by sectarian factors: because of a domineering minority (Syria, Bahrain) or of an overassertive majority (Iraq, Saudi Arabia).

In Yemen, the conflict has taken a clear denominational stamp, whereas in Egypt, internal tensions are connected to socio-economic demands and diverging visions of society. Even in Tunisia, the old tradition of industrial action and secularism has been overshadowed by endless debates about the role of Islam within the Constitution. For comparison's sake, some examples from places contiguous to the Arab zone (and politically connected to them) can be given: the changes in Iran are the result of harsh living conditions aggravated by a humiliating embargo, while Turkey's flourishing economic expansion has reinforced the government's authoritarian drift. The fate of Kurdistan is another case since the main driver of local politics stems from pure nationalist claims. National experiences do differ, and the (supposed) link between economic activity and technological progress, on the one hand, and revolutionary experience, on the other, has to be investigated since the very political categories essential to a revolution seem to be lacking. The aim of this paper is thus to look at all the recent changes – through the three paradigms of tradition, communitarianism, and production – in order to see whether they may be dubbed revolutionary or, on the contrary, reactionary. Egypt, for its geographical centrality (between Asia – some 70% of the world's population – and Europe through the Suez Canal) and demographical importance (more than 92 million people), will be the main case study.

If the state may act as a terrorist entity when it endeavours to prevent the emergence of plain citizenship – which is the case in almost all Arab states –, community dynamics may do the same, like in Syria where political alignments are globally defined along sectarian lines (although there are many exceptions). The pillars of this intimidating policy were described by Aristotle (384-322) in his *Politics*: the debasement of the citizens, the establishment of mistrust between them, and the impossibility of conducting any coordinated action.¹ Aristotle also insisted on the fact that men could only have a fulfilling existence and become accomplished citizens (within the framework of the ideal city) through reason, which has to be expressed through language – dialogue and criticism – so as to set up mutual links of justice and equity. Arab Spring upheavals seldom fit into this definition because of the narrow perspectives. Moreover, in the *Nicomachean Ethics*, Aristotle identified politics as the prime science, in direct connection with perfection: an exemplar collective behaviour and an impeccable personal conduct. Politics even surpasses morals since the quest for

the common good constitutes the human condition's honour, an ideal which seems unfamiliar to the very principle of communitarianism.

When dealing with tradition and communitarianism, especially in the Arab world, the analyst cannot dispense from considering religion (with all its meanings: deity, belief, values, rituals, economic organization, political mobilization) as a structuring factor. In this sense, one may wonder whether groups or individuals who use different discourses about the same object – *i.e.* religion as a normative and legitimizing process – may not in the end have some difficulties in communicating with each other, which would therefore jeopardize any chance of getting close to a political agreement in the aftermath of any power change. An intellectual like Michel Foucault, for his part, related discourse to the question of power, that manifests itself, through specific forms of discourse, by the shaping of the understanding of normativity (Foucault, 1993). The social construction of reality could also analyse words, practices and meanings insofar as they constitute distinct systems that are created, fashioned and upheld (in permanent interaction within the framework of human life and political activity), which determines perceptions and (de)legitimizes institutional order. In one sense, the 'legitimation of the institutional order, [...] faced with the [...] necessity of keeping chaos at bay, [since] all social reality is precarious', may push, once established power has been fatally shaken, toward the adoption of any new order, be it revolutionary or not, fair or unjust, just in order to prevent state institutions from collapsing and society from imploding. As Peter L. Berger and T. Luckmann noted, symbolic systems (of legitimation) can be described as self-maintaining until the moment where they become problematic, since socialization may never be complete, and that revolution / reaction always remains an option (Berger & Luckman, 1966, p. 1-46, 103, 92-106).

Does the fact that multiple identities exist within a particular society constitute a precondition for conflicts in which identity would be a dividing issue (instead of a mutually enriching element)? Probably yes, although such an assumption would disregard the weight of socioeconomic stakes, which are obviously fundamental. Whatever the case, those multiple religious, ideological, ethnic, territorial, tribal, etc., identities would very probably become a conflict factor when people reach the point where they feel that their essential needs are not met, be it because of the state's coercive and exploiting policy or on the part of some group's tentative clutch on power. And when such a political or security deficiency is recognized at a collective level, indignation, manifestation, protest become uncontrollable and can thus follow any unpredictable track, under the stimulus of the feeling that an existential struggle is being fought. In all these eventual occurrences, it is dubious that revolution may breed any lasting rational changes, but rather more plausible that mayhem will generate some form of lawless and brutal reaction with, in the end, the imposition of a new and similarly iniquitous (dis)order. This is what has happened in so many places of the Arab world (Egypt, Libya, Yemen, Bahrain, and so on). In most of such cases, governments and regimes have not been willing to respond to popular claims but with repression, which in return has created a vicious circle of violence. In many situations of protest and repression, international linkages have also been – artificially or because of old shared interests – established, to support either discriminated groups or repressive regimes, and such interfering has generally worsened the pandemonium while postponing the advent of useful and consensual solutions. In all cases, conflicts have been protracted, because of mutual stereotyping, constricted stances and unchanging socioeconomic gaps, because of the fact that amendable disagreements about economic or political discrimination have rapidly muted into indissoluble identity conflicts (Azar, 1990, p. 1-16; Cruz-del Rosario & Dorsey, 2016).

The Changes Confronted with the Weight of Tradition

If the notion of change is not so easy to define, since any change consists *in fine* in a subtle mix of ruptures and continuities, that of tradition may be even more difficult to define. Tradition could thus be sociological, cultural, religious, etc., sometimes consciously perceived and assumed, sometimes not. Tradition is finally to be found in almost every sphere of human activity: within the family, in a working context, on the political level. This concept must therefore be used with caution, although nobody would deny its analytical significance and heuristic value. Owing to a – supposedly – rather high level of religious pervasiveness and influence in the Arab world, in comparison with the West where secularism generally prevails, the conclusion that tradition and religion influence most of the political changes can be assumed. Probably the best example to assess the intensity of the changes is to look at the gender relations in the turmoil of the protests, upheavals, and revolutions.

Apart from some exceptions, it appears that the question of the juridical, economic and political relations between men and women has not really been put forward by male actors in whatever crisis has occurred. If some groups of activist women here and there (Tunisia, Yemen, Lebanon, etc.) have claimed more rights for the traditionally dominated half of society, their actions have not been crowned with much success, not to mention the male demonstrators, militants or fighters who have overwhelmingly and straightforwardly relegated this issue to the very bottom of their agendas. Religious creeds, social pressures, existing patterns of gender domination, or political systems: everything has contributed to the maintenance of the *status quo*, when evolutions have not taken a backward path, like in Tunisia under the Islamist government. During the latter's rule, the favourable position of women, acquired under the regimes of Habib Bourguiba and his successor, which managed to distance itself from what was considered as discriminatory Islamic legislation (*i.e.* repudiation and polygamy, for instance), reverted to a more classical stance concerning issues connected to the personal status. In Algeria, years before the Arab Spring, the government only slightly modified, in May 2005, the June 1984 law which permitted polygamy, but there was no radical modernization in order to court the Islamist trends of society.² And it is more than dubious that the recent (2004) reform of the Moroccan *Mudawwana* can be dubbed a genuine reformist breakthrough.

Egypt's present has been a bit chaotic: in the aftermath of the January 2011 revolution, the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces assumed power, until a Muslim Brotherhood president was democratically elected (June 2012). But due to mass protests, the army conducted a coup in June-July 2013, and President Sisi was elected in May 2014. If there is no ambiguity about the paternalistic and authoritarian nature of the new regime, the question as to whether the new president will follow a reformist or reactionary form of caesarism remains open³. In any case, one interesting way to study the weight of tradition, as an impediment standing on the path toward modernization and emancipation, is to look at the moral and juridical positions with regard to excision. Excision may take many forms, mainly: clitoridectomy, *i.e.* the surgical reduction or removal of the clitoris; the ablation of the *labia minora*; infibulation, or the sewing of the *labia minora* (while leaving a small space for urine and the menstrual flow). A frequently given and specious argument is that excision 'regulates' (a euphemism for 'extinguishes') female libido, which blatantly contradicts all the Quranic verses and prophetic traditions that encourage sexuality.⁴

The Shafi'i school of law (the predominant one in Egypt today), along with a certain number of Hanbali scholars, generally recognized the necessity of excision, whereas the majority of the other (medieval) scholars admitted that excision could be accepted insofar as it was a custom ratified by the Prophet. If excision is an old and widespread custom in Egypt (about 87% of the

girls are excised),⁵ it is also to be found in other parts of the world, with no apparent religious reason in some cases, which puts its Islamic character into question. Whereas this large-scale social question had largely sunk into oblivion for decades, it is only after the energetic grasp on power wielded by general-turned-president Sisi that a new – and rather progressive – juridical approach towards this societal scourge took form. The Egyptian Parliament has recently (late August 2016) reinforced the sentences connected to excision: from 5 to 7 years in jail for whom practices excision, and from 1 to 3 years of detention for whom would hand over his/her daughter to a person performing excision. The new law encompasses all forms of excision, even partial ablation. According to the rapporteur of this new law, this initiative's philosophy is to respect the moral values of the Egyptian society and to reinforce family cohesion. It is therefore forbidden to impose any kind of mutilation on a minor.

Although Muhammad Mursi was the first democratically elected president, the excision rate seems paradoxically to have largely increased under his short tenure because of a collusion between the Brotherhood's new political leadership, sizeable conservative parts of society and some state structures from the previous regime⁶. It can be reminded, that it is the Brotherhood-controlled Parliament (during some 5 months) that neutralized the application of the sentence inflicted on the practitioner (in violation of the 2008 law). It appears also that during the same period of Brotherhood hegemony, there was an increase in the number of *fatwas* (juridical opinions) linking excision to religious duties.⁷ The most frequent pretext was that excision preserves young ladies' chastity, since the continuous friction 'of the clitoris on clothes would provoke a permanent excitation on women'.⁸ During the August 2016 voting session, the spokesman and deputy of the (salafi) Nur party's parliamentary group, Ahmad Khalil, declared his opposition to the penalization of this rather brutal practice on the fallacious ground that most medics were in favour of excision because of the physical benefits. He also asked the Parliament to officially denounce some reformist and progressive *fatwas* which objected to excision.⁹ In the end, this reactionary party's members decided not to approve the law project.

Already in November 2006, an international conference was convened in Cairo to address the thorny question of excision as a non-Islamic practice and an unacceptable mutilation (since the human body was inviolable). The participants included the Egyptian great *mufti*, 'Ali Jum'a, al-Azhar's great Shaykh, Muhammad al-Tantawi, and the Egyptian-born tele-predicator, Yusuf al-Qaradawi. After an official condemnation was adopted, a conservative front of al-Azhar's scholars promulgated an opposite *fatwa* stating that excision was unequivocally a recognized Islamic practice.¹⁰ Similarly, the Egyptian Council for Islamic jurisprudence (*majma' al-fiqh al-islami*) considered that excision could not be viewed as a negative act in the sense that it is not a socially recognized practice but a family one, whose appreciation must therefore only be judged from a private point of view.¹¹ Accordingly, nothing in scriptural texts called for the prohibition of excision, and it was thus better to do it than to refrain from it, except for the 'pharaonic' one (the – painful – partial or total ablation of the clitoris) which is forbidden according to the Quranic verse: {...] and the command of Pharaoh was no right (guide).¹² The Egyptian religious authorities have always, globally speaking, joined their efforts to those of the government to denunciate excision when performed under the false guise of religion, particularly when a mortal accident occurred. A new *fatwa* was in this sense promulgated in June 2016 by Dar al-Ifta' after a teenager died from the consequences of an excision operation in a hospital of the Suez province.¹³

In a *fatwa* decreed in August 2009, the Shaykh of al-Azhar, Muhammad Sayyid Tantawi, exposed his arguments in response to a query from the Egyptian Ministry of Health, and he stated that the consensus of the jurisconsults converges on the fact that female excision does not belong to the Islamic legal rites. He also recalled, among others, the great Egyptian scholar and previous Shaykh of al-Azhar, Muhammad Shaltut (1893-1963), who had previously asserted that excision

does not pertain to the prophetic Tradition.¹⁴ There was another public outcry on a connected subject: virginity. During a television interview, Egypt's ancient great *muftri* 'Ali Jum'a declared in 2007 that nothing in the Quran nor in the prophetic Tradition prevented a woman from redoing her virginity before marriage. If he had been accused by some of being the apostle of vice, others rushed towards rejuvenating cremes and plastic surgery. 'Ali Jum'a was also vehemently blamed – an accusation he strongly denied (but which is nevertheless significant of the general conservative mood) – for having promulgated a *fatwa* in which he maintained that an extramarital sexual intercourse could not be qualified as fornication (*zina*) as long as the man used a condom.¹⁵ In spite of all these examples of scholarly and documented criticism concerning excision and correlated issues, conservatism, (false) modesty and taboos persist by imposing a veil of silence on the Egyptian society (and more generally on the totality of Arab societies) as soon as the latter deals publicly with sexual pleasure.

The Arab demonstrations, protests, revolts, upheavals, and the like, have not changed anything to sexual frustration and discrimination – apart from a few marginal exceptions – even when they have been conducted under the banner of democratic claims and have endeavoured to achieve social, economic, legal and political rights for all the people. Moreover, private inhibition and public shame have not prevented many frustrated young males from harassing girls and women¹⁶, sometimes to the point of sexually assaulting them, as happened on Tahrir Square, the epicentre of the Egyptian revolution, in a few mediatized cases. In summary, the many popular rallies against authoritarian rule have seldom explicitly demanded equal rights for men and women, let alone in the situations of dire crisis, or even of dreadful war, when the priority can no longer be the eventual rebalancing of gender relations, but protection, if not sheer survival. In Egypt as in other places, since the beginning of 2011, the spirit of contestation has nonetheless succeeded, although timidly, in breaking some mental dikes due to the activism of civil society, especially of militant movements involved in the defence of women's rights. Whatever the case, it may be paradoxical to note that President Sisi's authoritarian rule has proved to be rather progressive when dealing with some social issues like excision (and very recently 'oral' divorce), although the grip on political and economic power remains sharp and brutal. The question is thus to know, whether radical social revolutions will be best achieved by the people (whose majority is conservative) or by more or less enlightened regimes.

Communitarianism: An Impediment towards Inclusive Identity?

The concept of communitarianism remains difficult to explain since it takes on different forms: a territorial community, a network of blood-related people, a group of individuals with common economic interests, a religious entity. This last definition is probably the one which corresponds better to the reality of community dynamics in the Arab world, in the sense that many people do seem to identify first in terms of sectarianism, before thinking in terms of national identity. If this process of religious differentiation does not appear to work effectively in the Maghrib, this is not at all the case in the Mashriq, where religious allegiances remain strong and frequently determine political alignments. Even in the Maghrib, where Sunni Islam is largely hegemonic, the sense of belonging to a distinctive community cannot be underestimated, particularly among religion-oriented actors, although many other factors do play a role in mobilization and identification. Communitarianism in the Maghrib could be understood as meaning the whole Sunni population *versus* the non-Muslims, especially Christians and Jews, with all the – implicit or explicit – linked political problems (imperialism, Zionism, etc.). Sunnism itself has been divided between different trends: a rather secular form of Islam and a more conservative one, like in Tunisia where the various Islamist parties, influenced by the Muslim Brotherhood and Saudi Wahhabism, have confronted since the fall of President Benali – physically, politically, and juridically – the more liberal tendencies of Tunisian society. These infightings within Sunnism

itself, based on some sense of belonging to ideological communities, have their counterpart in what could be named tribal communitarianism, like in the Libyan case where clan and territorial allegiances, sometimes reinforced by religious doctrinal divergences, constitute the axis around which most people define their identities, outline their interests, and express their actions. A collateral damage of the Arab Spring has assuredly been to unfasten, and even boost, all these dormant and contained centrifugal ingredients.

Although it is undoubtedly useful to use such concepts as community, tribe, clan, and the like, to describe political activity, one should not – according to Rogers Brubaker – treat entities and phenomena of social life as natural and primordial, since such an approach would eventually lead to the hiding of all the socio-political processes that have led, totally or partially, to the naturalization of cognitive categories. Concerning religion-based communities, whatever the intensity of the denominational causes behind the internal or external factors of mobilization in times of crisis, viewing conflicts with religious components only through the constricted perspective of religion certainly allows for the risk of overstating the very role of religion, which would thus lessen all the involved socio-political processes (Brubaker, 2002, p. 166). In the Egyptian case, although tensions, and even bloody brawls, do happen regularly between (mainly Orthodox) Copts¹⁷ and Muslims, considering them only as religious tensions would probably be misleading since other issues are obviously at stake, like rows caused by honour issues (for instance, a male Copt who would try to marry a Muslim lady) that are therefore more connected to some (Oriental? Mediterranean? Arab? Islamic?) patriarchal sense of domination and control over women. Broils and fights between the two communities have also been caused by competition over scarce economic resources. Finally, in some instances (under the regime of President Mubarak), and probably for cynical political purposes, it has been documented that it was the inaction of the security forces that led to the (voluntary?) deterioration of the situation. The recent terrorist attack in the Cairo Coptic cathedral (mid-December 2016) proves that religious hostilities remain deep-rooted, even though the perpetrators cannot clearly be assumed to represent all the Muslims in the Egyptian population.

Whatever the truth, the question remains open as to whether an authoritarian regime, like Sisi's, is better equipped to ease community tensions (and anxious to do so effectively as well) than unrestrained mobs, so much so if one considers the rather chaotic and partly immature nature of Egyptian political life. Indeed, the question of political maturity has to be raised. After having waited for about one and a half century, Copts rejoiced when a new law facilitating the renovation and the construction of churches was passed (August 2016), although many Christians expressed their disappointment and frustration because of this legislative measure's many prejudiced defaults and discriminatory shortcomings. The government's law project was voted by around two thirds of the deputies, who are either supportive of the regime, bond to it by a client-patron relationship, or under close scrutiny by the security services (which encourages them to voice prudently any discontent they may have while at the same time exercising a wise kind of self-censorship). Although the new law – passed through under President Sisi's both ruthless and 'reformist' political sway – offers a simplified administrative procedure in order to renovate or build Christian places of worship, in contradiction to the Mubarak regime's inertia and in opposition to the (at best) frequently condescending attitude of Muslims towards Christians (especially in poor districts from the south and the Delta region, where acute socioeconomic problems amplify religious misapprehensions), it has been considered as biased and inequitable by many Christians. In particular, article 2 of the law has been denigrated as unfair since it poses as a precondition that the building authorization as well as the envisaged area must be linked to the number of the faithful. But this prerequisite does not exist with regard to mosques...

Another fact which may generally prove that the unleashing of popular discontent and the expression of (often blurred) political claims by the people, in the *maelstrom* of the Arab Spring, could *in fine* lead to less reformist, modernist and democratic achievements than some form of open-minded, paternalistic and patriotic – yet fiercely monopolistic – (military) rule lies in the following point. The new law was not subjected to public debate, and the citizens had no say in the legislative discussion, which nonetheless certainly created a more favourable ground toward its adoption since this exclusive law-making process thus bypassed the many sociological and ideological barriers and therefore imposed a more or less acceptable consensus. After having fustigated some of the law project's articles because of their lack of inclusive national vision, which consequently jeopardized the Christians' Egyptian citizenship, the Coptic hierarchy finally accepted (at the end of an exceptional synod) the legislative initiative, just out of support for President Sisi's regime, seen as a defender of minorities' rights. Though, what may prove to be a strong reluctance from influential Islamic/Islamist conservative and even reactionary tendencies of Egyptian society – always ready to hinder the modernization of society and the democratization of public life, when not prone to violently oppress and sometimes assail non-coreligionists perceived as second-class citizens – to stop disparaging, downgrading, and persecuting (at least symbolically) Christians cannot be held, from an opposite point of view, to stand for an absolute generality. Islam is not monolithic, and there is also an ancient sense of tolerance and respect which can yet accommodate itself with some patronising superiority.

In many occurrences, Muslims have proved their empathy with Christians (when religious differences have mattered at all), considered as fellow citizens in full right, which means that creating or reinforcing a sense of belonging to the same national community is possible, although it remains doubtful that this could be (or has been) achieved through a formally democratic process, understood as the implementation of the intransigent rule of the majority or, more rightly, of those who pretend to represent the majority. Noteworthy, about two years ago, Muslims all over Egypt have donated money for the construction of a Coptic church in al-Manufiyya, a governorate north-west of Cairo. This collective gesture of generosity undoubtedly signalled a solidarity outshining sectarian lines, since some Islamic leaders from the area encouraged local Muslims to contribute. Thus, although Egypt has always been plagued by confessional violence, many members of both faiths have also tried to form a common front to oppose the extreme brutality perpetuated in the region by the terrorist organization of the Islamic State (IS). President Sisi's visit to St-Mark's Cathedral for the Coptic Christmas Eve (6 January 2015) made him the first Egyptian head of state ever to attend a Coptic mass. The President declared on this occasion: 'It is important for the world to see this scene, which reflects true Egyptian unity and confirms that we are all Egyptians, first and foremost. We truly love each other without discrimination.' After the gruesome and mediatised decapitation of some twenty Egyptian Copts by IS (February 2015), Christian priests and Muslim imams from the Minya governorate, the home province of those beheaded, launched an initiative in local schools to encourage peaceful inter-faith coexistence. This religious and civic initiative was supported by the Grand Imam of al-Azhar, Shaykh Ahmad al-Tayyib, as well as by the Coptic Orthodox Patriarch Tawadurus II, which indicates that the curse of divisive communitarianism can be kept in check by civil society.

In this sense, the frequently observed drift towards chaos and violence, which has too frequently followed popular protestation, political destabilisation and sometimes armed conflict, cannot be – at least always – assumed to be an inescapable consequence of the destructive nature of a communitarianism that has got out of control of repressive regimes. The state of communitarianism is different in other countries, like Syria and Lebanon where the confessional spectre is extremely wide, or Iraq and Yemen where the political and religious opposition between Sunnis and Shiites (Imami in the first case and Zaydi in the second) does not abate, due to internal factors and external pressures. When thinking about religion-based communitarianism, *i.e.* about

religion as the essential constitutive element of communities, one focuses on religion as both a mobilizing idea and a functioning mechanism aiming to achieve group cohesion. This concept was articulated by Durkheim who emphasized the role of religion in order to maintain societal order and normativity (Durkheim, 1964). Needless to say, when a conflict or – worse – a war flares up, and when religion – one of the many identities that constitute the national fabric – becomes salient and exclusive in terms of affiliations and allegiances, the connexion between social order, private and collective self-protection, political norms and religious legitimacy on the one hand, and the dynamics of communitarianism, on the other, turns out to be very significant.

Can communitarianism be revolutionary, *i.e.* lead (or contribute to lead) to radical political changes embracing all power issues and incorporating all the citizens without any distinction of class, sect, sex, and so on? In practice, this is far from being the case in the turmoil of the Arab Spring. Rather the contrary, certainly because of the intrinsic (ideological or organic) nature of communitarianism which pushes individuals to withdraw into their community more than to understand others' point of view. Treating the term 'community' as a reality can ill-advisedly veil underlying processes of permanent social deconstruction and reconstruction, that is that one 'should not uncritically adopt categories of ethnopolitical practice as [...] categories of social analysis', as R. Brubaker (2002) has pointed out. If revolution probably cannot be conducted in the name and for the interests of a sole group, the extent to which individuals relate themselves to such categories, conversely, has to be put into question. Problematizing the relation between individuals and the degree of groupness is of crucial importance, both *per se* and to understand why many popular movements of the Arab Spring have taken a rather reactionary turn: a contestation of the old repressive system just to impose a new form of political hegemony for the benefit of a sole category of people. In the Syrian crisis and then war, the (both natural and intentional) categorization of people along religious lines largely explains the political choices of Sunnis, Shiites (Alawites, Ismailis, Murshidis), Druses, and Christians, whereas the ethnical classification (which is both objective and fabricated) antagonizes Arabs against Kurds:¹⁸ the first (from both the regime and the opposition) continue to believe in Arab chauvinism and stick to the old idea of the supremacy of Arabity as a defining element of national identity. The second favour the fight for national autonomy, or even independence, at the detriment of radical political reforms. In this sense, how pertinent are the terms revolution and reaction since the political realm has been largely cannibalized by group links, *i.e.* the political activity is mainly driven by community relationships and not by ideological debate.

Turbulent Changes Explained by Socioeconomic Factors

The aim of this section is to show firstly, that socioeconomic grievances have been determining in shaping the trends followed by demonstrations, upheavals, and wars. Secondly, that the redistribution of wealth has in most cases not been carried out in an equitable way, which globally equivalates to some kind of return to the starting point. And thirdly, that the past fights for social justice, industrial rights, land reform, limitation of monopolies, end of corruption, etc., have probably not been radical enough to create the favourable political environment which could have oriented the various protests towards the expression of genuine socioeconomic claims, *i.e.* connected to rational political issues and not to the encumberments of tradition and the hindrances of communitarianism. In Tunisia, for instance, in spite of an old tradition of industrial activism reinforced by a legacy of secularism, and although the spark that led to the regime change was the self-immolation of a modest pedlar whose equipment and products were confiscated by the police, events quickly metamorphosed into a sterile debate about the place of Islamic law within the constitution, to the detriment of class struggle (which neither the 'liberal' intelligentsia nor the Islamist parties – which adhere to some form of social capitalism – were prone to encourage).

In Syria, too, the protests (which started in March 2011) were largely triggered by socioeconomic difficulties, in particular by a severe drought (2007-2010) which compelled many ruined farmers to emigrate to cities, and thus feed existing urban discontent. The socioeconomic causes for dissatisfaction were previously so numerous that the ground was more than fertile for complaining and demonstrating. The economic liberal overture of the mid-1990s had already widened the gap between well-off segments of society, on the one hand, and the middle class plus all the poor and marginalized people, on the other. Needless to say, these glaring social injustices were fuelled by sectarianism or, rightly or wrongly, by what was perceived as an intolerable power monopoly (mainly) wrought by members of the Alawite community (in collusion with the Sunni bourgeoisie, and accessorially Christian entrepreneurs). Although the Alawite community as a whole did not particularly benefit from the regime's largesse, since the attribution of favours and profits was in the first place based on loyalty rather than on sect, and although many Alawites were rotting away in prison because of political divergences while many Sunnis (together with members of other minorities) occupied lucrative state jobs or party functions, the general impression among the population was (and still is) that the security apparatus – and therefore the political power – had (and has) been phagocytized by Alawite officers. It is this accurate perception, which has yet to be nuanced, that rapidly eclipsed the socioeconomic issues, which thus became very secondary in front of the sectarian flashover (vicious circle of violent repression and religion-based armed mobilization). In any case, the potential for pursuing the (timid) socialist measures of the Baath party, initiated in the 1960s with the support of the Syrian communist party, was completely devastated. Many facts could explain the degeneration of the class struggle issue into sectarian strife, but probably the most convincing account has to be linked to the weakness of an inclusive class consciousness.

The Egyptian case is both different and similar: different since the sectarian factor is simpler (90% Sunni Arabs), and similar because of the socioeconomic hardships supported by the bulk of the population since bygone times. Whereas the country was considered as underpopulated for a long period of time (some 4 million in 1800 and about 37 million in 1976, before an exponential increase later on), there are now more than 92 million inhabitants, a huge number, moreover living on just 5,5% of the arable part of the national territory. Pollution is generalized (especially concerning water), there is no food self-sufficiency, industrial production is far from being competitive, wages are low, unemployment is high, job opportunities are scarce, the housing crisis is acute, trade unions activity is strictly controlled, etc., not to mention the frustrating authoritarian nature of the regime. All the socioeconomic elements making up an explosive cocktail are therefore present. And in spite of the recent discovery of a gas field off the Mediterranean coast, whose dividends will hopefully alleviate the burden weighing on the state's finances, it is yet more than doubtful that any economic recovery will soon manifest itself. And if it were to ever happen, owing to the reforms carried out by the regime and the investments attracted by its neoliberal policy, it remains absolutely uncertain that the corrupt system and the iniquitous repartition of wealth would change in a more equitable way. The regime established since July 2013 by general-turned-president Sisi can be characterized by a commitment to redress the country, in a rather paradoxical way: reinforcing the bureaucracy mainly for security purposes while liberalizing the economy and thus getting rid of the remnants of Nasser's more or less socialist heritage.¹⁹ One cannot but remind that General Sisi, the then armed forces' commander-in-chief, had been nominated defence minister by the Muslim Brotherhood-affiliated President Morsi, who was ideologically favourable – though probably in a slightly different way than the actual regime – to economic liberalism.

As the French Orientalist Maxime Rodinson wrote some decades ago (Rodinson, 1972, p. 423), the Arab left was already flirting with nationalism in the 1960s.²⁰ He was just theoretically assessing what was in fact a deeper political trend, *i.e.* the (active: violent, or passive: voluntary)

marginalization of the working class in most of the revolutionary processes that took place since the beginning of the XXth century (and even before), at the hands of bourgeois and nationalist forces more dedicated to the fight against imperialism than to any radical reform of the production system. Some pages later, Rodinson questions again the very possibility of having a socialist revolution in the Arab world, particularly in Syria and Egypt, because of the vividness of the rightist – reactionary – parties and tendencies (Rodinson, 1972, p. 431).²¹ To definitely confirm the fact that a genuine socialist movement has never been able to impose its agenda on whatever revolutionary dynamics may have existed in Arab political life, some passages of the Syrian Communist Party's manifesto (January 1944) may be reminded: 'Those who will read our 'National Pact' will find it devoid of any mention of socialism. There is not a single expression or revendication of socialist complexion. It is a national and democratic pact, no more, no less. [...] Our country, which suffers from the imperialist yoke plus economic, agricultural, and industrial backwardness, cannot take on the aim of installing a socialist regime. It can only aspire to national liberation [...]. Our Communist Party of Syria and Lebanon is, before anything else and any other consideration, the party of national liberation' (Rodinson, 1972, p. 435-436).

Since the January 2011 Egyptian revolution, which had been spurred in great part by socioeconomic grievances, the course of events has mainly taken the form of caesarist restauration – if we exclude the short chaotic interlude (June 2012-July 2013) of President Morsi's tenure – rather than followed the path of an authentic popular revolution. In order to explain the authoritarian and conservative trend pursued by the political leadership, against which the revolutionary forces have not been able to resist, it could be argued that the military elites have considered that the revolution's uncertainties represented a danger inasmuch as an opportunity – at the detriment of the people – in order to renegotiate more favourable economic advantages (Kandil, 2013, p. 5). Indeed, the revolution was immediately followed by a reactionary restauration which left intact the old production relationships (De Smet, 2016, p. 3). The failure of the January 2011 revolution may very probably originate, as it has been hinted at, from a long tradition (since the XIXth century) of 'passive revolution', *i.e.* of a constricted participation of the exploited classes (according to Marx's terminology) to protests and revolts. In other words, these exploited classes (peasants, workers, etc.) have not been able to enter straight into the political realm, but have rather remained at its margins, which has constituted a structural weakness that has impeded until now any radical change (De Smet, 2016, p. 123-126). In addition to inherited political immaturity and ensuing marginalization, assuredly reinforced by a cultural dimension (conservative social traditions together with traditional religious creeds), the standing of the Egyptian armed forces by the side of the state's institutions has doubtlessly encouraged an authoritarian takeover through the legitimizing process of a patriotic and paternalist discourse enhancing the notion of order above anything else.

The economic liberalization and privatization launched in the 1980s under President Sadat have mostly aimed at pleasing investors. Therefore, the different liberalism-oriented investments have not encouraged a strong and lasting kind of development, based on an accumulation of capital for virtuous purposes. Instead, they have rather extracted surpluses under the form of secured incomes, *i.e.* in an unproductive and speculative way, hence Egypt's socioeconomic woes and difficulties to reform a decaying and unjust system. Globally speaking, the available capital in Egypt has always been invested in the construction of profitable real estate, in the importation/production of somptuous goods, in prestigious projects whose financial soundness was doubtful, in short: in an irrational (from the wide perspective of the promotion of national interests) and short-term economic circle instead of being directed towards the production of goods that could be substituted to imports. Moreover, before the January 2011 revolution, the top military hierarchy did not seem to be opposed to the neo-liberal economic drift, but rather to the fact that it had been side-lined (Armbrust, 2012, p. 113-123). Obviously, the regime of President Sisi does

not show any convincing sign of willingness to inverse this structural tendency and in such a situation one cannot but admit that the acute socioeconomic grievances, that led to the collapse of President Mubarak's regime, are still afflicting the bulk of the population. Worse, for the time being, due to severe devaluation and high inflation, the social misery may be even harder than before 2011, which is a double paradox: firstly, the revolution has not achieved its goals and, secondly, it may even have created a worse socioeconomic situation.

The neo-liberal reforms launched in the 1980s under Sadat are continuing to be applied today, in a slightly different way, which corroborates the fact that the state has not withdrawn from the economic sphere but, on the contrary, that it has become involved in the process of reinforcing the whole system of secured allowances and guaranteed prebends, sometimes in an aggressive way without taking any care of the social cost, for the sole benefit of a clique of investors close to the regime (El Tarouty, 2015). That was the situation under Mubarak – which caused his fall – but it has not fundamentally changed under Sisi, since the state has relinquished its role of 'universal capitalist', a legacy of the socializing Nasser period: the state institutions have thus retracted from their ancient task of mediating between the different social classes (which it never tried to wipe out, though). As was the case under Sadat, then Mubarak, later Morsi (although he had not enough time to implement his Islamist socio-capitalist policy) and finally Sisi, the state has sided with capital-holding (national and foreign) groups together with power-wielding structures (the army and, accessorially, the police), which casts many doubts on the very possibility of ever implementing a real popular revolution aiming at the radical and equitable modification of production relationships, in Egypt as much as elsewhere in the Arab zone. Finally, the traditional illusion – a result of the accession to independence – that the state is representing all classes of society, through strictly controlled negotiation, has largely vanished to give way to a more brutal economic management, in front of which the Arab Spring has globally remained powerless (De Smet, 2016, p. 179).

The Aporia of Popular Contest: Asking for Change without Radically Changing Anything

On the socioeconomic level, as far as the Arab world (and beyond: Turkey, Iran, and even Israel) is concerned, the Arab Spring has not been able to create a propitious situation for profound and lasting changes. The reasons are assuredly multiple, but certainly the most important one is the weakness of the working movement in front of the traditional class interests (estate owners, semi-feudal landlords, monopolistic entrepreneurs, etc.) which have been protected, *nolens volens*, by the armed forces, in their attempt at standing for order, preventing collapse, and serving – overtly or, more subtly, under the mobilizing guise of overused nationalistic or religious mottos – their own interests in the very first place. In this sense, the nature of the pact between power and governed people cannot be described as having been radically modified. Apart from the situations of war (Libya, Syria, Yemen), all other Arab countries have witnessed a return to the starting point (with the exception of Tunisia), when it has not even become worse than before. If tradition and communitarianism may in some instances offer valuable protection to individuals and groups when the state apparatus is too coercive, can they serve as forceful means of collective mobilization in order to implement sweeping political changes? Or are they just heavy impediments on the road towards emancipation, liberty, and justice? The answer is not easy, as far as there can be any answer since situations are very different from one place to another.

Yet, it remains quite sure that the universality of human problems, socioeconomic claims, ways of political action and consensual solutions are not facilitated when people are organically divided along impermeable territorial allegiances, impervious sectarian lines and unbending traditional stances. Whereas any political problem may in the end find some kind of solution through negotiation, which implies the sharing of power and a redistribution of wealth, any single

issue connected to what may be perceived as essential links, basic ties, and fundamental representations can very rapidly degenerate into an existential conflict for the defence of (imagined) sacred values. Such has been the case in Tunisia with the interminable debate about the place of Islamic law within the constitution, while socioeconomic problems have remained acute and security concerns severe. In Libya, the control of tribal territories – and natural resources – has kidnapped any nation-wide political debate about the future of the country. In Syria, the socioeconomic complaints have quickly deteriorated into fierce ideological differences and violent sectarian strife. Yemen stands as a mix of tribal and sectarian dynamics, on a background of poverty, fuelled by Saudi and Iranian interference. Iraq may be a bit different in the sense that there has been ‘free’ elections (first under American occupation), with a – at least formal – normal party activity, but for the fact that the dividing lines between Sunnis and Shiites have prevented any national reconstruction project, not to mention Kurdish irredentism. Lebanon could be the only Arab country where a genuine nationwide civic and inclusive movement has taken form, except that the community-based electoral, political, and administrative functioning has not changed, probably because the state has always been weak and, therefore, the system has not been seen as deserving to be radically modified in the eyes of the majority.

In any case, can military tutelage offer some kind of alternative to traditional and sectarian forces which are in a lot of instances more reactionary than really progressive, particularly when they deal with individuals and groups with whom they are not directly connected? It can be assumed, and confirmed by experience, that self-imposed military sponsorship may sometimes encourage sound political change, on the condition that the martial guidance of the country be just temporary and remain only in force for the necessary transitional period. This was especially the case in Tunisia, which could in fact be the Arab zone’s exception, or even more: a kind of abnormality. In Egypt, the military take-over (in fact since 1952) does not appear to follow a progressive path, in spite of some limited reforms. But because of inherited behavioural attitudes (weight of clientelism), the weakness of a compliant party system (based on nepotism and cooptation more than on popular support), and the absence of real counter-powers, the intervention of the military into the revolutionary process (through the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces, then the coup against President Sisi and the Muslim Brotherhood, and finally the election of general Sisi to the Republic’s presidency) could not but be caesarist. But contrarily to the period of the Free Officers, neither the SCAF nor president Sisi have shown a great interest in the defence of the public sector: they have not tried to re-nationalize companies which had previously been public, and they have even promoted the privatization of a part of the state’s assets. In this perspective, the very notion of change can be questioned since most of the political forces (with the exception of some trade unions which carried out determined industrial action, before being violently repressed) have in the first place only tried to make the most of the new *status quo* instead of heartily fighting for radical transformations.

Apart from endemic corruption that exhausts the country’s resources, the state’s finances, and the people’s wealth, it seems that Egypt (and all the other Arab countries) continues to head for a political and economic functioning that privileges capital to the detriment of work. This is all the more true when take-overs have essentially been led by the military so as to satisfy collective needs for stability in front of widespread uncertainty, a reaction which has obviously not been to the benefit of irresistible aspirations to liberty. In many Arab countries, the restoration of order has seriously sidelined socioeconomic claims and calls for justice, while focusing on internal foes and external threats in a quasi-hysterical way.²² In any case, more globally, the new policies followed from the Mashriq to the Maghrib seem apparently to be part of a vast neo-liberal offensive that cares little for poor and middle classes. And whenever an Arab leader would be obliged to partially give in to popular demands, he would probably only do so through a limited redistribution of allowances, and not via a complete modification of the production patterns. A last fact which is

here just alluded to is that many Arab countries do not have strong economic systems, which puts them at the mercy of global pressures, and since many of them are unable to shield themselves from occasional or systemic crises, the level of acquiescence to popular demands is therefore correlatively limited.

Notes

¹ The expression 'political animal' reflects in this sense all the ambiguity of the various situations as well as the conflict between the existing potentialities. The human being can thus get close to, or away from, citizenship depending on the nature of the political system.

² Nahas M. Mahieddin, 'L'évolution du droit de la famille en Algérie : nouveautés et modifications apportées par la loi du 4 mai 2005 au Code algérien de la famille du 9 juin 1984', *L'Année du Maghreb*, II / 2007, p. 97-137 ; <https://anneemaghreb.revues.org/93>, posted on 8.7.2010, accessed on 24.1.2017.

³ Caesarism here means the rule of a (more or less) charismatic figure (a military) based for a large part on the cult of personality.

⁴ Yet a few (dubious) traditions seem to favour excision but under a very light form.

⁵ Particularly in the countryside and the south of the country (Sa'id).

⁶ Interview in Arabic, posted on 12.7.2016, accessed on 3.8.2016, <http://www.youm7.com/story/2016/7/12/%D9%85%D9%8A%D8%B1%D9%81%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AA%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%88%D9%89-%D8%AF%D8%AA%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A5%D9%86%D8%A7%D8%AB-%D8%B2%D8%A7%D8%AF-%D8%A8%D8%B9%D8%AF-%D8%AD%D9%83%D9%85-%D9%85%D8%B1%D8%B3%D9%89-%D9%85%D8%AF%D9%8A%D8%B1%D8%A9-%D9%85%D9%86%D8%B8%D9%85%D8%A9/2796277>.

⁷ Interview in Arabic, posted on 12.7.2016, and accessed on 3.8.2016, <http://www.youm7.com/story/2016/7/12/%D9%85%D9%8A%D8%B1%D9%81%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AA%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%88%D9%89-%D8%AF%D8%AA%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A5%D9%86%D8%A7%D8%AB-%D8%B2%D8%A7%D8%AF-%D8%A8%D8%B9%D8%AF-%D8%AD%D9%83%D9%85-%D9%85%D8%B1%D8%B3%D9%89-%D9%85%D8%AF%D9%8A%D8%B1%D8%A9-%D9%85%D9%86%D8%B8%D9%85%D8%A9/2796277>.

⁸ Aymon Kreil, *Du rapport au dire. Sexe, amour et discours d'expertise au Caire*, Paris (Écoles des hautes études en sciences sociales) / Neuchâtel (Université de Neuchâtel), 21.11.2012, 265 pages, p. 56-57.

⁹ Like those of Shaykh 'Abd al-Halim Mahmud (1910-1978, one of al-Azhar's previous great Shaykhs), of Shaykh Jad al-Haqq 'Ali Jad al-Haqq (1917-1996, another of al-Azhar's previous great Cheikhs), and of Nasr Farid Wasil (president of the Shari'a committee for rights and reforms, and a previous great mufti of Egypt from 1996 à 2002).

¹⁰ <http://forums.way2allah.com/showthread.php?t=32541>, accessed on 12.8.2106.

¹¹ For the text of the *fatwa*: <http://ar.islamway.net/fatwa/32771>. Posted on 9.10.2009 and accessed on 18.7.2016.

¹² Surat XI (Hud), verse 97.

¹³ Article in Arabic, posted on 2.6.2016, <http://www.uae-group.com/139952.html>. Accessed on 3.8.2016.

¹⁴ *Fatwa* posted on 12.8.2009, http://khettan.blogspot.com/2009/08/blog-post_6087.html. Accessed on 16.7.2016.

¹⁵ Posted on 22.10.2015, accessed on 3.7.2016, <http://medianewschannel.net/%D8%B9%D9%84%D9%89-%D8%AC%D9%85%D8%B9%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AC%D9%85%D8%A7%D8%B9-%D8%A8%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%A7%D8%B2%D9%84-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B7%D8%A8%D9%8A-%D8%A8%D8%AF%D9%88%D9%86-%D8%B2%D9%88%D8%A7/>.

¹⁶ Posted on 6.7.2016 (?), <http://www.vetogate.com/2265374>. Accessed on 18.8.2016.

¹⁷ A bit less than 10% of the population. The detailed examples of Coptic-Sunni relations, and as well of excision, are assuredly significant, at least in the Egyptian context. Yet, it is not totally clear whether they can be held as representative for the wider frame of developments in tradition and communitarianism if one considers the whole Arab zone.

¹⁸ For instance, the severe drought that lasted from 2006 until 2011 had harsh effects on crops and food prices, and thus created a favourable breeding ground for the articulation of socioeconomic grievances, which soon became fuelled by old sectarian frustrations and ethnic marginalization.

¹⁹<http://www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/20708/triumph-of-the-bureaucracy-a-decade-of-aborted-soc>, posted on 31.1.2015, accessed on 1.12.2016.

²⁰ The Arab left '*glisse [...] sur la pente d'un nationalisme absolu, plus ou moins 'peint en rouge' comme disait Lénine, plus ou moins pourvu de factices justifications universalistes (lutte contre 'l'Impérialisme'). Si la gauche ne se démarque pas de façon assez nette du nationalisme pur [...], on ne voit pas pourquoi les masses arabes ne leur préféreraient pas les nationalistes de droite, du moins ceux qui ont su maintenir quelque distance, au moins verbale, par rapport aux alliances occidentales*'.

²¹ '*Était-il possible de préparer en Égypte ou en Syrie une révolution socialiste? Ou du moins une révolution menée avec des troupes prolétariennes [...]? Ou bien tout effort dans ce sens, impliquant la rupture entre prolétariat et petite-bourgeoisie ou bourgeoisie nationaliste [...] ne devait-il pas avoir pour seul résultat un échec, un renforcement de l'influence impérialiste [...]?*'.

²² De Smet, *op. cit.*, p. 218-219 et 226.

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Ayfer Erdogan

Tunisian Democratic Transition: What Role for Political Islamists in Reconstructing Tunisia?

Contrary to the mainstream scholarship on persistent authoritarianism and ‘Arab exceptionalism’, the year 2011 witnessed a set of revolts that broke out in Tunisia and spread to other Arab countries in the region. These revolts raised many doubts and questions on the existing literature on this region. To some political scientists, the fundamental question arose as regards to whether the Arab revolts could be handled within a fourth wave of democratization or these revolts indicate a temporary breakup from the long-entrenched authoritarian regimes. Six years after these uprisings, Tunisia proved to be the only country that moved towards democratization among the countries swept by the Arab uprisings. In the post-authoritarian Tunisia, despite several actors’ engagement and a vibrant multiparty politics, much of the credit could be attributed to political Islamists who have played a critical role in the political transformation of the country. In the first election held after Ben Ali’s fall, Ennahda Party, borne out of an underground political Islamist movement that was for long suppressed under Ben Ali regime, gained an electoral victory. However, unlike the other Islamist movements in the region, Ennahda leadership’s decisions, priorities and preferences contributed to the success of the Tunisian transition, to a great extent. In that respect, this paper takes a closer look at the peculiarities of Ennahda movement, its historical evolution and at critical moments how the party leadership’s farsighted vision contributed to democratic transition in Tunisia.

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Introduction

January 14th 2010 was a remarkable turning point for the Tunisian history, but also the wider Arab world. In the history of the modern Arab world, it was the first grassroots revolt that toppled an entrenched dictator. It was a breakthrough as the will of the Tunisian people led the way to a revolutionary change and the Arab publics' long-lasting discontent with the robust authoritarianism became visible to the Western world. The Tunisian revolution was a breakthrough for the political scientists and analysts in the Middle East studies as it put an end to the obsolete orientalist approaches that viewed the Arab world as an exception to political change. The Tunisian revolution was also miraculous in several ways. First, it took Tunisian people less than a month of struggle to topple their dictator and its patronage networks once believed to be very resilient and robust. Second, it was a peaceful revolution and it did not turn into terror or civil war, to a great extent, thanks to the neutrality of the military. The peaceful nature of the revolution convinced the Tunisians that they would achieve their goal of establishing democracy and restoring dignity and inspired other Arab publics to struggle against their authoritarian governments.¹ Third, the Tunisian revolution lacked clear ideology, centralized leadership and a pre-established political program. The revolution was the outcome of the popular protests staged by ordinary people from all walks of life without a dominant group belonging to a single ideology and political party. As Asaf Bayat described the popular demonstrations in the Arab world as “collective actions of non-collective actors; they embody shared large numbers of ordinary people whose fragmented but similar activities trigger much social change even though these practices are rarely guided by an ideology or recognizable leaderships and organizations”². With all these aspects, the diffusion effect of the Tunisian revolution over other Arab publics, Egypt, Syria, Yemen and Libya made the Tunisian revolution merit world's attention and appreciation.

Since then, Tunisia has accomplished major milestones on its way to become a democratic country. In the wake of the uprisings, it is the only promising country in terms of democratic transition and expansion of rights and liberties. Initially, the establishment of the three reform commissions after the revolution³, the first free election in October 2011 and the formation of the National Constituent Assembly based on the election results were indicators that Tunisia has moved towards democracy. In 2014, the constitution of Tunisia was adopted with the majority of votes in the National Constituent Assembly⁴, by which Tunisia became a decentralized and open government where separation of powers is guaranteed. The new constitution is viewed as the most democratic and progressive in the region both in terms of its content and the process by which it was drafted.⁵ Furthermore, in 2014 the legislative and presidential elections were held marking an important step in Tunisia's transition to democracy though there is still long way to go. The inclusion of Ennahda in the coalition government is a step toward dialogue and consolidating the consensus-oriented tradition in the new era of Tunisian politics. The 2014 elections were an indicator that Tunisia passed the “Huntington two-turnover” test; that is the party that dominated the government immediately after the fall of the authoritarian regime peacefully gave way to its opposition and all political actors accepted the results of the ballot box.⁶ Tunisia's legislative election marks that the country moved towards a new phase in democratization, what political scientists call “consolidation of democracy”. According to the Freedom House Index in 2015, Tunisia is rated as ‘free’ with the overall freedom rating 2 (political rights rated as 1 and civil liberties rated as 3), a score which is higher than that of Turkey (rated as ‘partly free’ with 3.5), a country that has been indicated for long as a model in the Middle East.⁷

The transition to democracy in Tunisia has not been a straightforward process. Indeed, Tunisia suffered from the same ideological conflicts that have shaken the region for decades; among which the divide between the Islamists and secularists has stood out. This divide has asserted itself in various phases and occasions during the transition. Despite political conflicts and instability, Tunisia has not been marred in the early phase of transition like Egypt. Among several actors that contributed to democratization in Tunisia, Ennahda party has played a very critical role to keep Tunisian transition to democracy at its track. This paper explores the critical role of the political Islamists in the Tunisian transition. The paper is divided into three sub-sections. First, it takes a brief look at political Islamism in Tunisia, then, it presents the historical evolution of the Ennahda movement and finally, it investigates the role of the political Islamists during the transition process.

The Rise of Political Islamism in Tunisia

The most important aspect of the post- authoritarian Tunisia concerns the role of political Islamists who were isolated from political life for decades under the former regimes. Unlike the radical left wing parties, they were not granted party status. However, throughout Tunisia's independence, political Islam⁸ was strong with high grassroots support and the Islamist groups represented the main opposition force. Indeed, Michael Willis asserts that "of all the developments that have impacted on the politics of the Maghreb states in the post-independence area, none has equaled that of Islamism".⁹ Political Islamist groups attract not only religious followers but also supporters from various classes, regions and professions as they emphasize charitable work, family values, social justice and volunteer service for the community. Furthermore, as Noueihed emphasizes, voters support an Islamist party not necessarily because of religion, but rather due to their rejection of despotism and authoritarian regimes.¹⁰ Likewise, various scholars such as Willis and Turner argue that the mass appeal to political Islamism is, to a large extent, a consequence of Tunisia's internal repression of Islam in the political and public realms.¹¹ Therefore, the inclusion of the Islamist parties participate openly in politics in the transition phase was a milestone in Tunisian politics and it would serve as a catalyst for democratic growth and pluralism. After the ouster of Ben Ali, various political Islamist groups have gained visibility; however, the Ennahda party, with its strong link to the founding leader, Rachid Ghannouchi, stood out not as a classical opposition party, but rather a broad bottom up political movement that evolved over decades around Islamic ideal under a tightly controlled authoritarian system.

Tunisia, like many other countries in the MENA region, has been swept away between the competing forces of secular politics and political Islam after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire. Under Bourguiba, the Tunisian society was led to modernize along the lines of French style laicity and establishing a parallel with Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, the founder of the Turkish Republic, Bourguiba aimed to reform society within a controlled Islam. Thus, religion was heavily monitored by the state and the former regimes violently suppressed Islamist movements creating public fear of Islamic fundamentalism. Indeed, both Bourguiba and Ben Ali regimes established their political legitimacy on modernization and secularism by describing political Islamist groups as fundamentalists who would undermine women rights and overturn the secular regime and move into a theocratic rule. Political Islamists were isolated from Tunisian politics for decades, which left them with no choice but operate underground. However, the outbreak of the Arab uprisings in Tunisia opened a new era for political Islamism in Tunisia. The 2011 general Amnesty law that allowed the political Islamist parties to return to the political sphere put an end to the decades-long isolation and exclusion of Islamists from political arena. Since then political Islamist groups have been an essential component of the post- authoritarian Tunisia and the dynamics of the transition was shaped, to a large extent, by the strategic interaction and political bargains between

the secular parties and the Ennahda party. Indeed, a closer look at Tunisia's transition to democracy reveals that much of the credit could be attributed to the country's largest Islamist party, Ennahda and its willingness to grant concessions to its secular opponents. Furthermore, the emergence of Tunisia as the sole democracy from the Arab Spring movements merit attention to the evolution of the Ennahda movement in the course of time and the role of the party leadership in transitioning to democracy.

The Evolution of the Ennahda Movement

The Ennahda movement has evolved over the course of time from an underground Islamist movement into a political Islamist party that embraced the values of democracy and culture of consensus. When the movement first came into existence in the late 1970s, it was inspired by the Muslim Brotherhood historically committed to a model of political activism that was combined with Islamic charity work. The Brotherhood aimed to establish an order of community and state based solely on the Quran and the Sunnah. While the basis of Ennahda's foundational identity was rooted in preaching and Islamization of society, like Ikhwan in Egypt, Ennahda leadership, in the course of time, has moved beyond its origins as a political Islamist party and internalized the values of democracy often pointing to the compatibility of Islam with a modern democratic political system. To Ghannouchi and the party's leaders, their vision for an Islamic project does not necessarily contradict their support of a democratic and pluralistic Tunisia. In other words, embracing democracy does not mean giving up Islamic project and realizing Islamic project is not necessarily about establishing the Islamic state.¹² By 2016, Ennahda abandoned even the rhetoric of political Islam and the party leadership announced that Ennahda fully embraced a new identity as a party of Muslim democrats.¹³ Hence, the party's evolution of its identity from an underground Islamic movement to Muslim democracy was critical to the policies it pursued during the transition and eventually the emergence of a democratic outcome in the birthplace of the Arab Spring movements.

Ennahda first emerged as a religious group that aimed at preaching and Quranic study in the late 1960s. However, Ennahda's emergence as a political Islamist movement dates back to 1979 when Rachid Ghannouchi, the founder and the president of the Ennahda Party, created the Islamic Association (*Jam'ah al-Islamiyya*), a political group that reached out to lower and middle class families crying out for an end to Bourguiba's one party system and promoting a vision of Islam that addresses contemporary problems like workers' rights, poverty, wages, political participation. With the liberalization of the political apparatus by Bourguiba in 1981, the Islamic Association was renamed as the Islamic Tendency Movement (MTI), *Harakat al-Ittihad al-Islami*. In addition to MTI, there were other Islamic political groups; the Islamic Shura Party, the Islamic Progressive Tendency, the Islamic Vanguard, and the Islamic Liberation Party. However, the MTI was the most prominent political group and found supporters among the middle and lower classes in Tunisia for three reasons; its clear opposition to Bourguiba's repression of opposition and attack on Islamic institutions, its emphasis on Tunisia's Islamic-Arab identity and Ghannouchi's open commitment to democracy. Ghannouchi often emphasized the compatibility of Islam and democracy and asserted that a secular state in which freedoms existed would be preferable to the one with Sharia law and no individual freedom:

“[If] by democracy is meant the liberal model of government prevailing in the West, a system under which the people freely choose their representatives and leaders, and in which there is an alternation of power, as well as freedoms and human rights for the public, then the Muslims will find nothing in their religion to oppose democracy, and it is not in their interest to do so.”¹⁴

Following the Tunisian bread riots in 1984, the government accused the MTI of encouraging their followers to join the riots and Bourguiba cracked down on the movement arresting and

imprisoning many of its supporters including Ghannouchi. Bourguiba attempted to associate the MTI with a “radical fundamentalism” claiming that the movement’s supporters espoused an Iranian- style revolution. Later, Bourguiba’s initial crackdown on Islamist groups turned into an attack against any kind of religious expression in public; the civil servants were banned from praying during work hours, the Islamists who had lost their jobs during 1981-84 imprisonment were not hired back to public institutions and women wearing the veil were not allowed to attend public universities and workplaces.¹⁵ The persecution of the MTI members and Bourguiba’s attempt to suppress the MTI and other Islamist groups backfired and aroused sympathy for the MTI and its reputation enhanced as an organization devoted to helping the people. The government’s attempts to radicalize the MTI remained futile as Ghannouchi distanced himself from a violent Iranian style revolution. Instead, Ghannouchi believed only in a change that came from the bottom up by a slow and gradual transformation of a society and political participation to create a state that would be both compatible with Islamic values and democracy.¹⁶ His vision of a change that would come from the society gradually and by political participation has been pivotal in the initial transition process of Tunisia, in which the Ennahda party members would follow a moderate line and be open to compromise and to make concessions.

With the advent of Ben Ali to presidency, the initial months seemed promising given that he initiated political liberalization aimed at lifting restrictions on individual freedoms and opening space for opposition groups. As a response to Ben Ali’s requirement that no party could monopolize Islam with an Islamic labeling, in 1989 the MTI was renamed as *Hizb ut-Nahda* (the Renaissance Party) and the movement changed its name to *Harakat Ennahda*. In a few years, it became clear that Ben Ali indeed offered the veneer of democracy in form, yet no real political change in substance. He pursued the same repressive policies implemented under Bourguiba regime. During Ben Ali’s era, a brutal crackdown on the Islamic movements was ensued and members of Ennahda were faced with trials, arrests, custody, imprisonment, torture and at times death. In 1989, Ghannouchi and his key supporters fled to London where they lived in exile for twenty years whereas other Ennahda members became political asylums in France. In that period, Ghannouchi reflected on their concessions in an attempt to avoid confrontation with the regime:

“All our concessions became of no avail. Not even the relinquishment of the very name of our improvement helped. Nor was any avail the flexibility and moderation that we forced on ourselves to avoid a return to confrontation and to spare our country’s resources so that they may not be used except for the purpose of development and in confronting the colossal challenges facing our nation.”¹⁷

From 1956 onward, the suppression of a strong Arab Muslim identity and Islam’s disappearance from public life in the name of forced modernization didn’t lead Tunisians to backslide from their religion, instead they experienced a religious reawakening and adoption of an Arab Muslim identity often associated with Western modernity. The revival of Islamic practice and faith came as a rejection to both Bourguiba’s and Ben Ali’s imposed modernity, measures of French-style laicity and corruption in the name of progress. For those people, Ennahda constituted the most significant political challenge to the old regime and it had decades long history of charity organizations and social networks. After the ouster of Ben Ali, various political Islamist groups have gained visibility; however, the Ennahda party stood out not as a classical opposition party, but rather a broad bottom up political movement that evolved over decades around Islamic ideal under a tightly controlled authoritarian system.

Various factors could account for Ennahda’s victory in the first free and fair election in Tunisia. First, Ennahda is a well-organized movement having a large network of members and it has used the network of mosques as a tool for mobilization of religious segment of the Tunisian

population. The party reorganized its structures immediately after Ben Ali fell. Abdelhamid Jelassi, a member of Ennahda's Executive Committee argued that, "[g]iven that we are an old party, we have been able to revive our structures immediately after the revolution in January. Militants who were in prison for a long time started working for the party again, together with those who had operated underground".¹⁸ Thus, in the wake of the uprisings, though populists, democracy activists, liberals and Islamists were all engaged in the political mobilization of mass demonstrations, their superior political organization and widespread grassroots' support allowed Islamists to be the most powerful actors after the authoritarian regime fell. Second, the party gained an unprecedented reputation and legitimacy as an opposition movement during Ben Ali era. It provided a credible alternative to the holdovers of the former regimes. Third, unlike the secular parties, which depended on advertising and met voters exclusively in major cities, Ennahda reached out to the rural voters directly. Fourth, Ennahda emphasized on democratic principles and pluralism in its election campaigns and it attracted voters on the ground that it constantly made reference to national "consensus" on institutional matters. Ali Laareydh, an Executive Committee member who later served as minister of interior and prime minister, stated that the party is structured according to democratic principles: "In terms of organization, the party's philosophy is about democratic principles, which are enshrined in our statute and the way in which the party is structured.[...] The whole structure of the party is very much the product of the wishes of the fee-paying members".¹⁹

Ennahda has emerged as the largest political Islamist party but it has also been the most diverse political party in its internal structure. The party displays a great deal of variation in terms of the members' interpretation of political Islam and most notably their view of *Sharia* and its role in the constitution and governance of public administration. Internally, the party consists of different wings; ideological hardliners who are ready to use violence and brutal methods to achieve political goals; power-oriented pragmatic conservatives who are moderate and who respect democracy and this wing represents one-third of the party members.²⁰ A third wing is ideologically and politically close to the Salafist movements, yet they constitute a minority in the party base. Ennahda's internal contradictions posed a serious challenge to the party unity after it came to power in 2011 and internal division within the party manifested itself particularly in the constitutional drafting process. Nonetheless, the Tunisian transition benefited from the moderate position of the Ennahda party leadership who could successfully balance the more radical party base and the fact that the number of the ideological hardliners was outweighed by those of the pragmatic conservatives within the party. During the 9th Congress of the party, 73 per cent of the delegates' votes cast for Rachid Ghannouchi as the party leader indicate the majority's consent on the moderate policies adopted by the party leadership. Besides, the public documents and mainstream discourse of the party leadership after the revolution illustrate the search for consensus in the movement's political behavior.²¹ Ghannouchi has struggled to reconcile the different currents within the party and adopts a more tactical and pragmatic vision with the secular opposition.

A final move in Ennahda's ideological evolution emerged in Ennahda party's 10th congress where the party members voted in favor of separating its religious and political activities. Accordingly, the elected Ennahda officials involved in religious activities such as proselytizing in mosques will not be allowed to hold positions in the party and civil society including Islamic organizations.²² The party surely still promotes Islamic values since Islam is central to its existence and policies. However, by rebranding the party's image Ennahda has proved that it places itself as a political party with Islamic values which will act within a competitive, multiparty politics rather than an Islamist movement that aims to establish an Islamist state and implement Sharia law. The official party rhetoric pointed to two specific reasons for its separating the religious (*al-da'awi*) from the political (*al-siyasi*): First, the new constitution of Tunisia which was ratified in 2014

enshrines democracy and protects religious freedoms and limits religiously hostile extreme secularism practiced under the former regimes. Thus, under the new constitution, Ennahda no longer has any justification to prioritize political Islam in its agenda. Second, Ennahda aimed to distinguish itself from the extremist Islamist groups such as the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), which uses the term political Islam to legitimize its activities and therefore, Islamist movements, which define themselves as ‘moderate’ try to move away from that label. The separation of the party’s religious and political activities also indicates that Ennahda is on the way to become, in Larbi Sadiki’s term, a fully-fledged civic political party.²³ This ideological evolution of the Ennahda movement manifested itself in the political moves taken by the party leadership at critical junctures during Tunisia’s democratic transition.

The Role of the Ennahda leadership in Tunisian transition

One of the most fundamental questions to be asked regarding the link between political Islam and democracy is when an Islamist party becomes compatible with a modern democratic political system. The answer to this question lies in whether an Islamist group embraces citizenship instead of a Muslim-non-Muslim dichotomy, the nation-state instead of caliphate and pluralism instead of Islamic communitarianism.²⁴ Ennahda, given its record of six years of political engagement as a party, has proved that it has passed this test by embracing a civil nation-state based on citizenship and pluralism as an asset rather than a drawback in a modern state. Tunisia has been a success story in terms of democratic transition largely because Ennahda has made great sacrifices for the good of the country and the party remained committed to democratic values and a civil state. Thinking in the regional context, a religious party committing to democracy and civil state, particularly in a transition phase, may be rare and this is what makes Ennahda a unique political party. Ghannouchi, the ideologue of the Ennahda movement, is a true intellectual and religious leader with deep knowledge in both Western and Islamic philosophy and history. Having lived in exile for almost two decades in England, he has also internalized democratic culture and values. He was well aware of the difficulty of building democratic institutions in a society, which is highly polarized along the secular- religious axis. Besides, Ghannouchi’s main goal was to keep the Tunisian transition afloat, cast a modest role for his party in a multiparty democracy and make concessions to his opponents regardless of the costs to the party. Ghannouchi was farsighted enough to see that in case of a return to authoritarianism Islamists would suffer most, thus, he struggled to keep his party in a moderate line and prioritized maintaining unity and dialogue within the Tunisian society. Hence, according to Freedom House’s freedom rating, Tunisia is the only country with predominantly Muslim population in the Middle East and North Africa that is rated as free. The case of Tunisia not only brings an important insight to the compatibility of Islam and a modern democratic political system but also shed lights on how the elite commitment to democracy and their key decisions in critical junctures brings about a democratic outcome.

Ennahda leadership contributed to the democratization in several ways. First, the party leadership continually emphasized on their commitment to a civil state and democracy in their political discourse. Being aware of the deep polarization within the society, Ghannouchi refrained from any political expression or attitude that would instigate the existing division. For instance, in an interview he made with political expert Marc Lynch, Ghannouchi stated that he “instructed the [party’s] supporters not to come to the airport to meet him upon his return [to Tunisia] for fear of creating images reminiscent of Khomeini’s return to Iran”.²⁵ By taking such precautions and adopting a conciliatory tone in his speeches, Ghannouchi wanted to assure Tunisians that his party would be on a moderate line. Similarly, when the results of the elections in 2011 were revealed, in his speech Ghannouchi expressed his support for a civil state that is all-inclusive:

“We will continue this revolution to realize its aims of a Tunisia that is free, independent, developing and prosperous, in which the rights of God, the Prophet, women, men, the religious and the non-religious are assured because Tunisia is for everyone.”²⁶

A fundamental contribution of Ennahda party in the transition process was the party leadership’s willingness to cooperate with their opponents and their openness to engage in dialogue and build consensus. This consensus-oriented tradition results from the gradual construction of a dialogue between the secularists and the Ennahda members, a political rapprochement which began eight years before the fall of Ben Ali. In June 2003, representatives from four of Tunisia’s major non-regime parties (Ennahda, the CPR, Ettakatol, and the PDP) met in France and signed “A Call from Tunis” (Appel de Tunis) in which they negotiated on fundamental principles; any future government would draw its sole source of legitimacy from the sovereignty of the people and the state while showing respect for the people’s identity and its Arab- Muslim values would provide the guarantee of liberty of beliefs to all and the political neutralization of places of worship.²⁷ This dialogue among leftist, liberal democrats and Islamists enhanced and in 2005, “The 18 October Coalition for Rights and Freedoms” was formally established among political parties and civil society organizations of diverse or even contradictory, ideological orientations based on common goal for the rule of law and basic rights and liberties. The 18 October Coalition aims to

“lay the foundations for a democratic transition aimed at ending dictatorship and building the institutions of the state on the basis of democratic legitimacy rooted in respect for the sovereignty of the people, free from any form of tutelage, the practice of democratic succession of leaders, intellectual and political pluralism, and the safeguarding of human rights”

and the manifesto touched upon liberal family code and building a strong civil society.²⁸ Hence, the manifesto illustrates that a dialogue among disparate political forces began far before Ben Ali’s fall and the actors, some of whom already had known each other, were able to come together and decide on key issues on how to form an interim government and hold elections immediately after the ouster of Ben Ali. In Stepan’s terminology, a “political society”, that is an organized group of political activists who not only rally resistance to dictatorship but also negotiate among themselves on how to overcome their mutual fear and craft the “rules of the game”, flourished in Tunisia far before the authoritarian regime’s crackdown.²⁹ In addition to cooperation with the secularists, Ennahda leadership took a clear stance in support for a ‘civil’ state as they already negotiated in the October 18 Coalition. Ghannouchi and some other members in the leadership, such as Jebali and Laarayedh, played a critical role in keeping the two factions of the party, the moderates and the hardliners, within reason and moderation by exerting their authority. Ghannouchi constantly asserted firmly that the goal for Tunisia is a civil state not a religious state.³⁰

In the initial phase of the transition, a turning point emerged as concerns regarding the Article 57 in the constitution were raised by the activists in civil society organizations. According to this article, a new president should be elected before a new legislature was set up and the constitution can only be amended after the elections, which left the commission in charge of political reform with very hard questions. The main controversy arose as regards to the sequence of the constitutional reform and elections. Many activists opposed holding presidential elections under an unreformed and undemocratic constitution that concentrated unchecked power in the executive’s hands.³¹ Given Tunisia’s long history of presidents who used constitutions as weapons to serve their interests, this concern was not without a reason. With the existing constitution, the remnants of the old regime could divert the transition to their own interests or the new elected regime could turn to authoritarianism by legitimizing its policies based on the constitution. At this critical juncture, Ennahda leadership prioritized the constitutional reform over holding new elections though they were aware that a new election could have gained Ennahda an electoral

victory that would assign them more power to determine the rules of the game. Rachid Ghannouchi, the leader of the Ennahda movement, maintained that a transition from an authoritarian system to a democracy would call for a democratic constitution in the first place given that the current constitution hands the executive, legislative and judicial powers to the president:

“Basing the transition on the (current) constitution to build a democratic system is a futile attempt to build democracy from dictatorship because only God can bring out life from death. We cannot bring a democratic system out of this corrupt, dictatorial system. We have to put an end to the authoritarian system and start a new one. Basing this transition on Article 56 or 57 is a continuation of the old system. The constitution was a tyranny, the state was reduced to one man, who had in his hands the executive, judicial and legislative powers and was not accountable to anyone. How can such a constitution point towards building a democratic system, even as a starting point? The first step of building a democratic system is to build a democratic constitution. For this we need a constitutional council for rebuilding the state, one in which political parties, the trade unions and the civil society join. This council will rebuild the democratic constitution and will be the basis for building the democratic system.”³²

Ennahda leadership supported an electoral system that would enable the emergence of the highest number of parties possible in a multiparty politics and would most likely result in coalition building. When the Ben Achour Commission began debating on the electoral system, Ennahda’s leadership advocated the proportional representation (with zero-threshold) which would reduce Ennahda’s own share of votes. This reasoning of Ghannouchi and top leaders in the party has most likely resulted from their internalization of the lessons of Algeria where the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) dominated in municipal and first round of parliamentary elections in 1990 and 1991, upon which the existing military regime cancelled elections and suppressed the Islamists brutally.³³ The bloody civil war and a broad crackdown against the Islamists in Algeria enabled Ennahda elite to put survivalism ahead of other interests and take steps gradually in their policies rather than overplaying their hand from 1990s onward. In that regard, Ennahda’s leaders advocated Proportional Representation (PR) and vote shares translated into seat shares according to a formula known as the Hare Quota- Largest Remainders (HQLR). If the party leadership would have pushed for a first-past-the post (FPTP) principle, the party would have won approximately nine of every ten seats as opposed to four in ten under proportional representation. If the party leadership would have advocated for the other most common PR formula, d’Hondt Divisor, Ennahda would have been awarded 68 per cent of the NCA seats, likewise under St. Lague Divisor Ennahda would have won 55 per cent of seats and if it had been for a higher legal threshold, Ennahda would have gained outright majority of the votes.³⁴ Ennahda’s clear support for an anti-majoritarian and coalition encouraging system had two reasons. First, Ennahda’s farsighted leadership, particularly Ghannouchi was cautious enough to avoid any scenario like that of a Tunisia in 1989 or Algeria in 1991. Second, as Ghannouchi repeatedly asserted that Ennahda would not govern alone, this PR system with zero threshold created favorable conditions for Ennahda to cooperate with secularists to draft a new constitution and govern inclusively. Ghannouchi did not interpret majority of the votes gained by his party in the first election after Ben-Ali’s fall as a warrant to monopolize power. Ghannouchi was well aware that Tunisian political culture was not ripe enough for one party to dominate Tunisian politics, especially in a fragile and highly polarized political setting. Having not experienced culture of democratic governance for decades, both the Islamist and secular forces of the society could have manipulated their victory in the ballot box to impose a non-democratic rule, in other words, a system that they ideologically believe would be good for the country but not in line with the principles of democracy. Thus, Ghannouchi maintained in a transitional democracy there is a need for a consensual system and Tunisia can’t be ruled by one party; even if Ennahda gained the majority, 51 per cent is not enough in the period of transition.³⁵ Some commentators attribute this pragmatism to the coup against Morsi, however, Ennahda’s internal evolution and tendency for compromise manifested itself long before the coup in Egypt. As Monika Marks

observes the coup against the Muslim Brotherhood only “reinforced pre-existing postures of pragmatism and gradualism inside Ennahda that have been crucial to its survival in Tunisian society”.³⁶

Having come into power and being assigned with managing the drafting of the new constitution, Ennahda party was faced with an important challenge, which was to reconcile internal contradictions within the party. Two months into the constitution drafting process, Ennahda officials involved in the commission released a draft that included *Sharia* as the primary source of legislation. Protests on the street and criticism from civil society mounted and Ghannouchi announced that Sharia would not be inserted in the constitutional draft. Thereafter, another blow to party unity emerged as a bloc of Ennahda MPs proposed a provision that would criminalize blasphemy. In a similar vein, Souad Abderrahim, a female Ennahda MP proposed that Tunisian laws should not protect single mothers and 1998 law giving children out of wedlock equal rights should be eliminated arguing that the freedom granted to women should not be at the expense of Islamic principles.³⁷ Later, the constitutional subcommittee of the NCA on Rights and Liberties adopted its draft constitution thanks to the votes casted by Ennahda MPs stating: "The State shall preserve women's rights and achievements under the principle of complementarity with men within the family and as partners of men in the development of the homeland".³⁸ Hence, the principle of equality in the 1956 constitution turned into the principle of complementarity in the draft constitution. This draft constitution led to strong condemnations from secular non-governmental organizations including the Tunisian Association of Democratic Women, the Tunisian League of Human Rights, the Tunisian Branch of Amnesty International and the UGTT (the Tunisian General Labour Union) as well as secular parties arguing that this equivocal draft defines women in relation to men rather than as full citizens.

In the debates over the new constitution, the party leadership put an end to the rising tensions by supporting retaining Article 1 of the 1959 Constitution. Ennahda leadership compromised on several key articles such as adopting the principle of equality instead of complementarity with regards to the role of women and omitting the proposed article which criminalizes blasphemy. They also agreed on inserting the article on gender parity in local and regional elections. Ennahda leadership's willingness to make such concessions and reach a consensus with the secularist parties aimed to lessen secularists' fears and suspicions that Islamists would reverse the gains of secularism. The new Tunisian constitution protected religious and political freedoms and it created an ideal environment for both democracy and religion to flourish, what Alfred Stepan terms as “twin tolerations”. In a country that lives by twin tolerations, according to Stepan, “religious authorities do not control democratic officials who are acting constitutionally, while democratic officials do not control religion so long as religious actors respect other citizens' rights”.³⁹ Ultimately, the both of the twin tolerations in the new Tunisian constitution were guaranteed to such an extent that Ennahda even rebranded its identity from political Islam to Muslim democracy arguing that with the new constitution, there is no longer a need for the term ‘political Islam’.

Another challenge for Ennahda party was to face the growing uproar in the secularist segment of the society against rising Salafi violence in Tunisia. Over the course of 2012 and 2013, Tunisia witnessed various acts of intimidation and violence against artists, art galleries, theatres, embassies, journalists and political opponents. To mention few, in September 2012, a crowd of almost 2000 protestors attacked U.S. embassy in Tunis in their fury over a film denigrating Prophet Muhammad.⁴⁰ Five months later, in February 2013, Chokri Belaid, a poet, a lawyer and the leader of the secular left Democratic Patriots Movement, was assassinated after months of harassment and surveillance by the members of a radical Jihadist organization.⁴¹ Belaid's assassination led to the biggest political crisis in Tunisia since 2011 and his funeral was a manifestation of one of the

largest outpourings of anger and grief in Tunisian history, with an estimated one million people taking to the street.⁴² Few months after the assassination of Belaid, in July 2013, Mohammed Brahmi, the founder and the general secretary of the People's Movement and a vocal critic of Ennahda, was assassinated by a Jihadist. His assassination enraged an immediate wave of massive protests and sit-ins in the capital and at the Constituent Assembly.⁴³ Protestors gathered in Tunis and other cities calling the government to resign while Tunisia's largest union, UGTT, called for a general strike.⁴⁴ In the same week, fourteen soldiers were killed in a terrorist attack near mount Jebel Chaambi, on the Algerian border by a fundamentalist Jihadist group. The majority of critics accused Ennahda-led government of failing to investigate the attacks and assassinations, imposing charges on their perpetrators and promoting a climate conducive to such violence. By the summer 2013, transition in Tunisia seemed to head towards a chaotic downfall.

Ennahda was faced with mass protests and strong opposition from the National Salvation Front, a coalition of secular parties, which calls for the dissolution of the government. To break the deadlock, four civil society organizations, came to be known as "the Quartet", which was led by the labor union, the UGTT, took over mediating role. In September 2013, the Quartet presented a "roadmap" which required the government to hand power over to a caretaker government of independent technocrats. This was probably the greatest test Ennahda leadership was exposed to and a critical turning point in the trajectory of the Tunisian transition. The party leadership didn't choose to mobilize its grassroots supporters to the streets to confront protests movements organized by the secularist forces. Instead, despite their base's disapproval to negotiate with the opposition, Ennahda leadership decided to sign the roadmap presented by the Quartet and relinquished power to a technocratic government, which saved the Tunisian transition from derailing and coming to a standstill.

If the Ennahda leadership had not pursued a pragmatic pattern and rejected the mediation of the Quartet and the roadmap, Tunisia would suffer much more severe social, economic and security challenges. There was already growing discontent among the Tunisian public as many Tunisians accused Ennahda of foot dragging and emphasizing divisive social issues during the constitutional negotiations, coddling Salafis, failing to provide security and neglecting economy during the two years of the troika government.⁴⁵ In such a fragile political setting, to resist the demands of the opposition, Ennahda could also have faced the risk of serious damage to the party's credibility. Ennahda leaders made both political and ideological compromises in order not to jeopardize the party's long-term interests and Tunisia's entire democratic transition. The party leadership decided to abstain from nominating or endorsing any candidate for the 2014 presidential election, which was a clear signal that the party took its previous governance mistakes seriously and attempted to regain trust.

Last but not least, Ghannouchi and other top leaders retreated from their support to the lustration legislation that would prevent the old elite who held positions in Constitutional Democratic Party (RCD) from running in Tunisia's 2014 elections. Ennahda had the votes in the constituent assembly to pass an electoral law that would ban the members of the RCD from engaging in politics and such a law would serve as a barrier for Essebsi and Nidaa Tounes to regain influence in party politics. Ennahda leadership took a cautious stance by not excluding the old elite who still proved to be the pivotal actor. According to Ellis Goldberg, democratization succeeded in Tunisia because the old elite were not excluded and subjected to the threat of political or administrative marginalization.⁴⁶ When asked why his party compromised with the old elite during the political crisis in summer 2013, Ghannouchi explained:

"The old guard might have lost the election but it was still very powerful. It was the elite of the country. So we had to make deals with them. You cannot go for total victory, he said; the goal

has to be consensus. In a stable democracy, if you win the election, perhaps you can do everything your way. But in a young democracy, we need consensus and compromise... We lost power but we won Tunisia.⁴⁷

By adopting a minimalist and pragmatist approach and being ready to engage in dialogue with the opposition groups, Ghannouchi assured the Tunisian society at large that the party had no intention of seizing the state institutions to impose any religious governance. Instead, he manifested that Ennahda party would only be one political actor in multiparty democracy. In a similar vein, before the 2014 election Essebsi assured that “Nidaa Tounes will not govern alone even if the party receives an absolute majority”.⁴⁸ When the election results were revealed, Nidaa Tounes and Ennahda moved towards reconciliation and built a coalition that also included two leftist parties, an indication of Tunisia’s move towards becoming a consolidated democracy. If Tunisian transition had not ended up in a similar destination as that of Egypt, the Islamist political elite has an important share in this success. The Ennahda’s farsighted leadership has never interpreted the majority of the votes they achieved in the 2011 election as a right to impose any religious or ideological policies; besides, they avoided any polarizing discourse during their election campaigns and prioritized the long term interests of the party and democratization in Tunisia over maintaining power. At critical points, Ennahda has demonstrated that it is committed to key components of democracy including participation in elections, office holding and the separation of powers, engagement in dialogue with other political forces and making concessions to prevent Tunisia from sliding into chaos.

Conclusion

Tunisia has made considerable progress in democratic transition. It has become the only democracy to emerge from the Arab Spring movements. Tunisia’s success in its move towards democratic consolidation can be, to a great extent, attributed to the Ennahda movement and its leadership’s commitment to democracy and their willingness to make concessions and come to compromise at key moments, even at the expense of its popular bases. Following the uprisings, Ennahda was regarded as the biggest threat to the democratic process by Tunisia’s secular forces and some foreign observers; however, the party’s remarkable leadership ensured its role as an exceptional party in a multiparty electoral system along with its deep commitment to Islamic values. Ennahda movement, despite having inspired from the ideology of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, has evolved from an underground political Islamist movement under Ben Ali to a political Islamist party which would act within the principles of democracy following the Tunisian revolution and finally the party leadership has redefined itself as Muslim democrats in 2016. Following the first legislative elections after the uprisings, Ennahda proved that an Islamist party can also be bound to democratic values by forming coalitions with secular parties, making key compromises on the constitution drafting and above all, stepping down to keep Tunisia’s democratic transition afloat. Ennahda has adjusted itself throughout Tunisian transition to ensure that Tunisia’s democratic transition would be on the track. The party’s adjustment of its position in response to the pressure from both secular and religious voters made a remarkable contribution to the survival of Tunisia’s new democracy.

Notes

¹ Amira Aleya- Sghaier, “The Tunisian Revolution: The Revolution of Dignity”, *The Journal of the Middle East and Africa*, 3:1, 2012, p. 19

² Asaf Bayat, *Life as Politics: How Ordinary People Change the Middle East* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2009), p. 14

³ The interim government formed three special commissions to meet people's revolutionary aspirations and prevent further radicalization of the revolts: the Commission on Law Reform, the Commission of Inquiry on Corruption and the Independent Commission of Inquiry (this last commission was later disbanded).

⁴ The final text of the constitution was adopted by the NCA in January 2014 with 200 votes for, twelve against and four abstentions, which was well over the two-thirds majority required.

⁵ Aljazeera, "Tunisia signs new constitution into law", January 27, 2014, <http://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2014/01/tunisia-assembly-approves-new-constitution-201412622480531861.html>; Sarah Mersch, "Tunisia's Compromise Constitution", Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, January 21, 2014

⁶ The two turnover test, according to Huntington, reveals that a new democracy is consolidated satisfactorily if it survives two turnovers of power; that is, for an emerging democracy to be consolidated, free and fair elections must twice lead to the peaceful handover of power between the ruling party and its successful challenger in the election. See Samuel Huntington, *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century*, (Oklahoma: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991), p. 267; Ellis Goldberg, "Arab Transitions and the Old Elite", *The Washington Post*, December 9, 2014

⁷ Each country is based on two numerical ratings – from 1 to 7- for political rights and civil liberties, with 1 representing the most free and 7 the least free. The World Freedom Index is available at: Freedom in the World in 2015, <https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/freedom-world-2015#.VIDHw9ER5dg>

⁸ The term "political Islam" is used to refer to the ideology and political engagement of a wide array of groups that aim to promote Islamic values and ideology in their societies. As John L. Esposito contends that political Islam, in a broad sense, refers to "attempts by Muslim individuals, groups and movements to reconstruct the political, economic, social and cultural basis of their society along the Islamic lines". See John L. Esposito and Shahin El-Din Emad "Introduction" in the *Oxford Handbook of Islam and Politics*, ed. John Esposito & Shahin El-Din Emad (New York: Oxford UP, 2013), p.1

⁹ Michael Willis, *Politics and Power in the Maghreb: Algeria, Tunisia and Morocco from Independence to the Arab Spring*, (New York: Columbia UP, 2012), p. 155

¹⁰ Lin Noueihed & Alex Warren, *The Battle for the Arab Spring: Revolution, Counterrevolution and the Making of a New Era*, (New Haven: Yale UP, 2013), p. 270

¹¹ Michael Willis, *Politics and Power in the Maghreb: Algeria, Tunisia and Morocco from Independence to the Arab Spring*; John Turner, "Untangling Islamism from Jihadism: Opportunities for Islam and the West after the Arab Spring", *Arab Studies Quarterly*, 34:3, 2012

¹² Fabio Merone & Francesco Cavatorta, "Ennahda: A Party in Transition", *Jadaliyya*, March 25, 2013, <http://www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/10762/ennahda-a-party-in-transition>

¹³ Sarah J. Feuer, "From Political Islam to Muslim Democracy: Tunisia's Ennahda Changes Course", *Foreign Affairs*, June 8, 2016,

¹⁴ John Esposito, Tamara Sonn, & John Obert Voll, *Islam and Democracy after the Arab Spring*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), p. 181

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 182

¹⁶ John L. Esposito, *The Islamic Threat: Myth or Reality?*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), p. 167

¹⁷ Azam S. Tamimi and Rachid Ghannouchi: *A Democrat within Islamism*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), p. 69

¹⁸ Rikke Haugbolle Hostrup & Francesco Cavatorta, "Beyond Ghannouchi: Islamism and Social Change in Tunisia", *Middle East Report 262*, Spring 2012, p. 21

¹⁹ *Ibid.*

²⁰ Isabel Schafer, "The Tunisian Tradition: Torn Between Democratic Consolidation and Neo-Conservatism in an Insecure Regional Context", *European Institute of the Mediterranean (IEMED)*, No:25, 2015

²¹ Laura Guazzone, "Ennahda Islamists and the Test of Government in Tunisia", *The International Spectator*, 48: 4, December 2013, p. 46

²² Sarah Souli, "What is Left of Tunisia's Ennahda Party?", *Aljazeera*, May 27, 2016, at <http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/05/left-tunisia-ennahda-party-160526101937131.html>

²³ Larbi Sadiki, "Why is Tunisia's Ennahda Ditching Political Islam?", *Aljazeera*, May 24, 2016, at <http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/05/tunisia-ennahda-ditching-political-islam-160524094550153.html>

²⁴ Fabio Merone & Francesco Cavatorta, "Ennahda: A Party in Transition", *Jadaliyya*, March 25, 2013, <http://www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/10762/ennahda-a-party-in-transition>

²⁵ Marc Lynch, "Tunisia's New Al-Nahda", *Foreign Policy*, June 29, 2011, <http://foreignpolicy.com/2011/06/29/tunisias-new-al-nahda/>

- ²⁶ Lin Noueihed & Tom Perry, “Tunisian Islamists Show Strength at Chief’s Return”, *Reuters*, January 30, 2011, <http://blogs.reuters.com/faithworld/2011/01/30/2011/01/30/tunisian-islamists-show-strength-at-chiefs-return/>
- ²⁷ Alfred Stepan, “Tunisia’s Transition and the Twin Tolerations”, *Journal of Democracy*, Vol. 23, No: 2, April 2012, p. 96
- ²⁸ Lutfi Hajji, The 18 October Coalition for Rights and Freedoms, *Arab Reform Initiative*, October 13, 2006, <http://www.arab-reform.net/en/node/350>
- ²⁹ Alfred Stepan and Juan J. Linz, “Democratization Theory and the Arab Spring”, p. 23
- ³⁰ Alfred Stepan, “Tunisia’s Transition and the Twin Tolerations”, p. 96
- ³¹ Beji Caid Essebsi served as a Minister of Foreign Affairs from 1981 to 1986 during the Bourguiba period. Essebsi was not a member of the Ben Ali’s government since he took power in 1987 and his government didn’t include any minister affiliated with the RCD Party.
- ³² Financial Times, Tunisia in Turmoil, Interview Transcript: Rachid Ghannouchi, January 18, 2011, <https://www.ft.com/content/24d710a6-22ee-11e0-ad0b-00144feab49a>
- ³³ Monika Marks, “How Egypt’s Coup Really Affected Tunisia’s Islamists”, *The Washington Post*, March 16, 2015, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2015/03/16/how-egypts-coup-really-affected-tunisi-as-islamists/>
- ³⁴ John M. Carey, “Why Tunisia Remains the Arab Spring’s Best Bet,” conference presentation at Dartmouth College, September 9-11, 2013, <http://sites.dartmouth.edu/jcarey/files/2013/08/Tunisia-Carey-Aug-2013.pdf>
- ³⁵ David Hearst, “Rachid Ghannouchi Q&A: Thoughts on Democratic Islam”, *Middle East Eye*, June 12, 2016, <http://www.middleeasteye.net/news/rached-ghannouchi-interview-2016275498>
- ³⁶ Monika Marks, “How Egypt’s Coup Really Affected Tunisia’s Islamists”, *The Washington Post*
- ³⁷ Kouichi Shirayanagi, “Ennahda Spokeswoman Souad Abderrahim: Single Mothers are a Disgrace to Tunisia”, *Tunisia Live*, November 9, 2011, <http://allafrica.com/stories/201111281676.html>; Amal al- Hilali, “Ennahda Members Make Conflicting Statements about Women’s Rights in Tunisia”, *Al-Arabiya News*, November 13, 2011, <https://www.alarabiya.net/articles/2011/11/13/176916.html>
- ³⁸ Synda Tajine, “Will Tunisian Women Become ‘Complimentary’ to Men by Law?”, *Al-Monitor*, August 14, 2012, <http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/politics/2012/08/tunisia-are-womens-rights-fading.html>
- ³⁹ Alfred Stepan and Juan J. Linz, “Democratization Theory and the Arab Spring”, *Journal of Democracy*, Vol. 24, No: 2, April 2003, p. 17
- ⁴⁰ At least two people were killed and 29 were wounded in the attack to the U.S. Embassy. See Tarek Amara, “Two dead as protestors attack U.S. Embassy in Tunisia”, *Reuters*, September 14, 2012, <http://www.reuters.com/article/us-protests-tunisia-school-idUSBRE88D18020120914>
- ⁴¹ Belaid’s two e-mail accounts and his Facebook account were hacked. Militants tracked his phone with GPS. The sophistication of his murder raised suspects among many people that the killers received assistance from the state apparatus, particularly from individuals in the Interior Ministry.
- ⁴² Yasmine Ryan, “Who Killed Tunisia’s Chokri Belaid?”, *Aljazeera*, September 12, 2013, <http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/%20features/2013/09/201394183325728267.html>
- ⁴³ According to the ballistic tests, both politicians, Brahmi and Belaid, were killed by the same gun and the perpetrator was linked to a Salafi-Jihadist organization.
- ⁴⁴ BBC News, “Tunisian Politician Mohammed Brahmi Assassinated”, July 25, 2013, <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-23452979>
- ⁴⁵ Christopher Alexander, “Tunisia’s Islamists I: Ennahda Withdraws”, Wilson Center, December 18, 2013, <https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/tunisi-as-islamists-i-ennahda-withdraws>
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- ⁴⁷ Fareed Zakaria, “From Tunisia, A Voice of Hope in the Muslim World”, *The Washington Post*, October 29, 2015, https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/a-voice-of-hope-in-the-muslim-world/2015/10/29/a146f9da-7e60-11e5-b575-d8dcfedb4ea1_story.html?utm_term=.80ef4ef8f38f
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Hicham Khalfadir

The Constitutional Institutions in the 2011 Constitution

This paper discusses the evolution of the process of democratization at the level of constitutional institutions, by exploring the 2011 Constitution adopted by the Kingdom of Morocco on 1st July 2011. This constitution represents a transition from autocracy to democracy through the distribution and sharing of powers and the enshrining of some basic constitutional principles that were absent in previous constitutions.

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The Constitutional Institutions in the 2011 Constitution

Introduction

The constitutional framework plays an important role in the society. On the one hand, it defines the political system (nature of the state), the public authorities and their functions, as well as regulating relations between individuals and state organs. Thus, it ensures an appropriate balance between them. On the other hand, the constitution plays an important role in promoting democracy, through the recognition of democratic principles such as human rights, rule of law and the separation of power. These elements make the constitution into the country's normative and legal framework and enable the comparative study of the level of democratic process in various countries.

This study aims to trace the evolution of the constitutional institutions, which is considered as a gateway/input to measure the process of democratization in Morocco, by focusing on the 2011 constitution. Before analyzing, several concepts and terms will be clarified. Democratization is understood as a process of transition from authoritarian to democratic rule, it is a process that focuses on the exercise and sharing of power, and on people's position within this process. More precisely, democratization means the process by which the political system becomes democratic¹. Moreover, the term of the constitutional institutions refers to the institutions established by the constitution, especially, the royal institution, the parliament and the government. The paper is divided into two axes:

- The first will concentrate on some preliminary remarks on the constitution to highlight its nature and necessity.
- The second will discuss the most important updates provided by the 2011 constitution.


1. The nature and the necessity of the constitution

There is no doubt that constitutions are human creations (man-made) and products shaped by conventions, historical and social contexts, choices, and political struggles. They characterize the relationship between the state organs, and between the state and its citizens. For state authorities/organs, the importance of the constitution lies in distributing the powers (judicial, executive, and legislative) and the relation between these powers. For the relation between the state and its citizens, the constitutional framework helps to enhance stability and political consensus, as well as guaranteeing the standards of living together, which the public authorities must strive to achieve and provide.

In case of Morocco, the constitution is considered as a framework that ensures the modernization of the state and demonstrates the rationality of the state. The constitution can be considered as a supreme law (1.1), a social contract (1.2), as an expression of Sovereignty (1.3) and as a framework that allows to protect human rights (1.4).

1.1 The constitution as a supreme law

This part represents the legal dimension of the constitution. This means that any law or policy that is inconsistent with the constitution is not valid. Its provisions have to be respected by all the members of society, not only state organs. Therefore, the government action must conform with all the constitutional norms and values. This condition indicates the principle of the hierarchy of laws, where the constitution – as a supreme law – is at the top of the pyramid.



According to the hierarchy of norms, organic laws lie just below the fundamental law and above the ordinary laws. In this case, organic laws are considered as supplementary laws to the constitution, disposing of a special status. In contrast, all laws (organic laws, ordinary laws, settlement...) must comply with the fundamental laws of the constitution.

1.2 The constitution as a social contract

The constitution is a form of social contract², because it possesses the properties of all contracts. Mueller defines a contract as “an agreement among two or more individuals specifying certain duties, obligations, and rights of each individual, as well as rewards and penalties for complying to or violating the terms of the contract”³. In this case, the social contract or the constitution in its modern sense, defines the rights and duties of both, individuals and state organs. For example, if the government fails to fulfill their responsibilities towards its citizens, the social contract will be with no effect, which means a broken social contract. Thus, the citizens will have all the right to adopt a new government. This idea was at the origin of the great revolutions, such as the French Revolution in 1789, and the Tunisian and Egyptian Revolution in 2011, the so-called Arab Spring. In return, citizens could enjoy their rights and freedoms, under the condition that they carry out their duties, such as the performance of taxes, respect the law, defend their homeland, etc.

Consequently, the constitution, or the social contract or the pact, is always considered as a text expressing the common will of the citizens, granting legality and legitimacy to the state power, and emphasizing the unity and unanimity of all people as a political community.

1.3 The constitution as an expression of the sovereignty of the people

The constitution is not a favor, which the state grants to citizens. In fact, the constitution represents the sovereign rights of people. According to Thomas Paine’s famous book “The Rights of Man” (1791) “a constitution is not an act of a government but of a people constituting a government”⁴. This clearly shows that a constitution is anterior to the existence of the government. This means that government is only created by constitution, which is not an act of the government, but an act of the people who formed the government⁵. Thus, if the constitution is the source of formation and definition of responsibilities of the government/public authorities, this authority cannot draft it. Therefore, the constituent power must belong to the people who have all the right to accept and to approve it.

In other words, if the public has the right to accept and to approve the constitution, this means that the constituent power must belong to the people and not to the government, which is chosen by those people⁶. This is what makes the constitutions, at the same time, consciously chosen and designed by the citizens. In this case, the constitution expresses not only the will of the people, but also the constituent power, which is the highest power represented through this sovereignty⁷. That is why most constitutions of democratic countries usually devote one of their first articles to the declaration that the “*sovereignty belongs to the people*”, such as the article 3 of the French

constitution, article 37 of the Argentine constitution, article 1 of the Spanish constitution, and article 2 of the Moroccan constitution of 2011.

1.4 The constitution limits the power of the government to protect human rights

The constitution expresses popular sovereignty, which means that it reflects the various basic interests of living together, which helps to achieve the public interest or the wellbeing of society. One of the most prominent of fundamental interests is human rights norms, which guarantee each individual a set of rights (and duties), which he/she can enjoy within society, and impose the government to respect it, which constitutes at the same time a limit to its powers. This idea refers to a restricted or a limited government.

On the one hand, the constitution contains many regulation norms. The principle of separation of powers and the system of distribution of powers constitute the most important manifestations of these norms. Whereas the distribution of power guarantees that power is not monopolized and concentrated, the separation of power ensures the independence of authorities and control of powers, where each authority ensures that the other authority is consistent with the powers provided by the constitution. In this meaning, any constitution granting and distributing the various powers necessarily implies that the powers of each authority should be limited⁸. From the other hand, the constitution helps to limit the powers of the government by citing human rights standards⁹, so the state power finds its limits in human rights norms recognized by the constitutional norms¹⁰.

Generally, the constitution helps to limit government powers by means of power separation. That means that the government should be guided by principles and norms which clearly determine limitation and procedures, etc. and by the human rights norms, which must be respected. These elements make the constitution a fundamental framework on which the state and society are based (sovereignty). As it regulates social relations and resolves the social and political conflicts (supreme law), it's linked to the continuity of the state and its democratic process expressed in the constitution.

If the constitution is the result of the historical, societal and political circumstances prevailing in a political society, the various constitutional amendments are the reflection of the political circumstances that characterize each stage of the change that has taken place within this community, such as the 2011 constitution which represents (after all the several constitutional amendments) this idea as follows.

2. The constitutional institutions

If the various constitutions that Morocco has known in the past years came upon the will and the decision of the King¹¹, the 2011 constitution is linked to the pressure exerted by the Moroccan people through the 20th February Movement¹², a social movement demanding a set of rights such as justice, equality and freedom¹³. The circumstances surrounding this constitution, makes Morocco part of the democratization mobilization called the Arab Spring, which led to the overthrow of several political regimes in the Arab region, including in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya. This is what sparked the Moroccan regime's concern and explains the quick response of the royal institution to the social and political demands of the 20th February Movement. The King announced a constitutional referendum¹⁴ as a way to deal with this delicate situation and this is what reflected for the Moroccans, the King Mohamed VI's smartness and intelligence.

2.1 The 2011 constitution, some general principles

For the first time, unlike the previous Constitutions, the first article of the 2011 constitution defines the political system as “a constitutional, democratic, parliamentary and social Monarchy” where “the constitutional regime of the kingdom is founded on the separation, the balance and the collaboration of the powers, as well as on participative democracy of (the) citizens”¹⁵. On the one hand, it is important to note that the political organization of the parliamentary monarchy in the Moroccan context is not the same as in other constitutional monarchies, such as Great Britain. If the Queen in the British system reigns, but does not govern, this means that she has a symbolic power, whereas the King in the Moroccan regime reigns and govern. This means that the King actually governs and disposes of symbolic powers. In this case, the Moroccan political system is not considered as a real parliamentary monarchy, as much as, in our view, a semi parliamentary monarchy, especially given that the king has the right to dissolve the parliament. On the other hand, the 2011 constitution provides for the first time, the principle of separation of powers, which comprises the distribution of functions or missions of the state, by entrusting their exclusive exercise to different bodies or elected bodies, specifying the rules of their independence, and means of protecting pressures¹⁶. In this context, the 2011 constitution ensures this principle, by emphasizing the balance between the executive and the legislative branches and the independence of the judiciary, which is for the first time considered as an authority along the lines of the executive and the legislative. In addition, the 2011 constitution emphasizes “*the principle of sovereignty*” through article 2, which states “sovereignty belongs to the nation which exercises it directly, by way of referendum, and indirectly, by the intermediary of its representatives”.

Likewise, the 2011 Constitution includes, for the first time, the element of identity in the preamble ¹⁷ and article 5 determines the “Arabic language the official language of the state” and “Tamazight (Berber-Amazigh)” as “an official language of the state, being common patrimony of all Moroccans without exception”. In the same context, the 2011 constitution introduced for the first time some principles of participative democracy in the article 12, 14 and 1 of the constitution, which permits the individuals and associations to participate in public affairs.

Generally, these elements make the 2011 constitution an event of rupture with previous constitutions, which do not recognize many constitutional principles of separation of power or the Moroccan identity. Also the 2011 constitution provides, unlike the previous Moroccan constitution, many approaches in which democratization can be promoted at the national and local level through intermediation mechanisms, especially civil society organizations serving public interest purposes through petitions which permit citizens to participate in the conduct of public affairs by submitting such petitions to the public authorities. These elements represent a positive transformation compared to previous constitutions.

2.2 Human rights norms

Unlike prior constitutions, the 2011 constitution includes a variety of first generation rights¹⁸, second generation¹⁹ and third generation rights²⁰, which make it a vessel of rights and freedoms. This newness is represented through the title 2 of the constitution which includes most of the human rights norms such as the right to life (article 20), personal security and freedom (article 21), physic or moral integrity (article22), presumption of innocence (article23), right to the privacy (article24), freedom of thought, of opinion and of expression (Article 25), right of access to the information (Article 27), freedom of press (Article 28), freedom of reunion, of assembly, of peaceful demonstration, of association and of syndical and political membership (Article 29), and many others. But noticeable here is that although this title provides many rights and freedoms, it limits them at the same time, such as article 27 which provides the right to information, but at the same time restricts it for reasons of national security. Also, article 29 which includes the most

important freedoms, especially the freedom of reunion, assembly, and association, but at the same time permits the redefinition of these rights and freedom through an ordinary law, which has a sub-constitutional value.

2.3 The royal institution

The various Moroccan constitutions have stipulated supremacy and the highness of the royal institution, and by giving the king multiple powers made the royal institution the major player in the political arena since the first constitution of 1962, until the 1996 constitution. Although the constitution is an essential and important way to reconfigure state structure, especially the 2011 came because of the pressure of the people. The revision of the 2011 constitution did not affect the responsibilities of the royal institution, which continuous to strengthen the king's position as the main actor in the political field.

The most important constitutional renewals brought by the 2011 constitution at the level of the royal institution is to eliminate the controversy that existed under article 19 of the previous constitution, which combined all the powers of the king in one article. This caused the ambiguity of the king's responsibilities, especially that the status of the commander of the faithful includes, from the perspective of the Islamic caliphate, the political and religious authority. To overcome this ambiguity, the 2011 constitution describes the terms of reference of the king by means of two articles:

- Article 41²¹ of the 2011 constitution provides the terms of references of the king in the religious sphere as the commander of the faithful.
- Article 42²² provides the terms of reference of the king as the head of the state.

These articles and others, guarantee that the king still exercises the religious authorities and the political authorities, as in the past. In the same context, it is important to note that king exercises these authorities through the mechanism of royal decrees (Dahirs), which are not submitted to any debate or parliamentary vote. Hence, the 2011 constitution preserves the status of the Royal Institution in the Moroccan political structure.

2.4 The government

Unlike earlier constitutions, the 2011 constitution undoubtedly contributed to a transition from the old Moroccan regime to a genuine parliamentary system, by introducing that, "the king appoints the head of the government within the party that has led the elections of the members of the house of representatives and in view of their results"²³. As a natural consequence of this constitutional innovation, the 2011 constitution enhances the competencies defined in previous constitutions, by strengthening and expanding the powers of the government. Thus, it exercises the executive power, implements its governmental program, assures the execution of the laws, disposes the administration, supervises the public enterprises and establishments and assures their protection (Article 89). In addition, ministers are fully accountable, in the respective sector, which they are responsible for within the framework of governmental solidarity²⁴.

In this context, it should be noted that the government exercises these powers under the authority of the head of government, contrary to previous constitutions where he was attributed the function of prime minister. Regarding the government's responsibility, it is only accountable to the parliament. This means that the government is no longer accountable to the king. However, regarding the application of this principle in reality, the government still remains accountable to his Majesty. Although the constitution does not provide this accountability, it is important to note that some facts confirm that government is accountable to the king. For example, the former minister for youth and sports, Mohamed Ouzzine, who was deposed from his office by the king on

7 January 2015 following the football stadium scandal in Rabat. Even though this accountability is not direct, it also materializes directly through the mechanism of the council of ministers headed by the King, which allows him to monitor all the government activities, especially those related to public policy, law project (bills), draft constitution revision, the finance bill and appointments for high public positions²⁵.

Therefore, the government is still accountable to the king, especially as the king appoints the head of government, and its members. Besides, the king still has the right to “terminate the function of one or more members of the government” after the consultation with the head of government.

In this context, among the most important constitutional updates related to the competencies of the head of government, he is attributed the following important responsibilities:

- The right to dissolve the House of Representatives (article 104). This is an important introduction in the 2011 constitution, which represents a quantum leap concerning the balance of powers between the government and the parliament, especially as the parliament has the right to topple the government through the mechanism of censor and withdrawal of confidence.
- The exercise of the regulatory power (article 90).
- The presidency of the council of government (article 92), where the government can deliberate on many issues²⁶. In this context, the head of government informs the king of the conclusions of the deliberations.

Moreover, the most important responsibilities of the head of government is the signature on the royal decrees (Dahirs Malaki), except the royal decrees related to the:

- religious sphere.
- provisions related to the trusteeship council.
- government exemption and appointment of the head of government.
- dissolution of the parliament.
- appointment of judges.
- state of emergency.
- appointment of the president and members of the constitutional court.
- constitutional revision²⁷.

As well as, among the observations, we note the duplication of executive power. On the one hand, the executive branch of the royal institution, on the other hand, the executive branch of government. This means, at the same time, that there is kind of sharing of responsibilities between the monarchy and the government. But in spite of this, the 2011 constitution draws an important distinction between the executive branch of the royal institution and the government through the council of ministers headed by the king, and the council of government headed by the head of government. Thus, we can distinguish between the exclusive responsibilities of the king, and the common responsibilities shared between the king and the head of government as follows:

The executive responsibilities of the king:

- The religious sphere. (article 41)
- The supreme head of the royal armed forces. (article 53)
- The appointments of the judges. (article 57)
- The exercise of the right of pardon. (article 58)
- The exercise of the emergency powers. (article 59)

The shared responsibilities between the king and the head of government are:

- The dissolution of the House of Representatives. (article 104 and article 96²⁸)
- The initiative on the constitutional revision (article 172)
- The presidency of the council of ministers (article 48), and the presidency of the supreme council of security (article 54)²⁹.

This term of reference confirms the existence of a twofold exercise of the executive branch. Thus, there is the executive authority of the government and of the king, which is considered as a quantum leap in the history of the second institution in the country (the government) which comes after the royal institution. However, the relationship between government and the monarchy is unbalanced. The king had through the mechanism of the ministerial council, a veto power over all decisions made by the council of government. This confirms indirectly that government is accountable to the king and to the parliament, including the House of Representatives³⁰ and the Board of Advisors (House of Counselors³¹).

2.5 The parliament

The parliament occupies an important position in the constitutional structure of 2011. On the one hand, the 2011 constitution transmits to the parliament, for the first time, all the traditional functions of any parliament, which are:

- Representation of citizens.
- Voting laws.
- Oversight and control the government, including government accountability.
- Evaluation of public policy.

On the other hand, the 2011 Constitution provides, for the first time, the function of the opposition, that it defined as “an essential component of both chambers. It participates in the function of legislation and oversight”, and granted under the article 10 a status, which confer the rights to appropriately accomplish the missions and parliamentary work, such as:

- The freedom of opinion, expression and assembly.
- Airtime official media, proportional to its representation.
- The benefit of public finance, conforming to the provisions of the law.
- The participation in the legislature procedure.
- The effective participation in the control of the government work.
- he presidency of the commission in charge of the legislation in the chamber of representatives.

Concerning the Parliament as a whole, in addition to the traditional responsibilities³², we note that article 71 of the 2011 constitution has expanded the domains of law up to thirty³³ (30) contrary to the 1996 constitution, which limits it to ten (10). These constitutional updates, brought by the 2011 constitution, may help to achieve the efficiency of parliamentary work.

Furthermore, it is important to note that there are shared responsibilities between the king and parliament, especially in some domains of law, such as:

- Religious affairs
- Fundamental rights and freedoms provided in the constitution.
- The requirements related to respect the international commitments of the kingdom.

The royal institution exercises these responsibilities by decrees (dahirs)³⁴, unlike the parliament, which exercises the terms of reference through legislation. But despite these competencies, the royal institution has large powers, for example the king can ask the parliament

to read the law in second reading (article 95) and he has the right to dissolve both of Houses of parliament (article 51).

Conclusion

The constitutional revision of 2011 led to a genuine change in the Moroccan constitution, for the first time since the independence. On the one hand, it provides elements of the Moroccan identity, the principle of the will of the nation, the separation of powers, etc.. Also, the constitution enhances the institution of the head of government (as the second institution in the Moroccan political system) and further established a democratic majority. On the other hand, the 2011 constitution preserves the excellence/supremacy of the royal institution over all other institutions.

However, despite the positive aspects of the 2011 constitution, one of the paradoxes existing is, that Moroccan state takes a nuanced place among the autocracies and democracies. The regime features fundamental democratic institutions while the monarchy, contrary to the principle of separation of power, exercises large powers and monopolizes all authorities. This leaves the question open for future research, related to the nature of the political system the Moroccan state and citizens seek. Is there really a desire to build parliamentary ownership (like the British example?) Or do we seek a parliamentary monarchy of another kind?

Notes

¹ G. Philip, Democracy and democratization, University of London, Minor Revisions (2011), P45. URL: http://www.londoninternational.ac.uk/sites/default/files/programme_resources/lse/lse_pdf/subject_guides/ps3086_ch1-3.pdf

Boutros Boutros-Ghali, An Agenda for Democratization, United Nations Publications, New York (1996), P 1.

² Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679 philosopher and sociologist) mentioned the theory of the social contract for the first time in 1651, in his famous work Leviathan. According to him, man lived in a state of nature without any authority of governance. Then, within the framework of the social contract, everyone renounces his natural freedom in favor of security and public order of a civilized society. This idea was taken up and developed by John Locke. Locke presents in detail each stage of the process leading to the transition from the state of nature to the civil society through the social contract. His theory had led to the concept of sovereignty of the people in relation to the power of the state, even if it is an authoritarian state. Later, Jean Jacques Rousseau (1712 – 1778, French Philosopher) pushed even further the reasoning and stated that power should be entrusted only to the representatives of the will of the people. In his work on the “Social Contract” (Le Contrat Social), Rousseau, pursues the reflections of Hobbes, and describes the process of the social contract as a process in which the people – find a form of association, which defends and protects the interests and properties of each partner.

For more expansion see : Ling Giang Nguyen, constitutional protection of Human Rights in Vietnam, PhD thesis of Law, presented on June 29, 2015 at the University of Toulouse 1 – France(2015) P26. (French version)

³ See : Dennis C. Mueller Constitutional Democracy , Published by Oxford University Press , New York (1996), P 61.

⁴ <http://www.constitution.org/tp/rightsman2.htm>

⁵ Linh Giang Nguyen, Ibid. P 29.

⁶ Ibid, P 29.

⁷ IBID.

⁸ See: Friederich A. Hayek The Constitution of Liberty - , translator : Raoul Audoin et Jacques Garello, Litec, Paris (1994), P 133. (French Version).

For example, the 14th amendment of the U.S constitution give us a good example of the limiting of governmental power, where it apply that: { No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty,

or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction of the equal protection of the laws }.

⁹ Ling Giang Nguyen, Ibid. P 36.

¹⁰ Dennis C. Mueller: - Constitutional Democracy - , IBID, P 89.

¹¹ I mean the 1962 constitution, the 1970 and 1972 constitutions, and the 1992 and 1996 constitutions.

¹² For more expansion on the 20 February Movement see: Marina Balleria: - Why Now and What is Next: The February 20 Movement's Challenge to the State - , Yale University - Independent Study Project (ISP) Collection 2011 P 4.

Web site : http://digitalcollections.sit.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2003&context=isp_collection

Consult the web on 11-02-2017.

¹³ This is what was expressed by the slogan (الشعب يريد الدستور الجديد the people want a new constitution)

¹⁴ This event confirms that the Moroccan constitutions is a way out of the political crisis in the country.

¹⁵ The notion of social Monarchy refers to social rights and the role of the monarchy in protecting these rights. See : Mohamed Madani, Driss Magbraoui and Saloua Zerhouni : - The 2011 Moroccan constitution: a Critical Analysis – International Institute for democracy and Electoral Assistance, Stockholm 2012 , P 18. (PDF version)

Published on www.IDEA.int

¹⁶ For more expansion: M.J.C. Vile (1967), Constitutionalism and the separation of powers, Oxford University Press, P 3.

¹⁷ “ ... its one and indivisible national identity, its unity, is Saharan-Hassanic (saharao-hassanie) components, nourished and enriched by its African, Andalusian Hebraic and Mediterranean influences (affluent). The preeminence accorded to the Muslim religion in the national reference is consistent with the attachment of the Moroccan people to the values of openness, moderation, tolerance and dialog for mutual understanding between all the cultures and the civilizations of the world...”

¹⁸ Political and civil rights..

¹⁹ Economic, social and cultural rights.

²⁰ Various new rights such as the right for peace, for development...

²¹ “The King, Commander of the Faithful [Amir Al Mouminine], preserves the respect of Islam. He guarantees the free exercise of beliefs [cultes]. He presides over the Superior Council of the Ulema [Conseil superieur des Oulema], charged with the study of his submitted questions that he.

The council is the sole instance enabled [habilité] to pronounce [prononcer] the religious consultations (Fatwas) before being officially agreed to, on the questions to which it has been referred [saisi] and this, on the basis of the tolerant principles, precepts and designs of Islam. The attributions, the composition and the modalities of functioning of the council are established by a dahir [royal decree]. The King exercises by dahirs the religious prerogatives inherent in the institution of the emirate of the faithful [Imarat Al Mouminine], which are conferred to him in exclusive manner by this Article.”

²² “The King is head of state, his supreme representative, symbol of the unity of the nation, guarantor of the permanence and of the continuity of the state and supreme arbiter between the institutions, preserves the respect of the constitution, to the good functioning of the constitutional institutions, to the protection of democratic choice and of the rights and freedoms of the citizens [feminine] and citizens [masculine], of the collectivities, and to respect for the international commitments of the kingdom. He is the guarantor of the independence of the country and of the territorial integrity of the kingdom within its authentic frontiers. The King exercises these missions by dahirs by virtue of the powers that are expressly devolved to him by this Constitution.

The dahirs, with the exception of those provided for in Articles 41, 44 (2nd paragraph), 47 (1st and 6th paragraphs), 51, 57, 59, 130 (1st and 4th paragraphs) and 174, are countersigned by the Head of Government. “

The dahirs that has been identified in the last paragraph concerning :

The dahirs related to the religious domain (article 41), the dahirs related to the council of the regency, the dahirs related to the appoints of the head of government, and the dahirs related to the dismiss of the government (1st and 6th paragraph of article 47), the dahirs related to the dissolving of the parliament (article 51), the dahirs related to the appointment of the magistrates (article 57), the dahirs related to the exercise of the practice of emergency powers (article 59), the dahirs related of the appointment of members of the Constitutional court (1st and 4th paragraphs of the article 130), the dahirs related to the constitutional reform (article 174).

²³ Article 47 of the 2011 constitution.

²⁴ Article 93 of the 2011 constitution.

²⁵ Article 49 of the 2011 constitution.

²⁶ Among these issues :

- The general policy of the state before its presentation in the council of ministers
- Public policies
- Sectorial policies
- Human rights and public order

For more details, see article 92 of the 2011 Constitution.

²⁷ Paragraph 4 of article 42 of the 2011 Constitution.

²⁸ In this case, we should note that the king has the right to dissolve both of chambers of the parliament, unlike the head of the government who has the right to dissolve only the house of the representatives.

²⁹ The head of the government can preside over these councils only upon a specific agenda.

³⁰ The council has maintained the same competencies as were established in the previous constitutions.

For more expansion see: the Articles 100, 101, 103 of the 2011 constitution.

The only newness here is the parliamentary committees that have become entitled to hear to the responsible of the administrations and of the public establishments and enterprises, in the presence of and under the responsibility of the concerned ministers (article 102).

³¹ The article 106 of the 2011 constitution: “The chamber of councilors can interpellate the government by means of a motion signed by at least one-fifth of its members...”

³² Article 71 of the 2011 constitution stipulates, that “the parliament exercises the legislative power, votes the laws, controls the actions of the government and evaluates public policies”.

³³ Which includes for example :fundamental freedoms and rights provided in the constitution, the regime of the broadcast media and of the press, Amnesty, the determination of infractions and the penalties, the statute of the services and forces of maintenance of order (for more expansion see the article 71 of the 2011 constitution).

³⁴ Article 42 of the 2011 constitution defines these domains.

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Ana-Maria Gajdo

The Wave of Change in MENA - Between Arab Spring and Arab Destruction

The revolutions in MENA, started in 2011, meant not only the fall of some dictators (in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Yemen) and the hope for a transition to democracy (Tunisia), but also civil wars (Libya, Yemen, Syria) and the rise of DAESH, a persistent threat to MENA's and Europe's political stability. Western media and academics talked about the Arab Spring as a possible mean of democratization, according to the theory proposed by S.P. Huntington. In opposition to this current opinion, some leaders of MENA countries have raised ever since the prospect of the Arab World's destruction as we know it.

This paper aims to analyze some of the major changes produced in each country hit by the wave of revolutions, according to a double-ended, compelling perspective: West and Middle East, Orientalism and Occidentalism, between an „Arab Spring” and an „Arab destruction” i.e. a geopolitical cataclysm of the whole Arab world.

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The Wave of Change in MENA - Between Arab Spring and Arab Destruction

1. The year 2011 in MENA – A milestone

The revolutions in MENA countries have a *common, avowed objective*: the collapse of authoritarian regimes. But in every country, there were specific conditions and internal causes that triggered revolutionary movements and, as a result, each country took a different path after 2011 (cfr. Altarozzi, 2011, p. 9). In the early days of the revolutions, the Arab Spring had been difficult to define, with the media using terms such as *revolt, revolution, Intifada, social movements, popular protests, Second Independence, Islamic or Arab awakening*, without further clarifications or distinctions.

Although Western governments and academics perceive the Arab Spring mainly as an ideological aspiration to freedom and democracy, removing authoritarian leaders without careful planning in appointing the rightful successor government will result in dire consequences for all related states. In a paper that had been published three years before the outbreak of the revolutions, O. Roy warned that removing dictators in MENA would mean the eruption of radicalism and the destruction of the region. „*Nobody wants to topple President Assad in Syria or General Musharraf in Pakistan, whereas it is an open secret that these two countries offer sanctuary or support to terrorist groups and radical movements, simply because their destruction would be worse than their current nuisance capability*” (Roy, 2008, p.9).

Arab Spring has been defining the events in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) since its start in late 2010 - early 2011. The wave of revolutions meant the removal from power of four dictators: Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali, in Tunisia (January 14, 2011), Hosni Mubarak, in Egypt (February 11, 2011), Muammar Gaddafi, Libya (August 20, 2011, fall of Tripoli) and Ali Abdullah Saleh, in Yemen. Regarding Saleh, some authors take into account the date of November 23, 2011, when he fled to Saudi Arabia, others February 27, 2012 when he stepped down and formally handed power to his deputy, Abdrabbuh Mansour Hadi.

While in Libya and Yemen the revolution has *apparently* achieved its purpose, namely the leaders were removed, the situation degraded and civil wars emerged. The revolutionary wave has also reached Syria, Morocco, Algeria, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, the Palestinian Territories, Bahrain, Iraq, Kuwait, Lebanon and Oman. To avoid the Tunisian scenario, some monarchs have adopted certain reforms demanded by the citizens (such as in Morocco and Jordan) or the leaders decided to violently repress the revolutions (Yemen, Syria and Bahrain). In Syria, the war has been already lasting for six years causing hundreds of thousands of casualties, the migration of a major percent of the population, as well as internal displacements.

One of our main ideas is that although most debates refer to countries where leaders were removed from power, all countries in MENA had been more or less affected by the Arab Spring. An important point of our analysis refers to the effects of the Arab Spring in each country.

2. Arab Spring, causes and outcomes

2.1. The Spark

The Arab Spring began in Tunisia in Sidi Bouzid where, on December 17, 2010, Mohamed Bouazizi, a 26-year-old fruit seller, set himself on fire to protest against police abuses. A police woman confiscated his merchandise on the grounds that he did not have any authorization. Because

he had not found justice in front of the superiors of the police woman, the young man made this extreme gesture and died because of burn injuries in the hospital on January 4, 2011. As a result, several hundred young people protested in front of the police headquarters in the small town of Sidi Bouzid. Images of police beating demonstrators began circulating throughout social media. It marked the beginning of the Arab Spring in MENA. On January 14, 2011, the Tunisian government collapsed, and president Zine El Abidine Ben Ali fled to Saudi Arabia. *The Jasmine Revolution*, the Tunisian's popular movement, created an unexpected wave of protests in the region. „Bouazizi came to symbolize the hopelessness and frustration of a generation of Arabs” (Noueihed and Warren, 2013, p.74).

2.2. General Causes of the Uprisings

Andrea Margelletti (Anghelone and Ungari, 2012, pp. 8-9) mentions a mix of causes that lead to the outbreak of the Arab revolutions: economic underdevelopment, social inequalities, closed political systems. In addition to these classical causes of social uprising, the role of new methods of communication, such as mobile telephony and social networks, was crucial as they opened up a gate to a whole new world, a virtual library of rights and freedom.

The regimes removed from power after the Revolutions, and the regime in Syria, were being maintained on terror and by the leaders' seemingly unlimited power: a unique political party (Syria) or futile political opposition (Tunisia, Egypt, and Yemen). The regimes in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Syria and Yemen present some characteristics identified with authoritarian regimes (according to Friederich and Brzezinski, 1956): a strong political police; state monopoly over media; centralized control of all political, social, cultural and economic organizations and entities. To all these we can add the establishment of a state of emergency, an extent through which the authoritarian regimes in MENA are controlling „the people's voice”. That is why people in the streets asked for *Freedom* and *Justice*.

Among the main causes of revolutions in MENA is the economic status of these countries.

„[Discontent] has its origin in poverty. The average income of an Egyptian is 12 percent of that of an American citizen, and the lifetime of an Egyptian is 10 years shorter than the life of an American. 20 percent of the Egypt population lives in total poverty” (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2015, p. 9).

In Egypt, the slogans were *Bread, Freedom, Social Justice*. Bread has always been a serious, political and economic issue in Egypt and other countries in MENA, as demonstrated by the *Bread Riots* in the '70.

In addition, Tunisia, Egypt and Syria were ruled by *oligarchs*: Ben Ali's family and entourage have controlled all the important domains: communications, air and sea transport, banks, retail, etc., gaining impressive fortunes (Honwana, 2011). In a similar manner, in Egypt many financial sectors were in the hands of Mubarak's friends and sons (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2012, p. 52). In Syria, the Assad family runs the commercial and many State institutions. Bashar's brother, Maher Al-Assad, was the commander of the Republican Guard Division and Bashar's brother-in-law, Asef Shawkat, was the head of the Syrian Intelligence. Rifaat Ali Al-Assad, the uncle of Bashar, has built alliances with the strongest Alawite and Sunni representatives in Syria, through family ties. They control real estate, banks, airports, stores, Syriatel - Syrian mobile operator, etc. (Leverett, 2005, p. 84).

2.3. Changes across MENA

Although media and academic environments focus particularly on countries where leaders have been removed from power or those in which conflicts continue, all MENA countries have been shaken by the wave of revolutions.

a. Tunisia

After January 14, 2011 (when Ben Ali fled) Fouad Mebazaa, the head of the Parliament became president *ad interim*. A new Government (*ad interim*) was formed with the mandate to manage the political transition, prepare the elections for the Constituent National Assembly and draft a new Constitution.

In October 2011, more than 94 political parties were on the electoral lists in Tunisia. The favorites were the EnNahda's Islamists, who formed a coalition government with the Congress for the Republic and the Democratic Forum for Labour and Liberties – Ettakatol. EnNahda has been forced to give up power in early 2014, after a year marked by political crisis and the assassination of two opposition leaders. The most important step for Tunisia was, perhaps, the adoption of a new Constitution in the early months of 2014, which granted broad powers to the parliament and government and limited the prerogatives of the President. In October 2014, the secularist Party Nidaa Tunus (Call of Tunisia) has won 85 of the 217 seats, while EnNahda won 69 seats in Parliament. In November 2014, Beji Caid Essebsi won the presidential elections.

Tunisia is now considered the successful example of a transition to democracy, although there are some question marks: the current president was part of the entourage of Bourguiba and Ben Ali and cannot be the representative of the young revolutionaries. In addition, Tunisia has not passed the „two turnover test” (the next elections are scheduled for March 2018). According to Huntington,

„a democracy can be considered consolidated if the political party or group that comes to power at the first election in the transition to democracy loses the next elections and give up power in favor of to those who win the elections, and if these winners, further, give up power in the good to winners of the next election” (Huntington, 1991, pp.266-267).

Moreover, in May 2016, R. Ghannouchi, the leader of EnNahda, announced that his Party would leave political Islam, which raised new questions about Islamist parties' access to post-revolution political life:

„we are leaving political Islam and entering democratic Islam (...) We are Muslim democrats who no longer claim to represent political Islam. We want religious activity to be completely independent from political activity” (Middle East Eye, 2016).

But Tunisia has another argument in its favor: Domenico Fisichella argues that modern democracy is based on the idea that there may be „a disagreement and an opposition in relation to the holders of power, without adversaries being considered enemies” (Fisichella, 2007, p.313). Fisichella also speaks of a feature of democracy that is considered revolutionary: not only that the political opponent is not an enemy, but the opportunity to show his disagreement is guaranteed by law. Also, Tunisia has a strong civil society. In 2015, the Nobel Peace Prize was awarded to the National Dialogue Quartet for its contribution to building a democracy. The Quartet (established in 2013) brings together divers professionals groups, intercessors between power and people.

b. Egypt

Hosni Mubarak had ruled Egypt from 1981 until 2011. Mubarak had been elected by Parliament and confirmed by popular referendums for three decades. During his term, the National Democratic Party (led by Mubarak) had controlled all elected State structures. The protests began in Midan al-Tahrir in Cairo, on January 25, 2011. In the 18 days of protests, three groups opposed the Mubarak regime: youth movements, labor movements and political groups, including the Muslim Brotherhood. On February 11, President Mohammed Hosni Mubarak resigned: the power was taken by a Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (CSAF).

In November 2011, the new Party of the Muslim Brotherhood, Freedom and Justice, won a majority in Parliament. But in Egypt, the army has always played an important role in the country's governance: all presidents had a military background. Since the beginning of the post-revolutionary era, the CSAF has struggled to remove the Islamists from power. In June 2012, the CSAF dissolved the Parliament. In this condition, on June 30, 2012 Mohamed Morsi became the new president of Egypt with the support of the Muslim Brotherhood. By the end of 2012, Morsi and the Army denied each other their power and legitimacy. In November 2012 the Egyptians were, again, in the streets to demand the resignation of Morsi. On the second anniversary of the Revolution on January 2013, protests broke out again in several Egyptian cities under the slogan *Unfinished Revolution*. At the end of June 2013 more than 20 million Egyptians have demanded the resignation of President Morsi. On July 3, the army occupied the headquarters of the public television and tanks were sent to the streets of Cairo. A new interim government assumed power until new elections. In December 2013, the Muslim Brotherhood was banned, being considered a terrorist organization.

In March 2014 Abdel Fattah Saeed Hussein Khalil el-Sisi ,commander-in-chief of the Army, the main character involved in the Second Revolution, announced that he cannot ignore the demands of the people and would run for presidency. After he had won the elections (May 2014), he became president. The last Egyptian Constitution was adopted following a referendum held in January 2014. It grants rights for Copts and, as expected, more powers for the military. Six years after the revolution, the space for civic engagement created in Tahrir Square is almost off. Egypt seems to have lost the way to democracy: without freedom of expression or the right of political leaders to compete, the Parliament's activity was suspended from 2013 until 2016 and Sisi led the country through presidential decrees.

c. Libya

The outbreak of riots began on February 17th 2011, when the rebels created a National Transitional Council (NTC), based in Benghazi, with the aim of overthrowing Gaddafi from power. On March 19, on the basis of a Security Council resolution, an international military coalition led by joint armies of NATO and the United States launched military operations on the territory and airspace of Libya. In August 2011 Gaddafi had lost control of Tripoli, but managed to escape. Gaddafi was captured and killed in October 2011 in Sirte.

On November 24, an interim government had formed and in 2012 the elections were held. NTC, led by Mustafa Abdul Jalil had ceded power to the General National Congress (GNC). Jalil became the leader of the National Forces Alliance, a coalition of 60 Islamist movements. The Libyans have chosen a new parliament to replace GNC in June 2014. The Council moved to the eastern city of Tobruk, leaving Tripoli under the control of Islamist militias. Libya currently has a prime minister internationally recognized, Fayeze Al Sarraj. He was elected in 2014 and took office in Tripoli after negotiations between the two governments with the support of the United Nations, in 2016.

Libya wants, at least in theory, to start a transition to democracy, as stated in the new Constitution of 2012. But the situation became more complicated after the Islamic State announced in 2014 the creation of an important base in Lybia. The outcome of the Libyan civil war determined an internal displacement of half a million people and deep poverty. According to a Report released in 2017 by Human Rights Watch, the militias and the army forces of the two governments are engaged in arbitrary detentions, torture, murders, kidnappings of public figures (journalists, politicians) and civilians. In Libya, US, British, UAE and French military forces are involved in the fight against the extremists (DAESH) in Sirte and Benghazi. Because of Libya's chaotic situation, illegal migrants and smugglers choose this route on the Mediterranean to reach Europe.

On July 25th, 2017, near Paris, French President Emmanuel Macron had discussed with the two Libyan governments, and they assumed to put an end to the military confrontations and holding of elections in the spring of 2018.

d. Yemen

In Yemen, protesters demanded the departure of Ali Abdullah Saleh. On June 3rd, 2011, following an attack on the presidential palace in Sanaa, the President had been injured and, therefore, went to Riyadh (Saudi Arabia) for treatment. From there, Ali Abdullah Saleh had promised to Yemenites to return for negotiations. Meanwhile, thousands of Yemenites have been killed, wounded or arrested. After 30 years of presidency, Saleh had stepped down in 2012. The protesters called for a new Constitution and the dissolution of Parliament. Since September 2014 the Houthis (Shiite rebels) began an offensive on the capital. A month later, in a coordinated attack by Al-Qaeda, dozens of Houthi rebels were killed in Sanaa. In 2015 there were 10 million Yemenite children who were in need of urgent humanitarian assistance, with more than 3,600 schools, 1,000 hospitals and clinics being closed. The Islamic State has made felt its presence in Yemen since March 2015, when two Shiite mosques had been blown up.

Yemen is in a critical situation. It is an underdeveloped country where terrorism destroys any hope of stability. More than 10,000 people have died, 2.8 million have fled the country, and 10 millions need „urgent assistance”, according to an UN report (Al Jazeera, 2017). Moreover, the government is in exile, groups of Houthis have control over parts of the territory, while Al-Qaeda or other terrorist groups are fighting to get control of some cities. The rivalry between Iran and Saudi Arabia, regarding the legitimacy for representing the Islamic community, was also reflected in the war in Yemen by supporting various opposing factions. More than 80 percent of Yemen's population suffers from lack of drinking water and food. All attempts to solve the conflict, initiated by the UN, have failed.

e. Syria

In March 2011 the Arab Spring reached Syria, but the revolution quickly turned into a civil war. Bashar al-Assad is the only president still in power after the outbreak of Arab Spring. Hafez Al-Assad and his son, Bashar have used „the military-security complex, the Ba'ath party apparatus and a new Alawite elite” to rule the country (Noueihed and Warren, 2013, p.215).

In 2012 Bashar Al-Assad had begun a campaign of „punishment” against his own people. In 2013 ballistic missiles were used to attack residential districts in Aleppo, attacks classified by the international community as war crimes. The real number of casualties is not known, but U.N. estimated there are over 400,000 victims. In July 2016 there were 4.8 million Syrian refugees and 8.7 million persons displaced in other areas of the country, according to the United Nations Refugee Agency - UNHCR.

It was difficult to define for a long time who is fighting in Syria. The country became a theater of war between the regime, different religious and ethnic forces (Kurds, Alwites, Shia, Sunni, Christians, Druze, Yazidi etc.) and terrorists. The many ethnic and religious minorities living in relatively compact areas on Syrian territory may be centrifugal forces to dismantle the country after the war will end. The idea was mentioned by Bader Jamous, secretary general of the National Coalition for Syria, at the conference „Syrian Crisis - Recent Developments and Prospects” organized by Istituto Affari Internazionali in Rome, in 2014. He said, according to the official translation, that „Syria risks becoming a federation. We need an internal political settlement, not the force of arms”. His statements were endorsed in the same conference by Michel Kilo, a writer and activist for human rights arguing: „if we want that Syria not to be broken into pieces, we need the support of the international community”.

The conflict in Syria unfolds on several levels: nationally (Assad and many opponents), regionally (Iran against Saudi Arabia) and internationally (Western alliance against Russia, China, and sometimes Turkey). Between Assad's regime and Iran exist many ties: a Shia allegiance (Assad belongs to the Alawite branch, assimilated to Shia), regional interests and old alliances like the one against Iraq, in the '80. On the other hand, Saudi Arabia and Qatar support the Sunni forces in Syria. The National Coalition for Syrian Revolution and Opposition Forces was created in Doha, Qatar, in November 2012 (some authors mention that the coalition was created in Turkey, in 2011). The Coalition is recognized by many countries as *the legitimate representative of the Syrian people*. However, the Coalition's efficiency is disputed: „In Syria (...) there has always been a general feeling that the opposition on exile was (and still is) illegitimate” (Lesch, 2012-2013, p.53).

At the beginning of 2013 a new force opposed the Assad regime: the Islamic State (IS), also known as ISIS, ISIL or DAESH. The IS conquered important parts of Syria and Iraqi territories, controlled important resources and declared, in 2014, the restoration of the Caliphate. IS has been organizing and has been claiming several terrorist attacks in MENA and Europe since 2014.

After six years, hostilities have not ceased. Since the end of 2015, the great powers understood that only a common solution could end the war, but the US and Russia fail to reach an agreement on the Assad regime.

f. Lebanon

Lebanon was affected by the Arab Spring because of the special relationship with Syria, which has always aimed to maintain its influence on the Lebanese state. Lebanon is seen as a part of Greater Syria. In 2011, Hezbollah („Party of Allah”, a Shia Islamist militant group, with a paramilitary wing, and also a political party) had dominated the Lebanese governmental apparatus, so Assad gained important allies in this country. In the same year, demonstrations had been held in Beirut and Saida, which led to some changes in the government. In addition, the authorities had adopted a series of economic measures, like increasing basic salary. Lebanon currently hosts more than 1 million Syrian refugees.

h. Iraq

In 2010, the first open elections in Iraq's history took place, during the „New Dawn operation”. It was the end of the U.S. presence in Iraq, established in 2003, which aimed at removing Saddam Hussein from power. But it took about eight months to form the new government, because of the sectarian divisions (Shia/ Sunni) Prime Minister Nouri Kamil Mohamed Hasan al-Maliki, named in 2006, wanted to create a centralized administration fearing that the oil-rich and Kurdish-dominated regions could become independent. Kurds in Iraq have been representing 20

percent of the population and have been backed up by US since the first Gulf War (1991), so they already created their own institutions and an autonomous government.

In September 2017, the Kurdistan Regional Government organized a referendum over Kurdish Independence, which may become a new pole of instability in the Middle East. Turkey, Syria, Iran, USA, Russia, France are opposing an independent Kurdistan, along with the UN and the Iraqi authorities. The US authorities mentions the referendum may weaken the position of Iraqi Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi before the general elections in April 2018 and, implicitly, the stability of the country. The Iranian and Turkish authorities consider that the referendum has a negative influence on the Kurds in these countries, possibly leading to similar secessionist movements. Israel supports the Kurdish Independence because of an economic interest (oil), rather than a political one.

Referring to the Arab Spring, about 35 people lost their lives during the protests that had started on February 10th, 2011. The revolution continued along the year in major cities like Baghdad, Mosul and Karbala. Many provincial governors and local authorities resigned. Iraq, similar to Syria, faces the Islamic State. In October 2014 an international coalition was formed to fight against ISIS, the operation *Inherent Resolve*.

g. Iran

Mir-Hossein Mousavi, the leader of the Green Movement, argues that the 2011 protests in MENA are an imitation of Iran's protests from 2009 when people took to the streets of Tehran. After the presidential election, won by Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, Iranians asked the new president to resign, under the accusation of electoral fraud (cfr. Esposito, Sonn and Voll, 2016, p. 77). As we have already mentioned, Iran and Saudi Arabia have divergent views concerning the conflicts in the Middle East (Syria, Bahrain, Yemen, Irak, etc.) where Shiites face Sunni militias. Iranian authorities have created links with all Shia forces in the area, including Syria, Hezbollah (Lebanon) or Hamas (Palestine) and does not recognize the existence of the State of Israel. Also, Iran held strong connections with the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt: after the Second Revolution in Egypt (2013) authorities in Iran were „disappointed” by Morsi's removal, especially since the two countries succeeded in resuming diplomatic relations, after nearly 30 years of animosities caused by the fact that during the Islamic Revolution, Egypt granted political asylum to King Reza Pahlavi.

The relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran evolved into being more complicated in early 2016, following the execution of Sheikh Nimr al-Nimr, a Shia minority defender and critic of the Saudi monarchy. Nimr was sentenced to death in 2014, for encouraging protests in Saudi Arabia, in 2011. In response, Tehran had promised „divine punishment” and Saudi diplomatic missions in Iran were attacked. As a result, Saudi Arabia had broken diplomatic relations with Iran.

h. Israel

Israel's leaders characterize the Arab Spring as a catastrophe (cfr. Danahar, 2014, p.8): „but even so, the Israeli leadership never believed in the policy of democratizing the Arab world which was at the core of the neoconservatives' project” (Roy, 2008, p.24). In 2016 Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu claimed that although his government rejected the possibility of establishing a Palestinian state, Israel has many strategic partnerships with Arab countries, aimed at „countering Islamic extremism” (al-Naami, 2016). Despite the new Egyptian policy after 2011, Israel's politicians were pleased that Morsi had resisted the Muslim Brotherhood's pressure to cancel the peace agreements with Israel, concluded at Camp David in 1979, during President Anwar Sadat's term.

In the Syrian case, Israel's position is limited to diplomatic interventions, but since 2013, Israeli armed forces have been carrying out air raids in Syria. Despite the official policy of non-involvement, some figures of the Syrian opposition have closed ties with Israeli officials in order to create a safe area in southern Syria. Israeli politicians prefer a stable, Assad-led Syria, rather than the possibility of a free Syria with stronger anti-Israeli feelings.

i. The Palestinians and Syrians who live near the border area with Israel

On May 15th 2011, the day known as the Day of the Catastrophe (Nakba), Palestinian demonstrators, encouraged by calls on Facebook, tried to reach the Israeli border. Israeli forces stopped them, but 12 protesters were killed in the clashes and another 300 people were injured. 23 Syrian protesters were killed in June 5, 2011, and more than 100 were injured after Israeli troops opened fire on demonstrators who had tried to reach the occupied area of the Golan Heights. Since 2012, the Arab Spring has allowed the Islamist movements to become stronger in the Gaza Strip. After the victory of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, Hamas felt again that it was time to face Israel.

j. Algeria

The riots began in December 28, 2010, but were decreasing in intensity since April 2011. Nonetheless, eight people were killed, dozens were injured and many arrested. The state of emergency instituted for over 19 years was revoked in February 2011. In January 2012 the protests broke out again in the south. In 2014, Abdelaziz Bouteflika, Algeria's president, was re-elected for a fourth term with 81.53%. The Algerian leader who has been heading the country since 1999 promised to make a number of economic reforms. Algeria did not suffer all the effects of the Arab Spring, and there were no major movements, because between 1990 and 1998 there had been a civil war, so the population did not want to go through a new trauma. However, the Arab Spring also meant some changes in Algeria. On February 7, 2016, the Algerian Parliament adopted a new Constitution. It has new provisions such as the recognition of the Berber language (Tamazight). Algeria is one of the few Arab countries that maintain good relations with the Assad regime.

k. Turkey

From the famous foreign policy formula „Peace at Home, Peace in the World” formulated by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, founder of the modern Turkey, or „*zero problem with neighbors*”, the State's leaders passed to a neo-Ottoman rhetoric at home and pan-Islamist ambitions abroad.

Turkey's role in managing the situation of Syrian refugees and, in general, the migrant crisis changed the configuration of international relations. Turkey received 2,749,000 Syrian refugees, according to UNHCR. There were also Afghani and Iraqi migrants coming and Turkey became the country with the highest number of refugees and migrants, with over 3 million. The authorities in Turkey and Germany have negotiated the management of the migrants' crisis: in exchange for supporting Turkey's EU accession, the authorities in Ankara would stop the wave of migration to Europe. Relations between the two countries has been jeopardized by the support of Germany for the Kurds fighting the Islamic State in Syria and also, in June 2016, due to the German Parliament's recognition of the Armenian genocide of 1915.

Turkey has a special status: it belongs to MENA, but has the desire to become a member of EU. Turkey has been seen as a model of democracy in MENA, and the Turkish Justice and Development Party (AKP) has been a model for many Islamist parties in the region, like EnNahda in Tunisia. Also, the Muslim Brotherhood has strong cells in Turkey and the Egyptian former president Morsi was the new ally of Erdogan, the current president of Turkey.

The Arab Spring, the war in Syria and the Iraqi Kurdistan are strong challenges for the Turkish state. The refugees, the Islamic State attacks, the Syrian Kurds secessionist movement, the Iraqi Kurdistan referendum for Independence are important threats to Turkey's security. 15 million Kurds live in Turkey. „*The Turkish state's engagement with the Kurdish question from 1923 until the 1990s stood on three pillars: assimilation, repression and containment*” (Yegen, 2016, p.3). After the outbreak of the Arab Spring the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) triggered a Kurdish Spring. The *Kurdish Civil Disobedience Campaign* meant an escalation of Kurdish separatism in Turkey between August and November 2011. (cfr. Noi, 2013, p.27).

Turkey, an important NATO member, refused initially to participate in operations against the Islamic State, for fear of favoring Kurds in Syria. But the IS attack in Suruc, in July 2015, forced the Ankara authorities to make a strategic change. In that summer, US brought F-16 jets to Incirlik (southern Turkey) to fight against the Islamic State. US, regional and European powers require an alliance with Turkey for their success, despite the skid of the current regime. Turkey is moving away from democracy and becoming an Islamist authoritarian regime. The shift is more evident after the so-called 2016 state coup, when hundreds of thousands of people were fired from all state institutions, and many were sent to prisons. US-Turkey relations have become tenser after this moment: Erdogan demands the extradition of Fethullah Gulen, a former AKP member living in Pennsylvania, accused for organizing the coup attempt. Because Russia's authorities had been expressing their „unconditional support” for the current Turkish government after the failed coup, a meeting between Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Vladimir Putin was scheduled in August 2016, to restore bilateral relations. Also, on July 2016, State-level relation with Iran was resumed.

Concluding, Turkey pursued its goal of becoming an important player in the Middle East and achieved a spectacular foreign policy shift.

All monarchies in MENA made some changes. It is true they have been much less affected because „*they tend to have more legitimacy and popular support*” (Danahar, 2014, p.31). Some monarchs decided to share power with the parliament, others to be generous with their citizens by giving them monetary compensation and guaranteeing more than a decent standard of living.

I. Saudi Arabia

In Saudi Arabia sporadic protests began on January 21, 2011. The king at the time, Abdullah, approved a series of economic concessions. Women have received the right to vote and be elected in municipal elections since 2015. Saudi Arabia and Qatar do not support democratization movements at home but have actively been involved in the revolutions in 2011 abroad. The Saudi Arabian monarchy „was angry about Mubarak's fall in Egypt”. The Muslim Brotherhood, which had been holding the power in Egypt until July 2013 was assimilated to a political cult and a secret revolutionary cell, thus representing the reasons why Saudi Arabia welcomed the removal of Morsi.

As we have already mentioned, Saudi Arabia has been supporting Sunni forces involved in the regional conflicts ever since the beginning of the Arab Spring. Saudi troops alongside those in the United Arab Emirates, under the auspices of the Gulf Cooperation Council, intervened in Bahrain's *Pearl Revolt* in 2011. In a similar way, Saudi Arabia led a coalition of Arab states and launched a military campaign in March 2015 against the Houthis in Yemen. Saudi Arabia is an important ally of US in the region. Also, the monarchy finances Assad-opposing Sunni movements in Syria. Saudi Arabia relations with Syria deteriorated after the assassination of Lebanese Prime

Minister Rafiq Hariri in 2005, a close friend to the Saudi monarchy. Syria, on the other hand, accuses the Saudi monarchy of funding Salafism.

m. Kuwait

In Kuwait the demonstrations started on February 18, 2011 without casualties, but have led to dissolution of the Parliament. On November 16, in a social movement described by Emir Sabah Al-Ahmad Al-Jaber Al-Sabah (Kuwait is a constitutional monarchy) as an unprecedented step on the road to anarchy and lawlessness, protesters occupied the National Assembly in Kuwait City for several minutes. In 2012 Islamists dominated elections, so the Emir decided to amend the electoral law.

n. United Arab Emirates

In 2011, in the United Arab Emirates, about 130 intellectuals signed and sent a petition to Sheikh Khalifa bin Zayed Al Nahyan, calling for the reform of the Federal National Council to create a democracy in an Islamic society. The document is considered „probably the first political petition in the history of UAE” (Noueihed and Warren, 2013, p.248). The initiators of the petition were arrested, sentenced to three years in prison, but then pardoned by the Sheikh. However, some changes have been made. If in 2011 there were 129,274 citizens with the right to vote, in 2015 their number increased to 224,279, during the elections for the Federal National Council or Majlis al-Ittihad al-Watani. From 347 candidates, 78 had been women, but only one, Naama Al Sharhan, was elected and admitted in the legislative chamber. In May 2011 the government began to expand the network of surveillance cameras as a measure to prevent the riots, while the media outlets were censored more drastically.

o. Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan

The protests in the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan began January 14, 2011, in Amman and in four other cities, forcing the King Abdullah II to dismiss the Prime Minister and his cabinet. Four people were killed during the protests. When the Jordanians took to the streets, the king responded with greater political openness, gaining even more popularity. However, Jordan has not become a democracy. Jordanians „cannot imagine a more moderate and pro-Western regime than the current monarchy, not democratic” (Kaplan, 2012, p.412). In May 2016 the king had decided to amend the Constitution, an initiative supported by the Parliament: the King now has absolute power to appoint the chief of police, members of the Constitutional Court and the Crown Prince. The Hashemite dynasty has built a national consciousness and a united elite. However, Jordan has been working on the demonization of the Jordanian Spring and the Muslim Brotherhood, according to Diab Al-Badayneh, Jordanian sociologist, in an interview for my PhD thesis. The Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood is described by King Abdullah as a Masonic cult. In 2016, the headquarter of the Brotherhood in Amman was closed without explanation. Jordan is one of the countries that hosts large numbers of Syrian refugees, but there are further social, economic and demographic challenges.

p. Morocco

Morocco, a constitutional monarchy with an elected parliament, has been a key ally in the international fight against Islamic terrorism. The protests began in February 2011 in Rabat, Fez and Tangier. The King Mohammed VI and his advisers had the clairvoyance to anticipate the needs of Moroccans and responded with a reform of the Constitution. The Constitutional amendments proposed by a commission authorized by the King and approved in a referendum in 2011, have been designed to increase the strength and independence of the prime minister and guarantee

human rights. In November 2011, the Justice and Development Party became the first one to lead a Moroccan government.

The Arab Spring has brought to light old, unresolved problems. Residents of Al-Hoceima, in the marginalized Rif region, have been constantly protesting since October 2016, asking for a program of economic and social measures. The region of Northern Morocco, mostly Berber, has been neglected since the Spanish withdrawal and faces high rates of poverty and unemployment. The Berber population claims rights and liberties in line with the new constitution adopted in 2011

In April 2017, the king dismissed the government, who had failed to form a ruling coalition with two royalist parties following the October 2016 elections.

q. Oman

In January 17, 2011, the protests began in Oman. The people asked for: wage growth, lower living costs, jobs and reforms. The sultan approved a series of economic concessions, and his ministerial cabinet was changed three times.

r. Qatar

Qatar has projected itself as a supporter of democratic movements. The powerful television network Al Jazeera is considered an important weapon in the foreign policy of Qatar. The Al Jazeera journalists are those who posted the images of the revolution and the calls to protests. The TV channel is known for its editorial policy, which supports Islamist political groups like the Muslim Brotherhood, but it also creates and promotes the image of a modern and altruistic Qatar. Also, Qatar has implicated itself in the regional crisis and it also serves as a strategic point for the United States, which has created an important naval base from where it conducts operations in the Gulf and in Afghanistan. Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani, leader until 2013, was called „an Arab Henry Kissinger” (Hounshell, 2012, p.8). In the revolution’s case in Syria, Qatar's position was clear: the isolation of Bashar Al-Assad and the removal of Syria from the Arab League as its main goal, despite Syria being one of the founding countries. Given the fact that the United States has important military bases in Qatar, Assad has named the authorities of Qatar as „lackeys of American and Israeli interests” (Lesch, 2012/2013, p.147) Qatar has been directly involved in the conflict in Libya: Al Jazeera has been calling ever since on the people to rise against Colonel Gaddafi, while Qatar has been providing weapons to the Islamist rebels too, although „Thani said that the popularity of Islamist parties in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya is the result of free elections, not a consequence of Qatar's involvement” (Schulze-Heil, 2012). But, most importantly, Qatar does not support democratic movements „at home”!

s. Bahrain

In Bahrain, 60 people lost their lives during the protests, which had started on February 14, 2011. The violent clashes have forced the government to accept the release of political prisoners and to negotiate with the representatives of the Shia community, while King Hamad accepted a series of economic concessions. The king received Saudi political and military support, while Hezbollah and Iran have backed up Shiites.

3. Orientalism: exporting democracy in MENA

Orientalism, as theorized by Edward W. Said, argues that East is an area which the West should fear or one that the West must control (Said, 2003, p.108), because it is a world difficult to govern or „to civilize”. An example of the Orientalist view is the Sykes-Picot Agreement and the Balfour Declaration, regarding the division between European powers of the Middle East, after the

fall of the Ottoman Empire, at the end of the First World War: populations of the same nation were divided by arbitrarily traced borders. We have already reminded the case of Kurds, living in 4 states: Turkey, Syria, Iran and Iraq. Also, the European colonialism of the 19th century is based on an Orientalist vision.

Following the terrorist attacks of September 2001, the former president George W. Bush's speech was an expression of his Orientalist view: he said America was a *good nation* attacked by *evil men* who wanted to destroy the *God's democracy*. Bush declared *war on terror* against *the axis of Evil* (Gentile, 2008, p.12). In the same Orientalist attitude, US administration tried „to export democracy” in the Middle East. In 2005 George W. Bush announced the primordial traits of what he called the *Freedom Agenda*, according to which the survival of freedom in the US depends on the success of liberty in other countries. Bush explained that the democratization of the Middle East would begin with Iraq (Roy, 2008, pp.27-33), after the fall of Saddam Hussein. US intervention did not make Iraq a full democracy, but had another outcome: the dismantling of the country, „a state without natural boundaries and populated by Kurds, Sunni and Shiite Arabs, all ignited by a sectarian and ethnic consciousness” (Kaplan, 2012, p.75).

Sometimes, promoting democracy comes in contradiction with US interests, making the politicians look hypocritical. President Obama ignored the repression of Shiites in Bahrain during the Arab Spring, and continued to support the monarchy, while theoretically promoting democracy in other countries throughout the Middle East and North Africa (Roth, 2013, p.16).

„Bahrain's naval ports are the home away from home for the U.S. Fifth Fleet, which — because of its proximity to Iraq, Iran, and Afghanistan — has played a more important role in the Iraq War than any other U.S. fleet in the world, and is also responsible for keeping oil shipping lanes in the Gulf secure”, according to a study published by Cornell University Library, in 2016.

There are two ways of talking about Islam as a source of law, civilization, religion and democracy: the temptation to exclude any links between them (an Orientalist view) and the principle of multiculturalism which holds that democracy and Islam are compatible - because multiculturalists assert that every human being can and should adopt moral criteria that is consistent with the appropriated culture. We emphasize that „absolute democracy - democracy without adjectives - does not exist: there are so many democracies, as they were historically developed in contingent forms” (De Nardis, 2013, p.8). Perhaps it will be enough to say that democracy is not alien to the Muslim world: „Democracy is present in non-Arab and Muslim countries such as Indonesia, Mali, Senegal, Albania, Bangladesh, Turkey, Pakistan” (Grassi, 2012, p.38). Since 2011, when Islamist parties came in power all over Middle East and North Africa, Western media started to write about the *Islamic Winter*, instead of *Arab Spring*.

4. Occidentalism: Arab Spring is a conspiracy

Occidentalism is a „dehumanizing portrayal made by the West's opponents” (Buruma and Margalit, 2014, p.14). The liberal ideals of the West undermined the potential grandeur of peoples, nations, and religions. Sayyid Qutb, an Occidentalism, saw the America of the 1950s as the expression of secularism, therefore an immoral world, without God. He was a member of the Muslim Brotherhood (established in 1928 by Hassan al-Banna, who upholds Islam as the supreme and perfect system of human activities, and, additionally, in his vision being hostile to foreign occupation as a phenomenon, cfr. Massoulie, 2003, p.34). Inside the Brotherhood there were four schools of thought, among which the most known is the *Qutbism*. Qutb said the West was not only a world without religion, but something worse: „a world worshipping false Gods (like money and fame), a civilization without roots, cosmopolitan, superficial, multiracial, trivial, materialistic” (Buruma and Margalit, 2014, p.154).

Some monarchs in MENA agree that the Arab Spring is a conspiracy and an attempt to destroy the Arab world: „The Arab Spring means the Arab destruction”, according to the statement made, in an interview, by Saudi prince Al-waleed bin Talal in 2013 (Khalijyya, 2013). King Mohammed VI of Morocco, when visiting Riyadh in April 2016, said:

„what has been described as the Arab Spring has caused destruction, chaos and human tragedies (...) We are facing conspiracies which seek to undermine our collective security. Things are quite clear and require no further analysis. They want to destabilize the few countries which have managed to safeguard their security, stability and political systems” (Morocco World News, 2016).

The Arab Spring, in the perception of many people in MENA, is just a conspiracy of the Western powers. According to a study conducted between March and May of 2013, from a national representative sample of 3,070 Tunisian adults, 14 percent state that the Arab Spring is a conspiracy:

„We may thus speculate that Tunisian activists, like their Egyptian counterparts, have also been more idealistic than the rest, with the difference that when the lofty ideals fail to materialize, conspiracy theories become an ideal model to explain this failure” (Moaddel, 2013, p. 22).

Although the majority of the respondents displayed affinity with Western values of democracy, they widely had believed in the existence of conspiracies against Muslims and consider „Western cultural invasion to be a very important or important problem” (Moaddel, 2013, p.78).

5. Conclusions

The hope of the people, after the dictators fled, were killed or imprisoned in 2011, was that of a better life. The fall of the authoritarian regimes did not necessarily mean more rights and freedoms. Arab Spring might be the victory of democracy in Tunisia and the Arab Destruction in other countries in the region, such as Syria, Libya or Yemen.

The Arab Spring is a „season of transformations”, but the transition to democracy has its own course in each country, in accordance with its history, traditions, culture and, in particular, with the will of politicians to go this way. Fisichella says that during the transition from a non-democratic regime to a democratic rule there manifests a different dynamic, with possible intermediate stages of authoritarianism (he prefers the term post-totalitarianism) or a direct step towards democracy. In other words, „the past tends to shape the culture, the laws” (Fisichella, 2007, p. 371). Thus, new democracies will have to face the legacy of a non-democratic past.

The Arab Spring affected every country in the region and changed alliances and foreign policy. Democracy cannot be exported to the Middle East, as foreseen the US foreign policy program: democratization must be a consequence of the desires and actions of those countries' people and politicians. Even the most authoritarian regimes in MENA have upgraded the governance style since the revolution: they permitted more rights, organized free elections, with women having now the right to compete in the elections, even in traditional communities where they are not usually engaged in politics.

Only honest dialogue between Western and MENA governments can lead to the end of hostilities around the region. The Westerners must not put the equal sign between Muslim and terrorist, and those in the Middle East must not see the West as just some persons willing to impose their values, at any cost.

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Ingrid Heidlmayr-Chegdaly

Renewed Authoritarianism - Chasms between state and citizens in the aftermath of the Arab spring

The Arab spring called not only theories on democratization, but also on the civil society's role in liberalization and democratization into question. In 2010/11, citizens started to protest in the streets and demanded individual rights and liberties. Protesting occurred for socio-economic rather than political reasons and was not formally organized¹. The Arab spring was neither a collective, strategically organized claim for western-style democracy nor a victory for civil society, but rather an expression of the society's discontent with the state and the society's desire for change and improvement of living conditions. Political opening and liberalisation hence led to depoliticization of citizens and civil society rather than democratisation. Within this context, the phenomena of (re-)autocratisation by liberal reforms and (de-)politicization of the society in North African countries, in due consideration of the tension between the "state" (administration and political elite) and its citizens are the subject of analysis.

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Renewed Authoritarianism- Chasms between state and citizens in the aftermath of the Arab spring

Introduction

Media and academia have repeatedly taken up the question why authoritarian regimes have survived several waves of democratization and why the Arab Spring did not lead to democratic transition, but rather to renewed authoritarianism. Before 2011, policy makers generally assumed that MENA countries have made progress towards democratisation, despite several backlashes. Morocco's role as a "model student of the EU"¹ confirmed the external perception of political liberalisation as democratisation, rather earned through Morocco's pro-European orientation and political and economic stability. Meanwhile, evidence of failing reforms and backlashes shows that democratization theory does not reflect reality. With the end of the *transition paradigm*², scholars changed their focus away from democratization towards restructuring processes of authoritarian rule. They raised the question why authoritarian regimes survived by introducing political liberal reform³⁴. The Arab spring called not only theories on democratization, but also on the civil society's role in liberalization and democratization into question. The Arab spring clearly demonstrates the tension between the "state"⁵ and its "citizens"⁶. This paper argues that the Arab spring was not a starting point for advanced democratisation, but in the case of Morocco, the outcome of controlled and lengthy political liberalization. Long-term political liberalization enabled citizens to claim improvements in socio-economic and political conditions. Even though political liberalisation may constitute a transitional phase towards democratisation, the Arab Spring (which emerged from a widened sphere of citizens' activism) led to a backlash and not advanced democratisation in the MENA-region (except for Tunisia).

Within this context, the paper aims to focus on the phenomena of (re-)autocratisation by liberal reforms and (de-)politicization of the society in North African countries. Due consideration of the tension between the "state" (administration and political elite) and its citizens, will underlie the analysis. The paper unfolds as follows: First, a theoretical outline of how political transition and liberalization can lead to depoliticization of the society is presented. The second part discusses the tension between state and society, which arise from weak governance structures. In this context, governance refers to public steering and management as well as policy implementation.

Political transition

Democratization literature that draws on structural and modernization theories assumes that democratization occurs in a linear way. O'Donnell, Schmitter and Whitehead, argue that linear democratisation is influenced by either endogenous factors (e.g. socioeconomic development) or exogenous factors (e. g. military intervention, diplomacy, etc.).⁷ Other theoretical models suggest that the alternation between authoritarian and democratic rule will always tend to democratization.⁸ Either linear or complex, both schools of transition theory focus on the shift from authoritarian to democratic rule, aiming to "identify the point at which a political regime stops being a dictatorship and becomes a democracy"⁹. While transition is an intermediate process of change, it does not necessarily lead to or guarantee democratic transition.¹⁰ Understanding transition as an "interval between one political regime and another"¹¹ or the transition from something to something else¹², it does not automatically mutate into transformation. While transformation is a comprehensive process of social and economic change, transition means a process between an existing regime and the establishment of a new regime. This process may comprise either the consolidation of democracy, the return to authoritarian rule or the establishment of a new form of rule (hybridization).

Hence, transition is a very critical process, joined by critical junctures where policies, politics and the given polity are challenged. First, because the risk of successful coups persists even after the establishment of political democracy¹³ and second, because uncertainty of democracy is manifold, as it may lead to either conservative, self-limiting outcomes or progressive outcomes¹⁴. As political transition begins when authoritarian rulers start to modify existing rules and formalize rights for individuals and societal groups¹⁵, the political liberalization of the society is a necessary but not sufficient prerequisite for democratisation. Given that the outcomes of liberalization and democratisation are unforeseeable, the consolidation of democratic structures is a process of institutionalizing uncertainty and continual conflicts.¹⁶ The institutionalization of *normality* in political life marks the completion of transition processes. “Normal” political life includes the settlement of political actors and their obeying and compliance with rules and procedures of the regime.¹⁷

Drawing on the Arab spring, prior controlled political liberalization and opening facilitated popular mobilization and unrest. In Tunisia (and partly in Egypt) the creation of *new spaces of activism*¹⁸ due to political liberalisation enabled the breakdown of the former regime. The regime's process of disintegration and demise is one of the two parallel and autonomous processes of democratic transition.¹⁹ Other trajectories or forms of hybridization are possible. Nevertheless, successful democratization is more likely if society actively supports political and socio-economic demands. Broad societal voice and support for change impacts on the regime's legitimacy, while current power-holders retain and ratify much of their power via competitive elections.²⁰ In contrast to the politicization of society in the democratization processes, depoliticization of life and civil society is common in case of autocratization or the renewal of authoritarian rule.²¹ Feigned democratisation and sham reforms are part of authoritarian regimes' survival strategies. As Levitsky/Way (2002) outline in their concept of *competitive authoritarianism*, rulers obtain political authority by formal democratic institutions, even though common rules and democratic principles are frequently violated²². The regime does not meet minimum standards of democracy, even though it appears democratic, while being authoritarian. Brumberg (2002) further argues, that guided pluralism, controlled elections and selected repression in several Arab states “is not just a “survival strategy” for authoritarian regimes, but a *type* of political system whose institutions, rules, and logic defy any linear model of democratization”²³.

Liberalization

Understanding liberalization as a process of “redefining and extending rights [...] and making effective certain rights that protect both individuals and social groups from arbitrary or illegal acts committed by the state or third parties”²⁴, it is a prerequisite for democratization, but does not result inevitably in the consolidation of democratic rule. Launched liberalization and political openness that respond to domestic pressure may also strengthen the position of power holders in authoritarian regimes. Subsuming liberalization processes as types of *tutelary democracy* or *liberalized authoritarianism*, liberalization per se does not change the structure of authoritarian rule.²⁵ Even though democratisation and liberalization are not mutually dependent, advanced political liberalization enables more space for civic participation and activism. This increases the demand for democratization and participation.²⁶ Evidence in the MENA countries shows, that political liberalization can indeed lead to less repressive rule, but consolidates existing forms of authoritarianism.²⁷ Liberalization may either foster autocratization or enable democratization. In parallel, the consequences of political liberalizing reforms are uncertain. According to Carothers, most transitional countries entered a political *gray zone*, as they “are neither dictatorial nor clearly headed toward democracy”²⁸.

Depoliticization of the society

At the base line, transition is a process of inventing (new) rules for the political game. The rules are imposed by a dominant actor or based on common agreement and pacts.²⁹ Depoliticization of the society in autocracies may result of repression and ideological manipulation in response to intense social conflicts and political mobilization. The latter may strengthen or enable political leaders to come to power. Consequently, in autocracies with limited possibility of participation, citizens may forget their public and political identities, concentrating on merely private pursuits. Citizenship is then limited to holding passports and obeying laws³⁰, while active political participation is limited to voting during election periods³¹. From this perspective, external democracy promoters' aim to politicize society in general and civil society activists in particular contrasts with authoritarian leaders' intention to depoliticize society.


In the case of Morocco, Maghraoui argues that *depoliticization* is the outcome of liberal reforms, which have worked against democracy. He understands depoliticization as the "marginalization of questions of legitimacy or sovereignty and [...] the concomitant political primacy given to economic issues"³². The Moroccan monarchy survived after the Arab spring due to depoliticization, neo-liberal reforms, religious and historical legitimacy and strategies of *divide and rule*³³. People participating in the 2011 uprisings were to a certain degree depoliticized, in the "sense of being largely unwilling and uninterested in participating in institutional politics through traditional actors such as political parties or long-standing civil society organisations, this did not mean they were not involved in other 'politicised' activities outside of mainstream institutions"³⁴. Regarding Morocco, Cavatorta argues that *depoliticization* occurred through *technocracy*. In contrast to the understanding of depoliticization as the outcome of authoritarianism, which turns people away from institutional engagement and participation, the concept of depoliticization through technocracy understands depoliticization as the result of a "process whereby decision-making appears to be removed both from the elected institutions and, in a sense, from the real centre of power"³⁵. Through technocratization, complex issues and policies, that are deemed too difficult for ordinary people to understand, are removed from partisan and political debates. Naturally, technocrats will identify how to proceed. People remain effectively depoliticised and excluded from participation, because governing follows a logic of technocratic management rather than political choices³⁶. In a certain way, participatory mechanisms also risk to lead to depoliticization because citizens' and civil society's participation are instrumentalized for legitimating already formulated or taken decisions by the state.³⁷ A further example of the depoliticization of social conflicts, are the wage conflicts arising out of rapid transformations of the labour markets. In 2003, wage discussions were removed from the public field and relegated to the economic sector after social negotiations with the employer's class and the adoption of a new labour code took place. While the employer's class was politicised and its formation of an interest group strengthened, social conflicts became neutralized and depoliticised. Social conflicts were shifted from public spheres to spheres of public non-decision.³⁸

A *popular upsurge*, comprising various layers of society, has a crucial role in transition. Different groups, such as trade unions, professional associations, religious groups, grass-roots movements, intellectuals, artists, etc., support each other's efforts towards democratization and identify themselves as "the people". The practice of pressure enables them to expand the limits of liberalization and partial democratization.³⁹ The Arab spring showed that the society and even civil society in MENA countries were highly depoliticized. The 20th February Movement (Feb20) did not emerge out of a partisan structure; neither was the movement an *ex nihilo* creation. Feb20 is an autonomous movement and the outcome of virtual initiatives on social media as well as mobilisations on the street.⁴⁰ However, the form of manifestation during the Arab spring is completely new. The individual participants as well as active militants, new types of alliances and

of mobilisation, and the dichotomy between a national rallying group and local supporting groups, made Feb20 to a completely unprecedented form of activism.⁴¹ The claims of protestors were of political but even more of economic and social nature. The Arab spring protestors is distinct to former revolutionary movements in the MENA region, such as anti-colonial movements against the French and British colonialism, communist counter-power movements against the reign of Hassan II in Morocco, Islamist armed attacks against the Algerian military and state power, etc.. They led to a new type of *associationism* with a nationalist character. The civil society evolved during the colonial period from a cultural nationalism to a political nationalism⁴².

The happenings since November 2016 in Al Hoceima, a city in northern Morocco, following the death of a fisher merchant, have shown how protests with political implications and claims are rapidly depoliticized by the state. The Moroccan ministry of interior reacted quickly to implement a fast and correct judicial procedure. The ministry's reaction to Mouhcine Fikri's death and subsequent protests clearly illustrated, that the Ministry wanted the happening to remain an accident and a matter of penal law. Protests soon became politicised and moved beyond socio-political demands. Even though the circumstances are still unclear, the events reflect the difficult socioeconomic reality and people's desperation in Morocco. Moroccan citizens reacted by massive protests across the North, as well as major cities, like Casablanca and Rabat. In addition to the difficult socioeconomic situation, they denounced physical repression by the police and oppression by the state apparatus, referring publicly to the *hogra*, which means scorn in Moroccan Arabic dialect. In this context, *hogra* refers to political and economic exclusion, whereas Mundy defines *hogra* in the case of Algeria as "a sentiment of contempt expressed by those with more social, economic, and political power toward those with less. *Al-hagrah* or *al-hagra* comes from the root *haraq*, which denotes scorn and disdain, [...] inequity, oppression, or tyranny expressed from a position of relative power"⁴³, as well as "widespread unemployment"⁴⁴. Protestors stressed the Berber identity of the citizens in northern Morocco (Rif Mountains) and their independence from the centralized political and economic state apparatus in Rabat. The state's aim to move protest movements and civic activism to the private sphere was also evident in Algeria during the violent confrontations in the Kabyle city Béjaïa in January 2017. The violent response to demonstrations against rising prices and for better social and living conditions, illustrate the government's tremendous fear of a new "Berber spring" as in 2001. Opposition members argue that the lack of dialogue between the rulers and the ruled (comprising all citizens including minorities and marginalised groups) facilitated a climate of violence and verbal attacks. Similar to the Arab spring, citizens in Béjaïa did not claim broader political participation but manifested their frustration regarding injustice and low development compared to other regions.⁴⁵ Risks of destabilization due to the existing gap between rulers and the ruled remain high in the MENA-region. Furthermore, low social capital and limited societal trust through social networks hindered citizens to build trust towards political institutions and actors.⁴⁶ Low voter turnouts and disinterest at the Algerian parliamentary elections on the 4th May 2017 confirm that public authorities have failed to take necessary actions to increase citizen's interest in politics and trust in political institutions over the years. Arguing that voting will not lead to change, the states non-engagement towards citizens is perceived as an intentional depoliticization of citizens⁴⁷. Also in Morocco, the extremely high abstention rates and number of invalid votes at legislative elections reflect the existing crack between citizens and the political class⁴⁸. The Civil Society Index for Morocco 2010 shows, that the trust of the population in political parties, the parliament, trade unions, the Maghreb Arab Union (UMA), the EU and the United Nations organizations is rather low in comparison to citizen's confidence towards social groups and institutions as well as religious leaders (see Figure 1)⁴⁹.

Figure 1: Trust in institutions comparison (Source: Civil Society Index 2010)⁵⁰




Democratic governance

One of the reasons for the upheavals in 2011 is rooted in preceding failures of governance⁵¹ - i.e. high corruption, unequal distribution of resources and socio-economic precariousness -, and not primarily in the people's desire for democratic participation. The state-society relations are therefore crucial aspects that have to be taken into consideration: This relation became tense, due to inefficient and opaque management of public resources and expenditures. Bad and exclusive management kindled the citizens' dissatisfaction with public services and the state's responsibility for the supply welfare. For further exploring possible alternatives for democratization within this context, democracy subsumes three definitions: (1) the organization of political power and a resulting system, which determines the distribution of resources and the realization of particular groups' interest⁵²; (2) a theoretical concept based on values of equality and liberty⁵³; and (3) the procedures of public decision-making⁵⁴ based on democratic principles.

From a conceptual approach, democracy can be understood as the "self-governing of the people"⁵⁵, where citizens constitute the foundation of the political system, holding rulers accountable for their actions.⁵⁶ Democratic governance refers to democracy as an instrument for public decision-making based on democratic principles. Democratic governance refers to the normative principles of democracy and not its institutional setting, even though an adequate institutional setting is necessary for efficient and effective governance. The incorporation of democratic principles in state administration and practices can thus occur within a non-democratic polity.⁵⁷ Regarding the democratic backlashes in the MENA region, strengthening democratic governance may constitute an alternative model of democratisation.

To renew state-society relations, decision-makers have to regain the confidence of citizens towards the policy and governance level. A recent report from Transparency International on corruption in the MENA-region showed that 61 percent of respondents⁵⁸ think that corruption has increased during the last year. Figure 2 illustrates that, varying between countries between 20 to 70 percent of those surveyed believe that public sector agents are mostly corrupt.

Figure 2: How corrupt is the public sector?⁵⁹



Q. How many of the following people do you think are involved in corruption, or haven't you heard enough about them to say? Base: all respondents, excluding missing responses. Chart shows the percentage of respondents who answered either "Most/all" of them, "Some" or "None" are corrupt on average across the seven public sector groups: the president's office, Members of Parliament, government officials, tax officials, the police, judges and magistrates, and local government councillors. "Don't know" responses are not shown for ease of comparison.

Citizenship and counter-power

Due to civil society's role as a counter-force to state power, civil society is seen as major element in political transition processes and democratization. According to international donor institutions, such as the African Development Bank, civil society comprises all human and associative activities that are realised in the public sphere, but outside the state sphere. Civil society reunites citizens with the same interests, objectives, values and traditions, and mobilises collective actions. Civil society organizations may comprise, but are not limited to, non-governmental organisations, trade unions, professional organisations, youth and women's associations, religious groups, etc.⁶⁰ As the Arab spring showed, the potential of civil society for inducing major reforms was rather low contrary to the hugely successful mobilization efforts of a depoliticised society. By depoliticizing civil society and making civil society actors to partners of the authoritarian power-holders, civil society certainly strengthens authoritarian patterns and rules. Cavatorta defines civil society as more than organized non-governmental activism. He argues that as a counter-power civil society follows a concept of *activated citizenship*⁶¹. Protecting individual freedoms from state intervention is one major function of civil society⁶². "Civil society is the space of the individual protected from the state"⁶³, defining it as an autonomous space that is not anchored in constitutional democracy. Civil society is not an integral part of the state apparatus/power and interferes from outside the state sphere⁶⁴. To ensure the protection of citizens' rights, civil society exercises control of state powers' actions and performs corrective duties. Although civil society not necessarily induces democratization, civil society organisations that execute evaluation and control functions of public authorities certainly make a state more democratic and effective. At the same time, associations working in the field of socioeconomic development mainly cooperate with the state and intervene in areas, where the state is absent.

Regarding political transition processes, the repositioning of CS needs to be carefully considered. Associations might just be re-baptized versions of previous organizations, taking actions to defend the interests of the old/former regime.⁶⁵

The assumption of civil society's beneficial impact on democratisation is based on a western academic approach and broadly adopted by external democracy promoters and donor institutions. Still today, associative institutions in Morocco dispose of their initial forms of traditional Berber and Muslim institutions of voluntary and communitarian work, such as the *waqf*⁶⁶. The concept of civil society and its underlying norms and practices was diffused by European colonialism and current international diffusion of political systems and values.⁶⁷ The adoption of civil society as a basic element in strategic reforms and inner-state relations is less due to the political elite's willingness, but more ascribable to international donors' conditionality, which often targets the strengthening of civil society.

Located between the public and the private, civil society is a form of interest representation in modern democracies. Civil society organisations represent the interests of their members, who are affiliated to the organization or union due to functional (class, sector product, etc.), territorial (local, provincial, national, etc.) or professional (employers, militants and services) belongings. Citizenship or *activated citizenship*⁶⁸ constitutes a further type of interest representation, comprising besides periodical voting in elections, the joining of associations and movements, protests, petitions, etc..⁶⁹

Although civil society activism builds on activated citizenship, we need to differentiate between *civil society* and *democratic citizenship*. *Civil society*, as a western-based concept, comprises *civility* and *society*, a kind of distinction from *uncivil society*⁷⁰. Schmitter defines civil society as "a set or system of self-organized intermediary groups"⁷¹, that are independent of public authorities and private units (dual autonomy), take collective actions to defend and promote their own interests (collective action), do not seek to replace public agents nor private actors (non-usurpation); and agree with the pre-established rules of *civil* or legal nature (civility) (4). *Uncivil society* may constitute a threat to civil society, such as religiously motivated terrorism emerging from *bidonvilles*⁷² that do not operate in the legal and civil framework.

Therefore, CS and democratic citizenship – the civic duties and individual rights of every citizen - are two distinct forms of participation. While the first one is a semi-public form of participation that intermediates between the public and private sphere, citizenship refers only to individual rights guaranteed by the state. If citizenship under authoritarian rule is reduced to electoral participation and citizens are excluded from day-to-day political decision-making processes, dissatisfaction with the state's governance risks rising. Redefining the relationship between the state and society by political rulers⁷³ and establishing a commonly accepted social contract⁷⁴, are necessary to repair the existing breach between society and state in the MENA region.

Conclusion

Recent political developments in the MENA-region show that political transition and democratization do not occur along the lines of widely accepted transition and democratization paradigms. Democracy rankings did not capture ongoing processes comprehensively, as events took unexpected turns against anticipated outcomes. The classifications and rankings initially encouraged rather positive short-term forecasts (during the Arab spring). Conversely, in the aftermath of the Arab spring this changed to long-term negative prognosis. Furthermore, the Arab spring showed that democratization does not occur on a linear scale model, but comprises complex processes of transformation and faces alternating democratic progress and backlash.

The Arab spring demonstrated that the empowerment of civil society in the public sphere within long-term political liberalisation, has only limited effects on democratisation. Moreover, similar to political openness, the depoliticisation of society and the removal from citizens from the public sphere and decision-making process, created a tense relation between the state and society - the rulers and the ruled. Activists denounced long-term mismanagement by dominant power elites and unequal distribution of resources. However, broad social upheavals forced North African and Middle Eastern governments to react, make concessions and launch reforms. Even though, mostly young, depoliticised citizens without any group or party affiliation took part in protests and claimed better socioeconomic conditions, the movements soon achieved major political importance and induced substantial political reform. However, induced political reforms did lead to a democratic backlash. In countries where regime change did not or only partly occur, the repercussions of the Arab spring did not lead the expected emancipation, but rather the re-empowering of the country's designated *deep state*⁷⁵, e.g. the military in Egypt and the Makhzen in Morocco. Whereas Egypt and Morocco opted for renewed authoritarianism⁷⁶, Tunisia adopted a transitional model of fragile democracy. In Morocco, together with rather low performing and weak state institutions, the strong and powerful palace's administration ensures a dysfunctional equilibrium. Because of the existing deep state, democratisation and power redistribution would require effective *state building*, which includes good governance, new public management and decentralization⁷⁷.

Five years after the Arab spring and despite the undertaken political efforts since, the decision-makers could not repair the breach between the state and citizens. Moreover, small and regular upheavals, low voter turnout, high political distrust among young people and general dissatisfaction with public governance due to institutionalised inequalities of political, social and economic nature, illustrate still existing tensions between the state and the people. To overcome this tension, it is necessary to facilitate democratic governance based on principles of equality, participation and accountability. Based on experiences of liberalization processes under authoritarian rule, democratisation processes do primarily require performant and effective state institutions (governance) instead of quasi-democratic changes of rules (government). Ongoing liberalisation, depoliticization and consolidation of existing structures and rules will continuously increase the chasm between the state and society in the MENA-region.

Notes

¹ Fernandez-Molina, *Moroccan Foreign Policy Under Mohammed VI, 1999-2014*

² Carothers argues that the transition paradigm was a useful model at a certain moment, but is not adequate for analysing democratisation any more, as many transitional countries are not in transition towards democracy. He identifies five core assumptions that define the transition paradigm: (1) moving away from authoritarianism means transition towards democracy; (2) democratization occurs through different stages; (3) the “determinative importance of elections”; (4) underlying conditions do not determine the outcome of transition; (5) democratic transition is based in coherent, functioning states. Carothers, ‘The End of the Transition Paradigm’

³ Political liberalisation involves the redefinition and extension of rights of individuals and social groups without changing the basic fundamentals and structure of the regime. Participation is still controlled by the regime.

⁴ Cavatorta, ‘Arab Spring: The Awakening of Civil Society. A General Overview’, 75–6

⁵ In this paper, state, as the polity level, refers to the structure and institutional design, i.e. regulatory frameworks, constitutions, of the political system.

- ⁶ The term citizens is used for a community of people, who belong together regarding the language, origin, identity, nationality, etc. The UNESCO defines citizenship as “the status of having the right to participate in and to be represented in politics” (Baylis, J & Smith, S. 2001. *The Globalisation of World Politics. An introduction to international relations.* Oxford University Press, qtd. in UNESCO: citizenship. Available under <http://www.unesco.org/new/en/social-and-human-sciences/themes/international-migration/glossary/citizenship/>)
- ⁷ O'Donnell, Schmitter and Whitehead, *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule.*
- ⁸ Schmidt, *Demokratietheorien*, 431
- ⁹ Cheibub, Gandhi and Vreeland, 'Democracy and dictatorship revisited': 79
- ¹⁰ Burnell, *Democracy assistance*, 23
- ¹¹ O'Donnell and Schmitter, *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies*, 6
- ¹² Ibid., 65
- ¹³ Ibid., 21
- ¹⁴ Ibid., 25
- ¹⁵ Ibid., 6
- ¹⁶ Adam Przeworski, 'Problems in the Study of Transition to Democracy', 58
- ¹⁷ O'Donnell and Schmitter, *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies*, 65
- ¹⁸ Cavatorta, 'Arab Spring: The Awakening of Civil Society. A General Overview', 81
- ¹⁹ Przeworski argues that democratic transition consists of the following two processes: first a process of disintegration of the authoritarian regime, including liberalization, and second, a process of emergence of democratic institutions. (Adam Przeworski, 'Problems in the Study of Transition to Democracy', 56)
- ²⁰ Alfred Stepan, 'Paths Toward Redemocratization: Theoretical and Comparative Considerations', 73
- ²¹ O'Donnell and Schmitter, *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies*, 26
- ²² Levitsky and Way, 'Elections Without Democracy': 52
- ²³ Brumberg, 'The Trap of Liberalized Autocracy': 56
- ²⁴ O'Donnell and Schmitter, *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies*, 7
- ²⁵ Ibid., 9
- ²⁶ Ibid., 10
- ²⁷ Oliver Schlumberger, 'Assessing Political Regimes: What Typologies and Measurements Tell Us - and What They Don't', 34
- ²⁸ Carothers, 'The End of the Transition Paradigm': 9
- ²⁹ O'Donnell and Schmitter, *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies*, 68
- ³⁰ Ibid., 48
- ³¹ Morlino, 'Are there hybrid regimes?'
- ³² Maghraoui, 'Depoliticization in Morocco': 24
- ³³ Cavatorta, 'Morocco': 87
- ³⁴ Ibid., 91
- ³⁵ Ibid., 92
- ³⁶ Ibid., 93
- ³⁷ Saaf, *Du mouvement associatif marocain: le récit et le sens*, 37
- ³⁸ Myriam Catusse, 'Morocco's Political Economy', 24
- ³⁹ O'Donnell and Schmitter, *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies*, 54
- ⁴⁰ Saaf, 'Trajectoires de la société de la société civile au Maroc "Histoire et sens"', 47
- ⁴¹ Saaf, *Du mouvement associatif marocain: le récit et le sens*, 24–25, 27
- ⁴² Saaf, 'Trajectoires de la société de la société civile au Maroc "Histoire et sens"', 19
- ⁴³ Mundy, *Imaginative geographies of Algerian violence*, 205
- ⁴⁴ Ibid., 67
- ⁴⁵ Alilat, 'Que veulent les kabyles?', 40
- ⁴⁶ Helliwell and Putnam, 'Economic Growth and Social Capital in Italy'
- ⁴⁷ Telquel, 'Algérie. L'incertitude des élections législatives'

- ⁴⁸ Rachik, *Les mouvements de protestation au Maroc*, 88
- ⁴⁹ Aksebi, *Civil Society Index for Morocco*, 55
- ⁵⁰ Ibid., 56
- ⁵¹ Wittes, *Politics, Governance, and State-Society Relations*, 3
- ⁵² Electoral systems, laws on media access, judicial procedures shape the realization of group-specific interests. Adam Przeworski, 'Problems in the Study of Transition to Democracy', 57–8
- ⁵³ Whitehead, *Democratization*, 12–5
- ⁵⁴ Ibid.
- ⁵⁵ Merkel, 'Embedded and defective democracies': 52
- ⁵⁶ Whitehead, *Democratization*, 10
- ⁵⁷ Freyburg et al., 'EU promotion of democratic governance in the neighbourhood': 917
- ⁵⁸ "The survey samples were selected and weighted to be nationally representative of all adults aged 18 and above living in each country/territory, and all interviews were conducted face to face. Half the surveyed respondents are female, and half are male." Pring, *People and corruption*, 28
- ⁵⁹ Ibid., 12
- ⁶⁰ AfDB, 'Cadre d'engagement consolidé avec les organisations de la société civile', 4
- ⁶¹ Cavatorta, 'Arab Spring: The Awakening of Civil Society. A General Overview', 77–8
- ⁶² Merkel, 'Embedded and defective democracies': 46
- ⁶³ Ibid.
- ⁶⁴ Ibid., 47
- ⁶⁵ Schmitter, *Some propositions about civil society and the consolidation of democracy*, 10
- ⁶⁶ Saaf, *Du mouvement associatif marocain: le récit et le sens*, 12
- ⁶⁷ Schmitter, *Some propositions about civil society and the consolidation of democracy*, 18; Until political independence of the MENA states in the middle of the 20th century, Islamic Waqf was the major civil society institution in the Arab world.
- ⁶⁸ Cavatorta, 'Arab Spring: The Awakening of Civil Society. A General Overview', 78
- ⁶⁹ Schmitter, *Some propositions about civil society and the consolidation of democracy*, 7
- ⁷⁰ Ibid., 4
- ⁷¹ Ibid.
- ⁷² Whitehead, *Democratization*, 79
- ⁷³ Brumberg, 'The Trap of Liberalized Autocracy': 64
- ⁷⁴ Wittes, *Politics, Governance, and State-Society Relations*, 3–4
- ⁷⁵ Laurence Whitehead, 'On the 'Arab Spring'', col. 18
- ⁷⁶ Wittes, *Politics, Governance, and State-Society Relations*, 3
- ⁷⁷ Carothers, 'The End of the Transition Paradigm': 17

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Civic Activism and Social Movements

Rachid Touhtou

Metamorphoses of Civil Society Activism in Morocco: Converting Social Capital to Political Capital

The aim of this paper is to interrogate the notion of social activism inside civil society organizations in Morocco, a country with rich local-based solidarities, as a response to vulnerability in the process of globalization. Through a study of the main local and transnational actors within NGOs in Morocco, this paper argues that civic volunteering, as a modern form of militant activism in an emerging public sphere in Morocco, is the new arena of political visibility during the democratization phase. The emergence of the modern volunteer with a civil society identity from within NGOs during the 90's up until now unveils new forms of doing politics, integrating the debate on the social in Morocco into a new way of claiming a political identity. The logic behind the paper is to demystify the intricacies of a nation perplexed by market reform integration, a fragile process of democratization and a growing sense of radicalization as well as alienation. In my analysis, I illuminate dark sides in the linkages between the liberalization of Morocco and social inequalities as a consequence of market reform restructuring. I argue that gender dynamism, political Islam and ethnic/linguistic identity politics emerged in the process and played a major role in mobilizing actors for policies, development and institutional reforms, and in the formation of the modern public arena. In this context, within a nascent civil society being transformed by a process of 'NGO-ization' and divided among seculars, Islamists and state actors in a developing country where radicalization and democratization coexist, the idea of constitutionalizing the roles of civil society in democratic governance arena is transforming civil society, political discourses and the public sphere.

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Metamorphoses of Civil Society Activism in Morocco: Converting Social Capital to Political Capital

Introduction

This paper analyses the emerging activism and discourse of civil society volunteers during the debates on post-2011 Morocco. The aim is to interrogate the religious, cultural and historical dimensions of volunteering inside civil society organizations in Morocco, a country with rich local-based solidarities. Through a study of the main local and transnational actors within NGOs in Morocco, the paper argues that volunteering, as a form of social capital in a modernized associational activism within an emerging public sphere in Morocco, is the new arena where social capital through civil activism is translated into political capital during the democratization phase. The emergence of the modern volunteer with a civil society identity from within NGOs during the 90's up until now unveils new forms of doing politics, integrating the debate on the social in Morocco with a new way of claiming a political identity. The ambition of this paper is to contribute to the understanding of volunteers' repertoires (secular, religious), discourses and strategies of mobilization, and collective action in matters of participatory governance mechanisms.

The research demonstrates that volunteering in Morocco produces new values and forms in both the public and private spheres, making development interventions from NGOs and the call for good governance mechanisms into "sites for discursive struggle for meaning" (Barbara and Stuart 1995,115). This paper's main goal is to research the extent to which civil society contributes to strengthening good governance practices and mechanisms in Morocco in issues related to social welfare, development and gender equality where non-state actors replaced state retreat. The main argument is that, despite a few encouraging examples recently, civil society's role in strengthening public sector accountability remains limited at both national and local levels. This is due to three main reasons. The first relates to the nature of the political system, mainly with reference to the dominance of upward accountability mechanisms in the Moroccan governance system, given the political weight of the King and the historical proximity approach of the monarchy in matters of social service delivery. The second set of reasons refers to certain internal features of Moroccan civil society, especially the limited priority given to accountability issues and its internal divisions. The third reason can be found in civil society's position with regard to its external environment, i.e. the nature of its relationships with the public sector, both local governments and ministerial public administrations, which at best amount to "co-production" rather than "co-governance" arrangements.

The paper tries to explore the scope for co-governance mechanisms in the civil society-state partnership in issues related to social welfare, development and gender equality. This approach highlights the multifaceted aspects of volunteering and its role in governance mechanisms in a context of total fragmentation along the religious-secular divide. Other issues are also considered such as the new vs. old regime representatives and political structures, limited public sector accountability mechanisms within the government, a fragmented nature of "civil society" and the lack of agreement on the way forward. This is illustrated by contention over the policies targeting human development framed either in the concept of "dignity" or "empowerment".

The paper argues that religious, secular and state development organizations, comprising the major actors of social provision and service-delivery, invest in the arena of the social in order to bridge the gap of social inequalities, questioning legitimacy and power redistribution. The social progress and political overtures pursued in the contemporary development enterprise ultimately depend upon these relations. The main argument of the analysis is that civil society advances the

following diagnosis: different constraints persist in the face of a multidimensional perspective on inequality reduction where it has to be linked to education, health and gender equity. It has also been demonstrated that there is a lack of a comprehensive and integrated social policy as the experience of the National Initiative of Human Development (INDH) shows¹. However, the rigor of its design and localized success remains limited in its size, its means and its effects. With adjustments necessary in logistical, regulatory and institutional capacity, and in the collaborative and participatory approaches adopted, it deserves to be mentioned that any strategy on national development would require all government departments, local governments and other development actors to work together.

Scope and Context

The philosophy of volunteering in the Arab world is not embedded in the culture of society and official policies that should encourage civic engagement and volunteering in the region are not well organized. Volunteering and civic services are neither framed nor included in the legal dispositions. Furthermore, many challenges face the development of the idea of volunteerism. The first challenge is the absence of clear policies on civic engagement and volunteerism; the second one is the lack of funding possibilities. Most of the organizations receive funding from either religious organizations or international organizations. This has an impact on the idea of volunteering among the local population. Last but not least, there is the lack of enthusiasm by the Arab people in general to the idea of volunteering due to the low level of institutionalization of philanthropy (Amaney 2007).

Social responsibility as a traditional form of solidarity is an ancient tradition in Morocco (Rachik 2001). Although this major cultural and religious asset in communities calls for a moral and religious giving and social solidarity based on Islam and Amazigh social organization (Roque 2004), the trend of philanthropic giving in Morocco, which is based on giving money and helping strangers instead of volunteering, support the idea that giving has a religious dimension (Harmsen 2008).

However, although the ideas and concepts of volunteering and civic service are not popular in the Arab world, this trend is changing: the idea of democratization as well as social and economic factors are the main reasons for the development of the culture of volunteering in the region. By 2000, Arab states started to encourage and improve the legal and political environment that would support voluntarism by including the idea of civic engagement and voluntarism in the school curriculum; more and more programs and policies have been formed that can be considered part of this form of volunteering. Organizations and societies are starting to understand the importance of such an act and its link to the social and economic revival of social enterprises.

In Morocco, the growing politics of the “non-governmental” (Howell 2006) in the context of INDH, the constitutionalization of civil society’s role in 2011 (during the Moroccan version of the Arab-Spring) and the launching of the national dialogue on civil society² question politically and socially our understanding of intervention as a societal responsibility. In this context, within a nascent civil society being transformed by a process of “NGO-ization” (Jad 2007) and divided among secularists, Islamists and state actors in a developing country where radicalization and democratization coexist, the idea of development interventions in the social arena is transforming political discourses and the public sphere itself.

Social Capital, Civil Society and Development

According to John Field (2003), social capital permeates all fields and all subjects; political scientists, development practitioners and policy makers are interested in social capital reserves and stocks to resolve problems related to development, conflict resolution, lack of solidarity and network management. It seems that the most prominent engagement with social capital is found in the civil society sector and gender research (O'Neill and Gidengil 2006; Howell and Pearce 2001; Howell and Mulligan 2004; Molyneux 2002). In social capital "relationships matter" and connections as well as networks are considered as stocks of capital. The more people you know, the more you are rich in social capital. The more you help other people and the more values you share with them, the more cooperation you get. Robert Putnam (1993) has defined social capital as: "features of social organization, such as trust, norms, and networks, which can improve the efficiency of society by facilitating coordinated actions" (1993, 167). Classical social theory dealt with norms, networks and relationships as a source of meaning and order; it was echoed in the works of Alexis de Tocqueville, Emile Durkheim, Max Weber, and Karl Marx.

Pierre Bourdieu's engagement with the concept became part of his analysis to understand the place of individuals within the social order. Bourdieu (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992) defines social capital in the following words: "social capital is the sum of resources, actual or virtual, that accrue to an individual or a group by virtue of possessing a durable network of more or less institutionalized relationships of mutual acquaintance and recognition" (1992, 14). Bourdieu's main concern with the concept of social capital was to use it as an analytical tool to understand social inequality and hierarchical societal structures that exclude some citizens and benefit some. For Bourdieu, social capital can cause the production of inequality. It functions as an investment strategy (Field 2003, 19). Unlike Bourdieu, James S. Coleman views social capital as a reserve that can be attained by all people, whether privileged or not. Coleman's conceptualization of social capital stands on values of trust.

Coleman defines social capital as follows:

"Unlike other forms of capital, social capital inheres in the structure of relations between actors and among actors. It is not lodged either in the actors themselves or in physical implements of production. Because purposive organizations can be actors ("corporate actors") just as persons can, relations among corporate actors can constitute social capital for them as well." (1988, 98)

Field highlights Coleman's definition of social capital by arguing that

"...the set of resources that inhere in family relations and in community social organization and that are useful for the cognitive or social development of a child or young person. These resources differ for different persons and can constitute an important advantage for children and adolescents in the development of their human capital." (2003, 24)

For Coleman, both the individual and the collective are interconnected to social capital. Moreover, as highlighted by Field, the family as an institution is imperative in Coleman's thought regarding social capital. However, it appears that Putnam's conceptualization brings in notions of collective action and networks to his definition of social capital; he argues that

"Social capital contributes to collective action by increasing the potential costs of defectors; fostering robust norms of reciprocity; facilitating flows of information, including information on actors' reputations; embodying the successes of past attempts of collaboration; and acting as a template for future cooperation." (1993, 31)

During the 90s, Putnam refined his definition of social capital by stressing the use of networks, norms and trust. Putnam's famous study was on how the decline of civic engagement in the USA resulted in a decline in social capital. For him, civil society is the sphere to measure the power of social capital. Social capital is tied to the powerful nature of networks. It explains how social capital was used in different ways and different fields. Field explains,

“...social capital broadly does what the theorists have claimed: to put it crudely, people who are able to draw on others for support are healthier than those who cannot; they are also happier and wealthier; their children do better at school, and their communities suffer less from anti-social behaviour.” (2003, 45)

It seems that the concept is beneficial in all fields and for all people; it is an empowering mechanism. It can explore the benefits of social capital in education, economy, health and well-being, and crime and deviancy.

For Francis Fukuyama (1995, 26) trust is a fundamental element of social capital, “social capital is a capability that arises from the prevalence of trust in a society or in certain parts of it” (1995, 26). Trust seems the core of the debate on social capital. However, Field argues that trust itself is too complicated to be incorporated as essential to social capital discussions. He argues that “...trust itself is a complex and varied phenomenon...trust is not a necessary consequence of shared norms and strong networks, and may therefore be best treated as a separate variable...trust may be best seen as a consequence of social capital over time...” (2003, 64). For Field trust is treated independently of social capital. Trust for Field may sometimes express mistrust because people may fear, for example, being fired from their job. Hence social capital used as a tactic to keep the social dimension necessary for keeping the job.

When looking at social capital through civic engagement, Michael Woolcock distinguishes three types of social capital: bonding (people in similar situations), bridging (more distant ties) and linking (outside the community) (Woolcock 2001, 42). For Field (2003), “bonding” (or “exclusive”) social capital is based around family, close friends and other near kin; it is inward looking and binds people from a similar sociological niche; it tends to “reinforce exclusive identities and homogeneous groups” (Field, 2003). By contrast, Michael Edwards (2004) in his study approaches civil society by trying to apply the notions of bonding and bridging to civil society networking. Likewise, Field recognized the importance of these distinctions for community development policies and anti-poverty strategies; for Field (2003, 65), “bridging” (or “inclusive”) social capital links people to more distant acquaintances who move in different circles from their own; it tends to generate broader identities and wider reciprocity rather than reinforcing a narrow grouping”. Without a vertical dimension, Field argues with Woolcock (2001, 13) that social capital misses the “linking” dimension that permeates the two other dimensions.

Field refers to the analysis of Pamela Paxton (1999, 88-127) in incorporating values as important dimensions of social capital. Field explains, “Paxton has defined social capital as constituted of two different components... (a) the level of associations between individuals or the objective network structure... (b) the subjective ties between the same individuals” (2003, 67). Based on this distinction between the impact of social capital on the individual as well as on the community that we can understand the inner workings of social capital; how it can weaken the individual at the expense of the community or *vice versa*; or how it can make individuals powerful at the expense of the community or *vice versa*. Therefore, a balanced relation is of utmost importance.

However, there is a “dark side” of social capital as there are two negative consequences of social capital. Firstly, social capital may enhance inequality. Secondly, social capital may encourage antisocial behaviour. Social capital may bring individuals to cooperate for negative as well as positive ends. The issue of social capital and inequality then emerges as a negative side where some enhance their social capital at the expense of others, in order to access resources and privileges. Field mentions two types of inequalities. The first one involves the richest and the most educated having more connections and hence more social capital. The second one is about the relationship between connectedness and social capital. The more connected you are, the more social capital you have, especially if your connections provide you with support. Field then moves to explain the link between “sociability” and “perversity”. Field (2003, 83) argues that people “can exploit social capital for purposes that are socially perverse”.

The contention now is how to handle social capital during the emergence of new forms of citizenship and activism in which networks become very significant and part of daily life changes. One of the characteristics of social capital in transitions is democratic citizenship activism. Field argues with Alain Touraine,

“the demise of the welfare state is closely connected with individualism, which has witnessed the appearance of new forms of citizenship. Rather than seeking to belong to wider collectivities, they have developed resources which enable them to resist the logic of technical objects, instruments of power and social integration” (Touraine 1995, 230).

Through examples from cyber space communication, ex-communist states and family ties, Field supports the argument of Touraine. He further analyses these new spaces and their relation to social capital regarding inflexible and virtual relations in a “risky society”. Field concludes, “...the move towards more open, fluid and temporary forms of social capital appears to be part of a much wider process of social and cultural change” (2003, 114).

In the Arab world, social capital from within civil society is being mobilized to push for reforms that are more democratic. Amaney Jamal’s study “Barriers to Democracy” (2007) deals with the question of the usefulness of the concept in capturing the dynamics of democratization in the Arab world. Her study focuses mainly on Palestine but she extends her study to Egypt, Jordan and Morocco. Jamal’s main argument is the following:

“Because political institutions shape civic attitudes, both the content and the form of civic engagement will differ across varying political contexts.... the absence of accessible channels of political participation will not hinder some forms of participation but also shape one’s attitude and beliefs about participation. Individuals will develop opinions, attitudes, norms, and perceptions influenced directly by the political context in which they operate. Since patterns of political participation differ in nondemocratic settings, patterns of civic engagement should differ as well.” (2007, 10)

Due to the nature of the political regime and system in Morocco, the state realized that the civic sphere should not be left for manipulation and penetration by the opposition. One of the state strategies is to sponsor, promote and build a pro-regime civic sector (Jamal 2007; Sater 2007). Association leaders in Morocco find it hard to be in total opposition with the state because they are funded by local elected municipality leaders; that is why the paper argues for a discursive negotiation or bargaining for interests, needs, goals and priorities vis-à-vis the state.

On the other hand, civil society NGOs in Morocco are recognizing the effect of social capital and networking on their work and its sustainability. Fatima Mernissi (1997) was one of the first researchers focussing on social capital and its magical workings in civic traditions in Morocco. She

devoted a whole book to the linkages between traditional forms of solidarity as a form of social capital and associational involvement. NGOs exploit these stocks of social capital to implement development projects and to mobilize illiterate people to manage the village's daily affairs³. All in all, social capital, I argue, is all about "needs-talks" in the sense that "oppositional" forms of needs talks are politicized in order to generate a response from the state. Hence when civil society NGOs exploit their accumulated social capital, in their endeavour to counter and compete with state organizations. They do this solely for the purpose of positioning their search for legitimacy in the political landscape. NGOs in this sense do go beyond their watch-dog or intermediary roles to the political one, competing with political parties in governance and the political sphere. There are two cases where two NGOs transformed into political parties, mainly the "Mouvement pour Tous les Démocrates" changed into the Party of Authenticity and Modernity (PAM) and The "Mouvement fidélité a la démocratie" helped in founding the Unified Socialist Party. The social domain in Morocco is both a new field for state intervention and a site of contestation for social movements, bringing their own interpretations of what peoples' 'needs' are. The emergence of the new social actors consisting of a mixture of Islamists, secularists and feminists working together to change the face of the public sphere, involves a battle of 'needs interpretation'.

In mobilizing social capital, civil society NGOs manage to impose their own interpretations of needs contrary to hegemonic state or expert discourses. Nancy Fraser analyses this first type of needs talk through stressing three necessary elements,

"First, they contest the established boundaries separating "politics" from "economics" and "domestics". Second, they offer alternative interpretations of their needs embedded in alternative chains of in-order-to relations. Third, they create new discourse publics from which they try to disseminate their interpretations of their needs throughout a wide range of different discourse publics. Finally, they challenge, modify and/or displace hegemonic elements of the means of interpretation and communication; they invent new forms of discourse for interpreting their needs." (1989, 171)

I argue that developmental NGOs in Morocco are contesting and reordering the political space through a revitalization of the local, through "oppositional" discourses on the "social" in the form of needs-talks. Social capital as needs-talk is, in this sense, a strategy of meaning production; it is an alternative meaning to hegemonic knowledge production in the field of social capital where manufacturing new discourses on the social is an act of change.

The argument is that the "needs and interests satisfaction/interpretation" (Fraser 1989,171) paradigm is an entry into empowerment. What is less clear is that power is embedded in em(power)ment and involved in the construction of interests. Power is embedded in local spaces, mainly in networks and institutions. The social can be best understood in terms of power relations. The social emerges out of local reordering of the political in Morocco. The social blurs the boundaries between the private and the public and also among politics, economics and domestics in postmodern societies. In words of Habermas, "this public is made of citizens who seek acceptable interpretations for their social interests and experiences and who want to have an influence on institutionalized opinion and will-formation" (1996, 367).

The social is an arena of political contestation. It is a shifting terrain, where different actors forge new identities and where new social agents of change emerge on the political scene. Fraser defines the social in the following terms, "the social is a site of discourse about problematic needs, needs that have come to exceed the apparently... self-regulating domestic and official economic institutions" (1989, 156-57). Therefore, the social is a place of contestation. The social is characteristic of the modern public sphere. It is a conflicting, competitive way of interpreting

people's needs. The social allows for a plurality of voices to emerge in the public arena. The social in Morocco is a new terrain for the state and for wider political contestation. Fraser (1989, 158) argues that in the social "the focus would be as much on need interpretation as on need satisfaction. This is as it should be, since any satisfactions we are able to win will be problematic to the degree we fail to fight and win the battle of interpretation".

Methodology

Civil society's capacity in Morocco is primarily dependent on its autonomy and relative strength in relation to both the political and economic spheres. In other words, the state and capacity of civil society can be discerned by analysing its position relative to political society. Prior to an empirical analysis based on expert interviews in Morocco, this section provides a theoretical discussion of the concept of civil society. First, the concept of civil society will be discussed in relation to the state and the economy, and placed in the democracy-debate, especially the theoretical assertions to a non-essentialist analysis of civil society in Morocco. The argument is an attempt to contrast a civil society's strength with both weak and strong state assumptions, and to proclaim the importance of a context-specific approach. Second, the theoretical analysis is a plea for a more nuanced approach to civil society and social movements' research (O'Donnell and Schmitter 2013).

As far as methods of data collection are concerned, qualitative interviews were collected from the fieldwork which was conducted in two phases. First, the initial phase was conducted between 2004 and 2008 with big networks of local development NGOs in Morocco. During this phase in-depth interviews with NGO staff, volunteers and beneficiaries on the contribution of associations to local development were conducted by the author (Touhtou 2012); second, 20 in-depth interviews were conducted in 2016 with the main actors in civil society in Morocco on the post-2015 development agenda for the implementation of the Millennium development goals. My research relies also on secondary resources, mainly the results of the consultation process launched by the United Nations and the civil society recommendations on the post-2015 development agenda. This research aims to explore the many facets of volunteering in the development of the post-2015 agenda in a growing intervention context of the state as a developmental institution, changing frameworks of mobilization, and uncertain transition to the democracy process (Klandermans and Roggeband 2010).

Analysis and Discussions

Civil Society: A Critical Reading

Based on fieldwork, I argue that the civil society NGOs movement is the most dynamic social and political activism in the democratization phase where Islamism, feminism and secularism interact and coexist in the public sphere. These social movements adopt a discourse of universal rights coloured with specificity and locality as strategies or responses to globalization and postmodernism (Karam 2000). Their strategies of empowerment create a third space between modernity and globalization. They particularize their activism through redefining citizenship and human rights. Civil society activism in modern Morocco follows two logics: activism for a dynamic political citizenship and devoted criticism of emerging "neo-patriarchies". Civil society in Morocco tries to combine the politics of "redistribution" and "recognition"⁴. Hence, we witness an emerging hybrid civil society in Morocco and it seems that human rights, gender, ethnic/linguistic and migration activism have a transformative power. Hybrid in the sense that civil society in Morocco has taken state roles and political parties roles with the retreat of both actors and mistrust of the population from both; the hybrid role of civil society encompasses an identity that is beyond the capabilities of the civil society actors. It is a new identity in the making. Most importantly, the

social construction of place takes a local/global dimension when volunteers/activists take the development of their original communities as a political legitimacy.

The main feature civil society organizations have in common is that they provide a network for civic engagement. The organizations can differ in their forms. Hawthorne (2004) distinguishes five types of organisations in Middle Eastern civil societies: Islamic organizations, Nongovernmental service organizations, Membership-based professional organizations, Associations that foster solidarity and companionship, and prodemocratic associations. Two wrong assumptions exist about civil society organizations. First, many people believe that a strong civil society automatically leads to democratization. This is not the case (Carothers 2000). Civil society can play an important role in the process of democratization, but for those organisations to play a democratizing role they have to develop several key attributes. If the civil society lacks those attributes, it will be very difficult for citizens to pursue their democratic values through civil society organisations (Hawthorne 2004). Amy Hawthorne states in her article “Middle Eastern Democracy: Is Civil Society the Answer?” that for civil society to play a democratizing role, civil society must develop three key attributes, namely a prodemocracy agenda, connections with other organizations in civil society and an autonomous position from the regime. Yet, as claimed by Foley and Edwards (1996), political settlements are often the work of political parties in association with the best-financed and best-armed parts of civil society. In other words, the political and economic sphere can be highly inter-twined with civil society organizations, which further problematizes the attainment of a relative autonomous position.

However, one should remain cautious about the possibility of seeing the associative movement (a group of associations mainly founded in the 80’s and 90’s as pro-democracy organizations) develop into a real Moroccan civil society likely to erect itself as a genuine counter-power to the state (Denoeux and Gateau 1995). For civil society to emerge as a new oppositional actor, civil society in Morocco should re-appropriate the discourse on civil society in the public sphere from the perspective of legitimacy, representation and new oppositional, alternative strategies.

Moroccan civil society has entrenched its role in the 2011 constitution reform and launched a broad debate enabling a better determination of its potential contribution to democratic governance. It is important to mention that the present government, led by the Islamist Party of Justice and Development (PJD), launched a national dialogue on the prerogatives of civil society in the new constitution (Touhtou 2014). It is also worth mentioning that part of a secular civil society boycotted this dialogue and organized a parallel dialogue⁵.

Since consultation of civil society has always been “sporadic and irregular”, it is doubtful whether its voice will actually be taken into consideration in the creation of a genuine public sphere. The representation deficit left by the traditional political parties and the increasingly criticized high levels of social inequality linked with the failure of poverty reduction strategies would nourish this cynicism. The principles of equality, equal opportunity, justice for all, support of the youth and the independence of the judiciary are not loose alien words. They represent a hotbed for the depth of any real societal reform aiming at reducing poverty, vulnerability and restoring hope for broad categories of Moroccan citizens. The current social and political structures may restrain the constitution’s impact in practice. Surely, a new legal norm cannot beget a new society; however, it can perhaps contribute to its gradual and inevitable transformation.

Civil society mobilized masses through service delivery, moral sensitization and sometimes through family bonding. These actors exploited globalization to their ends and linked the amorphous space of the globe with local experiences and thus provided an alternative possibility

of identity formation; they want to work for an order that refers to abstract laws and trans-historical legitimacy. It is an inner approach from within the subject's own experience of changes and transformations using institutional reform and political alliances as analytical tools for understanding social inequalities caused by market reform integration.

Since the onset of the Arab Spring, the 20th February Movement has mobilized citizens under the banner "People want to Fight Corruption", defying corruption among state bureaucrats and representatives. Besides the 20th February Movement, a surge in the number and diversity of groups – including feminists, Amazigh, human rights activists, youth, and Islamists – created this new dynamism in Morocco's public sphere. I argue that this 'new dynamism' might help to bridge the gap between the public and private spheres as well as formal and informal ways of doing politics in Morocco. Despite reforms, many protesters are unsatisfied, as the monarchy prevails in its battle with the 20th February Movement (Fernández Molina 2011, 441). After initial uncertainty, the king has managed to take control of the situation and take hold of the reins of political change. This could have potentially slowed the initial dynamism of the 20th February Movement. Expectations from civil society and volunteering in the developing countries are very high and crucially so in sectors where the state has relinquished the field in favour of civil society action. In this context, where development assistance is increasingly rare and difficult to reach, undesirable effects of the crisis are touching the less developed countries who depend heavily on the developed countries, the contribution of volunteering, which is the essence of associative life, is both precious and crucial. Volunteering within civil society, as a site for renegotiating the public-private boundary, and the changing relations between state and NGO's in Morocco, cannot be studied without an analysis of the three main actors in the social welfare system: State/Monarchy, Secular and Islamist NGOs.

Discourses on Development, Participation and Empowerment: Aspects of New Public Space Actors

This section is about civil society activism/volunteerism and its relationship to development, in which the social, cultural and political intertwine and transform the public sphere in Morocco. It examines the myriad strategies and discourses that the NGOs pursue to defend their rights and impose their agendas. The dominant discourses on needs with reference to the social in Morocco revolve around issues of development, participation and empowerment. These framing dimensions permeate Moroccan NGOs' discourses, ideologies and interventions and endow them with a coherent force for social as well as political negotiation. This gives them the power to be firmly embedded within society and also to renew their strategies and hence secure a sustainable existence. Faith-based associations use the same discourses and strategies as secular or state NGOs. They are very active in service delivery types of social intervention and compete with the king as a symbol of religion, "Makhzen⁶" and the state. The most powerful Islamist organization is "Al-Adl Wa-Al-Ihsan" (Justice and Charity has the status of an NGO though they are illegal, as the state does not recognize it) led by the spiritual leader Mohamed Abbadi and his daughter Nadia Yassine. They both challenge the king's legitimacy, position and sacredness through imposing their own interpretations of the political and the social in Morocco on the king and other Islamist as well as secular actors. The era of the Plan of Action for integrating women into development in 1999, during the government of democratic transition, the Islamists (mainly Adl Wa Al Ihsan and PJD) opposed the Plan because of its referential stance that is the gender analysis framework. The Islamists won the battle of needs interpretation because they knew how to mobilise the masses and how to argue for a local culture and religion bound approach.

The First Islamist political party is Justice and development (PJD) which won the 2011 and 2016 elections. This is a powerful political party in terms of numbers of activists and sympathizers,

with different affiliated NGOs of development, education and also a powerful section of a feminist NGO (Renewal of Women's Consciousness organization). The PJD are aware of the position of the king as a commander of the faithful. They cannot challenge his sacred leadership. Thus, they have to rely on different manoeuvres apart from the religious one. PJD in opposing the Plan of integrating women into development argued that the gender approach would create breakdowns in Moroccan family households, the last fortress of Islamic socialisation reproduction.

A secular management of local affairs characterizes the Moroccan political arena. The king is the only personality who can use both religion and politics in managing governance as was clear in the latest family reform of 2003. The king himself stressed this point in his speech concerning the new family code arguing that the only person who can have both roles is the king, having settled a long battle among secular and Islamists on the right to use religious discourses in politics. What did the king leave for the different actors in both political parties and civil society to compete over? Civil society, I argue, is the only space in modern Islamic states that can either advance or curtail the development of these societies. Some intellectuals attempt to redefine civil society in cultural terms arguing for the possibility of a coexistence among Islamism, democratization and secularism, while refuting the idea of an impossible existence of civil society where states have a religious or authoritarian basis (Cavatorta 2006; Kamali 2001; Turam 2004; Bayat 2002; Hanafi 2002).

Morocco's civil society is a space for the king to renew his legitimacy through social services delivery to an extent, that his principal efforts target the poor in rural areas and in urban cities from which the radical 'Jihadists', responsible for the 16th May 2003 terrorist attacks, came. PJD has started as an association of social service deliver and preaching and then transformed into a political party; civil society was also a space for moderate Islamists to found a legal political party and participate in elections and attract the attention of research centres in the United States of America. For secular and other emerging movements, mainly those of youth and women, civil society allows them to reframe their activism and discourse. All these actors use civil society as an arena where the social and the symbolic play decisive roles of empowerment and visibility. They rely heavily on proximity work through social service delivery and they also use powerful symbolic tools, like religious preaching and education (in the case of Islamists) or secular ideas of democracy (in the case of secular groups) to empower them politically.

Metamorphoses of Civil Society Activism

The social, the local and “needs satisfaction” translated in social provision services in Morocco are key constructs to capture state-civil society interactions. Civil society NGOs mobilize social service delivery and volunteering to fill the gaps left by the state. Tracing the way these discourses influence how these NGOs struggle and negotiate with institutions and other actors (the state, the community and the family) in their environment, I highlight that good governance practices, accountability mechanisms, engendering of civic institutional structures and tradition/modernity nexus are at the heart of social debates in Morocco. These issues create the divide between civil society actors and the state organizations (Mohamed V Foundation of Development, Agencies of social development and the National Initiative for Human Development). State actors provide also social delivery services to weaken NGOs who use the same strategies; NGOs when they provide social services, they exploit their proximity to the population for grassroots activism. These government-non-government organizations (GONGs)⁷ emerged as a powerful rival to civil society institutions.

The projects of integrating managerial mechanisms, modernising NGO culture and women in development become sites of contestation over the meaning of needs and governance. It emerged from the fieldwork that the history of civil society in Morocco with its “proximity”

approach, being first providers of basic needs and services to the population where the state fails to do so, brings to the surface new discourses on needs and governance where the state is absent or weak enough not to service those needs. So what active forms of citizenship and governance are civil society organizations constructing in this emerging public sphere? The main observations/results can be summarized as followed.

First, the local and the social have become a refuge strategy; these two concepts have found a privileged place in the vocabulary of different social actors in the field of NGOs in Morocco concerned with issues of development and democracy. The local and the social debates are brought into the public sphere as arenas which can allow a critique of development agendas nationally; it challenges the universalism of development discourses upon which the framework of modernisation was built; and it allows people to participate in the economic and political life of their community. Finally, the local and the social also challenge authoritarianism by promoting decentralisation and autonomy.

Second, we witness a travelling of both family and masculine values into civil society; notions of family, belonging, care and bonding find their way into the conceptualization of civil society NGOs at the level of creation, management and mobilization; NGO activists and beneficiaries reproduce these familial bonding to manage and expand their networks of solidarity and influence. These values should be incorporated in any attempt to study or define the dynamism of civil society NGOs in Morocco. The main argument is that in the field of civil society in Morocco a gender-based polarisation prevails in the form of organizations, though there are claims of a “feminized” activism⁸. Citizen identities are gendered so that civic activism is associated with the death of institutional politics, meaning that “gender and women’s empowerment” are mobilized as empowering aspects for civil society organizations and not as an “emancipation” paradigm for women.

Third, empowerment through civic activism tilts between 'needs satisfaction' and 'needs interpretation'; social service delivery for catering to the needs in search for legitimacy and strength in both the formal and informal arenas of politics in Morocco is a very competitive activity. The battle now is about who is going to win the interpretation phase, which has the capacity to impose its agenda and define the terms of the game.

In this sense, associative action is the expression of individuals’ will to take charge of their own development. This is translated into a number of initiatives and actions that contribute to sustainable human development, mainly the promotion of values of citizenship and democracy. Civic action is an arena for practicing citizenship rights and defining its conditions by renegotiating the public-private boundary, and the changing relations between the state and civil society. The private-public divide cannot be studied without an analysis of the gender system, as gender is a central structuring principle of social relations and a primary way of signifying relationships of power. Second, ways social actors organise themselves institutionally and in relation to the state are relevant. And finally, how discourses on “needs” and good governance” practices emerge from within social actors and redefine state civil society relations are important.

Conclusion

This paper tried to analyse the emerging forms of civil society activisms in post-Arab spring Morocco and the metamorphoses happening within the associational life. It attempted to bring into visibility the fragmentation among these civil actors, their discourses and their interaction with the state apparatuses. The post 2011 phase is a momentum of upheavals and changing relations and dynamics which interpellate my research to rethink volunteerism and social capital as assets used

by these actors to move to the political sphere and consequently translate their gained social capital into political capital.

As argued in this paper, social capital is all about needs talks in the sense that “oppositional” forms of needs talks are politicized in order to generate a response from the state. Civil society NGOs mobilize social capital in their war to win the politics of needs. In mobilizing social capital, civil society NGOs manage to impose their own interpretations of needs contrary to the hegemonic state or expert discourses. I argue with Nancy Fraser (1989, 171), in order to understand the metamorphoses of civil society organizations in Morocco, through stressing three necessary elements, first, CSO’s (civil society organisations) [they] contest the established boundaries separating “politics” from “economics” and “domestics”⁹. Second, they offer alternative interpretations of their needs embedded in alternative chains of in-order-to relations. Third, they create new discourse publics from which they try to disseminate their interpretations of their needs throughout a wide range of different discourse publics. Finally, they challenge, modify and/or displace hegemonic elements of the means of interpretation and communication; they invent new forms of discourse for interpreting their needs and contest, reorder the political space through a revitalization of the local, through “oppositional” discourses on the “social” in the form of “needs talks”¹⁰. In conclusion, civil society takes on the role of a counterbalance vis-à-vis the state and private economic interests. In performing this role, the principles of neutrality and independence must be maintained very cautiously. For only independent organizations vis-à-vis the state and the economic sector can observe and evaluate the actions of the latter objectively.

Notes

¹ This is a royal initiative launched by the King Mohamed VI in 2005 to fight against poverty, vulnerability and marginalization among underprivileged people.

² See the website dedicated to this dialogue: <http://hiwarmadani2013.ma/>.

³ Fatima Mernissi is a sociologist and a feminist known for her path-breaking research on Islamic feminism; she initiated research on civil society in rural areas in Morocco; her 2003 study “Les Aït-Débrouille: ONG Rurales du Haut Atlas” and also her article: ‘Social Capital in Action: The Case of the Ait Iktel Village Association’ are pioneer works on social capital in civil society in Morocco.

⁴ We owe this terminology to: Fraser, Nancy (1997): *Justice Interruptus: Critical Reflections on the “Postsocialist” Condition*. Routledge.

⁵ See the website of the civil society parallel dialogue: <http://www.dynamiqueappelrabat.org/ar>.

⁶ In Moroccan Arabic, the term means literally “storehouse” that is the palace quarters where goods offered to or expropriated by the sultan’s representative were stored. In Politics, it has come to denote the king’s surroundings and the notables governing next to him. In the post-Arab spring era, people refer to it meaning the deep state.

⁷ This I call “state civic organizations” which are organizations created by the state to ensure control of NGOs. These GONGs mobilize the “deep state” arsenal and symbolism to insure loyalty to the king and control electoral tendencies in the regions in Morocco.

⁸ The “Feminization” of civil society argument focuses mainly on the women’s movement activism in the 90’s as the feminist battle for changing the personal status code was exploited by the opposition and by the Monarchy as a mobilizing framework for legitimacy and power. Touhtou, Rachid. 2014a. *Gender Codification in the Family Code and the Constitution in Morocco: Social Movement and Feminist Approaches*. In Women’s Rights and Gender Equality in the MENA, FEPS and SOLIDAR Publications: Brussels.

⁹ I am these concepts from the book of: Frazer, Nancy. (2008). *Scales of Justice: Reimagining Political Space in a Globalizing World*. Polity.

¹⁰ This has been clear in the last constitutional reform of 2011 where civil society organizations advocated constitutional recognition of the civil society role in governance and public policies and lobbied for representativity within structures of governance to ensure that their opinions and suggestions are taken into

consideration (Touhtou, Rachid. 2014. *Civil Society Under the New 2011 Constitution in Morocco: Issues, Stakes and Challenges*. In Arab Centre for Research and Policy Studies.)

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Oualid Bakkas

Digital Activism vs Digital Surveillance: Who Wins? The Case of the February 20th Movement in Morocco

Alike many countries in the MENA region, the year 2011 was undoubtedly a real turning point in the modern history of Morocco. Led by the February 20th movement, Moroccans took to the streets and shouted one big slogan: "Freedom, Dignity and Social Justice". Rather than teaching about the role of digital media in the collective social movement of 2011 in Morocco, as a continuity of a number of collective movements known as the Arab Spring, the present paper argues that regardless of social media being a strong backbone for the kingdom's social protests in 2011, these protests have failed, or at least reached a cul-de-sac. This is not only due to the quick promises of reform made by the leader of the country, in the aftermath of the early protests, but also due to digital surveillance. That said, if Moroccan authorities resorted to all forms of censorship to stop free press calling for democratic change in the past decades, it was time for digital surveillance to play a decisive role to intimidate, harass, silence and repress Moroccan activists in 2011. Activists often look at digital media as a chance to enlarge their call for protest and mobilization that guarantees at the same time their invisibility and anonymity. However, these forms of communication were used against them in an unprecedented way where they lost the battle. Again, the question of the legitimacy of these forms of surveillance has to be raised. Law in Morocco guarantees the right to privacy to everyone, but to what extent this right has been respected?

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Digital Activism vs Digital Surveillance: Who Wins? The Case of the February 20th Movement in Morocco

Introduction

It seems that, what British novelist and journalist George Orwell predicted in his famous “1984”, where the practice of surveillance will be very advanced, and where the Big Brother will have the ability to exercise an unconditioned, harsh surveillance on all people, was not taken as that realistic in dealing with modern societies. However, what we are living and experiencing nowadays shows the opposite of what we might think of Orwell’s fiction, and that his prediction was in fact just right. The surveillance society, the big brother and the electronic eye. These terms, among many other terms coming from the lexicon of the state surveillance, have emerged unprecedentedly in the recent decade, as the phenomenon of digital surveillance gained currency worldwide. The latter is regarded as an output / side effect of the ongoing technological revolution the world has been witnessing starting from the 1990’s and as an ultimate incarnation of the very contemporary manners of surveillance exercised by the state towards its people. The digital surveillance as an experienced reality made many scholars agree with Orwell’s assumption, and the fact that we live in a surveillance society par excellence.¹

The word “surveillance” literally means “*some people watching over other people*”, but it also refers to a social practice and relationship stuck to all human societies over history.² The practice of surveillance was in the beginning a personal or a one-to-one practice consisting of “*one person being surveilled by another one individual.*” In the nineteenth century, the practice of surveillance witnessed a real historical turning point with the invention of *The Panopticon*, literally the eye that observes everything, a technique that allows the surveillance of many people (basically prisoners) at one time by only one individual. This practice was institutionalized over time, allowing the state and its institutions to watch over all its people, and it reached an unprecedented point with the practice of the digital surveillance.³

According to Spanish semiologist, essayist and political critic Ignacio Ramonet, the strong, unlimited presence of all that is digital in the practice of surveillance in our modern world is a reasonable point to argue that we really experience a veritable age of digital surveillance, “*the age of the Orwellian state par excellence.*”⁴ The state, adds Ramonet, wants now to know everything about its citizens, lifting the infamous banner of “*Less freedom and privacy for more security*”⁵. Thus, Ramonet ventures to say that the state is leading what Stephen Graham names “*A fourth-generation warfare*”. A warfare taking private lives of people -basically users of digital communication technologies- as a major battlefield, a warfare waged by the state in the name of fighting terrorism, criminal cellules and isolated wolves, a warfare with extended fields, reaching urban spaces, train stations, hypermarkets, commercial centers, metro stations and airports.⁶ Ramonet concludes, that the coming decade will be the decade of digital surveillance par excellence, a decade where the “*panoptic system*” will be boosted and enhanced, and the internet of things within which all equipment around us will be connected to the internet, from communication tools to kitchen and entertainment material.⁷ Under these brand new conditions, all people, in the eyes of Ramonet, will remain guilty by definition in a clear announcement of the end of the private sphere and private life of individuals and a triumph of the public sphere and all other forms of publicity. Here, new big players are emerging within this game of digital surveillance of the state. We are talking about social media networks, those huge reservoirs of all the data the state seeks about its people. Under these new conditions, privacy is not considered a core component of the everyday life anymore, to the point that Facebook cofounder Mark Zuckerberg said that “*Privacy is no longer a social norm*”⁸, and that “*If you have something that you don't want anyone to know, maybe you shouldn't be doing it in the first place*”, as Google’s former CEO Eric

Schmidt proposed in a famous interview with the CNBC in 2009.⁹ The power of drawing borders between the private and the public are increasingly in the hands of not only Facebook and Google, the two most powerful components in our digital everyday life, but a possession of what is known in the literature of big data and digital surveillance as the GAFAM; Google, Apple, Facebook, Amazon and Microsoft.

In the Arabic-speaking countries, the practice of state surveillance is often regarded as an infamous component of the colonial heritage. As Canadian sociologist and surveillance scholar Elia Zureik suggests, the practice of surveillance in this part of the world, similarly to all third world countries, is a continuity of the colonial project in the region, aiming at dominating the people exactly as it was the goal of the colonizers during the colonial period.¹⁰ There is no doubt that most of the Arabic-speaking countries are familiar with the practice of the state surveillance through classic means, but it seems also that in the wake of the so-called Arab Spring, Arab regimes have strengthened modern digital forms of surveillance such as tracking phone calls and online correspondences to stand against the spread of the democratic collective movements, and to intimidate, harass, silence and repress activists.¹¹

The purpose of the present paper is to argue that the Moroccan authorities have resorted to the practice of digital surveillance in order to intimidate, harass, silence and repress Moroccan activists in 2011. Our argument is that, regardless of the right to privacy guaranteed by the Moroccan and international laws, the practice of online infiltration and digital state surveillance gained an unprecedented currency within the democratic collective action of the February 20th movement, and that the private online sphere and digital privacy are being transformed to a field of struggle in Morocco, between the digital state surveillance and the counter surveillance targeting the state in turn.

The Juridical Protection of Digital Privacy in Morocco

According to Freedom House's 2015 report on internet freedom in Morocco, the telecommunication sphere in the kingdom, unlike many countries in the MENA region, is relatively free. Internet users in the country don't face any prior restrictions or censorship on communicating any kind of content online, and they have accessibility to online materials regardless of origin and source without any kind of blocking or filtering.¹² What was considered as sensible topics / online taboos in Morocco, such as the Sahara issue, political Islam, and the Amazigh affair, no longer face any kind of restriction.¹³ In addition, the new Moroccan constitution of 2011 guarantees the right to privacy, stating that

*"[e]ach individual has the right to a protected private life, and to a secrecy of personal communications which cannot be violated, revealed or communicated, partly or totally, or to be used against anyone, unless under a juridical order, and within conditions and ways stated by the law."*¹⁴

In addition, the kingdom of Morocco ratified in the year 1979 the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, whose 17th article states that *"[n]o one shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to unlawful attacks on his honor and reputation."*¹⁵

Within the endeavor of Morocco to establish digital trust and security, to protect the digital private life on internet users and to fight digital crimes, a famous law number 09.08 concerning the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data came into force in 2009. It represents the ultimate incarnation of the Moroccan government's will to protect the private life of internet users, within a context of an unprecedented flux of data online.¹⁶ In the same year,

Morocco launched a big national program: *Le Plan Maroc Numérique 2009-2013*. The objective of this program was to revitalize and develop the digital sector in the country and to make of the digital a pillar of the social, economic and educational development in the country. Once again, the program insisted on the importance of protecting the private digital life of internet users and did so in the spirit of achieving its other aims.¹⁷ Further, we have to mention that the Moroccan penal law frankly criminalizes tracking or surveilling phone calls, or any kind of violating telecommunications privacy, unless under order from the examining magistrate or the attorney general, and within some very specific cases related to the security of the state, terrorism, crime, drugs and hallucinations, weapons, kidnapping and hostage taking.¹⁸

Digital State Surveillance

Though the juridical arsenal in Morocco provides a clear, recognized protection of the digital privacy, the state of Morocco seems to be in a contradiction with itself, exercising harsh surveillance on its people. This practice can be dated to the very early years of internet arrival in Morocco, and even before, regarding mobile phone surveillance in the kingdom. Many intelligence services and offices of western countries have always been warning their people coming to Morocco to take all the necessary arrangements when using telecommunication material, so they can escape any kind of state surveillance.¹⁹

In almost all countries, the practice of digital surveillance has become a common practice, not only with the pretext of protecting the security and stability of the state but also with the pretext of protecting the safety of the internet users themselves.²⁰ With these two pretexts, the Moroccan state allows itself to track but also to block any content threatening the pillars of the Moroccan Nation: monarchy, the Islamic religion and the territorial integrity of the kingdom (so to say the Saharan affair). In addition, keeping the public order and security, interrupting hate speech, violence and breaching morality remain core pretexts within which the Moroccan state guarantees to itself the privilege to keep its *digital eyes* on the internet users in the country.²¹

In February 2008, Moroccan engineer Fouad Mourtada was arrested and sentenced to three years of jail for creating a false profile of the King's brother on Facebook. Mourtada was released 43 days later by a royal pardon. The Fouad Mourtada affair is widely seen as major event in the trajectories of digital state surveillance and privacy violation in Morocco, and it generated controversy on the utility of the juridical arsenal in Morocco and its capacity to really protect the privacy of internet users in the kingdom as well as the legitimacy of such practices in Morocco.²²

The February 20th Movement and the Digital State Surveillance

No one can deny the decisive role digital media have played during the democratic collective movements all around the Arab spring countries. Digital media are thus regarded as the heroes of these movements, thanks to the amount of freedom and opportunity they offered to protesters / rebels to speak out and mobilize within a total secrecy and anonymity beyond the state's eyes of surveillance.²³ However, digital media is not always regarded as a divine blessing.

Many scholarly works stress a dark side of the use of these media. They look at digital media first and foremost as an invisible power in the hands of the state, as it changed in a revolutionary way the practice of surveillance within the democratic collective movements. That is to say, the internet, and more specifically the digital media, helped the state authorities to achieve an easier surveillance and getting all the needed data easily, thanks to these digital media which are a huge *Panopticon* with open doors and without walls, in complete and continuous secrecy.²⁴ So, we can venture to speak about social media within this brand-new use by the state as a danger on the

collective movements rather than a blessing. Social media became beneficial to the state's digital surveillance rather than being helpful for social movements.

In the context of Morocco's integration in the so-called war on terrorism, the kingdom introduced a national strategy in 2003 to fight against terrorism, organized crime and fanaticism; a strategy where digital surveillance was a core component. This strategy is often referred to in the lexicon of the Moroccan National Defense Administration (the Moroccan equivalent of the Defense Ministry but with limited power) as *The Digital Defense*, a notion that surprisingly gained currency with the raise of the democratic movement within the 20th February movement.²⁵ This strategy of *Digital Defense* is then considered by many activists as a camouflage of a systematic digital surveillance, a strategy to watch over and dominate the digital sphere in Morocco, and a "*modernization of the old ways of exercising surveillance in the country*" in order to stop the spread of the Arab spring, and to intimidate, track and harass the February 20th movement's activists.²⁶

In 2015, the UK-based prominent NGO defending the right to privacy, Privacy International (PI) published a report stating that the Moroccan authorities resorted to digital surveillance, but also to hacking in order to infiltrate telecommunication accounts of prominent activists from the 20th February movement. The report was based on interviews with four Moroccan activists and journalists, who assumed that their phones, emails and social media accounts were infiltrated by hackers working for official Moroccan authorities. The interviewees said that they felt targeted and in danger, and that made other digital media outlets remove content related to the movement by fear of being targeted by digital attacks as well.²⁷ In March of the same year, some of the interviewed activists in the PI report were driven to court, for getting "*foreign illegal funding*"; but during the trial, they were asked about their relationship with Privacy International, leaving little doubt that they were in fact interrogated for their sayings in the cited report.²⁸

In the context of the digital activism of the February 20th movement, the website www.mamfakinch.com literally means *we are not giving up*, was in the heart of the online activism. The website was founded and managed by prominent activist in the movement, and contributed significantly in covering, mobilizing, organizing and calling for taking the fields and protests. The PI report revealed that www.mamfakinch.com was in 2012 a target of the biggest cyber-attack and infiltration an online content has ever faced in Morocco. The hack was a *DDoS attack*, and all contents and kinds of existence of the website were completely deleted, specifically its coverage of the democratic movement in Morocco.²⁹

Counter-surveillance in Morocco and the State as a Target of Digital Surveillance

So, what to do? This is the biggest question many scholars in surveillance studies ask -or at least have to ask- wondering how to guarantee a safe usage of digital communication technologies including keeping their right to privacy. In fact, the most recommended way to escape digital surveillance remains the usage of specialized websites and applications guaranteeing the minimum of the digital privacy for internet users by encrypting online correspondences.³⁰

We had practically to wait until 2010 with Julian Assange's WikiLeaks, and 2013 with Edward Snowden leaks, the two big names known as *whistleblowers* or *digital guerrilla fighters* in the vocabulary of digital surveillance. Assange and Snowden taught us, in the context of our paper, two very important things. *Primo*, that many Arab states exercise a harsh, unconditioned digital surveillance on internet users, and *secondo*, that the state can also be subject to digital surveillance, a counter-surveillance consisting basically on revealing the practice of the state's digital surveillance. Thus, one can dare to say that the state failed to silence the voices of resistance and change in the Arab context.³¹

In late 2011, French online paper *Reflects.info* revealed that Morocco bought a very sophisticated surveillance software from Amesys, a famous French technology firm specialized in internet security and digital surveillance. The paper stated that the concerned software was used by Moroccan authorities to track activists online in order to facilitate their arrest. The source stated also that the software named “Pop Corn” cost Morocco two billion Euros, including usage training of Moroccan agents on tracking online correspondences with complete secrecy.³²

In July 2015, the infamous Italian company *Hacking Team*, known for providing governments with digital surveillance material was the target of a major digital infiltration that resulted in the leak of more than 400 Gigabytes of classified documents and correspondences with customers around the world, including the Moroccan authorities. These leaks revealed that the Moroccan intelligence services used Hacking Team services. Morocco bought a software known as *Remote Control System* and used it to practice digital surveillance for the February 20th movement, specifically to hack www.mamfakinch.com in 2012. This was later shown by researchers from the Canadian digital and technology laboratory Citizen Lab later.³³ The same leaks showed that Morocco spent about three billion Euros between 2012 and 2015 for the services of an Italian company. The relationship between the Moroccan authorities and the Italian company dates to the year 2009, with the medium of Al Fahad Smart Systems, an Emirati software company.

These leaks supported the assumption of activists form the February 20th movement of being targeted by digital surveillance attacks, specifically when WikiLeaks mentioned that the Moroccan services were provided with digital material able to get into and gather data from any computer or smartphone, turn on the camera and the microphone, save and send data and infiltrate live conversations without leaving any trace.³⁴ Once again, in January 2015, and under pressure from journalists, NGOs and activists, the Swiss government revealed classified documents proving that Moroccan authorities got digital surveillance material to be used for tracking phone and online correspondences from Swiss companies.³⁵ Few days before these leaks, in late 2014, the kingdom of Morocco witnessed the largest infiltration the state has ever been a target of. An unknown person named *Chris Coleman Le Makhzen* published classified correspondences of the Moroccan ministry of foreign affairs, intelligence and security services as well as members of the ruling family, journalists, and other Moroccan and foreign diplomats.³⁶ The quality of the leaked information made of Chris Coleman a *Moroccan WikiLeaks*.³⁷

Conclusion

To conclude, the experience of the so-called Arab spring taught us that the political regimes in the Arabic-speaking countries are capable of everything in order to intimidate, harass, silence and repress activists calling for freedom, dignity and social justice. As discussed in this paper, the use of digital surveillance was one of the soft ways to do so in Morocco. One can venture to say that the dichotomy of the digital activism and the digital surveillance in the kingdom is a vicious circle, within which one element generates the second. However, the big question remains how to escape digital surveillance of the Moroccan state, and of the *State* in general? The famous answer is basically using encryption. Also, former Google CEO Eric Schmidt’s infamous proposition “*If you have something that you don't want anyone to know, maybe you shouldn't be doing it in the first place*” was meant probably to be a proposition announcing the triumph of the state over the internet users, even though it seems a nihilist proposition. My proper view is that the counter-surveillance remains the best answer for digital state surveillance. Activists don’t have to think about escaping state surveillance but facing it.

Notes

- ¹ David Lyon, "Lecture on the State, Surveillance and Big Data," *Doha Institute for Graduate Studies*, April 14, 2016.
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Bertold Schweitzer

Informal Social Institutions and Mechanisms of Change in the Countries of the MENA Region

This paper presents an analysis of the chances and obstacles for the evolution of political systems of the countries of the MENA region by identifying and analysing some of the underlying causally relevant social mechanisms. Key elements of many of these mechanisms are informal social and cultural institutions, based on shared rules that are established, spread, and sanctioned independent of formal social or political institutions. These include norms, values, beliefs, practices, and cognitive constructs structuring world views that influence perceptions and behaviour of relevant actors, and interact with formal political institutions and their processes of reproduction, stability, and change. Informal social institutions on the one hand strengthen social systems by generating stable expectations and predictability but at the same time also constitute obstacles for change since they exhibit a strong tendency to preserve the status quo of social systems. On the other hand, there is a potential for evolution and renewal of informal (and formal) social institutions, though this is a slow and – unless institutional entrepreneurs take initiative – undirected process. This paper explores the roles of functional, or problem-solving, versus dysfunctional, or problem-creating, informal social institutions and discusses the possible interactions between formal and informal institutions that either inhibit or facilitate change. In a situation of increasing demand for identifying new and creative solutions for the problems of the MENA region, the analysis and deeper understanding of the prerequisites for societal and political change and their underlying social institutions is expected to provide a vital contribution for the comprehension of the difficulties and obstacles as well as the opportunities for development.

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Informal Social Institutions and Mechanisms of Change in the Countries of the MENA Region

Introduction

The general economic and political situation in the countries of the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region in the year seven after the Arab Spring is arguably worse than before the uprisings. It is not only that – with the exception of Tunisia – authoritarian rule in its well-known Arab appearance is back throughout the region. Moreover, the deterioration of state-backed order in Libya and Syria has massively affected the security and stability of the whole region, affecting still functioning countries with insecurity and terrorism, and creating refugee flows to the neighbouring countries. Economically, this had massive effects for the whole region, resulting in a downturn even of the few flourishing industries (like tourism in Tunisia and Egypt) and on the states' room to manoeuvre due to massive strains on their budgets.

It is the obvious failure of the traditional model of the Arab state that has motivated the question about alternatives for quite some time. Widespread views, however, see the Arab countries of the MENA as comparatively resistant to change, in particular against transition to democracy. After a number of “waves” of democratisation throughout the world, MENA is seen as one of the few regions in the world where – with very few exceptions – democracy has not been able to gain a foothold (Diamond, 2011).

Various explanations have been offered for this allegedly atypical state of affairs. Philippe Schmitter (2012, pp. 5–6) identifies six widely discussed “usual suspects”: (1) In the MENA region, a strong Islamist opposition to “Western” practices of democracy exists. (2) Patriarchal structures in family and society cause comparatively strong deference to authority in general. (3) Primary loyalties (based on, e.g., tribal structures) are inimical to the establishment of inclusive political parties, interest associations and social movements. (4) The middle class is particularly dependent upon the state for employment. (5) Countries depend to an unusually large extent upon their militaries. (6) Oil-rich and other rentier states use financial resources for co-opting citizen dissent. Not all of these “suspected” structures, of course, equally apply to all countries in the MENA region: For example, the political role of the military in Tunisia is almost negligible, and tribal loyalties hardly play any significant role in Egypt. Significantly, these factors are mostly described as essentially stable and assumed to constitute “the region’s suspected structural and cultural constants” (Schmitter, 2012, p. 13).

Schmitter presents a different set of (again, six) “speculative” explanatory factors for this allegedly atypical state of affairs that are more dynamic in character, and depend on particular constellations of factors, and the specific current period of history: (1) Worldwide, democracy seems less attractive now than it did during the, roughly, past seventy years, since it is less clearly associated now with economic prosperity, job opportunities, and social equality than it used to be. (2) Political parties, usually seen as key requisites for democracy and democratisation, are universally in decline. (3) New information and communication technologies, and social media platforms enable peer-to-peer, non-centralised communication on socio-political issues, and have been facilitating mass mobilisation, most notably in the 2011 Arab uprisings – but it seems to be highly difficult to transform these virtual connections into more permanent organisations with stable goals and strategies that translate into political clout. (4) As to regional organisations, neither the League of Arab States nor the African Union seem to be capable of nudging their member states towards democratisation in a similar way as, for example, the European Union and NATO did in the case of the transformation of the eastern European countries in the 1990s. (5) Governments

and publics in the MENA countries are comparatively more suspicious of Western interference, including attempts of promoting democracy from the outside, and, possibly, of Western practices of democracy, or even democracy itself. On the 2011 Arab uprisings, Schmitter comments, “[w]hat seemed to be appealing to the demonstrators were freedom and dignity, rather than democracy and voting” (Schmitter, 2012, p. 11). As far as religiously motivated opposition to democracy is concerned, these tendencies overlap with the first “usual suspect” quoted above. (6) Worldwide, democratisation efforts from above (described as “imposed” or “pacted” transitions) seem to have become more frequent and to have proved to be more sustainable in the long run. The most recent changes (or attempts at change) in the MENA region, however, seem to be based on (historically earlier, and presumably less successful) democratisation efforts from below, whether reform movements, or revolutionary uprisings (Schmitter, 2012, pp. 7–12).

In conclusion, Schmitter contends that these factors do indeed all render democratisation more difficult, but not impossible, underlining “the basic principle of possibilism: there are no insuperable pre-requisites for democracy, there are only facilitating and impeding factors.” (Schmitter, 2012, p. 13)

Schmitter’s exploration provides us with two plausible and widely discussed sets of hypothetical explanatory factors that are capable of facilitating or impeding political change towards more democracy in the MENA region. As indicated before, the first group focuses more on long-term and for the most part, static structures and constellations in which the MENA region differs from other world regions, whereas the second list examines a number of factors that, while still indicating relatively durable differences, seem to be changeable in historically shorter time frames.

The aim of this paper is less to determine the actual relevance and the relative weight of each of the items on these lists as facilitating or impeding factors for political change in the MENA countries, or even examining the undeniable significant differences between the individual countries. The aim is, rather, to identify and explore some of the factors *behind* these factors, that is to say, the underlying factors that cause, or contribute to, either the stability or the changeability of the more proximate factors such as the twelve listed above. This approach attempts to provide a more comprehensive explanation of the comparative differences between the MENA and other regions as well as to explore the mechanisms by which either stability or change is brought about. More specifically, this paper will look at some of the *social* structures and mechanisms that underlie social and political stability and change. In sociology, these fundamental *social* building blocks have been identified, from sociology’s very inception, as “institutions”. Émile Durkheim, in *The rules of sociological method*, defined: “... one may term an institution all the beliefs and modes of behaviour instituted by the collectivity; sociology can then be defined as the science of institutions, their genesis and their functioning” (Durkheim, 1895/1982, p. 45).

Institutions are frequently characterised as the key elements providing stability to social systems: “Institutions by definition are the more enduring features of social life” (Giddens, 1984, p. 24). This stability in turn is based on more or less faithful reproduction of institutions: “Typically, contemporary sociologists use the term [institution] to refer to complex social forms that reproduce themselves such as governments, the family, human languages, universities, hospitals, business corporations, and legal systems” (Miller, 2007).

Institutions provide social solutions for the fundamental problems of life that humans are faced with: Institutions are

“a complex of positions, roles, norms and values lodged in particular types of social structures and organising relatively stable patterns of human activity with respect to fundamental problems in producing life-sustaining resources, in reproducing individuals, and in sustaining viable societal structures within a given environment” (Turner, 1997, p. 6).

Hence, the reproduction of institutions is a prerequisite for the stability and relative efficiency of such solutions and the social systems they rely upon.

Institutions are of course not uniformly stable throughout time. Institutional change and evolution can be explained by modification (during reproduction or transmission) and selection (Blyth, Hodgson, Lewis, & Steinmo, 2011). Modification may be unintentional, or intentionally caused by social actors (“institutional entrepreneurs”). Selection is based on an institution’s (perceived) efficiency, but also on its compatibility with other (beliefs about) institutions, both within a society or social group and within an individual’s belief system (Gilgenmann & Schweitzer, 2006). Hence, institutions have been identified as the elementary units of sociocultural evolution (Gilgenmann & Glombowski, 2003).

The concept of “institution” has to be distinguished from “organisation”. While the latter is roughly synonymous with *formal* institution, sociology also recognises a multitude of *informal institutions*. Although formal institutions, being explicitly created, for example, by constitutions or laws, are both more manifest and more easily accessible for either analysis or planned modification, we will argue that a deeper understanding of the functioning of informal social institutions seems highly useful. Specifically, informal social institutions, which can either complement or counteract the working of formal institutions, are crucial in trying to understand how to change or replace an existing set of formal institutions.

In sum, informal social and cultural institutions on the one hand strengthen social systems by generating stable expectations and predictability but at the same time also constitute obstacles for change since they exhibit a strong tendency to preserve the status quo of social structures. On the other hand, there is a potential for evolution and renewal of informal social institutions though this is a slow and – unless institutional entrepreneurs take initiative – mostly undirected process.

In political science, too, informal institutions have started to come into the focus of debates during the last few decades, partly motivated by a general trend towards “new institutionalism” (Hall & Taylor, 1996). The political science literature on informal institutions includes characterisations of the concept (Hodgson, 2006; North, 1990, 1991), categorisations and typologies (Grzymala-Busse, 2010; Helmke & Levitsky, 2004; Lauth, 2000), discussions of the role of informal institutions in political transformation (Lauth, 2004), explorations of the mechanisms by which informal institutions affect formal institutions (Grzymala-Busse, 2010), as well as case studies applying an informal institutions framework to democratisation in Latin America (O’Donnell, 1996), post-communist state development (Böröcz, 2000; Grzymala-Busse, 2010), and economic change in China (Tsai, 2006).

Some studies on MENA countries discuss informal institutions. For example, accounts of neo-patrimonial features (Pawelka, 1985, 2012) and of trajectories of democratisation and authoritarianism (Hinnebusch, 2015; Volpi, 2013) refer to the interaction between formal and informal institutions in their analyses. However, the theoretical framework on informal institutions developed in the literature outlined in the previous paragraph does not seem to have been applied

to the states of the MENA region so far. This seems all the more astonishing since the initial plausibility of the candidate factors discussed, for example, by Schmitter (2012) being themselves influenced by underlying informal institutions seems considerable. Hence, this paper aims to explore the role of informal social institutions, their interaction with formal institutions, and their role in mechanisms of change in the countries of the MENA Region.

Since informal institutions interact with both individuals and formal institutions, some of the key questions include how informal institutions affect the functioning of formal institutions, how informal institutions contribute to the formation, and the success or failure of formal institutions, what effects changes in informal institutions have on formal institutions and vice versa, and to what extent individuals or groups are able to introduce or promote the change of informal institutions. The argumentation will proceed as follows: The next section will explore existing definitions and typologies of informal institutions, while the following section will apply these to a selection of political and social structures of MENA countries, initially focusing on the role informal institutions play in the context of existing formal institutions. A further section will look at how informal institutions are likely to respond to changes in formal institutions (“new social contract”) and a final section will look at how changes in informal institutions might cause or at least facilitate changes in formal institutions. The paper closes with an outlook on the prospects for change in the MENA countries and various actors’ chances of influencing these processes of change.

Features and Typologies of Informal Social Institutions

Analysing the chances and obstacles for change in the countries of the MENA region requires identifying and analysing relevant underlying social or informal institutions that influence perceptions and behaviour of relevant actors. In a wider understanding, institutions include norms, values, beliefs, practices, and cognitive constructs structuring world views that interact with formal social and political institutions and their processes of reproduction that generate a specific social and political structure. However, a general definition of “institution” is contested. In addition to the definitions given in the introduction, social institutions have also been characterised as “systems of established and prevalent social rules that structure social interactions” (Hodgson, 2006, p. 2) or as “rules and procedures (both formal and informal) that structure social interaction by constraining and enabling actors’ behavior” (Helmke & Levitsky, 2004, p. 727).

Similarly, there is no single, universally accepted definition of “informal institution”. Some authors define informal institutions as cultural traditions (Pejovich, 1999, p. 166: “informal institutions are the part of a community’s heritage that we call culture”). Others equate formal institutions with the state, and informal institutions with civil society (Tsai, 2006). Finally, some see the distinctive feature of formal institutions in the fact that they are typically enforced by specialised actors, for example governments, whereas informal institutions are taken to be self-enforcing (Knight, 1992, p. 3).

For *informal* institutions, this paper follows the definition given by Helmke and Levitsky (2004, p. 727), who define them as “*socially shared rules, usually unwritten, that are created, communicated, and enforced outside of officially sanctioned channels*” (emph. orig.). Some of their further clarifications seem useful, too: Informal institutions are not just weak formal institutions. Informal institutions also not merely consist of any informal behavioural regularity (using the example “Taking off a hat in a church is an informal institution; taking it off in a restaurant is not.”). Moreover, informal institutions are not the same as informal organisations. And finally, they claim that informal institutions are not synonymous with culture, since they see shared expectations as the main feature of informal institutions, rather than shared values in culture.

Now, one of the central question for this paper’s analysis is, how do formal and informal institutions interact? On this question, the academic literature contains a number of proposals. Most of these presuppose both the existence of formal institutions and the feasibility of classifying them according to their efficiency. In their relation to formal institutions, informal institutions have been described as either functional or problem-solving, i.e., supporting the working of formal institutions (e.g., Axelrod, 1986), or dysfunctional or problem-creating, i.e., disturbing or disrupting the functioning of formal institutions (e.g., Böröcz, 2000; Lauth, 2000, 2004; O’Donnell, 1996). Most accounts discussing and evaluating informal institutions in terms of function and dysfunction seem to presuppose that formal institutions can usually be assumed to be functional. Calling an institution functional, however, critically depends on the position of the observer. From a government’s point of view, an efficient security apparatus might be seen as eminently functional, whereas parts of the population might point out the dysfunctional effects its activities have on their lives. Moreover, informal institutions that counteract the functioning of formal institutions that have effects perceived as negative by some actors can contribute to making the formal institution more bearable. In such cases, a “dysfunctional” informal institution might ultimately even stabilise a formal institution.

Other accounts extend the one-dimensional distinction of functional/convergent and dysfunctional/divergent by introducing a second dimension, effectiveness. Helmke & Levitsky (2004) propose a more complex typology of informal institutions, extending ideas developed by Lauth (2000)(see Table 1):

Table 1: Typology of informal social institutions

Outcomes	Effective formal institutions	Ineffective formal institutions
Convergent	Complementary	Substitutive
Divergent	Accommodating	Competing

(after Helmke & Levitsky, 2004, p. 728)

The “effective formal institutions” column contains cases where actors expect that formally existing rules are also actually implemented or enforced by a powerful actor such as the state. The “ineffective formal institutions” column includes cases where actors expect that many or most formally existing rules are not actually implemented or enforced. According to this typology, most problem-solving kinds of informal institutions can be identified with the “complementary” type, and the majority of problem-creating informal institutions with the “competing” type. If the outcomes or goals of effective formal institutions *converge* with those of relevant informal institutions, these are labelled *complementary* (Lauth, 2000). If the outcomes or goals of effective formal institutions *diverge* from those of relevant informal institutions, these are described as *accommodating*.

Complementary informal institutions frequently provide “lubricants” for formal institutions: They provide additional rules, guidelines or arrangements that smooth the operation of formal systems, enhance their efficiency or enable their proper functioning in the first place. In this sense, they have also been described as “filling the gaps” in formal institutions. Complementary informal institutions are also perceived to be supplying essential foundations for formal institutions which are not capable of providing these themselves. One version of this argument claims that “the liberal, secularized state lives by prerequisites which it cannot guarantee itself” (Böckenförde, 1976, p. 60). According to this view, certain informal beliefs and norms are seen as indispensable for the proper functioning of a state, even though the state is not able to establish or reproduce these by itself. These beliefs have been taken to include individuals’

fundamental moral orientations and commitments to following the community's rules but also, much more controversially, religious beliefs.

The goals or outcomes of *accommodating* informal institutions diverge from those of their corresponding effective formal institutions. Accommodating institutions “are often created by actors who dislike outcomes generated by the formal rules but are unable to change or openly violate those rules” (Helmke & Levitsky, 2004, p. 729). If internal or external pressure forces the establishment or maintenance of at least minimally effective formal institutions of democracy, this can lead to situations where actors start developing informal institutions of vote-rigging or vote-buying or other forms of electoral fraud in order to maintain power, while upholding the impression of a democratic procedure. Many other examples of bending the rules qualify, too; the key distinction from “competing” institutions being that in the accommodating cases, formal institutions or rules are, however minimally, at least nominally accepted and enforced, or in other words, not openly contested.

The second group of cases consists of *ineffective* formal institutions paired with interacting informal institutions. If the outcomes or goals of ineffective formal institutions *converge* with those of relevant informal institutions, these are characterised as *substitutive* (Lauth, 2000). If the outcomes or goals of ineffective formal institutions *diverge* from those of relevant informal institutions, these are labelled as *competing*.

In the case of *competing* informal institutions, goals and outcomes of informal institutions diverge from those of matching, but ineffective formal institutions, and the formal rules are less thoroughly enforced than the informal ones. This creates two competing systems of rules where actors have to decide which version to comply with. “These informal institutions structure incentives in ways that are incompatible with the formal rules: to follow one rule, actors must violate another. Particularistic informal institutions such as clientelism, patrimonialism, clan politics, and corruption are among the most familiar examples” (Helmke & Levitsky, 2004). Other examples include cases where mafia-like structures and associated rule systems compete with state law. Democracy in general may become compromised when competing institutions gain relevance: While democratic norms call for universalistic formal institutions, competing informal systems can render them ineffective: “Individuals performing roles in political and state institutions are supposed to be guided not by particularistic motives but by universalistic orientations to some version of the public good. ... Where particularism is pervasive, this notion is weaker, less widely held, and seldom enforced.” (O'Donnell, 1996, p. 40)

Finally, *substitutive* informal institutions appear where actors do agree with the aims of some set of formal rules, which, however, are not actually enforced. Here, the goals and outcomes of informal institutions converge with those of matching but ineffective formal social institutions. In such cases, informal institutions may fill the resulting gap, and provide a functional replacement for ineffective formal institutions. Typical examples include the informal economic sector, the formation of vigilante groups where police services are unable or unwilling to combat crime, or, rather common in the MENA countries, the activities of religious charities substituting for the frequently dysfunctional or non-existing formal institutions of the welfare state.

Yet other accounts focus more on the mechanisms that operate in connection with informal institutions, and develop a typology of influence relations between informal institutions and formal institutions that distinguishes “replacement”, “undermining”, “support”, and “competition” (Grzymala-Busse, 2010, p. 318). In the case of “replacement”, “[i]nformal institutions (II) act as templates (transformed into formal institutions (FI)), or substitutes (act in lieu of FI)” (Grzymala-Busse, 2010, p. 318). This type finds its counterpart in the “substitutive” type discussed above,

though the examples given by Grzymala-Busse (2010) are mostly from situations where formal institutions do not exist yet, and informal institutions affect the questions of if, when, and what kind of formal (state) institutions develop. “Undermining” mechanisms occur when “II [are] used to exploit loopholes in FI, or to contravene FI directly” (Grzymala-Busse, 2010, p. 318). Examples include informal privatization and party funding but also vote-rigging and other forms of electoral fraud. This type corresponds to a combination of “accomodating” and “competing” types, and indeed the boundaries between the latter two types seem indistinct: The more successful the exploitation of a loophole proves to be and the longer such practices continue without being contested, the more the formal institution turns into a facade which may or may not continue to be supported for separate reasons, for example the desire to keep at least the appearance of a free and fair electoral system. In the case of “support”, “II provide the information for FI to function or reify FI domains” (Grzymala-Busse, 2010, p. 318). This closely corresponds to the “complementary” type listed above. Further examples of this type include coalition formation and power sharing. The last type, “competition”, has no clear counterpart in Helmke and Levitsky’s scheme. Here, “II help to structure elite competition” (Grzymala-Busse, 2010, p. 318), citing elite cleavages and internal party rules as examples, and assumes that informal mechanisms of elite competition facilitate institutional change, including the establishment of formal institutions.

Informal institutions in the political and social systems of the MENA countries

After having discussed various typologies of the roles of informal social institutions, this section explores a selection of examples of how informal institutions affect formal institutions. Further, this section takes up the question of how informal institutions prevalent in MENA can be expected to respond to any changes in the formal institutional setup, in particular top-down strategies that try to improve the political or economic situation by introducing rules of democracy, accountability, good governance and economic best practices.

Existing empirical and theoretical accounts of authoritarian trajectories and neo-patrimonialism provide a rich repertoire of well-researched examples of informal social institutions that are worth examining with regard to their role for persistence and change. I limit the discussion to a few prominent examples, and use the scheme proposed by Helmke & Levitsky (2004). The overview presented in table 2 shows an interesting imbalance concerning the extent to which research has been carried out on informal social institutions in the MENA region. The lower part of “divergent” outcomes shows a vastly richer repertoire of informal social institutions that tentatively provide “glue”, or stability, for existing social systems and thus constitute a challenge for any attempts at change. In the “competing” quadrant we find the “usual suspects” of factors that have frequently been charged with hampering change in the Arab world. It is the inventory of the parallel world of informalism in Arab countries that penetrates the system of formal institutions and leads to their – partial – ineffectiveness.

Table 2: Informal social institutions prevalent in MENA countries

Outcomes	Effective formal institutions	Ineffective formal institutions
Convergent	Complementary patriotism/nationalism, civic sense, moral resources, esprit de corps of elites informal arrangements and traditions that “lubricate” formal institutions	Substitutive informal economic sector, parallel justice systems, non-state welfare, charities

Outcomes	Effective formal institutions	Ineffective formal institutions
Divergent	Accommodating electoral fraud, vote-rigging, vote-buying, gerrymandering shielding government activities or departments, e.g. the military, from public scrutiny political demobilisation corruption	Competing clientelism patrimonialism clan politics religious particularism patriarchate seniority principles corruption

In the second lower quadrant, we find the “accommodating” informal social institutions where actors either avoid contested topics, or try to exploit loopholes, both because of a perception of being either unable or unwilling to change the situation. Currently, we find both self-imposed political demobilisation, which goes along with a withdrawal into the private and a tabooing of any discussion of political issues in general, as well as informal government strategies aimed at shielding government activities from public scrutiny or discussion. One prominent example in Egypt are the military’s budget and its business activities. In addition, this quadrant assembles all the “usual suspects” connected with constellations where some kind of facade – whether of democracy, of good governance, of economic transparency – is judged to be required, but still actors seek their advantages by exploiting – or where possible, even creating – loopholes in order to be able to obtain benefits for themselves.

In the upper part of the table, we find fewer informal social institutions, which is partly an indicator of the fact that research in Middle East studies for a long time focussed on the study of authoritarian resilience and, with a few notable exceptions, still does. Nevertheless, these informal social institutions are more interesting in potentially leading to a convergent outcome between formal and informal institutions. However, the “substitutive” quadrant, with its examples of the informal sector and the activities of religious charities, points at the problematic situation of the MENA countries concerning welfare policies and their funding, in connection with the informal economic sector. On the one hand, the informal sector provides a more fertile ground for smaller entrepreneurs, but tolerating it comes at a price, that is, considerable loss of tax revenue by the state. The flip side of tax avoidance and tax fraud is the lack of resources available for funding the welfare state. As a consequence, its functions are substituted by diverse religious charities that gain societal legitimacy by their charitable activities. In this respect, the activities of groups such as the Muslim Brotherhood and Hamas have been judged to be highly welcome in principle – as long as they limit themselves to practising religion and charity and do not engage in politics.¹

How can informal institutions respond to changes in formal institutions?

The next issue to be discussed is the question of how informal institutions respond to changes in formal institutions. This is an issue that appears to be highly relevant in the context of any planned changes to formal institutions, such as rewriting of constitutions, revisions of other laws, and other major changes to the legal, political, economic, or social ground rules of a state or other community.

Many proposals have been put forward for reforming the political, social and economic systems of the MENA countries. Here, two examples will be discussed: Attempts to reduce the informal sector of the economy, i.e. to convert informal jobs and businesses to formally registered

¹ Interview with officials from the Egyptian Foreign Ministry, Cairo, 21 Oct 2014.

and tax-paying ones, and plans to remove subsidies, e.g. for bread or petrol, in favour of direct financial support for the poorest, and to cut back on overstuffed bureaucracies.

The informal sector of the economy of most MENA countries is comparatively large, and there are a number of reasons for wishing to reduce its share of the total economy if not to eliminate it as far as possible, including the problem of lost tax revenues but also issues of regulation of wages, job safety and security, and others.

Any attempt of eliminating the informal structures listed in the “competing” quadrant, however, can be expected to cause a multitude of forms of societal resistance, from religious or tribal groups (particularism) as well as from larger parts of the – often permanently underpaid – administration (petty corruption). Thus, the “competing” quadrant amounts to a massive challenge for any change of the system because change is perceived as a threat for the social position of many relevant actors and the benefits of a number of societal groups involved. The impact of the “accommodating” informal social institutions for changing social setups is difficult to assess since we have to factor in preference falsification (Kuran, 1995) as a confounding factor (see also Bauer & Schweitzer, 2013). As to the “substitutive” quadrant, in particular the informal sector and religious charities, when introducing systemic change strengthening the formal institutions and organisations of the welfare state, groups such as these can be expected to resist because the introduction of a comprehensive and efficient system of taxation and general public welfare funding in place would diminish the benefits of both sectors. Thus, the informal social institutions that substitute ineffective formal institutions can be expected to put up considerable resistance towards such kinds of societal change.

As to projects of cutting back on subsidies and bureaucracies, most of these, whether proposed by domestic experts or international financial institutions, focus on changing a typical political and economic arrangement in many MENA countries, republics and monarchies alike, which has been described as these countries’ “social contract”. Introduced in the 1950s, for example by Nasser in Egypt, it functions as follows: people trade in their liberties, and accept an authoritarian system in exchange for a number of benefits, including but not limited to the redistribution of wealth, subsidies and the creation of jobs in the public sector. While this system seems to have worked reasonably well for a number of decades, fuelled mainly by rents (from oil revenues, canal tolls, and similar sources) its weaknesses have long been highly obvious. Growing populations, growing demands, economic downturns and sinking rents, however, have led virtually all international financial institutions to recommend, and many governments in the region to implement, reforms that typically involve economic liberalisation, privatisation, and cuts in the welfare system (Devarajan & Mottaghi, 2015; Larbi, 2016; Rougier, 2014).

Any attempts at revising this social contract, however, have been met with considerable resistance, as, for example, attested by the repeated “bread riots” in Egypt in the wake of the government’s recurrent attempts to cut back on subsidies for bread and other staples. In part, this resistance can be explained as a reaction to an objective deterioration of the economic situation of sectors of the population caused by such reforms or by other vested interests in the status quo. However, reform plans that involve targeted cash transfers to the least well-off strata of society in order to compensate for scrapped subsidies (see Devarajan & Mottaghi, 2015, p. 21) have been met with considerable resistance as well. Assuming that such schemes do indeed provide full financial compensation for lost subsidies, and that the details of the reform are suitably communicated to the public, enduring resistance is best explained by the inertia brought about by informal social institutions, in particular, deeply entrenched judgments concerning the appropriateness and justice of the existing “social contract”.

How do changes in informal institutions cause or facilitate changes in formal institutions?

In the examples discussed in the previous section, informal institutions were regarded as relatively stable and, if they change at all, typically lagging behind compared with the change in formal institutions. Here, the converse question is discussed: How do changes in informal institutions cause or facilitate changes in formal institutions?

The most far-reaching relation is a mutually exclusive one, where informal institutions replace, or are replaced by formal institutions. However, this relationship seems to be less well explored than others:

“It remains an open question [...] whether accommodating and substitutive institutions can contribute to the development of more effective *formal* structures, or whether they ‘crowd out’ such development (by quelling demands for formal institutional change or creating new actors, skills, and interests linked to the preservation of the informal rules)” (Helmke & Levitsky, 2004, p. 730).

In such constellations, it seems safe to say that the existence of substitutive institutions clearly identifies a functional requirement, or in other words, a functional gap in the system of formal institutions, which might motivate the introduction of formal institutions in place of informal ones. In many cases, substitutive informal institutions appear to be surprisingly stable over time. In particular, if they function reasonably well and establishing a formal counterpart would be difficult or costly, and those involved in running the informal system or those benefitting from it are fearing losses if the formal system were to be installed, none of the actors involved has an incentive at all to promote change. Conversely, formal institutions can also be dismantled in favour of informal institutions. Deregulation, privatisation, and reduction of governmental responsibilities are all cases in point, in the MENA region just as well as elsewhere. The existence, or the likely emergence of functionally equivalent informal institutions, for example in welfare or healthcare, of course facilitates the implementation of such measures.

On the other hand, it has been observed that informal institutions can assist in the formation, growth, and improvement of formal institutions. First, this effect is straightforward in the case of “complementary”, or “supporting” informal institutions. Second, informal institutions can give rise to functionally equivalent formal institutions, in particular if this step promises gains in efficiency: “Informal institutions can also serve as templates for formal institutions. Informal rules may generate precedents and prevalent practices that are then formalized for efficiency’s sake” (Grzymala-Busse, 2010, p. 321). Third, informal institutions can boost the efficiency of formal institutions, thus supporting their formation, or maintenance:

“Informal political institutions can also support or reinforce formal institutions. They do so both by ‘reifying’ formal institutions – delineating the domains where formal institutions rule – and by providing information and enforcement that promote the functioning of formal institutions” (Grzymala-Busse, 2010, p. 324).

Even “accommodating” informal institutions can have such effects:

“[...] for example, even as informal financing and mobilization techniques are used in electoral campaigns, they reinforce the notion that elections are the legitimate means of elite competition” (Grzymala-Busse, 2010, p. 325).

Hence, informal institutions are in principle capable of contributing to changes in formal institutions, either by providing support from which formal institutions draw advantages, or by

advancing formal institutions in a more oblique way. On the other hand, some informal institutions put up remarkable resistance against being replaced by formal institutions.

Conclusion

This paper has tried to show that informal as well as formal institutions are key constituents of social and political systems and that their analysis is highly relevant for understanding and influencing processes of social and political change. Partly, informal institutions are transmitted, reproduced, and evolve in relative independence from formal institutions; still, their relationship is symbiotic and co-evolutionary. From the point of view of formal institutions, informal institutions can be described as functional or dysfunctional, resulting in convergent or divergent effects. In the countries of the MENA region, informal institutions that unfold dysfunctional effects on their formal counterparts seem comparatively more frequent, which may provide part of an explanation for the seemingly greater resistance to change in comparison to other world regions.

Hence, based on this paper's exploration of the role of informal institutions, the prospects for change in the MENA countries seem ambivalent. There are obviously strong informal institutions that support those factors that impede change towards liberal democracy, including but not limited to the "usual suspects" of religious-cum-political ideology, patriarchal structures, fragmented loyalties, ineffective redistributive social contracts, glorification of the military, distrust of democracy, political parties, and outside interference. On the other hand, there are also informal institutions that seem capable of supporting change, including more primordial ones such as moral resources, civic sense, deeply rooted convictions on justice, welfare, and dignity, as well as emerging adaptive informal institutions that demonstrate how alternative social and political relationships are not only possible but functional.

This paper has attempted to highlight the relevance of an analytical perspective that focuses on informal institutions. A more careful empirical study and inventory of the existing informal institutions in the MENA region, including intra- and inter-regional comparative analyses was outside the scope of this paper, but would appear to be highly desirable. In a situation of increasing demand for identifying new and creative solutions for solving the problems of democratisation and economic development, the analysis and deeper understanding of the prerequisites of the functioning of social and political systems and their underlying social institutions is a vital contribution for the comprehension of the difficulties and obstacles as well as the opportunities for development.

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Feminism and Gender Equality

Soumaya Belhabib

Challenging Gender Paradigms in Cyberspace

The MENA region has known considerable changes following the so-called Arab Spring. During the upheavals, women were massively present and have challenged physical and social barriers between men and women not only to be part of the overall struggle for political change but also to make of women's empowerment one major criteria to achieve that change and establish real democracy and gender equality policies. In what is also called the Moroccan spring, with their male counterparts, women have actively participated in the call for constitutional reforms and pro-democratic changes. What is significant is that in the aftermath of the Arab Spring, they have come to develop, explore and negotiate new spaces of expression and protests. Cyberspace and social media have opened up the scope for other ways of getting people mobilized and have revolutionized the way individuals communicate, how they see themselves and how they perceive others. New means of gender socialization are set up as the masculine and the feminine are redefined leaving room for multiple gender paradigms where the barriers are blurred, creating genderless spaces or other ways of being gendered. Cyberspace offers then a more democratic space where all voices can be heard regardless of their gender, race, age, education, religion, etc. As more and more women get involved in the use of information communication technologies (ICT), even the prejudiced idea that technology is primarily a masculine domain is destroyed. A new space is today being gender-challenged and the male/female power relationship is being transposed into the virtual world. Youth female leadership emerges and new innovative types of feminist cyber activism appear. Thanks to the digital media technologies and social networking tools, women are able to perform their gender, gain agency and act as cyber activists launching cyber initiatives like the women's rights group "Woman Choufouch" or the "Qandisha e-magazine" to raise issues formerly considered to be taboo like rape or sexual harassment. The purpose of this paper is then to examine some of these initiatives and see how cyberspace has become the ground for questioning traditional gender paradigms and how new feminist/feminine discursive practices have to be constantly reinvented to challenge the patriarchal hegemonies.

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Challenging Gender Paradigms in Cyberspace

Introduction

The MENA region has known considerable changes following the so-called Arab Spring. During the upheavals, women were largely present in the streets with their male counterparts and no one contested that. They have challenged physical and social barriers between men and women not only to be part of the overall struggle for political change but also to assert themselves as equal partners in contributing to historical pro-democratic shifts of their country. In what is also called the Moroccan spring, women have actively participated in the call for constitutional reforms and pro-democratic changes. What is significant is that in the aftermath of the Arab Spring, they have come to develop, explore and negotiate new spaces of expression and protests.

The new technologies together with the internet access¹ have largely allowed Arab Spring activists across the region to translate online activism to offline protests and achieve successful huge mobilization of protest groups. The purpose of this paper is then to examine how in the aftermath of the Arab Spring, cyberspace has become the ground for questioning traditional gender paradigms and how new feminist/feminine discursive practices have to be constantly reinvented to challenge the patriarchal hegemonies. The focus will then be put on the following questions:

- How do women use new communication technologies for social activism and what kind of activism do they engage in? What are the new opportunities these female cyber activists are discovering? Are we redefining traditional gender paradigms?
- Do digital technologies empower women or reassert unequal gender binaries? Is it an individual action or a collective project? What kind of digital initiatives are being launched?
- Are we moving towards feminism 2.0?

Cyberspace and women's activism

The new technologies (internet and cell phone) together with social networks (Facebook, twitter, LinkedIn and you tube) have introduced new human communication channels and revolutionized the way individuals address each other. Constraints related to time, geographical location or even language are all outplayed and defeated; as long as you are 'connected', you can get in touch with one or more individuals, wherever they are and in the minutes following your decision to do so. Communicating with the other, addressing one person or 'speaking' to the rest of the world, has never been so accessible.

A large literature is developing around the endless possibilities that the ICTs are creating and how they impact diverse fields, including media, politics, cultural and social practices, etc. They are actually overwhelming our modes of living, thinking and being. By invading all socio-political and economic spheres, they have set up new priorities and allowed other mechanisms to operate. The ICTs have created spaces where power is efficiently located and which is extensively used by decision-makers and world leaders. Power relations and cyberspace are impacting social and cultural gender norms; the latter are no exception as new means of gender socialization are set up and the masculine and the feminine are redefined, leaving room for multiple gender paradigms where the barriers are blurred, creating genderless spaces or other ways of being gendered.

In cyberspace, all physical bodily features are removed from communication and as such, "our interactions are fundamentally different, because they are not subject to judgments based on sex, age, race, voice, accent, or appearance, but are based on textual exchanges"². The common face-to-face exchange, which is inevitably impacted by implicit signals and meanings, associated

with physical appearance, posture, gestures and attitude is absent, allowing neutral genderless and bodiless forms of interactions to take place. Communicating via a machine seems to erase all identity markers, including those, which can be alienating or discriminating as one's gender, race, color, sexual orientation, etc. and is thus opening up the scope for a gender free space ideally devoid of sexism or racism. The traditional gender norms are subverted and identities are blurred and endlessly recreated³, leaving room for a virtual gender.

The computer-mediated world has indeed allowed women to experience a new sense of the self, made multiple and fluid, and freeing them from a fixed gender identity that assigns them a subordinate position merely based on their gender. As such, that virtual mobility allows not only multiple gender expression but also more freedom of expression. Due to that anonymity and fluidity, cyberspace offers then the possibility for all individuals to express themselves in a way that might not be possible in real life. Yet, it is clear that various flaws and abuses also come out of that freedom the medium allows. Cyber criminality has unfortunately developed because of that screen behind which one can 'safely' operate. Internet and social networks can represent a real threat to all individuals and particularly to women who can be subject to online sexual harassment, misleading online dating and other types of crime like sex trafficking or prostitution.

Digital technologies and Women's empowerment

However, my concern here is rather with the effective use of the creativity and the endless possibilities the ICTs offer to the feminist activists who would like to share, reach and influence a large number of people. The large participation of women in the Arab uprisings throughout the MENA region has clearly attested and revealed the potential of female cyber activists who can easily translate online activism to offline protests. Women formed valuable partners in the pro-democracy demands for social justice and dignity. In Morocco, many female activists invaded the streets, participated in the marches, asked for constitutional reforms and supported the overall youth-led pro-democracy movement of protest (starting from the 20th February 2011). Their demands were not specifically gender-oriented but were part of a broader call for justice, social equality, freedom, decent life for all, etc. In fact, women and men face similar difficulties related to unemployment, poverty, political misrepresentation, corruption, elitist policies, access to equal opportunities, right for education, etc. Within this wave of mass demonstrations, women's activists were able to find their place and express their anger about discriminating practices as members of a marginalized community. Hence, the Arab Spring was a unique opportunity to integrate their demands within the new national discourse and assert themselves as citizens who deserve full rights.

The uprisings have thus taught women how to be opportunists. Beyond the protests, they have developed new tactics to bring into the spotlight of the political scene their feminist demands. The post-Arab spring context contributed in enhancing a 'protest culture', which could be used for more mobilization, awareness raising and pressure for women's causes. Cyberspace and social media are thus empowering women and offer a more democratic space where ALL voices can be heard regardless of their gender, race, age, education, religion, etc. As more and more women get involved in the use of information technologies, even the prejudiced idea that technology is primarily a masculine domain is destroyed. Many see it today as a tool of social, economic and political empowerment.

The notion of the empowerment of women goes back to 1995 as it is one of the major stands that the Beijing Platform for action document came up with (during the United Nations Fourth World Conference on Women in September 1995). It is mainly a process that challenges patriarchal beliefs and institutions that perpetuate women's inequality and its objective is also to achieve legal rights

and progress of women's participation in social, economic, political and cultural key domains (Moghadam, 2009). Empowerment then includes a wide range of concerns that seek to secure not only women's legal rights at all levels but it also addresses socio-cultural practices that foster discriminating biased attitudes towards women and that need to be eradicated. It can be a collaborative endeavor, involving both institutional actors and civil society activists, or individual initiatives triggered by personal determination and belief that other ways of impacting mindsets can be investigated⁴. To what extent then has internet contributed to the empowerment of Moroccan women's rights activists? Has the medium transformed their ability to contest the patriarchal social order or do they need to find new ways of doing so?

In a society where women face various forms of discrimination, the ICTs and internet represent an innovating means that effectively contribute in their empowerment and that allow them to have access to the public sphere; they are able to make their voice heard and contest the male dominated public order. Although Moroccan women gained equal economic, social, cultural, and environmental rights in the new constitution of 2011, they still face social and political resistance in their integration as full citizens into the public sphere. The gap between legislation and practice reveal that further mobilization and innovative procedures are needed to impact patriarchal mindsets and reach out the masses. The public sphere is still largely male-dominated with a majority of men at the head of business organizations, administrations, public institutions, political parties, etc. which keep the country decision-making process gender-unbalanced and male-biased. One of the major challenges that women are still facing is indeed how to reorganize the public sphere in a more equitable way and how to shake up resisting traditions and backward practices so that women would find their place within public spaces just as men do.

It is quite significant that women today are able to express their agency and push for more legal rights thanks to their knowledge in using the ICTs. A daring example in renegotiating public spaces is the initiative of a young teenager (Majdouline Al Yazidi, 20 year old) who launched via a facebook page the "woman choufouch" movement after the slutwalk movement, which started in Canada⁵ in April 2011. Its purpose is to fight sexual harassment against women and draw attention to the difficulties women face in the Moroccan public space on a daily basis. It refers to a social phenomenon that unfortunately all Moroccan women have been subject to at one point or another. Street harassment is indeed a calamity that undermines women's integrity and that violates their human right for freedom. The name used "woman choufouch" shows how it has been adapted to the Moroccan context so that even if experiences and aspirations are shaped by the on-going globalization process and the unexpected consequences of the uprisings, it is used in such a way that it resonates in the local context. The expression refers to one of the very 'famous' catcalls "man choufouch a zine" that Moroccan women unfortunately know too well and that is perceived as highly degrading.⁶ What is significant about such initiative is that cyberspace is used as an alternative space to negotiate, debate and almost bargain about women's right for safety within public spaces.

Another equally innovative activist initiative is the creation in August 2011 of a feminist e-magazine called "Qandisha Magazwine" which also aims at opening a space for women to speak freely about any kind of subject that are of interest to them. Fedwa Misk,(32 years), founder and editor in chief explains in an interview that

"The idea was to give Moroccan women an alternative to traditional women's magazines, which ... deal with subjects such as beauty, fashion and cooking, and never talk about news or politics. It was a shame that, with all the changes that were happening with the Arab Spring, these magazines kept writing about superficial themes. It made me angry as a woman and as a

journalist. This is why I wanted to create a magazine where women would not necessarily be sweet and soft creatures without any demands.”⁷

The Arab spring has then set up a time for change, time to say enough with these stereotyped images of the submissive empty-headed Arab woman who cannot express opinions worth of interest. The name given to the magazine Qandisha⁸ is a subversive one as it refers, according to the Moroccan myth, to a beautiful woman considered to be devilish because she upsets men. Hence, the magazine’s purpose is clearly to disturb the socially and unquestioned norms, and move away from traditional ways of defining womanhood. It is essentially a means for women (and also men) to make their voice heard, to readjust a discriminating situation where male voices largely monopolize the public space. Beyond that, it is a form of feminist cyber-activism which do not necessarily follow a feminist movement per se but which is inscribed within the larger scope of nationhood and citizenship. And as such, it is open to criticism and even to hostile reactions from people who do not adhere to its values.

Other initiatives are also channeled through individual blogs created by women for activism objectives and which makes it easy to develop transboundary networks and to move from the personal and private into the public realm. The example of Samira Kinani, a prominent activist in the Moroccan Human Rights Association (AMDH), is quite significant as she feels that expressing herself on the blog allows her to move away from the institutionalized and standard discourse of activism she uses within the organization and adopt a more personal and liberated speech. Besides the blog, she is also active on social networks (Facebook and Twitter) as she advocates multiple identity vectors related to her identity as a woman, a citizen, a feminist, and a human rights activist. Cyberspace not only allows that larger identity spectrum more visibility but it also gives the user, like Kinani, the possibility to react and interact on a broader range of issues⁹.

Are we moving towards feminism 2.0?

Digital media technologies empowered women, enabling more women to engage in cyber activism. Whether it is a personal individual initiative like the bloggers and facebookers who manage to get the support of a number of followers or whether it is a collective action like the Qandisha e-zine which requires the participation of several people, new ways of advancing women’s rights are taking shape. My interest actually falls on ‘feminist’ and ‘feminine’ actions that do not necessarily belong to civil society’s mainstream activists but rather on those ‘isolated’ actions that are attention grabbing and which can resonate both nationally and internationally even if on a temporary basis. It is often a younger generation of activists who are challenging the processes used by traditional feminists to advocate for women’s rights. Their active use of social networks together with the mobility, rapidity and accessibility that smartphones allow help in the emergence of a new form of activism, which is moving away from traditional means of protests. It is a kind of citizen feminism which not only tries to break with the old biased ideas associated with feminism per se but which also has a more holistic approach; demands concern larger social issues related to poverty, social injustice and corruption unlike mainstream feminists who focus on legal and political rights for women.

Feminism, throughout the world, is definitely evolving. With the e-generation (the digital natives or the net generation), a 2.0 feminism is emerging which is quick, quite reactive and which deals with present situations on the spot. A new term is even coined to refer to this new generation of cyber activists¹⁰ as ‘clicktivists’ referring to simple clicks you can make to take part in a militant action. Such a strategy can indeed be quite successful in mobilizing a large amount of people to impact change. Recently in France, Jaqueline Sauvage¹¹ benefited from presidential right to pardon convicted criminals though she acknowledged having murdered her abusive and violent husband;

this case clearly demonstrates how online mobilization is able to channel massive offline support and impact decision-makers at the highest level. Similarly, it is thanks to the effective online mobilization for Amina Filali¹² that the long established penal code is publicly being contested and the awkward silence around this legislation is broken. The post-Arab spring context and the global support that such a sad story triggered has generated positive action as the article 475 has been repealed at last¹³. Politicians, decision-makers and legislations seem to be better impacted through the new channels of communication as the primary site of struggle seems to be operating first within the virtual world before it is made tangible and concrete within the real one.

Conclusion

Cyberspace initiatives can be powerful enough to effect change. With the era of the new technologies, endless possibilities are offered to internet users and cyber activists are gaining more visibility and power. People belong today to a newly 'connected' world where debates, conflicts and battles for justice often take place in the World Wide Web, transgressing borders, origins and beliefs. Cyber world has 'broken' ideological barriers and made feminism and the prejudiced ideas it is commonly loaded with less frightening. A more 'trendy' feminism open to all is emerging with more attractive and innovative advocacy techniques. However, real concrete actions have to be taken and traditional strategies of activism are still needed. In a patriarchal society, internet is empowering women because they are increasingly using it to resist restrictions imposed on their struggle for equality and dignity, to gain access into the public sphere and space, and to challenge and disturb long lasting dominant discriminating social and cultural practices. We can only hope that the utopian freedom and equality which can be possible in cyberspace would be one day transferred to the real one.

Notes

¹ In fact, the number of Internet users in Morocco has gone from 100,000 in 2000 up to 20.207,154 in 2016, with a penetration rate of 60.0 % of the population with 12,000,000 users of Facebook (Internet World Stats, 2016).

² Judy Wajcman (2004), *Virtual Gender, Learning Gender in a Diverse Society*, p.155.

³ Postmodern feminist Scholars [Turkle (1995) and Bruckman (1993)] have also seen in the flexibility of identitarian categories and virtual gender swapping on the web the possibility for individuals to express masculine and feminine aspects of their personality but also allowing users to explore their sexuality.

⁴ As an example, it is possible to refer here to the Moroccan comedian and feminist activist Mounia Magueri, who did with Human Rights Watch a video on domestic violence and who collected more than 30 000 views. In fact, it is due to her successful videos showing feminist monologues on various issues with over a million views that she has been approached by HRW to do a sketch on the problem of domestic violence. See the link <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=23QIeRI4598>

⁵ The SlutWalk protest marches began on April 3, 2011, in Toronto, Ontario, Canada, and became a movement of rallies across the world. Participants protest against explaining or excusing rape by referring to any aspect of a woman's appearance. The rallies began when Constable Michael Sanguinetti, a Toronto Police officer, suggested that to remain safe, "women should avoid dressing like sluts." The protest takes the form of a march, mainly by young women, where some dress provocatively, like sluts. *From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia*.

⁶ Loubna Hanna Skalli further explains in her article (March 29, 2012) "*Young Women Demanding Justice and Dignity: By All Means Necessary*" (in www.jadaliya.com) that "Shoufouch ... is the word that harasses [women] in every corner of the public space from men of all ages. Its meaning ranges from "what's up?" "Look here!" to more sexually loaded overtones of "shouldn't we try?" The poster used subverts the meaning of this term by asking the question in Arabic "And, shouldn't we be looking for a solution?" to end sexual harassment:

⁷ *The Struggle For Women's Rights in Morocco: An Interview with Fedwa Misk*. August 8, 2013 - <http://www.worldpolicy.org/blog/2013/08/08/struggle-womens-rights-morocco-interview-fedwa-misk>

⁸ There is also a play on words on the name « magazwine », using the expression « zwine » in moroccan dialect (darija) to say that something is 'nice' / 'beautiful'. The magazine is actually using different languages (French, Arabic and English) to enhance the principle of freedom of expression by not imposing any language.

⁹ Samira Kinani says in an interview (Ben Moussa, 2013, p.15): "I write what I like, I don't control myself a lot. There I am Kinani, not the militant....Because when you are at the AMDH, you have to use your legal discourse, the other one allows me to remain the person I am.... It is my private place. For instance, there was this Moroccan champion in athletics of the year 1973, and I met her and she was living in a shantytown house and I talked about her in my blog. What happened is there was a lot of solidarity with her. There are people who wrote to the ministry [of sport] or who proposed to help her. You see, it [blogging] can serve something. I was writing only for myself, but there are people who read and become involved. Perhaps because I am an activist at the AMDH, and I am in contact with a lot of people and know about many things around us".

¹⁰ Another term is coined, 'femvertising' to refer to a 'feminist advertising' as a new type of ads which is supposed to attract feminists women. It is interesting to see how brand names are supposedly becoming advocates of women's issues and are fighting sexism while they are simply attracting more women consumers and using this new type of ads (free of any sexist connotation) as a marketing strategy.

¹¹ Jacqueline Sauvage, of Montargis in central France, was sentenced to 10 years in prison in 2014 after killing her alcoholic and abusive husband, shooting him three times in the back with his own hunting rifle, the day after their son hanged himself. Mr Hollande issued a partial pardon at the end of January 2016 after more than 400,000 people signed a petition calling on him to use his right to pardon convicted criminals to release Ms Sauvage. <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/jacqueline-sauvage-kill-abusive-husband-france-leaves-prison-after-president-francois-hollande-a7499901.html>

¹² On March 10, 2012, Amina Filali, a 16-year-old girl committed suicide and swallowed rat poison to escape from continuous abuse and suffering after having been forced to marry her rapist.

¹³ Following significant advocacy by WLP Morocco/ADFM and other Moroccan women's rights organizations, on January 8, 2014, the Moroccan Parliament finally adopted the draft law to amend article 475 of the Criminal /penal Code, which allowed rapists to escape prosecution if they married their victim. This article has mainly been used to justify the traditional practice of pressuring the victim to marry her rapist in the name of "preserving the honor of the girl's family." This new amendment removes the second paragraph of the article, lifting the immunity of the rapist and preventing him from marrying his victim.

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Ilham Bettach

The Moroccan Constitution & Gender Equality: Issues of Implementation in Education

The Moroccan government has shown a great ambition to fully challenge the gender biased discriminatory practice embedded in the Moroccan society and has reflected this ambition in explicit and extensive regulations to promote gender equality (in 2011 the new constitution introduced universal parity principles). Now, given these changes in the Moroccan society, it is important to investigate whether this breath of fresh reform includes a change of gender representation in the school textbooks. Utilizing a postmodern feminist perspective, the researcher explores the issues of representation relevant for the interior collective dimension that corresponds to culturally shared beliefs about gendered-beings within a given society (gender ideology). More importantly, this article will explicate the ways in which education works to guarantee the dominant position of men and the subordinate position of women shaping women to serve patriarchal ends (Sarup, 1993). The researcher uses qualitative content analysis as a text interpretation method in this case study (Mayring, 2014). More specifically, the researcher uses the interpretive paradigm, which views reality as a social construct. By revealing the treatment of women and men in textbooks, it is hoped that such revelation will help towards creating future textbooks that are more reflective of the full potential of both genders in the Moroccan society (2015-2030 strategic vision for the Moroccan school reform).

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The Moroccan Constitution & Gender Equality: Issues of Implementation in Education

Introduction

Gender equality is that concern with the development of the freedoms of all individuals (irrespective of gender). It is integral to ideas of educational quality, as an education system would lack key dimensions of quality if it was discriminatory or did not develop capabilities in children to work for an education that was personally and socially worthwhile. Gender equality in the classroom is a key to connecting schooling and citizenship with human rights and underpins values of care and respect for children and their teachers. One of the ways in which we can increase gender equality is through the curriculum, including textbooks. Textbooks are one of the several methods that schools use to pass on societal values to children, as Hutchinson claims “textbooks are not simply the daily tools of the language teacher; they are an embodiment of values”¹. In this process, the gender ideology is also transmitted; children learn sex-typed behavior from symbolic models including textbooks². Gender equality is an important and ambitious aspiration for countries and education systems, and is linked to the achievement of gender equality in the everyday lives of individuals and groups. Over the last one hundred years, there have been huge steps forward towards realizing gender equality in education, but there are also considerable obstacles and much work still to be done.

Education in the early periods mostly focused on teaching women how to care for their families, conforming entirely to Moroccan norms. However, since the country was colonized by the French in 1912, there were indeed some intellectual voices encouraging women to engage into the nationalist movements, therefore calling for the need of educating women, criticizing the traditional attitudes towards women and urging them to take action. The late 1940s saw an up-rise of women publications. As connections between Morocco and foreign countries grew, knowledge about women’s movements in the country exercised an impact on women’s awareness of self-emancipation³. Female book authors encouraged women to be independent, develop occupational skills and join the national struggle for independence. Women’s issues were not heard within the wider political and human rights movements, it was until the 1980s that the first women’s rights NGOs were founded. They resorted to a new repertoire of actions (petitions, sit-ins and rallies). Women’s rights NGOs began asking for a change in the family law (Moudawana) in late 1980s, however; due to strong resistance from the Islamists the plan was abandoned. After several more years of campaigning by women’s NGOs the country adopted several reforms. In 2004, Morocco rewrote its code of family law, establishing the right to divorce by mutual consent, placing limits on polygamy and raising the minimum marriage age for women to 18 from 15. But no changes were made with respect to inheritance; current inheritance law in Morocco states that men receive double the inheritance of their female relatives. Other laws followed, in 2011 when the Arab Spring reached the country, Moroccan women were granted more rights. The new Constitution prohibits gender-based discrimination and adopts new laws that reinforce gender equality. Article 19, entitled “Honor for Moroccan Women”, clearly calls for gender equality, as a policy and grants men and women equal social, economic, political and civil rights. Article 19 as a general guarantee of gender equality changes the conventional gender system and introduces the idea of gender equality across all fields of society. It signals the beginning of a new era bringing about major changes in the Moroccan society.

Sharia is the chief source of legislation in the Moroccan law and the Moroccan Constitution would be illegitimate if it contradicts by any means the traditional religious understandings of the Islamic law. Accordingly, the Moroccan Constitution indicates that the state is obliged to respect Islamic legal principles. The Quran explains that men and women are equal in creation and in the afterlife. The Holy Quran further expresses the moral and spiritual equality of men and women by

balancing virtues and rewards for both genders in identical terms. Men and women are moral equals in God's sight; they have the same duties and responsibilities. Therefore, they should both face the same consequences of their deeds: "The believers, men and women, are protectors one of another; they enjoin what is just and forbid what is evil: they observe regular prayers, practice regular charity, and obey Allah and His apostle. On them will Allah pour His mercy: for Allah is Exalted in power, Wise"⁴. Men and women are equal but they are not identical. The Quran affirms equality; however, certain rights and obligations are prescribed under some specific conditions. There are some references in the Quran that distinguish between males and females, for instance, wife-to-husband ratio makes reference to gender and the Quran permits men to marry four wives: "Marry women of your choice, two or three or four"⁵. However, if a man cannot maintain justice in the treatment of his wives, the Quran stipulates that he is to have no more than one wife. Testimony (witness) in the Quran makes another reference to gender. God has commanded the testimony of two women so as to be sure that they remember: "And get two witnesses out of your own men. And if there are not two men (available), then a man and two women, such as you agree for witnesses, so that if one of them (two women) errs, the other can remind her..."⁶. The law, which is laid down in the Quran, states that male relatives receive double the inheritance of women in most cases: "Allah commands you as regards to your children's (inheritance); to the male, a portion equal to that of two females"⁷. The female is entitled by the Islamic law to a half share of the portion of inheritance received by the male: "...for men are a degree above women..."⁸.

Now, does this imply any superiority or advantage of one gender over the other before the law? Is Islam a 'gender-biased' religion, which favors the male over the female? And are the patriarchal (mis-)interpretations of Islam just one element that underpins gender inequality? For legitimate progress to be made on the gender front, the Islamic discourse must be coupled with further widespread social, economic, and political reforms. Such reforms would create an environment far more conducive to the spread of gender equality. Islam does not call for absolute equality nor does it call for the totality of rights and responsibilities of both genders. Instead, it calls for the fair treatment of both genders regarding their natural differences. From an Islamic perspective, the focus is on parity and men and women might just be different enough as they have different priorities in life. From a Constitutional perspective, both equity and equality are meaningful, article 19 refers to equal rights and ensures an equitable view of the way society organizes itself.

Article 19 enshrines the principle of equality between men and women and ensures fundamental freedoms and rights. The law as a political force guarantees gender equality and the policy framework for gender equality creates authority parity. However, satisfying social demands for equity and ensuring equality across all institutions remains a challenge for the Moroccan government. Surprisingly, not all patterns of equality are covered in the legislative text; educational equality is not clearly articulated and only six dimensions of equality are mentioned: civil, political, environmental, economic, social & cultural. In other words, the gender equality policy is taken into account as a generalized understanding in every domain. Article 19 of the 2011 Constitution establishes that men and women should enjoy equal rights: "The man and the woman enjoy, in equality, the rights and freedoms of civil, political, economic, social, cultural and environmental character, enounced in this Title..."⁹. This recognition of gender equality as a policy concern should ensure automatic implementation in all aspects of the Moroccan life; it should be translated into methodological procedures, tools and techniques that are integrated into a gender planning process. In other words, this assumes that once gender equality is legislatively perceived as a policy, implemented practice is automatically required¹⁰. Given these changes in the Moroccan society, it is important to investigate whether this breath of fresh reform includes a change of gender representation in the school textbooks. The present study goes further to discover if the textbooks currently used in primary public schools have incorporated equality policy and gender

perspectives introduced by the new Constitution in 2011. More importantly, the article aims to see if gender equality as a policy has been fully implemented as a practice in the currently used primary level Arabic language textbooks. And if gender equality is not implemented is it the textbook that fails to account for the social changes brought on by the Arab Spring may be because of certain technical constraints for example inappropriate planning procedures? Or are there wider political constraints, operating at the level of policy formulation, which impeded successful implementation? This major question has the following sub-question: In what form in the illustrations and text does gender role stereotyping appear in terms of the power relationships?

One of the mechanisms of social construction that interferes with learning is power relations between the genders. Textbooks embody underlying gender norms and aspects of unequal power relations; they create a context where students learn hidden messages of how social relationships between men and women should be organized. The nature of social relations between genders depends on the distribution of power and prestige measure of public recognition of male and female position in a society.¹¹ The power in question here is the power of domination and subordination; differential control over or access to materials and symbolic resources. The nature of power relationship in the textbooks is to be deductively inferred from evidence gathered from the qualitative content analysis. The textbooks' use or non-use of power balance and/or imbalance is to be later interpreted as an evidence of an ideology of domination. The purpose of this study therefore is to examine the power relations in a gender hierarchy as exhibited in the illustrations and the text of primary level Arabic language textbooks of grades 1 and 6.

Patriarchal power of men over women is basic and exists in all societies all over the world and extends much further than typical forms of power¹². Patriarchy is preserved firstly through a preparation process that starts with children's socialization in the family that is the first agent of socialization and is encouraged further by education to such an extent that its values are adopted by men and women¹³. Patriarchy has been important in feminist analyses. For Walby (1990) patriarchy is a system of social structures and practices, in which men dominate, oppress and exploit women. Walby identifies six structures of patriarchy that are argued to capture the depth and interconnectedness of women's subordination and allows for change over historical time (paid work, household production, culture, sexuality, violence, the state and a historical account of the shift from "private" to "public" forms of patriarchy). The last structure is maybe the most important, as private patriarchy is found in systems of household production and operates through the exclusion of women from the public realms of male power. In contrast, public patriarchy operates through the segregation and subordination of women within the public sphere of politics and culture. So, this structure is relative to the position of women within the workforce and, in relation to the present study, within educational settings. Utilizing a postmodern feminist perspective, the researcher explores the issues of representation relevant for the interior collective dimension that corresponds to culturally shared beliefs about gendered-beings within a given society¹⁴. More importantly, this article will explain the ways in which education works to guarantee the dominant position of men and the subordinate position of women shaping women to serve patriarchal ends¹⁵.

The researcher focuses on primary school level because Moroccan primary school children have an age range from 6 to 12 years old, which coincides with the stage of 'gender consistency'¹⁶. Using pre-set categories, the study investigate the manifestation of power in language reading textbooks. It uses the results of qualitative content analysis to identify the essential patterns related to stereotypical and conventional representation of gender in the sample textbooks. The categories chosen for this study were relevant to the research interest. The selected categories used in the examination of the depiction of gendered power relations derive from previous studies on gender representation. Qualitative Content analysis in this research was guided by a coding scheme that was developed a priori. Researchers and authors have classified different types of power.

According to Longwe 1991 as cited in UNICEF 1995 types of power include:

- Depiction of patterns of ownership of property by male and female characters;
- Portrayal of holding leadership roles/positions of males and females, hence differentiation of those depicted in leadership positions and those who are followers; and
- Male and female characters as portrayed in situations of possession of information (skills, and in association with technology).

The inter-coder reliability level for each category was calculated and reliability percentage agreement was therefore computed to determine inter-coder reliability where coders agreed with the coding system. The coding system was refined until the orientation of coders was arrived at 100%¹⁷.

Literature Review

Feminist criticism (1960s-present) is a type of analysis that tends to advocate the plight of women. It deconstructs works by men, which usually promotes the idea of patriarchy and males dominance over females. Males hold power by strengthening the ideologies within the artifact to dominate females and prove that they are worthier than their female counterpart. Feminists then deconstruct texts to show readers that these are mere men made ideologies, which are not biological but socially constructed. Feminist Criticism without doubt brings women's oppression into light. This movement tries to decenter 'logocentrism' and 'phallogentrism' that oppressed and suppressed woman throughout history. Feminist criticism tries to bring about equality and avoid sexism within discourses and social practices. Feminist criticism discusses our social ideology and raises questions about gender representation. One cannot talk about 'representation' without acknowledging the power structures that marginalize groups within the wider society. According to Cixous (1981b), silence is the essential feminine quality of a woman. The masculine power silences women and oppresses them. She illustrates an existing world of symbolic order. She argues that 'logocentrism' and 'phallogentrism' work together to maintain the subjugation of femininity and maintain the masculine order. In this way, the system of power allows one side of representation to appear; the representation of the dominant male.

For many feminists social stratification has been seen as entrenched in relations of sexual power that are built around natural differences of sex¹⁸. Although sexism is the basis of feminism, there are some factors other than sex, which are focused in different branches of feminism. Culture is one of those factors that are considered broadly in the gender division. Gender stratification occurs when a specific gender has unequal access to power, property and prestige. As gender is classed as a 'master status' it forms a significant structural characteristic within society. It is society through construction then that determines what gender norms are considered appropriate and can be passed through generations of people via agents of socialization such as family, mass media, and education or in the form of symbolic interaction¹⁹. Representation according to Craig Owen (1950-1990) is not neutral; it is an act of power in our culture.

Power relations can be symmetrical or asymmetrical²⁰. In asymmetrical power relations, masculine qualities are more valued than feminine qualities in a society. Hegemonic masculinity and marital power both show evidence of gender asymmetry in our society. Hegemonic masculinity does not only give men the power over women but it also perpetuates the concept of male privileged to rule: "There are predominant ways of doing gender relations that enforce and elevate the social status of masculine over feminine qualities and privileges some masculine qualities over others"²¹. Hegemonic masculinity-based on Antonio Gramsci's concept of hegemony is that dominant form of masculinity in a particular culture at a given time²². Even though most men do not, and will never,

embody hegemonic masculinity, society's largely unquestioned acceptance of hegemonic masculinity, and rejection and denigration of other forms of masculinity (e.g. masculinities constructed and performed by gay men) and femininity, help to reproduce male power and privilege²³. Hegemonic masculinity can be seen to organize the realm of education, ensuring that women continue to be subordinated, in two ways: through the reification of both the binary gender system²⁴ and compulsory heterosexuality²⁵. Hegemonic masculinity is supported by sex role theory, which advocates for people to learn from society's institutions to behave in ways that are appropriate to their sex. The sex role theory views men as dominant and objective while women are passive and subjective. The theory further assumes that women are esteemed for their passivity as men are for their aggressiveness²⁶. The concept of hegemonic masculinity largely rests logically on dichotomization of sex, which is biological versus gender, which is cultural, thus marginalizing the body. According to Connell (2005) hegemonic masculinity is constructed in relation to subordinated masculinities. In other words there is no feminist that is hegemonic in the sense that the dominant form of masculinity is hegemonic among men.

Postmodern theorists have shaken the rigid categories that had been shaped, confirmed and fixed by the past patriarchal systems. According to Noelle McAfee many postmodern feminists distinguish the biological category of sex- i. e. of male and female - from the cultural category of gender. The idea here is that masculinity and femininity are social and cultural constructions whereas being male or female is a biological fact. This is why we can think of some biological men as rather feminine or some women as masculine. Kate Millett is one of the first critics who challenged the ideological characteristics of both the male and the female. She asserts that a female is born, but a woman is created²⁷. Many gender theorists find this category of gender useful, because it helps explain how cultural and sexist stereotypes arose and how they can be changed. Tina Chanter in her essay on essentialism writes: "Once we realized that femininity was culturally constructed, and not inscribed in our natures, we could change the ways in which gender was constructed."²⁸.

School textbooks are another area where the reinforcement of stereotypical views are culturally orchestrated and administered. Leo-Rhynie (2003) asserts that: "textbooks provide an inaccurate view of society to young people, a view which devalues the role of women"²⁹. King and Morrissey (1988) examined contemporary text history, geography and social studies utilized by teachers and students in preparation of the Caribbean Council Examinations and they concluded that these books reinforced conventional societal views of patriarchy and male domination. The language in the books did not include women and exhibited them as being passive, subordinate and in menial roles.

Males are usually portrayed as more active and dominant than women. For example Au found that males are accorded leadership and strength while females are described as typically ignorant, emotional and concerned with their appearance.³⁰ Other studies had similar findings: Cairns and Inglis (1989); Commeyras and Alvermann (1996); Hartman and Judd (1978) found that females rarely appear in history textbooks and, if they do, have no power or authority. In Spain, Cerezal (1991) conducted content analysis on a number of textbooks in terms of character representation. The results illustrated that in most cases, males appeared superior, had superior occupations and played the protagonist's role. In the German context, Hellinger (1980) found that textbook writers tended to underestimate the role of women and girls in their textbooks; they show them as being worthless and disempowered. Sunderland (1994) defined degradation as essentially making the characters look worthless and disempowerment as withdrawing power. Additionally, whitely (1994) analyzed integrated science books used in lower grades of Jamaican schools. He discovered that considerable male bias in these texts and questioned the influence it had on girls' choice of studying science.

In their study focusing on how the effects of a gender resource model would affect gender-biased teaching behaviors, Jones, Evans, Burns, and Campbell (2000) provided teachers with a self-directed module aimed at reducing gender bias in the classroom. The module contained research on gender equity in the classroom, specific activities to reduce stereotypical thinking in students, and self-evaluation worksheets for teachers. The findings support the hypothesis of their study "...female students would move from a position of relative deficiency toward more equity in total interactions...."³¹, this demonstrates that teachers who are made aware of their gender-biased teaching behaviors and then provided with strategies and resources to combat bias are better able to promote gender equity in their classrooms.

In the Moroccan context, little research on the gender representations within the pages of textbooks exists. One of the few published papers "review project" is by Sabir (2008), which investigates negative representation, stereotypes and prejudices in secondary school textbooks. Sabir (2008) has explained the importance of gender equality through family law that was passed in 2004 in Morocco. After the passing of the new family code, Human Rights Education Association (HREA) decided to undertake an 18-month legal reform project to help solidify these changes to training of judges and through review of school textbooks. The conclusion of this research was that gendered identities are constantly constructed within the classroom and that these identities and classroom practices were influenced by what was within and outside the immediate walls of the classroom: the wider society.

Plumm (2008) in a more recent study, stated that despite the fact that it was hoped with the emergence of technology sexism would dwindle, this has not resulted in gender-neutral language classes since teachers tend to attribute "technology-related activity to boys more so than girls"³². Texts read by future adults of society help shape views and reproduce an institutionalized gender division of labor, which may be transmitted to later generations of school learners. This has been broadly discussed in Bray's book 'Technology and Gender' (2013). She criticized the distribution and exercise of power in the society and described women as being imprisoned, deprived of freedom and dignity, and so physically and morally submissive to the tyrannies of patriarchy that they were incapable of productive work. Despite increasing emphasis on women's reproductive roles, she argues, this cannot solve the problem of domesticity and childbearing. Gender hierarchy within the family reinforces the power of husbands over their wives who cannot give up their responsibilities in marital activities and child rearing.

Methodology

A qualitative content analysis was conducted to investigate the distribution of power between the genders in the sample textbooks. The researcher uses qualitative content analysis as a text interpretation method in this case study. More specifically, the researcher uses the interpretive paradigm, which views reality as a social construct. If quantitative researchers make inferences using numerical data, qualitative researchers strive to describe and interpret the meanings of phenomena under consideration³³.

The researcher uses qualitative content analysis in this case study research. To be more precise, based on the presence or absence of some evidence in the text, interpretations are put forward. A descriptive case study is one that is focused and detailed; the main goal of the descriptive case study is to assess a sample in detail and in depth, based on an articulation of a descriptive theory. This theory must respect the depth and scope of the case under study, which is conveyed through robust propositions and questions. The researcher uses a descriptive design working through the texts with a deductively formulated category system and registering the

occurrence of those categories in a nominal way.

The main sampling method chosen is purposive sampling, which is where the researcher can decide on what units to include in the sample according to what he/she deems to be appropriate³⁴. Several factors influence this decision. First of all, the intention is to study two textbooks of different grades in primary education in order to anticipate any variation in representation between the styles of presentation of textbooks. Secondly, it is the textbook of national education with the highest circulation figures that wished to be studied, as this generally tends to indicate that these are the textbooks with the highest readership, thus the most popular and therefore indicating a larger audience (students) that can potentially be affected by the messages within its content. Thirdly, because the research is not concerned with a particular event or a certain period of time other than to be as current as possible, the dates of the editions are not an important consideration because as far as this research is concerned, the editions could be selected from any year from 2003 to 2017 and the results could still be generalized.³⁵

The unit of analysis is the particular part or incidence of the text the researcher is categorizing, coding and recording. There were two units of analysis needed for this study. The first was the text of the two textbooks where a female/ male classification was determined. The text was used to determine the sex of the character, the presence of specific gender character traits displayed by the character and to observe gender roles and perceptions related to the role. The second unit of analysis included Illustrations (illustrations are an important component of students' textbooks). In this study, the illustrations have been included in the content analysis and they were utilized to observe roles and the general image of females and males.

Using a content analysis approach, the researcher developed a coding scheme that was generated from both model and theory. First, the researcher created general coding categories based on theoretical grounds (post-modern feminist criticism) and adopted Michel's UNESCO study (1986) to define the categories of gender bias. Secondly, the researcher developed a coding sheet with operational definitions for the characteristics of each category of analysis.

In order to ensure consistency and coherence in the coding system proper orientation was carried out on how to use the content analysis guide and the accompanying coding scheme. After finalizing the coding sheet, two coders were trained for several weeks. Reliability in this case "can be improved by ... coding in pairs of coders, developing more detailed instructions, selecting professional coders"³⁶. Because this study operates and intends to interpret data using postmodern Feminist criticism and relevant literature on gender power relations, it uses direct content analysis. At this level, the qualitative research approach allows for the descriptive account of occurrences, therefore descriptive statistics are used.³⁷

This study has embraced qualitative and quantitative steps in a single case study as a means of gaining a broader understanding of the issues by transcending inadequacies in each method³⁸. The central idea of Qualitative Content Analysis as a mixed methods approach containing qualitative and quantitative steps of analysis is "to start from the methodological basis of Quantitative Content Analysis but to conceptualize the process of assigning categories to text passages as a qualitative-interpretive act"³⁹. This combination of methodologies in the study of the same phenomenon is what is known as Triangulation. This is particularly useful to ensure rigor of the research and make stronger the credibility and applicability of findings⁴⁰.

Findings

Table 1.1 Ownership of property

	Level 1				Level 6			
	Illustration		Text		Illustration		Text	
	Occurrence	Percentage	Occurrence	Percentage	Occurrence	Percentage	Occurrence	Percentage
F	0	0,00%	0	0,00%	0	-	0	-
M	5	100,00%	5	100,00%	0	-	0	-
Total	5	100%	5	100%	0	-	0	-

Table 1.2 Leadership position

	Level 1				Level 6			
	Illustration		Text		Illustration		Text	
	Occurrence	Percentage	Occurrence	Percentage	Occurrence	Percentage	Occurrence	Percentage
F	1	4,00%	0	0,00%	0	0,00%	1	20,00%
M	24	96,00%	24	100,00%	2	100,00%	4	80,00%
Total	25	100%	24	100%	2	100%	5	100%

Table 1.3 Possession of information

	Level 1				Level 6			
	Illustration		Text		Illustration		Text	
	Occurrence	Percentage	Occurrence	Percentage	Occurrence	Percentage	Occurrence	Percentage
F	7	21,88%	6	20,00%	0	0,00%	12	27,91%
M	25	78,13%	24	80,00%	17	100,00%	31	72,09%
Total	32	100%	30	100%	17	100%	43	100%

Table 1.1, 1.2 and 1.3 show that more males than females are portrayed as possessing more power and status. The findings indicate that the counts of males outnumber the counts of females in textbooks of level 1 and 6. Data in Table 1.1 depict males as being over represented in the ownership of property. In table 1.2 for example men are pictured more frequently in leadership positions. Besides, more of the 50 % of the cases featured men in prominent power possessing roles.

Discussion

Based on the significant number of the male character in all three tables, it can be inferred that when it comes to power and authority, males are the leaders of the situation. All of the above

findings combine to form a vision of the Moroccan male as possessing the “right” social characteristics. The results of this content analysis show that gender stereotypes and gender role stratification in our society are reinforced in primary school textbooks.

Masculinity and femininity are arranged around the dominance of men and how the power relations of gender order keep women in subordinate positions. By putting wealth at the hand of males; men own property to dominate and keep women in subordinate positions. According to Giddens (2009) gender differences are rarely neutral and gender is a significant form of social stratification. Giddens (2009) stressed that even though men and women’s roles vary from society to society, there is no known society in which women are more dominant than men. Men’s roles are usually highly rewarded and valued more than women’s.

Examples of male character possessing property were demonstrated in the pictures of the textbooks analyzed. For example, in the textbook of first grade a man has been observed driving a car and a text passage confirms that the car is a personal property that belongs to him:



Source: Arabic textbook of 1st grade p 128

The type of male and female leaders may be influenced by the gender-based expectations. Society establishes certain expectations for individuals’ behavior, which is based on their own beliefs about what the appropriate behavior of males and females should be like⁴¹. Moroccan students as readers of textbooks can become accustomed to the types of leaders men are since men have long held these roles. As a result, they tend to see women as being less hierarchical and subordinate to male privilege.

A significant disparity remains for the category of leadership. In this illustration, the power is hierarchical; the male doctor is the leader and the female nurse is the follower:



Source: Arabic textbook of 6th grade p 213

Textbooks convey the concept of sex role stereotyping as a normal gender categorization. When females are depicted in passive and submissive roles, males are portrayed as the prevailing sex. Masculinity is defined as a product of a ‘process’ in order to attain patriarchal power and status. Masculinity within the textbooks is characterized by action and persuasion while femininity is silent; it has no voice. The dominant group exercises its domination over the subordinates using hegemony. The dominant group is in control of information in society. The subordinate group on

the other side lacks information; females here are depicted as most appropriate for second role duties.

Evidence of men possessing more information than women was seen in some images within the analyzed textbooks of first grade. The following image is an example of a male character most suitable for possessing information and knowledge. The man here takes an active in-door responsibility as an all-knowing master:



Source: Arabic textbook of 1st grade p 30

Women in the analyzed textbooks are shown as being subordinate, passive, submissive and marginal, performing a limited number of secondary and uninteresting tasks confined to their sexuality, their emotions and their domesticity. The concern being voiced here is that this 'symbolic annihilation of women' means that women's lives and interests are not being accurately reflected in textbooks. This annihilation serves to confirm that the roles of wife, mother and housewife are the fate of women in a patriarchal society. Because the 'symbolic annihilation of women' in textbooks fails to address the full range of women's real-life goals and potential, it plays an important role in establishing and normalizing ideology that helps those in power (men) stay in power.

The Arabic Language used in primary school textbooks is an evidence of the invisible thoughts of the Moroccan society. The language here is the reflector of the Moroccan man's thoughts whose patriarchal ideology is adopted, nurtured and practiced within the walls of primary level classrooms. Such ideology embodied in language simply reflects the social fact; men are the center of the family and even the whole society and women are looked down on as 'the weaker sex'.

Now, we can say that the language in Moroccan primary school textbooks is not a 'neutral medium'. The power in this case comes from the ones who are writing⁴² because they are the ones who have control in shaping identities. Identity is dependent on language; it does not exist without it. Language embodies a discourse of social relations and patterns of exclusion require a strict hierarchical organization of sexual difference in discourse⁴³. The female character is different as she is regarded as a negative mirror- image of a man; thus she is invisible to him. This fantasy of male egoism is what makes cultures including the Moroccan culture narcissistic. In this case the reality of the female presence is denied by her male counterpart. Clearly the results of this content analysis would be on the side of the dominant and the superior, in this case the male. Under patriarchy, the equation is the following: masculinity is active while femininity is passive, silent and dead.

In view of the current findings, one could claim that what students learn through Arabic language reading textbooks depends on enforced social constructs that allows the concept of male privileged to rule and dominate. Certain ideologies about gender are embedded in textbooks and the imbalance does not only manifest itself in an explicit manner, hidden forms are used to maintain

traditional gender relations. Textbooks are especially important in the formation of children's gender. If children only see stereotypical personality characteristics in reading materials, their behavior will certainly be affected by the dichotomous gender structure that exists in the Moroccan society. Besides, Moroccan primary school students may think that this is the way they should behave or react to certain situations, and they may adjust their actions accordingly.

We say that gender is a social construct of the society. Gender does not only refer to women and men rather it refers to the behaviors that are learnt socially, it refers to the idealized expectations, and repeated performances which are linked to the pre-arranged gender construction of femininity and masculinity⁴⁴. Children's experiences in the school are a combination of what they are presently experiencing in their classrooms and what they already know and have previously experienced about gender-roles. Overall, the conception of gender-role behavior is the product of a broad network of social influences operating not just within the family but also in the many societal systems that are encountered by children in their everyday life.

The analysis of the gender representations in primary level textbooks revealed crucial qualitative and quantitative aspects of gender asymmetries. The data demonstrated that textbooks are male dominated and the distribution of male and female figures in the illustrations yielded similar findings; female characters were significantly underrepresented. In the textbooks, masculinity and femininity are tied together in a binary relationship and acquire meaning in relation to each other and through a gender hierarchy. Masculine is what is not feminine, and feminine is what is not masculine. This polarized binary is reinforced by the narratives in the textbooks to perpetuate a strictly patriarchal model of family organization.

In the complex network of family relationships, masculinity is identified with hegemonic masculinity values while femininity reproduces the traditional gender discourse. In this polarized binary, females are in most cases confined to the rigidly demarcated sphere of the home. The discursive representations of femininity emphasize and idealize the representation of females as engaged in nurturing and caring roles, while males are involved more in physically and intellectually challenging roles. In the textbooks, a female character lives for and through others, primarily her children and husband. These discursive practices are what reinforces the institutionalization of male dominance over women in the family and perpetuates the traditional view of women as 'subject to men'. Their proper place is in the private, 'domestic sphere', while men 'properly inhabit, and rule within, both spheres'.

Educational institutions convey and legitimize certain ideologies about power relations to students in a way that makes the curriculum provides top and down representations about rules, beliefs and attitudes. Relations of power can be difficult to notice because they are naturalized in the language that people use and the social habits that they follow. Nye's (2004) theory of soft power revolves around the notion that it "rest(s) on the ability to shape the preferences of others"⁴⁵. In this case, Arabic, as the cultural product of the Moroccan society, influences the users (primary school students) because the content is admired.

Soft power is manifested in primary level textbooks because power relations are delivered in the Arabic language dialogues: Arabic language model conversations and Arabic language readings and activities that are designed to be practiced and rehearsed in the socially constructed world of the textbook. Now, because ideology is both embedded and naturalized in language as a social practice and consequently in images, Arabic language textbooks position the students to accept the hidden agenda.

In view of the above findings, the study concluded that what students learn through Arabic

language reading textbooks depends on enforced social constructs that allows the concept of male privileged to rule and dominate. The researcher in this study believes that certain ideologies about gendered power relations are embedded in textbooks. Power imbalance between the two genders does not manifest itself in an explicit manner; however, hidden forms are used to maintain traditional gender relations. The results of this study indicate that gendered power relation “elevates the social status of masculine over feminine qualities and privileges some masculine qualities over others”⁴⁶.

This study reveals that there are obvious gender disparities in the Moroccan education. The findings from this research call for the government to act with urgency to set up a clearly articulated gender policy that ensures gender considerations in educational settings. The legislative text, article 19 of the Moroccan Constitution, does not place the issue of equality in the context of equal opportunities in education; it is a legislation that is mentioned as a generalized statement guaranteeing the equality between men and women’s rights. Educational equality is not clearly articulated and only six dimension of equality are mentioned: civil, political, environmental, economic, social & cultural. In other words, the gender equality policy is taken into account as a generalized understanding in every domain. Besides, article 19 as a current ‘policy’ does not include clear processes on how this right of gender equality is communicated to users; the policy claims the rights but does not delve into it.

One of the weaknesses of the existing policy of gender equality in Morocco comes from the misapplication of the principle on which it was based. The principle of gender mainstreaming as an adopted strategy should be present in all phases: design, implementation, periodic evaluation and update to ensure that gender equality is incorporated at all levels and to all spheres. This suggests that we should not only focus on why equality policy is not being implemented but on what is actually happening at the level of equality policy formulation. At this stage different strategies and tactics should be adopted to bring forward a transformative gender equality agenda. Equality policy as established by Article 19 of the 2011’s Constitution is therefore not produced in its final form; the production of policy should belong to a continuous process where actors at each stage shape it to suit their own needs. In order to turn the promise of 2011’s constitution into reality, gender equality policy should include an explicit and deliberate focus on women, and a need for intervention in their name. Targeting actions to empower women should include women-specific approaches that are necessary in order to compensate for actual gender-specific disadvantages and discrimination.

The findings of content analysis in previous research (Hellinger, 1980; Lee& Collins (2009); Porreca, 1985; among others) are consistent with the results of the present case study; previous studies around the world suggest that women are underrepresented in curricular materials. The same unbiased representations prevail in both primary level textbooks of grade 1 and 6. In a time when issues of gender equality are very much at the forefront of social conquests, the results in this study are especially alarming. In 2017, a major gap remains between the ‘somehow well formulated’ gender policy developed by government and the gender inequalities that persist in the school system (textbooks). Therefore, a concerted effort is needed to include gender-balanced lessons in the curriculum, and gender equity considerations should be included in the process of textbook construction.

The findings from this research suggest that the textbooks analyzed do not entirely reflect the Moroccan government’s commitment to gender equality. In every category of analysis there was evidence that sexism still exists in texts and illustrations. Much effort is still to be made to reduce this gender gap, as equality between men and women is vital to the social, economic and political growth of any given society. Article 19 exists as legislation (defined by the 2011 Constitution) to

establish the equality of rights between genders; however, recognizing rights does not technically ensure effective and successful law practice.

The strategic vision for the Moroccan school reform of 2015-2030 will definitely determine the extent to which this goal of gender equality will be realized. At this level, the gender equality policy as introduced by the 2011's Constitution has 'failed' to be translated into practice. Consistent with the "progress" view⁴⁷, gender scholars have identified several reasons for the 'failure' of policy. Three prevalent explanations for the 'failure' of gender policy dominate the literature: one, there is resistance to gender-related social change within institutions; two, the feminist agenda is being de-politicized in policy and therefore lacks power to affect real social change and; three, the policy that is being developed is inappropriate⁴⁸.

Further re-adjustments are required to widen the legal scope of the legislative text for an inclusion of gender equality in education with a rights-based approach. Besides, a policy shift from gender development perspective to gender mainstreaming orientation, including all the phases, is required to bridge the gap between the genders. Policy priority would include the development of a gender policy as a follow up to the legislative text in order to adequately address the limitations of the former policy. Policy priority areas would mean redoubling of efforts towards women empowerment to ensure gender justice.

Conclusion

After analyzing the selected textbooks, it can clearly be said that the Moroccan government did not fulfill its promise of gender equality and non discrimination. Patriarchal, traditional and stereotypical socialization patterns emanating from our norms and values still hold true for our educational system. When talking about equal opportunities one has to think beyond girl's access to education. Gender equality in the Moroccan context cannot be achieved by simply getting girls into schools, but it is also important to ensure that boys and girls have equal education and that teaching materials are not gender-biased and conducive to girls' learning.

Traditional gender norms in the Moroccan society are deeply rooted in the social psyche and gender segregation pervades many levels of social interaction. There are substantial and important gender inequalities between Moroccan men and women in terms of labor force participation, earned income, or political power. In terms of educational attainment, however, Moroccan girls seem to be in the lead, with larger numbers of girls graduating from secondary school and lower repetition rates. Now, although the Moroccan educational system seems to be adequate in terms of quantity, a closer look at quality shows a large gender gap and persistence of gender inequality. As the results of this research show, Moroccan primary textbooks are failing to provide a gender-equal environment.

The Constitutional changes that took place in 2011 were of pivotal social and political significance for gender equality in society in general. However, a legislative change is recommended to include a clear statement on gender equality in education, as an important prerequisite for prosperity and advancement in society, to shift people's views of gender roles. The patriarchal structures operating in the Moroccan social order constitute the central hindrance to achieving substantial gender equality. Much work still to be done for women to be equals in an unequal patriarchal institution that reinforces traditional views of gender roles in every aspect of the Moroccan society.

Policies are designed by people and therefore people can change them, modify them and complement them with new approaches and strategies, Gender mainstreaming must be deployed

as a strategic approach for tackling deficiencies in the gender equality policy; it should complement the existing policy that is already in place. The gender equality policy has been on the agenda since 2011, but yet it is not a reality in 2017. It does not outline implementation strategies for gender mainstreaming as well as ways of addressing several concerns of men and women in order to ensure that they have equal access to opportunities, resources, and rewards towards promoting sustainable human and national development.

The Moroccan Ministry of Education is currently carrying out an interesting academic reform and Content seems to be a central topic in the discussion about quality of education. However, there is little mention of the gender issue in the new theoretical underpinnings of the curriculum design, outside some general and vague goals. Clear guidelines for gender depiction in school textbooks should be drawn, requiring equal representation in terms of numbers (female to male ratio) and occupational diversity (both genders should be portrayed performing all occupational activities)...

In addition to dictating a reformulation of school materials, a program for teacher training in gender-sensitive issues should be drafted. Teachers are, ultimately, the ones who bring textbooks to life, transforming information into reality, and the influence they exert in children's modeling behavior should not be underestimated. In the same way, school administrators and academic staff must be taken into account for a successful gender-neutral policy implementation. Further research on gender-stereotyped content and depictions in textbooks should be carried out to establish successful strategies.

Using textbooks that omit contributions of women or that does not equally distribute power between males and females, would limit students' educational and career aspirations. Therefore, Moroccan stakeholders need to be aware of the ideologies embodied in reading materials to remove the bias and create textbooks that are more equitable. Gender bias in education goes beyond the use of textbooks. Bias is embedded in the teacher-students interactions. This gender bias is subtle; it is part of the curriculum taught implicitly to students. Future researches are recommended to consider other dimensions that interfere with the learning process.

Teachers need to be aware of the gender bias imbedded in many educational materials and need to take steps to combat this bias. They should be provided with strategies and resources to combat bias, as they are better able to promote gender equity in their classrooms. Curriculum researchers have established six attributes that need to be considered when trying to establish a gender-equitable curriculum. Gender-fair materials need to acknowledge and affirm variation. They need to be inclusive, accurate, affirmative, representative, and integrated, weaving together the experiences, needs, and interests of both males and females. We need to look at the stories we are telling our students and children. Many of our classroom storybooks and texts "describe a world in which boys and men are bright, curious, brave, inventive, and powerful, but girls and women are silent, passive, and invisible"⁴⁹. Furthermore, teachers can help students identify gender-bias in texts and facilitate critical discussions as to why that bias exists.

The Ministry of National Education and Vocational Training is committed to implementing policies consistent with the strategic vision for the Moroccan school reform of 2015-2030. It is now in the process of undertaking curriculum reforms and textbook revision. Therefore, the results of this case study will help stakeholders take the necessary actions to eliminate such biases where they exist. The findings of this study will be of great benefit to textbook designers who are interested in diminishing gender-bias in the content and pictures of the textbooks. It is essential for textbook designers to take into account the learners' sex equality in all forms. Textbook designers are advised to take advantage of this study as it reveals the points that the content

contains strong discrimination against females, and the pictures are gender-biased pictures.

Notes

¹ Tom Hutchinson, "What's Underneath? An Interactive View of Materials Evaluation in Leisure". In E. Sheldon (ed). *ELT Textbooks and Materials: Problems in Evaluating and Development. ELT Documents* 126. (1987), 37.

² See Walter Mischel. A social-learning view of sex differences in behavior, in Maccoby, Eleanor E. (ed.), *The development of sex differences*, Stanford: Stanford University Press (1966), 56-81. See also Graham White. *Socialization. Aspects of modern sociology: social processes*. London: Longman. (1977), 34.

³ For more details on this, see Fatima Sadiqi *Women, Gender, and Language in Morocco*. Leiden and Boston. Brill Academic Publishers. (2003).

⁴ Ali, Abdullah, Yusuf, Translation. *The Holy Qur'an*, American Trust Publications, Indianapolis, (1977) Surah 9, Ayah 71. (Whenever necessary, slight modifications of this translation were made by the author of this work in the interest of improved clarity and accuracy).

⁵ Ibid 4:3.

⁶ Ibid 2:282.

⁷ Ibid 4:11.

⁸ Ibid 2: 228.

⁹ Since the constitution of 14 December 1962, Morocco has experienced eight constitutional amendments. The last revision came about because of the 1 July 2011 referendum. For a commentary on the new Constitution, see A. Bouachick, M. Degoffe and C. Saint-Prot (eds.) *"Réflexions sur la monarchie démocratique à la marocaine"*. (2012), 67.

¹⁰ See Rosalind Eyben. Thinking about change for development practice: a case study from Oxfam GB, *Development in Practice*. (2008), 201-212.

¹¹ See Sheila Aikman and Elaine Unterhalter's book *Practising Gender Equality in Education* where they tried in their introduction to consider the challenges that confront policy makers to make real progress towards gender equality in education, in the context of the Millennium Development Goals. Oxfam GB (2005).

¹² Power is a critical component of feminist theory. As Marie Withers Osmond and Barrie Thorne put it, "Gender relations are basically power relations". (1993), 593.

¹³ Valerie Bryson has published extensively on feminist theory and her *"Feminist political theory an introduction"* provides a wide history of western feminist thought.

¹⁴ Referred as well as gender ideology.

¹⁵ Madan Sarup describes power-knowledge as 'structured'. (1993), 65.

¹⁶ According to Lawrence Kohlberg (1966) children develop an understanding of the concept of gender in 3 stages: the first is gender identity, the second stage is gender stability, the third and final stage is gender consistency. The child here is aware that gender remains fixed over time and in different situations. This usually occurs between the age of 6 and 7.

¹⁷ Percentages over 80% indicate high reliability. See Kippendorf, (2004).

¹⁸ In their fourth edition of *Sociology* Fulcher and Scott provide an interesting theoretically grounded approach to sociology covering contemporary research. (2011).

¹⁹ Jhon J. Macionis & Ken Plummer *Sociology: A Global Introduction* New York; Prentice Hall. (1997), 139-141.

²⁰ Power asymmetry in relationships has been studied by a number of researchers. See (Johnsen & Ford, 2001).

²¹ See McGuffey, C.S. & Rich, B. L. Playing in the gender transgression zone: race, class and hegemonic masculinity in middle childhood. *Gender and Society*. (1999). 13(5), 608-627.

²² See Rayewn Connell *Gender and Power*. Stanford University Press. (1987), 158-63.

²³ Ibid, 158-63

²⁴ e.g., Messner & Bozada-Deas, 2009(Lorber, (1993).

²⁵ e.g., Kolnes, (1996).

²⁶ See Kathleen Trigiani's *Masculinity-femininity: society's difference dividend* (1998).

²⁷ Kate Millet in *Sexual Politics* was first to challenge the ideological characteristics of both men and women; asserts that a female is born but a woman is created (sex is genetic, but gender is socially constructed).

- ²⁸ See Tina Chanter , “*Rewriting Difference Luce Irigaray and the Greeks*” the University of New York Press. (2010), 185.
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- ³³ Qualitative Content Analysis is a model developed by philipp Mayring for further explanation see *Qualitative Content Analysis: Theoretical Foundation, Basic Procedures and Software Solution*. Klagenfurt. (2014).
- ³⁴ Purposive sampling is based on a logical deductive reason see Neuendorf’s the *Content Analysis Guidebook*. (2002), 88.
- ³⁵ Textbooks are not published on a yearly basis in Morocco.
- ³⁶ See Hak & Bernts ‘Coder training: Theoretical training or practical socialization?’ *Qualitative Sociology*. (1996).19 (2), 222-257
- ³⁷ Data is analyzed and interpreted using descriptive statistics such as frequency distribution and percentage.
- ³⁸ For further explanation see Monti and Tinggen paradigms in human science and natural sciences, (1999).
- ³⁹ Phillip Mayring. *Qualitative Content Analysis: Theoretical Foundation, Basic Procedures and Software Solution*. Klagenfurt. (2014), 10.
- ⁴⁰ See Creswell’s *Educational research: Planning, conducting, and evaluating quantitative and qualitative research* (2nd ed.). Upper Saddle River, NJ: Pearson Education. (2005).
- ⁴¹ See Eagly, A. H. *Sex differences in social behavior: A social-role interpretation*. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. (1987).
- ⁴² Authors of textbooks in both levels are males.
- ⁴³ See Helene Cixous. “The Laugh of the Medusa”. *New French Feminism: An Anthology*. Ed. Elaine Marks and Isabelle de Courtivron. Hemel Hempstead: Harvester Wheatsheaf. (1981), 245-64.
- ⁴⁴ V. Spike Peterson. “Gendered Identities, Gendered Ideologies, and Practices in the Context of War and Militarism. In *Gender, War, and Militarism: Feminist Perspectives*, eds Laura Sjoberg and Sandra Via. (2010), 2.
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- ⁴⁷ See James Midgley: “Social development: The developmental perspective in social welfare”. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. (1995), 63.
- ⁴⁸ Woodford-Berger P., elaborated on that in ‘Gender Mainstreaming: What is it (About) and Should we Continue Doing it?’, *IDS Bulletin*. (2004) 35(4), 65–72.
- ⁴⁸ McCormick, 1995

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Fatimaezzahra Abid

Arab Feminists' Sexual Revolution and Social Activism After the 2011 Arab Spring: Aicha Ech-Channa's *À Hautes Voix* as a case study

*No matter how controversial the ongoing debate was and still is about the success or failure of the Arab revolutions, it did unprecedentedly raise subaltern population concerns; Arab youth are sinking in illiteracy, unemployment, poverty, corruption and exclusion from the public political sphere. Hence, the Arab revolutions gave voice to this youth and generated intense debates in the humanities and social science disciplines, particularly over Arab women's issues. Women protested side by side with men and they had recourse to unprecedented forms of protest to speak up for their rights and their existential demand for dignity and social justice and the will to be involved in building up their societies. Self immolation and nudity constitute women's alternative paradigm for their revolutionary discourses that have generated heated debates about woman's status and body, which usually inhabits the religious, cultural and traditional sites of the family honour. Indeed, these events spark literary critical discourses that scrutinize the position of women in Muslim countries and their struggle for a smooth access to the public sphere since the decolonization era. Thus, the impact of these revolutions on women's lives does not go unnoticed, but rather finds its way in literary works that document such historical events. Moroccan women writers foreground feminist revolutionary discourses in their creative writings that highlight women's daily struggle in the public arena. They endeavour to represent female agents who break the silence around taboo issues such as female sexuality, sexual education, single mothers and illegitimate children inaugurating, hence, for a sexual revolution in Mona Eltahawy's terms. These issues will be examined in Aicha Ech-Channa's *À Hautes Voix* whose female characters challenge the social and the religious practices that veil women's issues and limit their emancipation.*

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Introduction

The Arab revolution drew worldwide attention to the Arab countries' road to democracy and to the restoration of law and order. But little was paid to women's role in the revolution and its impact on shaping women's rights as equal partners. Though international media's coverage of the events highlighted the role of women activists online, such as bloggers, and offline, on the ground squares, it failed to acknowledge ordinary women and uneducated ones. It only limited coverage to those who are basically educated and already subscribe to social or feminist organisations. Hence, it did merely authenticate the western accounts that vindicate their perception of Arab women as being restricted either by their culture or religion given that:

“the Western and national secular feminist assumption that women are major losers of the Arab uprisings because their political representation in formal politics has not met the international criteria of gender equality and because of the essentialist feminist view that an acquisition of power by Islamist political parties is a threat to women's equal rights.” (Aitemad 2014: 4)

But to Arab feminists, unique forms of women's protests represent unprecedented strategies women used during the upheavals to challenge social injustice. In the Moroccan context, two Moroccan women, namely Fadoua Laroui and Amina El Filali, set themselves on fire; their deaths had gone completely unnoticed by the media except for some reports on local newspapers and news from Reuters, which is an international news agency. Fadoua was the first Arab woman, who set herself on fire protesting against being denied the right to benefit from a social housing project for the mere reason that she is a single mother (Reuters 2011); whereas Amina El Filali committed suicide because she was forced legally to marry her rapist. The cases of Fadoua Laroui and Amina El Filali represent ordinary, rural and uneducated women whose acts were perceived differently. Hence, the death of Filali did lead to political changes and street demonstrations that eventually forced the abolition of article 475 from the Moroccan penal code. Article 475 refers to a law that allowed the rapist to avoid legal charges by marrying the victim under the pretext of protecting the family honour and disregarding violence against women.

In Egypt, the Tahrir square's demonstrators comprised of both men and women protesting side by side against social malaise and injustice within an atmosphere of equity and non discrimination till the women protesters were forced to undergo virginity tests. Female protesters reacted in an unexpected way posting naked photos on social media platforms, as it is the case of Alia Almahdy. Consequently, Elmahdy was beaten by demonstrators and kicked out of the square for posting naked photos on her Facebook page and her blog “a rebel's diary” (Elmahdy 2017). Her act spurred other women to post naked photos on their Facebook wall supporting Almahdy and claiming the right to speak up and condemn sexual harassment and eliminate the restrictions imposed on their freedom of speech. Yet, her act caused outrageous reactions across Egypt; she was threatened with death and rape and she was exiled later to Sweden. These nude manifestations swept promptly to other Arab countries, namely to Tunis where Amina Taylor posted topless photos of herself online on March 29th, 2013 with a written slogan suggesting that a woman's body is not a sin, and protesting against patriarchal oppression. She ended up joining FEMEN as she stated in an interview with an Italian journalist Federica Tourn to whom she confirmed that

“At the beginning I did not even know what they were, but I really liked what they were doing to promote women's freedom. I contacted the German and Ukrainian group and I asked what I

needed to do to join them. They responded that I should start with a photo and a small message in English and Arabic on Facebook. I posted it, and they immediately shared it.” (Amina Tyler, Topless Tunisian Femen Protester, Tells Of Fear Of Being ‘Raped And Beaten’ By Police (Interview) | HuffPost UK”)

Both Alia Almahdy and Amina Taylor ‘s publicised acts, using Dabashi’s terms (Dabashi 2012), received national and international media coverage which ultimately supported their struggle towards maintaining autonomy and attaining individual freedoms. However, those women who opted for self-immolation acts were promptly forgotten even if they also used their bodies in the same way Mohamed Bouazizi did to protest against social injustice and humiliation. Women’s nudity is celebrated repeatedly by international western media disregarding the fact that “dressing is the ceremonial ritual to present the body in public. Posing a body beneath or beyond its habitual habitat is disruptive in varied cultures”(Dabashi 2012). And though it aroused the public’s debate on issues such as body politics and Islam, it failed to veil its bias in covering nude protesters, while repressing stories of the very ordinary women who struggle for a decent living and demand to have a say in their countries’ policies. Therefore, Almahdy and Taylor’s rebellious actions stirred worldwide attention particularly when they joined the feminist movement FEMEN. The founders of this movement or the so-called women activists claim defending women’s rights and protest topless to raise the public’s attention to women’s issues and their daily struggle for their individual freedoms. FEMEN demonstrated everywhere topless in public with written slogans on their breasts demonstrating sometimes the organization’s skewed atheist and islamophobic attitudes their activism could be summed up as “a war on patriarchy on three fronts, calling for an end to all religions, dictatorships and the sex industry” (Cochrane 2013). Indeed, Alia Almahdy’s subversive action, posing nude in public and writing slogans on her breast that condemn religious oppression such as “shari’a (Religious laws) is not a constitution”, encouraged FEMEN’s protests to sweep across the Arab world and even inspired other women to post nude photos online initiating a revolutionary campaign that assured the public that there will be millions of women militants and nude protests. Hence, women’s revolutionary protests took different forms during the upheavals given the context of each country and its geographical, political and historical affiliations making Egypt and Tunis stand on one side and Morocco on the other. But women in those countries significantly maintain that “bodies have emerged as the singular site of resistance to power - from suicidal violence around the globe to young women exposing their bodies to shock and awe of a different sort”(Dabashi 2012).

These actions by ordinary women, namely the cases of the two Moroccan women, have no political background nor a feminist consciousness to engage in the fight for women’s liberation. Yet, their struggling to live a decent life prompted demonstrations and called for legislative changes. Thus, the revolution provided an opportunity of free expression to these women as it did to all marginalized subaltern populations to speak up for social injustice. Hence, Arab women “participated in the uprisings with a diversity of interests. They exercised their agency beyond their gender identity, calling for equal rights, human dignity and justice for both men and women, particularly marginalised social groups” (Aitemad 2014: 6). Educated and non-educated, Islamist and liberals, women and men, apolitical and party political widely engaged in this upheavals calling for unity and change; a change that could be only accomplished through collective work and commitment to one’s community wherever it is situated in the Arab world.

Yet, Egyptian and Tunisian feminists led a sexual revolution with a feminist and political agenda in mind calling out for gender equality in decision-making positions which could enable women to defend their rights, and have an impact on the public’s opinion concerning women’s daily struggles at home, at work and in the streets. Women sexual harassment, for example, constitutes a major problem in Egypt; women are often verbally abused or even physically assaulted as “they

were socially excluded by the limbo of “waithood,” or prolonged adolescence as marriage and entry into adulthood was delayed, in part due to the high cost of marriage” (Singerman 2013: 9). Hence, the revolution provides diverse public ways of expression to speak up for their daily struggle with harassment and exclusion from public life. Indeed, Egyptian women’s activism during the revolution increased and women’s movements were created calling out for collective actions to support women’s rights and inclusion in public politics.

The fact that neither Laroui nor El Filali, showed up naked in public and used their bodies differently from their Egyptian sisters further exemplifies the plurality of women’s struggles within the Arab region. Egyptian women resorted to nudity to revolt against their marginalization as powerless women which would imply a call for a sexual revolution. While Moroccan women opted for self-immolation which gave voice to the uneducated, rural and middle class women with no political or feminist agenda in mind. Both actions support a social revolution that should include all women from rural or urban backgrounds, who are educated and not educated and who are subject to domestic and sexual violence. Hence, women collective and collaborative actions ignored traditional organizations which failed “to provide a constructive, conducive atmosphere or leadership for aspiring men, women and youth who are interested in becoming more politically engaged and who are often tired of divisive identity politics that fragment their society” (Aitemad 2014: 14). Therefore, changing the family code, calling out for laws that enforce the practical implementation of the reformed articles, promoting women’s status as it is related to equal job opportunities and decision-making positions and fair inclusion into the political arena, regardless of the quota system, are all key demands that Moroccan women aspire and work for through social mobilization after the Arab uprising. Women have put aside ideological and polarized discrepancies, whether they are liberal, secular or Islamist to inaugurate an ongoing debate about issues such as rape, domestic violence, and single mothers and forced their consideration in national policies and political agendas.

Therefore, this article examines the role that the Arab spring played in highlighting issues regarding women’s claim for social justice and gender equality in these countries and sparked public debates over women’s concerns and status in the Arab region. The paper depends on a variety of resources which include social media, news reports and documentaries, blogs as well as literature in order to survey women's participation in the Arab spring. It first provides a reading in Mona Eltahawy’s book which partly provided a theoretical background for women’s participation in the Arab uprising with a particular focus on the case of Egyptian women and a considerable analysis of the status of women in other Arab countries in general. This is followed by an examination of Moroccan women’s reactions to the revolutionary movements and whether their reactions align or fall at odds with women’s revolutionary discourses across the Arab region, particularly in Egypt and Tunis. It will also draw on a wide variety of sources and a body of literature that would illustrate how women feminize the Arab spring as well as survey women’s agency during and after these movements. Thus, the study will revolve around a work of literature published in 2013 written by a Moroccan woman writer and a female activist, Aicha Ech-Channa, who chose to document the stories of the women she had been helping during her thirty years of voluntary work to get a minority of single mothers recognition, help and integration via her association Feminine Solidarity. The work will be examined to find out how the Arab spring cleared the floor for a woman activist, who is not a writer, to embark on such mission so as to give voice to ordinary marginalized women; their stories discuss taboo issues such as female sexuality, illegitimate children and spark heated debates in the public arena that would never be possible before the revolutionary movements. Indeed, to figure out the context of Arab women’s sexual revolution after the Arab spring and address the similarities and discrepancies that generate a plurality in women’s struggle, it would be imperative to examine it with reference to the recent theoretical debate on the sexual revolution initiated by Mona Eltahawy.

Mona Eltahawy's Claim for a Sexual Revolution in the Arab World

One of the most prominent women figures and advocates of women's sexual revolution in the Arab world is Mona Eltahawy who is an Egyptian journalist and writer, writing from the west, whose provocative writings on women's sexuality and oppression at home and in the street stirred much attention to her call for a sexual revolution in the Arab world. Being herself sexually assaulted by a state police officer while demonstrating at Tahrir Square, she was compelled to call for a revolution that would never succeed if its principles - equality, dignity and social justice - did not apply to women and men equally. Eltahawy had been critical of the women's status after the Arab uprising, namely in Egypt as women seem to lose more than they gained. Indeed, "women were not only at the forefront of the revolutionary uprisings. They were also its first and foremost victims — the first targets of the brutal repression that those in power launched against the uprising" (Dabashi 2012). Eltahawy herself is a living example of a women writer who could not remain in her own country and write about the state's systematized oppression in Egypt of female activists. In this vein, she states that:

"This is where the soldiers in our regimes and the men on our streets unite: they both sexually assault women to remind us that public space is a male prerogative. Security forces and civilians alike violated women in Tahrir Square, and men of the revolution—be they from the left or the right—have set us back with their insistence that "women's issues" cannot dominate "revolutionary politics." Yet I ask: Whose revolution?" (Eltahawy 2015: 11)

She critically scrutinized the revolution's drives that were supposedly chanted by men and women alongside calling for justice; yet, Egyptian women were unfairly treated either by the demonstrators or the state's representatives as they were beaten and sexually assaulted even when Morsi, the Egyptian President, was elected president. Eltahawy condemns the whole society's silence on such epidemic issues women live through on a daily basis and points out that:

"And it would not have happened unless there were societal acceptance of such assaults; it would not have happened if women did not face various kinds of sexual violence on a daily basis. It would not have happened if hatred of women had not, for so long, been allowed to breathe and stretch and run so freely in our societies." (Eltahawy 2015: 14)

Thus was how Eltahawy persisted on claiming that the revolution shrank women's freedom rather than advocating women's rights in the public sphere. Her accounts about women's rights in the Arab region are basically drawn from her experience at Tahrir Square and the living experiences of Egyptian women before and after the Arab uprising. Her repertoire of women's stories extend to include all Arab women across the Arab region by giving examples of women's oppression from some countries such as Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Libya, Tunisia and Morocco. Throughout her essay "Why They Hate Us", Eltahawy argues for a sexual revolution that would break up the misogynistic practices that denies her political inclusion in the country's policies. She goes on to conclude that the bigger fight would be a revolution that change people's patriarchal attitudes towards women's individual and political rights.

Her feminist perspective generated reactions of controversial views about her theory across the Arab region. Eltahawy's interpretations of women's abuse rely heavily on those she witnessed in the demonstrations and on her own childhood recollections. Overgeneralizing women's status across the Arab arena that she is not familiar with puts her theory under scrutiny as it encompasses all Arab women within her personal experiences in Egypt. Thus she overlooked the geographical, historical and political specificities of the countries from which she cited examples of oppression failing to see that even within the same country, women would experience diverse situations either of abuse or privilege. The author offers no explanation for a detailed historical account on the

distinction between the status of the Egyptian women and Arab women cited from other countries. Indeed, she argues for a women's sexual revolution by claiming that women have been reduced to a mere headscarves and intact hymens. Yet she does not elaborate on how women would confront misogyny, but only scrutinizes its practice and silence about women's sexual issues. One question that needs to be asked, however, is whether Eltahawy's theory of sexual revolution finds its roots in the 1960s – 1980s in sexual revolutions that reshaped gender roles and what is considered sexual norms, which stressed individual sexual freedom and attitudes, introduced contraceptives and legalized abortion.

Yet, throughout the book, *Headscarves and Hymens: Why the Middle East Needs a Sexual Revolution*, Eltahawy presented arguments that were employed to back up her call for a women's revolution that would end sexual harassment and exclusion from the public sphere. She brought up stories of Egyptian women's fight against genital cutting and how this operation is endorsed by clerics, namely Al Qaradawi, though it has no religious backup and it was outlawed by the legislature in 2008. She had also cited Saudi Arabian women's dependence on a male guardian when it comes to driving or travelling, though women excel at studies more than their male counterparts in Saudi Arabia. Moreover, she stressed domestic abuse in Lebanon and girl's marriages in Yemen in which many girls do not survive their wedding night. Ironically Eltahawy commented on the Moroccan family code as being internationally touted as progressive and modernized while it's not. All these examples are cited in a challenging inquiring tone that will defy the reader when inquiring "name me an Arab country, and I'll recite a litany of abuses against women occurring in that country, abuses fuelled by a toxic mix of culture and religion that few seem willing to disentangle lest they blaspheme or offend" (Eltahawy 2015: 7).

Considerations of women's issues raised in Eltahawy's theory of a sexual revolution will be addressed in the following section with reference to women's testimonies and narratives of their lives on the ground. Hence, the work of Aicha Ech-Channa: *À Hautes Voix*, which could be translated into English as speak up, provide a recent and a rich resource to study women's agency before and after the Arab uprisings.

Moroccan Feminists' Revolution and Social Activism

In the course of this article, the work of the Moroccan activist Aicha Ech-Channa entitled *À Hautes Voix* will be examined on the ground of the post Arab uprising's impact on the position of women in society and the changes that have taken place after these upheavals in the Moroccan context. The work portrays the writer's commitment to women's empowerment and social development through social activism and the full engagement of Moroccan women writers in their societies as committed intellectuals who seek real social and political changes that are of benefit to women and society as well. Hence, it is through their critique of patriarchal practices and social malaise that Moroccan women writers could be seen as feminist agents whose national and social concerns make them genuine change makers in society.

In *À Hautes Voix*, Aicha Ech-Channa opts for female protagonists who themselves narrate their stories and shed light on social injustice, inequality and the cultural and ideological prejudices that restrict their education and systematically limit their presence to home and family given that "illiteracy is a major social and pedagogical concern, for it is very high, particularly among rural people and women. Illiteracy contributes to widening the socio-economic gap between lower and upper class people" (Ennaji 2005: 199). *The narrative* opens up with a quote from Albert Einstein stating that "le mot progrès n'aura aucun sens tant qu'il y aura des enfants malheureux" (The word progress will have no meaning as long as there are unfortunate children) (translated by the author, Féminine and Elbaz 2014: 7). Further, the quote tells so much about

single women's cause and their children who were born out of wedlock. The work is classified as testimonies, which reveals the true nature of the characters involved in the work. The debate over the nature of testimony as a form of literary production or as a mere actual narrative of one's lived experiences is unresolved because of the paradox between the real and the fictional. Yet, a testimony not only combines true stories that reflect the authenticity of life and the hardship of living it, but it also has a performative role that is "to provide the addressee with the testimony for the purpose of not only learning it but also experiencing it"(Delaperrière 2014: 45).

Hence, Aicha Ech-Channa opts for testimony as form of literary expression, to document the life of a category of outcast women who struggle to start over again in a society which faulted women for prostitution and adultery. The works celebrates the audacity of these women to narrate their intimate stories about their life and to fearlessly unveil gender issues related to sexual violence, single mothers, street children, rape, treatment of maids and abandoned children that are widespread issues in the Moroccan society. Indeed, the present work accumulates testimonies of nine women and one man whose narratives portray shocking behaviors, attitudes and perception of sexuality related issues, morality and citizenship.

À Hautes Voix is the second work launched by Feminine Solidarity after the first one *Miseria*, which was also classified as testimony. The name of the association replaces the name of the writer; an association which is a non-profit organization founded by Aicha Ech-Channa in 1985 for the help of single mothers in Morocco. Placing the name of the association instead of a personal name that should refer to the writer reinforces Ech-Channa's intention to recognize all those working with her to support these outcast women. Further, it recognizes the great effort the founder of this association, Aicha Ech-Channa, and all those who work there, including the social workers, lawyers, teachers etc. who helped these single mothers and their children.

There is no doubt that their stories are non-fictional though they are presented in a literary form. The work accumulates stories that have different beginnings and endings. These stories are set in the present and all revolve around actual characters and plots that are shocking to the reader; every single story has characters whose destiny swings back and forth between joy and pain, hope and despair, success and failure. All the stories come in the form of a short bibliographical narrative that introduces a story which has a beginning and an end that might be a happy ending or a tragic one. That diversity of stories in the work invites the reader to draw his own conclusions and stir his sympathy towards single mothers and their children; it might also forces the reader to wonder about how many unwed mothers might have no such chance to tell their stories or even get the help of the association to start over again.

These women's testimonies disclose different types of sexual issues that have rarely been addressed in literature, particularly by Moroccan literary writers. Male and female sexual behaviour and attitudes towards virginity are unveiled. The work has also highlighted the quilt that single mothers undergo due to the undesired pregnancies. The stories unveil the truth of a so called conservative society where sexual behaviours such as premarital intercourse, college dating and rape do really exist and need to be publicly tackled so as to raise awareness about these issues.

Single Mother: Victims of Rape

All the testimonies are narrated by the concerned women themselves; hence as Aich Ech-Channa states "Single mothers are now more aware of their rights, they know the father should accept his child, but to make him get married is another issue"(James Copnall). Her name is Itto and she is one of the first generations of single mothers who was received by the association, Feminine Solidarity, which guarantee her a job at a social center called "le centre social El Hank"

(the social center El HANK) in Casablanca, which used to be a medical center for mental health that treats psychiatric patients. Itto was the first woman to tell her story and that choice was deliberate to attain the reader's sympathy and stay hooked for the unfolding of the following stories. Itto talked first about the place of work and how filthy it was, given the high numbers of teenage drug addicts, social outcasts, thieves and pregnant teenagers, who come even from rich families. Her account includes other people's stories, namely that of her cousin whose name was kept anonymous; but her story portrays deep rooted malaise in the Moroccan society. Itto, then, introduced her daughter, Malak, and explained how she got pregnant with a baby without even knowing what pregnancy is; she did not even know that to have periods is a biological process women go through once a month. All of sudden and at the age of 18, she had her periods stating that "j'ai eu des pertes de sang anormales. Dans les années de mon enfance on n'enseignait rien sur le corps, les règles. Tout ça, c'était hchouma, honteaux." (I have had an unusual blood loss. During the years of my childhood, subjects like the body or the menstrual cycle were not thought. All this, was *hchouma*, shameful) (translated by the author, Féminine and Elbaz 2014: 12). She did not dare back then to ask her step mother, it was already too late since she got pregnant. To avoid the scandal in the family, as it was a case of family incest, she was taken by a cousin to a centre which takes care of orphans called 'l'orphelinat' (orphanage) knowing that she was not, but after that event she was an orphan for the rest of her life. Despite these circumstances, she was assisted by the association to learn some skills that helped her to integrate in society and bring up her daughter; she worked as a cook at the association, a driver and a cleaner; all for the sake of raising her daughter and get her the necessities of life. She was nicknamed the iron man, because she was the first female garbage truck driver in Morocco and who works harder to earn her male co-workers respect, who had no idea that she is an unwed mother. Though she never set foot in school, Itto was highly aware of her own status and those living around her; she consistently expressed her concerns about the social and ethical issues young and poor people are stuck in, such as the growing number of street children roaming the streets, single mothers, violence, terrorism and poverty which leads to most of these issues.

The protagonist of the second account is Ahlam, who is from the Eastern part of Morocco, Oujda; and who was also a victim of rape. Only her mother and her sisters knew the story and managed to get her to Casablanca to avoid shame. She gave birth to a baby girl whom she named Noor. She was never allowed to go back to her family's home or to visit them. So, she was destined to have no family but her own daughter, whom she wants to have the life of Judy, the main character in a Japanese anime entitled *My Daddy's Long Legs*. Ahlam made reference to this cartoon twice in her account and even retells her story and how she was an orphan girl, but did succeed in her studies and ended up by marrying the wealthy man who took charge of her while living at the orphanage. That was the life she wanted for her own daughter stating that "j'aimerais qu'elle ait un destin comme Judy ...qu'un prince charmant vienne à son secours. On dit que ça n'existait que dans les films, mais qui sait? »(I like her to have a destiny like that of Judy... that a prince charming comes to her rescue. They say that such things happen only in movies, but who knows?) (translated by the author, Féminine and Elbaz 2014: 97).

Women and False promises of Marriage

Rafea is introduced as the philosopher who is fond of reading books of a philosophical background such as those written by Ibn Rochd, Descartes and Platon; books that instil deep thinking and alienate her from the harsh reality of being a young single mother for her one year old daughter named Ikram. She works as a receptionist in a Hammam, a public bath, but dreams of being a social worker. At the beginning of her account, she recognized the hard work and potential the female social workers invest in the association to help the unwed mothers reintegrate in society and raise awareness about their children's legal and social rights to be officially recognized. As

victim of a false promise of marriage, Rafea then retells how her fiancé lost interest in marrying her after being sexually abused and raped in his car away from home (Féminine and Elbaz 2014: 38). She was kicked out of her parent's house and was welcomed by the association who helped her in getting a shelter and a job to support her daughter's and her own basic needs. Most of her account stresses the vitality of education in one's life; stating that "c'est la seule chose qui me fasse du bien. La connaissance est tellement vaste, elle est une nourriture de l'esprit, mais aussi de l'âme » (It is the only thing that makes me feel good about myself. Knowledge is so vast, it is the food of the mind, but also that of the soul.) (translated by the author, Féminine and Elbaz 2014: 42). Yet, she ends her story in a very distressed tone reaffirming that unconditional love does not exist in adult relationships given that "dans la vie, ce sont les intérêts qui priment, chacun a des objectifs conscients ou inconscients et ce sont eux qui le guident» (In life, it is the interests that prevail, each one of us has either conscious or unconscious objectives and it is they who guide him/her) (translated by the author, Féminine and Elbaz 2014: 42).

Safia is a college student in sociology; she represents another category of single mothers who was voluntarily engaged in a mutually consensual relationship with a man whom she met at her sister's house, hoping for a successful love story that would happily end up in marriage. Unfortunately, she was let down by her partner and ended up as a single mother struggling to start a life as an outcast within her own society. She left for Casablanca looking for the help of the Feminine Solidarity who provided her with the needed help, shelter and work, to start over again with her baby Kenzy. The association also helped her to register her child so that she can have access to health care and vaccinations, which can only be attained if the baby born is officially documented and has a birth certificate. Further, she succeeded in resuming her studies at the faculty of letters and human sciences, Ben M'sik, Casablanca majoring in sociology. All along her account, Safia portrays how independent and open minded she was at the time she met the father of her daughter; she moved to her brother's house in Fes and then to the university campus after getting her baccalaureate to follow her studies. During her pregnancy, the father of her daughter rented her an apartment and agreed both on giving up the child for adoption, which she found it difficult after birth and insisted on keeping her baby despite the father's will. Indeed, she moved to Casablanca and joined the association to get the needed push to start all over again, and never lost hope in education. Yet, she grew stronger and independent and confident; she concluded her story stating that all men are the same affirming that "la seule chose qui les intéresse en réalité, c'est d'abuser sexuellement d'une fille et de la jeter" (the only thing that interests them is to sexually abuse a girl and then throw her away) (Féminine and Elbaz 2014: 51). But the ending was a very promising one since she finishes by stating that they're celebrating marriage of a single mother within the association.

Meriem is a 38 single mother from Taza in Northern Morocco. She had never been to school nor had been to any other city until she was pressured to leave or rather flee her hometown to Casablanca because of the shame she caused for her family by giving birth to a baby girl out of wedlock. The father of her daughter, whom she named Hayat, is her cousin. Hayat's family did not accept Meriem as a wife because she limps and thus it would be shameful to have a handicapped wife. But while waiting for his parent's consent, which will never be attained despite his insistence on his choice, the couple began cohabitating and they enjoyed a considerable freedom that led to unwanted pregnancy. All along Meriem's account she stressed the importance of family in one's life, and bitterly cried for missing her whole family whom she could not visit. Yet, she succeeded in court to get the father of her daughter arrested and imprisoned for one year due to his denial of paternity which was proved via DNA (paternity test). But he was freed from any responsibility for the baby when he married and started a new life. The story ends with no hope of change, given the mother's situation; she has no interest in education, or in learning a social skill that would qualify

her for a job which would help her support herself and her child. She was still traumatized by the loss of her family and her beloved hometown and by the responsibility for an undesired child and by the injustice of being deemed unfit to be a wife due to her disability.

Ouarda, Nedjma's mother is introduced as the tormented soul which indicates that it would be an unresolved story. She is 24 years old and has spent most of her infancy as a maid in the city. She is torn between her love for her daughter, and the fear of losing her family. Because of her pregnancy, her partner drew back and decided not to marry her and also give up the child against the mother's will. So she joined the centre, INSAF, which receives single mothers who helped her to register the child officially so that she could have a birth certificate. But, she never took her case to court to force the father to admit his parenthood and assume his responsibilities because of her fear of losing her family who would never tolerate another case of an unwed mother in their family. So, she kept silent while she pondered about her situation as a single mother and visited her family regularly without being accompanied by her daughter. She ended up her account wishing that one day her parents would hopefully accept her daughter, stating that "j'aime autant ma fille que mes parents. C'est pour ça que c'est dur, je me sens déchirée." (I love my daughter as much as my parents. That's why it's hard, I feel torn) (Féminine and Elbaz 2014: 71). Indeed, this statement gives essential evidence for the argument that she was simply daydreaming because her family is too conservative to accept her status as a single mother, especially because they reside in a rural area.

Zaina is another 24 year old single mother who dropped out of school at an early age due to her family's inability to educate their five daughters at the same time. So, she started working as an employee in a shoe factory in Casablanca to help raise her family's income. She kept moving from one factory to another at times of bankruptcy. She met the father of her daughter, Aya who is now 10 years old, at her workplace, and she was fooled into believing that he had good intentions to marry her. Unlike all the other cases, her family knew all about her situation and her mother herself placed her at Feminine Solidarity to avoid shame within her family circle and community. But, he family continued to visit her at the center and maintained a relationship. But they could never allow her to live with them because "la vie au quotidien n'est pas facile surtout quand on a grandi trop vite dans une société qui ne te ménage pas" (Everyday life is not easy especially when you have grown too fast in a society that does not respect you) (Féminine and Elbaz 2014: 85) and because she would ruin the reputation of her sisters.

Zahra, the adventuress, was introduced in a way that promises a very successful modal for single mothers. She is portrayed as lively and sharp woman who has a good memory for dates and minute details. Thus, she started her account by explaining the meaning of her name which refers to Venus, which symbolizes femininity and beauty. She also narrated the story of her birth and that she was named after her grandmother; she grew up in a small village which is called Jemaâ Esshaïm and worked there as a cleaning lady at a bank agency; and that's where she met the father of her son Mohamed Amine. Her story is quite complicated as she was engaged to him and they were preparing for the marriage ceremony when her brother objected to the marriage, claiming that she was only seventeen years and wouldn't be able to assume marriage responsibilities. But the real reason was that he was afraid of her claiming her share from her father's legacy which was under her older brother's control. Thus, when she insisted on marrying her fiancé, she was kicked out of the house and left with no choice but to ask for her fiancé's help without knowing that he was married, but he ended up receiving her in his apartment. One week later, he raped her when he came back drunk and torn between his true feelings for the wife and nostalgic yearning for the return of his ex-fiancé. So, they cohabited and kept living together till she gave birth to a baby boy whom he wanted her to abandon so as to maintain their relationship discreet and with no official papers; otherwise, he would break up with her. However, Zahra got a job as a maid and

lived with her illegitimate son till she joined the organization: Feminine Solidarity where she found the help needed to register the child and get a job and a new family as well. She ends her account wishing that her story would be adapted into a movie and she and her child would appear at the end with their real names just to say that it is a true story.

Out-of-wedlock Children: Testimonies of Gratitude and Loss of faith

Tarik is the only man included in this work which sounds quite unusual because it is assumed that the work includes only women's accounts. Tarik is a young man aged 24 and the son of a single mother. His account was placed almost at the end prior to the conclusion as if to add a male's perspective to these testimonials and even shows how this issue affects not only women's lives but men's as well. The young man is a sophomore majoring in law in Rabat. He joined the university only after failing to achieve his dream of being a policeman. Tarik passed the police exam successfully but failed to be accepted because of his questionable parentage. Tarik narrated bitterly how he takes responsibility for his parents' actions, not his and retells in details how he was condemned not to succeed in his search for employment in the public sector, though he is a Moroccan citizen and holds an identification card (ID). He questioned his Moroccan nationality, identity and even his constitutional rights as a Moroccan citizen. Tarik never considered this issue until he was denied access to his dream profession. As a result of these changes, he could no longer get along with his own mother as he used to be, although he knew that he was the son of a single mother; but he never thought that it would cause problems in his future job or family life. However, he ends up his story in a promising note that he will never lose hope in fulfilling his dream of joining the public sector. Yet, his mother's story and how she ends up as a single mother was kept anonymous.

Malak's story stressed the hardship her mother went through so that they would not end up living on the streets. She is 20 years old and a successful nurse and a very proud daughter who gains so much from her mother's life story. Looking back on her childhood to tell her life story, Malak stresses her mother's family background and her character's as a strong woman whom she will never condemn for being a single mother because it was never her mistake, stating that "je lui suis reconnaissante de tout ce qu'elle a fait pour moi ... elle avait 20 ans quand elle est tombée enceinte. On est jeune à 20 ans et on ne connaît pas grand-chose à la vie. On est vulnérable à cet âge et je ne la condamne pas" (I am grateful to her for everything she did for me ... she was 20 years old when she became pregnant. We are young at 20 and we do not know much about life. One is vulnerable at this age and I do not judge her (translated by the author, Féminine and Elbaz 2014: 24/25). Thus, her account contains details of what her mother experienced to highlight a single mother's daily struggle to get a daily income and a decent and safe life. She also stressed that not all single mother are prostitutes; but some are victims of poverty, family incest, underage and forced marriages or even those who are victims of unkept promises of marriage. However, Malak reveals her story from the perspective of a fatherless daughter, an adolescent who will always hide the legacy she carries from her own family, and always hide behind her mother's name instead of the father's name, as the norm and the law dictates in Morocco. She wondered about her future life and if she would have children of her own; she even wonders about the kind of man who would accept being married to someone who is the daughter of a single mother. She kept those questions for herself being fully aware that she would find no logical answers which would change her situation, except investing more efforts in her education and future potential. Malak ended up her account praising the effort of the association, Feminine Solidarity, and the women in charge. Further, she expressed her own thoughts about sexual education and its necessity in schools; and finally she wishes if all single mothers could retell their stories publicly so that the next generations, particularly women, could benefit from these actual testimonies, not only for the well being of women, but for the welfare of the whole community.

A Female Scholar's Testimony: Women's Morality versus Men's Disgrace

The conclusion was a testimony written by Naima Chikhaoui who is a university professor of sociology and anthropology at Mohamed the V University, Rabat. She entitled it as "Du Déclic... À la Détermination" (From the epiphanyto determination) (translated by the author). Her testimony is placed at the end of the work to serve as an epilogue for the work and as the most fitting conclusion which demonstrates the academic perspective on the issues discussed in the work. It also stresses the importance of voicing the issue of single mother's in Morocco. Chikhaoui starts by praising Aicha Ech-Chenna for standing up for the rights of unwed mothers and their children in Morocco. Further, she acclaims her audacity and wisdom in being committed for that cause despite the social, cultural, religious and political preconceptions in a society where such subjects remained taboo despite the social changes that are taking place on a daily basis. She opened her account by quoting a Chinese saying that signifies how small work and ideas matters in the life of the people and communities as well, reaffirming that "il est préférable d'allumer une petite flamme plutôt que de maudire éternellement l'obscurité" (it is better to light a candle than to curse the darkness) (translated by the author, *Féminine* and Elbaz 2014: 127). She highlighted the vital role Aicha Ech-Chenna and her association Feminine Solidarity played in bringing into debate about the rights of unwed mothers and their children, raising funds for the help of these women, organizing colloquiums, seminars and public campaigns to raise awareness about these issues that do not concern only these women but the whole society.

Indeed, she explains that the reasons that lead these women to be single mothers are not always the same; some are victims of rape, others are victims of false promises of marriage, and unfortunately some are victims of family incest; while others were victims of their individual choices. Disregarding these causes, the mothers are condemned for the shame they brought to their families and communities; thus, they were excluded and left with no support, income or shelter. Hence, the association "Feminine Solidarity" was created by Aicha Ech-Chenna in 1985 for this cause, hosting unmarried mothers and providing them with some of their basic needs: shelter, nutrition as well as offering them psychological follow-up and teaching them skills that would help them reintegrate once again in society. They are offered literacy classes and workshops where they learn social skills for the sake of their psychological stability and acceptance of their status; the association also offers them work skills that will guarantee them decent work and a regular income and hence a secure life.

The writer has also referred to the role of higher education and the obligation of scholars to shed light on these social issues and dig deeper beneath the surface. These women are sometimes charged with prostitution or even adultery, while men are socially and legally protected against sexual abuse allegations. She did also stress the notion of "Hogra", which literally signifies social humiliation and contempt, and which women are subject to on a daily basis at work, at school, and even at home.

Conclusion

These narratives represent actual women whose stories were meant not only to tell narratives for the sake of telling, but they are meant to be remembered so as to reassure the existence of women beyond the moral judgement of women's sexuality and gender inequality. Twelve female protagonists face compelling moral and ethical dilemmas that may cause a moral shock for readers as the category of people concerned portray a category whose existence is vital for the evolution of societies. These female protagonists ask questions for which they found no answers given their social status as outcasts; questions that are related to their existential demands for justice, citizenship and identity. They were torn between living a free sexual life according to their individual will, and having a life that conforms to the community's moral and

cultural codes. They were in continuous search of their identity; yet they are marginalized and socially excluded because their society “c'était un lieu mal famé, qui était fermé aux gens de l'extérieur. On n'y ramenait que les largués sociaux : des prostituées, des vieillards, des enfants abandonnés, des délinquants en tous genres, et des maladies mentaux aussi” (The place had a bad reputation and its door has been shut in the face of the public. Only social outcasts were brought in: prostitutes, old people, abandoned children, offenders of all sorts and mental patients) (translated by the author, Féminine and Elbaz 2014: 14). The women represent diverse social backgrounds; some are from rural areas, while others are from urban places; some are educated, whereas others are illiterate; some are from a rich background, while others are from poor ones. All these categories are highlighted and their stories are cited in the women's testimonies so as to identify the double standard of their country and their compatriots; under such double standard, women carry all the blame for these social issues because they couldn't control their sexual behaviour while men would go with no risk of being morally or legally blamed for their sexual behaviours and attitudes.

Hence, it is with the Arab spring that these issues acquired the legitimacy to be discussed publicly; and that the individual social actors, like Aicha Ech-Channa, could act freely and with no fear from censorship or restriction that the media and the state could exercise on the public opinion. And it's with the Arab spring that women became capable of committing acts that would never be expected in an Arab Muslim setting prior to the Arab spring such as setting oneself on fire or getting undressed in public. Such acts alludes to the Arab population's dissatisfaction with their societies' malaise and their inability to speak about such issues in public.

In these testimonies, Aicha Ech-Channa documents these women's suffering and her own as well. She never forgets the first time she witnesses a woman who was forced to give up her child to a foster family right after birth; while she herself was a new mother; she states that

«Le déclic, j'ai eu après mon accouchement en 1981. J'étais dans le bureau des assistantes sociales. Une maman donnait le sein à son bébé. Elle venait de signer l'acte d'abandon. Quand la voiture de l'orphelinat est arrivée, d'un coup sec, elle a retiré son sein. Le lait s'est mis à gicler et l'enfant à hurler...je suis sortie en pleurant. Je suis rentrée chez moi retrouver mon bébé. Je lui ai donné le sein. J'ai pensé à l'autre, qui en avait été privé, et à sa mère. Je n'ai pas dormi de la nuit. » (I had my aha moment after my birth in 1981. I was in the office of social workers. A mother was breastfeeding her baby. She had just signed the act of abandonment. When the van of the orphanage arrived, she yanked her breast. The milk began to squirt and the child to howl ... I went out crying. I went home to find my baby. I breastfed him. I thought of the other, who had been deprived of such a right, and of his mother. I did not sleep at night) (translated by the author, Féminine and Elbaz 2014: 127).

Thus, she constantly bears witness to stories of women who became single mothers for different reasons, often beyond their control. Hence, the present work is a call for a collective effort to fight those issues as well as for society to take responsibility for the future generations of these children who are born out of wedlock.

Aicha Ech-Channa resorts to testimony as a literary genre to document the brutal reality these unwed mothers endure; she was determined to highlight these women's daily struggle to start a life after finding themselves in this situation. Her voluntary work with these women and their children on a daily basis qualifies her to play the witness role in speaking up for their rights and the risks of veiling these issues on the whole population. Being in charge of hosting these women in her association Feminine Solidarity and standing up for a public recognition of their rights makes her an actual bearer of not only a feminist mission that aspires for women's emancipation, but a bearer of a national mission which stresses the wellbeing of her community and her countrywomen as well.

Writing these women's stories in a literary form portrays her audacity to expand the circle of those concerned: single mothers and their families and their partners, or those who are working within the association: social workers, psychiatrists and lawyers. She lets these women narrate themselves their accounts so as to provide precise facts that are unknown to the public and to disclose the ongoing suffering these unwed mothers endure. Their painful shocking narratives might traumatize some readers and awaken their consciousness as well because "we do not learn from one another's states of believing or knowing—we learn from one another's words"(Lackey 2008: 2). Despite the overwhelming hardship the women testified about in these testimonies and the brutality of sexual violence they endured. These stories open up new venues to understand a multilayered society whose citizens who only scratch the surface of their religion as devout Muslims.

The work is a call for a bottom up social evolution that touches upon the daily issues of all marginalized and unprivileged young women, particularly those who become single mothers such as the ones who are listed in the work aging between twenty-four and thirty years old. Limited access to education and sex education programs, health care and sanitation all constitute basic elements in a child's upbringing. Sex education may provide technical information and an official knowledge about sexuality inside school. What is meant by being sexually active, how to deal with the physical changes in one's life; how sexual knowledge is acquired; how Moroccans perceive it; what are their attitudes towards sexuality and how to explain the intersection between religion and sexuality on one part and sexuality and morality on the other part? All these questions would have never been asked or discussed in a family context, given that these are taboos for Muslim communities, let alone to be answered in an academic setting. Being highly educated and well informed about one's physical traits and attitudes, could make one disbelief that there are women who still could not associate vaginal blood loss with menstrual cycles and puberty is the case of Itto in these testimonies. But it's real and it signifies that such education is restricted in some areas, rural ones; while it goes beyond theory in other parts such as in the city even if it is restricted by the cultural and social norms that necessitate privacy. In rural areas, girls are rarely allowed to pass their primary school, because villages and remote areas do not have middle and high schools and even if they exist they lack the necessary boarding schools to receive girls and provide the necessary requirements for a successful academic career.

These are vital issues that are to be taken into consideration in the educational system because today's children are the future citizens who should be well aware of how to take care of themselves and of others. All the single mothers in these accounts involuntarily give birth to a generation of illegitimate children who suffer from social prejudice and judicial unacknowledgement. This is evident in the case of Tarik who was denied a job in the Moroccan interior ministry because he holds the name of his mother. Further, by allocating much space to the theme of sexuality which is highly stressed in the work under study, it would be imperative to admit that having consensual premarital sex is a reality, given the cases that are enlisted in the work and who consent to being in sexual relationships being fully aware of what cohabitation would entail on both the social and legal level. Hence, women suffer severe consequences from these unkept promises of marriage; for example, having an undesirable child bearing, being a prostitute, being abandoned by the family and having no chance to get married, not to mention the feeling of guilt of having sex out of marriage and the general perception that these women are evil and they need to be excluded and locked up so as not to diffuse prostitution and adultery among other women. Though debates on sexuality in Morocco are still largely taboo and it is rarely addressed publicly, but it would be imperative to conclude that sex education within the formal educational system would be the key to protect girls from sexual exploitation, unless it is an individual choice. Indeed, sex education has many positive effects such as reduction of sexual guilt, inhibitions, and the

double standard, maintaining the traditional values of love and fidelity, and providing a healthier, more comfortable and responsible attitude toward sex (Gunderson and McCary 1980: 375).

It would also alter the traditional conceptions of the female sexuality and the belief that only women should control their body and sexual experiences with respect to the community's Muslim identity. Indeed, the growing numbers of single mother and illegitimate children has become more of a serious issue that concerns both women and men, and matters to the welfare of the present and the future generation in a society whose citizens manifest diverse cases of women and men who are being torn between tradition and modernity.

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Gender Relations and Social Values in Morocco: Prospects of “Third way” Islamic feminism after the “Arab Spring”

With the emergence of the “Arab spring” in 2011, men and women in Morocco started to become more aware of the changing nature of the relationship between them. Aspects of gender equality and the negotiation of visibility and power inside and outside the private sphere is strikingly an indication of a massive change in gender relations and social values. Moroccan society appears to be undergoing a difficult transition from tradition to modernity with tension between Islam and feminism in their complex, infinite and fluid definitions and manifestations. Sociologists have coined terms like “crisis of values”, “Bricolage”, “Detraditionalization” to better describe situations of societies that fluctuate between values of the past and the present. In Morocco, where minor revolutionary change happened at the political level, the social arena saw sweeping waves of individualization in contrast to resisting acts of collectivism and conformity. Women are at the heart of this struggle as they are challenging traditional gender roles and compromising established social values in novel, unauthorized, and often shocking ways. Academicians, civil society activists and policy makers are all engaged in a polarized debate about convergence and divergence between tradition and modernity where binary lines are still hazy and uncertain. In this context, a growing tendency, endorsed by the state, and referred to as “third way” Islamic feminism, has appeared to pacify the contention and create forms of conciliation between gender equality and the Islamic teachings. Thus, the “third way” Islamic feminism propagates the possibility of non-contradiction between Islam and international demands of gender equality, and takes part in a discourse that touches upon issues of the local and the “Universal”, the static and the changeable in Sharia, and the socio-religious dimensions of reform. This paper, therefore, tries to investigate the theoretical paradigms, sociological facts and the political strategies of constructing new patterns of gender relations in Morocco. Furthermore, the paper inspects the impact of the Arab uprisings on the trajectories of social change touching on gains and challenges for new configurations of gender equality in the Moroccan society.

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Gender Relations and Social Values in Morocco

In Morocco, as in many other parts of the world, gender relations are dramatically changing in different aspects of life. This change primarily indicates a remarkable transformation in society’s system of values. There are basically three reasons (or waves of change) that constitute the impetus behind the transformation we see in the world and in Morocco today.

The first wave of change comprises the waves of globalization, industrialization and urbanization. These waves are magnificent factors that heralded a new era of lifestyles marked by an increase of intercultural encounters, technological and industrial advancement within a context of increasing urbanization. Family planning, women’s increased visibility in the work force, and individualism are features of change in people’s patterns of life and a transition from a traditional to a more complex and modern society.

Second, the wave of feminization of society’s issues also aided in the transformation. The issues that used to be seen from a male-centric vision are now necessarily viewed from a gender perspective with more focus on the notion of equality and parity. Globally speaking, starting from the late 60s and early 70s, a liberal “universal” feminism emerged, dominated the international feminist discourse, and influenced a large number of countries in their legal and political inclinations towards women.

Third, in Morocco, the wave of reform and democratization of the Moroccan state, especially after the ascension of King Mohammed VI to the throne in 1999, and the implementation of the family code in 2004, and the promulgation of the 2011 new constitution, helped to create a more suitable atmosphere for women’s rights and gender equality. However, these reforms remain within the framework of the state’s constants (Islam, the national union, the constitutional monarchy, and the democratic choice), which all are mixed and somehow perpetuate an ambiguity of whether Morocco is a modern or a traditional society.

Aspects of the dilemma of reconciling both past and present values can be traced through an analogy that I call “the balance of values”. I argue here that the Moroccan society, like many other societies, is still reluctantly oscillating between one set of traditional, national and conservative values on the one hand, and a “global”, secular and modern set of values on the other hand, in complex and unfixed ways. I elaborate here on the following three pairs of values that contest and interplay in our society in relation to gender relations:

1. Individualism / Solidarity

This dimension is demonstrated through the fact that the nuclear family represents more than 60% of families in Morocco today according to the highest commission of planning¹, which indicates an inclination towards more individual centered preferences in the society. The irony behind this is that while the young generation holds more individualistic inclinations, it also maintains attachment to the family group and values belonging and solidarity. The 2014 World Values Survey showed that 90% of youths expressed strong attachment to their families and inability to be emotionally and financially independent from them,² while at the same time, another survey shows that an increasing number of Moroccan youths reject their parents intervention in their personal choices.³ Interestingly, young women appear to be more reluctant to challenge their

parent’s choices due to strong social norms imposed on them, however, today we see a number of aspects where women triumph for their individual choices rather than conformity to traditional gender roles.

2. Freedom / Obedience & Conformity

Today’s social life is full of stories that show how difficult it is to embrace both values of freedom and liberation and values of conformity to traditional ideals. For example, gender sexual relations are more and more liberal in real life but are less accepted in social norms and mainstream discourse. The Moroccan newspaper *L’Economist*, which estimated that 55 of its interviewees said they are in a current boyfriend /girlfriend relationship, which is inconsistent with their social and religious prescriptions, highlights this dichotomy. This disconnection between ideal values and social behaviors is what Dr. Abdesamad Dialmy refers to as a social schizophrenia that requires a transition so that values agree with social realities.⁴ If this duality between freedom and conformity shows the wide gap between reality and social values, another duality shows another aspect of values’ oscillation.

3. Equality / Sacrifice

There is actually a remarkable interplay between the value of equality and the value of sacrifice in the Moroccan society. If we consider the cases of divorce in Morocco, we notice the turning point that the new family law has made when it opened the gate for women to initiate divorce (divorce for irreconcilable differences). The new family law has contributed to the escalation of divorce rate (especially the divorce for irreconcilable differences). This is mathematically true, but many women were suffering and sacrificing for the sake of maintaining the family together, until the family code gave them the right to be equal to men in initiating divorce. So today, women have to choose between the equality granted to them or to keep sacrificing for the sake of keeping a family together. Indeed, a large number of women decide to break free from the patriarchal hold but still, according to recent report by the HCP, women are more hesitant than men to seek divorce, especially when they have children to raise.⁵

The rapid social transformations in Morocco today show many tensions without having a clear and determined destination. Sociologists like, Claude Lévi-Strauss, Anthony Giddens and Wayne Baker have coined expressions that describe the situation of societies that live in a hard transition of values. “Social bricolage” is a term introduced by Claude Lévi-Strauss to refer to how societies derive their values from different paradigms by picking and choosing among them⁶. “Detraditionalization” is a similar term, which refers to the situation where people’s beliefs and values belong to a random set of established ideologies and thoughts across history⁷. Finally, “crisis of values” is a term used in sociology to refer to the situation when values, principles and beliefs start to lose meaning and practical usefulness in concrete matters, such as the case of the value of chastity and its reflection in reality.

In relation to the context of the “Arab spring” insurrections, gender relations and social values accelerated towards more rebellion against norms and standards when women became more visible in the public sphere on an equal footing with men. The 2011 uprisings in the Arab region in general and Morocco in particular heralded an era that includes but is not limited to the following values and implications: 1) freedom, dignity and social justice, 2) media and technology and 3) democracy, secularism, Islamism, and culture. First, freedom, dignity and social justice were the slogans raised in all demonstrations, and were used by Moroccans to break the wall of fear of authorities and superiors in order to voice their demands. Women were no exception in this regard. Second, media and technology were useful tools in the hands of the youth, who used them to channel and popularize their demands inside and outside the country to create a strong front

against the old traditional structures of power, including gender power structures. Third, democracy, secularism, Islamism, and culture became a more visible set of elements that were and still are fused in heated debates leading to more consciousness of identity issues among Moroccans, who constantly negotiate and reconstruct their values and standards.

In sum, these concepts and terms appear to articulate how a society like the Moroccan society undergoes a situation of ambivalence and duality in its values and practices. This situation can be traced also at the level of the feminist discourses in the country.

Prospects of “Third way” Islamic feminism

The more feminist voices rise in Morocco, the more women feel the need to break through the traditional image of the sacrificing mother as entrenched in the cultural and religious dogmas. Muslim women today seem to embrace a modern understanding of their religion to keep loyal to their faith and meanwhile enjoy their rights of equality. In this sense, we can speak about prospects of a third way Islamic feminism in Morocco.

Basically, we need to know that feminism in general can be divided into two categories: the academic and the civil society feminist activism. In Morocco, both categories work within different referential systems; there is the secular and there is the Islamic feminist trend. This polarization is not always valid as there is space for diversity within each trend. According to Malika Benradi, there are four main categories of Moroccan feminist discourses: 1) There is a laicistic feminist vision that pleads for the historicity of the law and a differentiation between fiqh, Sharia and law⁸, which leads to a complete separation between religion and law. 2) There are advocates of modernism who think that fiqh should not be narrow-mindedly seen as the sole framework for discussion and interpretation, which implies that religion is not totally discarded. 3) There are reformers in favor of revising the Maliki rites⁹, in order to account for the changes in the society. 4) There are the traditionalists who fight against equality as a Western product, which infringes upon the cultural identity of the country.¹⁰

Within these categories, the “Third way Islamic feminism” can be located in the middle of the extremes. In her book: *Beyond Feminism and Islamism: Gender and Equality in North Africa*, Doris Gray writes that 'Third way' Islamic feminism inevitably negotiates internal tensions between what has been dubbed 'tradition' and 'modernity', thus, it incorporates national and cultural identity, post-colonialism and religious principles into their gender discourse.¹¹ Asma Lamrabet is a prominent Islamic feminist in Morocco and advocates the “Third way” Islamic feminist approach, referring to it as a set of attempts to claim women’s rights and gender equality within a religious framework, against those who monopolize the feminist discourse and claim that it can only be a secular endeavor.¹²

It is remarkable that the de-colonial approach in “Third way” Islamic feminism is always present in Islamic feminist discourses as it holds a critical eye towards the hegemonic and supremacist Western paradigms and agenda about women’s rights. However, this skepticism occurs in varying degrees among diverse nationalist and Islamist discourses. For this reason, Fatima Sadiqi, in her book *Women’s Movements in Post-“Arab Spring” North Africa* sums up her argument that the interaction between different types of colonial and post-colonial traditions, created new actors and agents as well as new ambiguities and dilemmas that today have an impact on the sociopolitical landscapes of the region.¹³

Once again we go back to sociopolitical landscape which is characterized as mentioned before by an oscillating, unfixed, uncertain, and ambiguous reality, which is now faced by a fluidity

of feminist discourses and activism characterized by diversity and ambiguity too. In this context, I argue that the middle ground situation of “Third way Islamic feminism” allows better dealing with and answering the problematics characterizing the issue of women in Muslim contexts. “Third way Islamic feminism” has the potential to find a way out of the extremes by addressing two basic key divisive issues: The fixed and the changeable in what is secular and what is Islamic. That is, to provide innovative answers within the Islamic framework that can suit with the changeable realities in Morocco. Likewise, to deal with the dialectic relation between what is local and what is universal by contextualizing its activism through thinking globally and working locally.

According to my experience as a researcher at the center for women’s studies in Islam affiliated to the Rabita Mohammadia of Ulema, “Third way Islamic feminism” attempts and has to fill two main gaps, or to connect the links between both research and policymaking, and research with civil society activism in order to reach better and comprehensive results.

Until then, ambivalences in both social values and feminist discourses will continue to inspire more work towards searching for a model that helps in embarking a safe and peaceful journey of change in Morocco.

Notes

¹ Haut-Commissariat au Plan (HCP) (2016). «Famille au Maroc- les réseaux de la solidarité familiale. Chapitre 1- Structures et caractéristiques des familles au Maroc». {Morocco-family networks of family solidarity. Chapter 1 Structures and characteristics of families in Morocco}. www.hcp.ma/file/103197/, Retrieved on 27.May.2016

² World Values Survey. F00001416-WV6_Results_Morocco_2011_v_2016_01_01, www.worldvaluessurvey.org/WVSDocumentationWV6.jsp, Retrieved on 27.May.2016

³ “Interesting facts about religious inclinations among the youths” {haqai’q moutira ’an mouyoulat attadioun ‘inda chabab”. cited in “Assabah newspaper” <http://assabah.ma/16709.html>. Retrieved on 27.May.2016

⁴ Abdesamad Dialmy. "Sexual transition in Morocco" {Al intiqaal Aljinsi fi Almaghrib}. Dar Al-Aman. Rabat. 2015

⁵ Haut-Commissariat au Plan (HCP) (2016). «Femmes et Hommes en chiffres 2016». {Women and men in numbers 2016}. www.hcp.ma/file/176550/. Retrieved on 27.May.2016

⁶ Claude Levi-Strauss. *The Savage Mind*. The University of Chicago Press; London [England]: Weidenfeld and Nicolson Ltd. 1966.

⁷ Anthony Giddens and W. Sutton Philip. *Sociology*. 7th Edition. Wiley publishing UK. 2013

⁸ The concepts Fiqh, Sharia and Islamic law are usually used interchangeably among many people. However, there are nuances between them that should be paid attention to. While Fiqh refers to the Islamic jurisprudence and scholars’s human interpretations of religious texts, Sharia represents the abstract religious teachings and principles that have not yet found ways to codification and implementation as laws and practices. This remains a subject of large dispute between Muslim traditionalists and reformists. See Oxford dictionary definition: <https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/sharia>

⁹ Maliki rites, or the maliki school of Islamic thought is considered as the tradition adopted by the Moroccan state in codifying Islamic prescriptions. The maliki school (*madhhab*) is one of the four major schools of Fiqh or religious law within Sunni Islam which are: the Hanafi, Maliki, Shafi'i, Hanbali schools.

¹⁰ Malika Benradi. “Women in Islam –Feminist Orientations and Strategies for the 21st Century”. (Ed). Johannes Kandel. Trans. James Turner (English). Friedrich Ebert Stiftung Conference. 2008

¹¹ Doris Gray. *Beyond Feminism and Islamism: Gender and Equality in North Africa*. International Library of African Studies. I.B.Tauris; Reprint edition. 2015; p. 66

¹² Asma Lamrabet. *Believer and feminist. Another view to religions {Croyantes et féministes, un autre regard sur les religions}*. Éditions La croisée des chemins. Casablanca. 2016

¹³ Fatima Sadiqi (Ed). *Women’s Movements in Post-“Arab Spring” North Africa*. Palgrave Macmillan. New York. 2016.

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World Values Survey. F00001416-WV6_Results_Morocco_2011_v_2016_01_01. www.worldvaluessurvey.org/WVSDocumentationWV6.jsp. Retrieved on 27.May.2016

Abdelilah Bouasria

Bits and Tits: The Dialectics of Bodily Encounters in Moroccan Politics

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Bits and Tits: The Dialectics of Bodily Encounters in Moroccan Politics

The representation and presentation of the body as a vehicle of political expression has become very popular in Morocco whether it is about gestures (the three fingers used by the Amazigh activists), pedophilia (the case of Daniel Galvan), immigration (drowning bodies of immigrants), violence (the confessions of tortured political prisoners) and religious rituals (the magical ring of king Hassan II). It is very important then to explore this “corpsification” -to use Lacan’s term- in Modern Moroccan politics whether it is in acts of resistance or in acts of cooptation and taming of these attempts of resistance. If we have started witnessing the increasing reliance on the body in the political contention of Moroccan dissenters and starting from the premise that the central player in Moroccan politics is the Monarchy -notwithstanding some poststructuralist attempts that argue, tactically or genuinely, that in Morocco there is no center of power and everything is negotiable- one needs to find the ways, in which this overseeing power in turn tries to capture the “body” rendering it docile and sanitized. To put it simply, one needs to ask the following questions: How is the body used in Moroccan protests? And how does the disciplining apparatus react to this use of the body? If the strict regime in Morocco is constantly “upgrading” its authoritarianism, easing out the political expression field-despite the shameful crackdown on the peaceful marchers of the Rif- while holding tightly onto the economic sphere with much predation and gluttony, I argue that it will adapt its defensive reflexes to the “habitus” of resistance, and will thus upgrade its use of the body, not by negating it or making it invisible, but by fragmenting it and presenting it as organs and members at the time when the protesters started using the body for political expression massively.

Rather than crushing the bodies of dissent, the Moroccan Makhzen sits quietly to listen to the sounds of these bodies before coming up with the antidote from the same bodily repertoire. For example, when the Islamists present a “covered body” according to the norms and standards of moral rectitude, the regime encourages a “lax” and lewd display of the “sexualized body” as in the case of the Moroccan theatrical performance “Dialy” adapting the Vagina monologues. Furthermore, the body that becomes displayed and flaunted is not a whole one but only one part of it, the vagina in this case. Moreover, when a dissenter uses his body to voice malcontent, the king shows up with an orthopedic cane, as if the clash of symbols is a protester claiming a “whole” body and the monarch appearing with a “weak” body. We will see how Moroccan dissenters are using the body and in a second part, we will see how the Moroccan monarchy produces a counter-discourse about the body.

The bodies that rebel

The dynamics linking the body to surveillance and policing are exposed in many streams of the literature. For instance, the French philosopher Michel Foucault presents the model of the Panopticon in which he shows how subjects internalize control and discipline without apparent physical force in a situation of a circular prison in which individual prison cells all look into a central tower without really seeing what happens inside the tower. Even when there are no watchmen in the tower, the prisoners think they are being constantly watched and as a result censor their moves. In fact, Foucault argues, torture “assured the articulation of the written on the oral, the secret on the public, the procedure of investigation on the operation of the confession; it made it possible to reproduce the crime on the visible body of the criminal; in the same horror, the crime had to be manifested and annulled. It also made the body of the condemned man the place where the vengeance of the sovereign was applied, the anchoring point for a manifestation of power, an opportunity of affirming the dissymmetry of forces.”¹ The central tower was replaced, in our postmodern world, with the cellular phone and digital surveillance with all the techniques attached

to it. In fact, in 2011, Morocco had been exposed for having invested 2 million Euros in a French surveillance system named Eagle, which allows the Government to perform censorship and mass monitoring of internet traffic. In 2012, the website of the dissident group Mamfakinch started being targeted with Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks overwhelming a server with fake requests to shut it down. The fake will become part of the disciplining tactics of the regime itself, after having been used primarily by the insurgents.

Another example is the eye at the top of the pyramid on the US dollar bill symbolizing either Osiris, the Egyptian god, or the all-seeing eye used by the Freemasons, whom some conspiracy theorists believe our founding fathers were². The eye of Providence was a very common cultural iconography of the 17th and 18th Centuries. Even in the Islamic literature, the prophet referred to the “eye” in a saying about the anti-Christ: “I will tell you something about him which no prophet has told his followers: Dajjal is one-eyed whereas Allah is not.” (Bukhari 9.241), adding that the antichrist is “blind in the right eye and his eye looks like a protruding grape.” (Bukhari 9.504) The eye is very important in the Arab and Islamic culture with a common belief in the evil eye that people thwart by using the hand of Fatima or the famous “khmissa” (Five). The hand of five fingers is thought of as an antidote to the evil eye and represents a wide range of cultural symbols from the Muslim five pillars and five daily prayers to the five senses of human beings passing by the five persons that came to be known, in the Muslim Shiite tradition, as the people of *Al kisa* (the mantle): The prophet Muhammad, Fatima, Ali, Hassan and Hussain.

Getting rid of the “cumbersome” body: from disappearing to overexposing

The reference to and the use of the body is not new in Moroccan politics. Dissenter’s heads were displayed on the walls of the city or they were paraded in cages before being presented as a meal for the king’s lions. What is new is how the bodies of dissidents are “disposed of” by the ruling powers. There is a “paradigmatic shift” in the security apparatus in the domain of body management of political dissidents. I will compare here two models of revolutionists who knew tragic ends in Morocco under the rule of the two kings Hassan II and Mohamed VI. Under the rule of king Hassan II, Mehdi Ben Barka, his former Math teacher and friend but also political opponent, was abducted in Paris in front of the Brasserie Lipp in Paris on October 29, 1965 and allegedly tortured and up to this day his body is not found although many speculations were made, awaiting declassified information, regarding diluting his body in acid or burying his head in Morocco or in a forest in France. There were several movies and books, often with contradicting assertions, trying to reconstruct the crime scene that sparked the freezing of diplomatic relations between Morocco and France. Daniel Guerain said about Mehdi Ben Barka: “this dead man will have a long life. This dead man will have the last word.” The French said, that “the issue of this case is that of the body. Returning it to the family would potentially mean losing the power enjoyed today by Mohamed VI.”³ Joseph Tual, the French journalist, said about the Ben Barka affair that it is “the issue of the body. Returning it to the family would potentially mean losing the power enjoyed today by Mohamed VI.”

Under King Mohamed VI, Hicham Mandari, an intimate right hand man of King Hassan and conman involved in dubious economic activities turned into an exiled “political” refugee threatening the Moroccan monarchy, was found dead with a bullet in his head in a parking lot in Spain. In fact, “when Spanish police first came upon the body of Hicham Mandari lying face down in a garage between Mijas and Fuengirola on the Costa del Sol with a bullet in his head, they thought him just one more victim of a revenge attack among gangsters, typical of the region. Or they said they did. But the death of the young Moroccan has involved the secret services of four countries and turned a spotlight upon the secretive, sometimes menacing world of the Moroccan royal court.”⁴ Mandari claimed to have secret documents, including an inventory of royal possessions abroad, which he used to blackmail the royal family. The gender variable also made its way in this

interesting case where the Moroccan palace had lost in court against Mandari in the United States. In an interview with the Spanish newspaper El Mundo, Mandari had accused the current Moroccan King of “being a toy in the hands of his wife Salma.”⁵

The Female Body on Stage

Amina Sboui (Tyler), a Tunisian activist from FEMEN, sparked controversy in her country when she posted a picture of herself with a naked breast, reading a book and smoking a cigarette. “I own my body and it is nobody’s honor”. Amina is coming up with a project of a magazine called Farida (unique in Arabic) and she is a former member of the Tunisian Association Femen. She has also made her coming out as a bisexual person on Tunisian TV. The group Femen had some activities in Morocco but it did not go far. On 11 April 2016, two Femen activists were arrested protesting against criminalizing homosexuality (6 months to three years in prison) in front of the court of the city of Beni Mellal, where an arrested homosexual was being convicted. The two French militants were kicked out of Morocco and sent to their country for having protested against the arrest of a Moroccan homosexual. While Abdellah Taia, the Moroccan openly gay writer, goes undisturbed in his sexual choice while lecturing in Morocco, the gay laymen are constantly harassed, arrested and jailed because of their sexual “abnormality”. Are we again reproducing the Moroccan war of classes in queerness as we have done so in promiscuity and rentier economy? It seems that the answer is “yes” and all these seemingly daring topics would just serve to divide the political actors and spectators around the throne (as other nations rally behind the flag).

The Moroccan artist Latifa Ahrar appeared partially nude in her play *Kafr Naum*. The audience was shocked to see Ahrar gradually strip her clothes and lay half-naked on the stage. Outraged, many spectators left the theater. Public nudity is a crime punishable by law in Moroccan society, and most Moroccans have an aversion to it.

Dialy is the name of the Moroccan adaptation of Eve Ensler’s theatrical piece *Vagina Monologues* with a funding from the French institute. In that theatrical piece, the name for the *Vagina* in Moroccan Arabic was mentioned seven times. The Moroccan Arabic name for “*Vagina*” was mentioned seven times in this theatrical piece, stirring much controversy. The play, a somehow cloning of Ensler’s piece negated for legal reasons, addressed important issues in Moroccan society like violence, menstruation, rape and sex. It is interesting that while the invisible foxes that allowed this liberal piece to get through censorship intended a counterbalance to islamists and conservative powers but the aftermath of the piece, years later, did not impede Morocco from pardoning and defending two sex offenders mentioned below, whose victims include women. It is interesting also that this play, which adopts the language of sincerity and transparency, does not portray some upper class women whose everyday activities revolve around sucking young men-in a literal sense-from their sexual energy and getting away with it, precisely because of their social ranking. In other words, power and sex, from a female perspective, was not addressed in this outcry.

Lahcen Zinoun, A Moroccan film producer, traces the idea of the tattooed body in his movie *Femme écrite* where Naïm K., an anthropologist, is back from a trip. He is actualizing the life of a woman whom he admires named “Mririda”. Naim in search of the traces of this woman poetess makes us visit a brothel that Mririda used to stay at. In the discovery of Adjou, Naim is in spiritual communion with her. Adjou is assassinated and her mysterious murderer seems to want to destroy tattooed information on her low abdomen. While the tattoo has been a real success throughout the world, while in Morocco the non-surgical tattooing is done by ablation with sulfuric acid. The movie shows the great Atlas, in the village of Ait Mizane, where an ancestral ritual, the wedding feast and of fertility (threatened with disappearance in Morocco) represented by phallic effigies linked this rite.

Bodies on fire, Crushed Bodies

Earth, fire, air and water: those are the four elements of earth. They have their influence on our cosmic life and depending on which one of these four elements happens to prevail over the other three, that element will be central in most walks of our life from politics to sports. Bodies on fire and bodies that are crushed (air for pressure). If Tunisia's Arab Spring started when Mohammed Bouazizi set himself on fire when police confiscated his selling cart, Mohsin Fikri, the fish salesman, had his body crushed by the police and became the icon of social unrest in Morocco's northern Rif region. On the evening of October 28, 2016 a garbage truck crushed Moroccan fish-seller Mohsen Fikri to death in the Moroccan city of al-Hoceima as he tried to protect his produce.

Fadwa Laroui, 25 years of age and a Mother-of-two, used in 2011 flammable liquid to set herself on fire in front of the town hall of Souk Sebt, in central Morocco for not benefiting from a housing scheme for low-income households because she was a single mother. She is the first Arab woman known to have set herself on fire in a protest at social conditions after Tunisian Mohamed Bouazizi's self-immolation, as the law stated that "divorced and single women and single mothers live with their parents." Another case is that of Amina Filali, a sixteen years-old girl from Larache, Morocco, who committed suicide by taking rat poison in 2012 after she was forced to marry her rapist. Since then, this law has changed.

Sacred nudity, profane nudity

How does nudity score in the barometer of Moroccan shocking performances? And is there a double standard in dealing with nudity? If we have witnessed a relatively massive display of nude female body parts in Morocco lately in the liberal scene, which ignited vociferous condemnation from the Islamic or more conservative factions in Morocco, one needs to ask how nudity is "treated" when its subjects belong to the highest spheres of society, the monarchical institution. In fact, some paparazzi photos were used by some Moroccan dissidents showing Princess Hasna, the sister of the current king, in a bathing suit in a coastal town in Brazil to criticize the sister of the commander of the faithful for not wearing clothes that are "Islamic". It is interesting to compare the logic of the liberal daring champions in Morocco using nudity in artistic performances to somehow question religious conservatism while in the political sphere the daring faultfinders of the monarchy use a morally-not to say religiously-discourse criticizing members of the royal family for doing what normal citizens do every day, like wearing a bikini. When the sister of the king goes to a resort abroad and wears a swimsuit, she is not doing anything illegal. The logic of the anti-princess critique has a moral resonance and attempts to taint the status of her brother, the king as a commander of the faithful. Shooting the male rooster by aiming at the female hen of his household is an old tactic borrowed from the repertoire of tribal and patriarchal societies. If we compare this position denouncing the uncovering of the royal body with the late manifestations of the nude body in the Moroccan artistic scene, there is much to say about the hidden war between the Moroccan monarchy and the Islamic actors in the country.

If we push the argument further we will see how the body is represented and used in the confrontation between the monarchy and the Islamist rivals. In the religious sphere in Morocco, Islamists tend to criticize any attempt at unveiling the body by using a slippery slope argument of moral depravity. However, at times, there are voices within the religious community that adopt positions of sexual "coming out". For instance, the Moroccan scholar Zemzemi issued in May 2011 a Fatwa that was very controversial and that allowed women to masturbate using carrots. The masturbatory device, an edible item in this case, is exteriorized in the public sphere and by a religious scholar. Two shifts of bodily discourses are witnessed here: the act of pleasuring the body is exteriorized publicly by talking about it, when it was hissed behind walls, and the nature of the bodily artefact or instrument of pleasuring the body is revealed instead of leaving it at the

discretion of the user. It is not the hand or the vibrator but a vegetable, the carrot, with many other associations like the bunny. The tool of the bodily enjoyment is not a body part (the hand) or an external artificial gadget (the vibrator or dildo) but an organic bio vegetable. The gadget in the service of pleasuring the body, and the pleased body become tropes that are advocated by some religious actors although garbed in a fatwa context. When comparing this position to that of the liberals, one is surprised to find certain motifs and areas within the sexualized body present in one camp and absent in another. For instance, in the liberal camp, the displaying of the sexual body is almost always linked to the issue of prostitution, which in turn is a subset, at least in one stream of the literature on prostitution, of a bigger social justice issue, exploitation. In the religious camp, the few daring displays of the sexualized body focus on pleasuring it and taking care of it. Hence, masturbation and aesthetic care are found in its narratives.

The Moroccan artist Mounir Fatmi inscribes his work on the body in the area of the sacred in an attempt to desacralize it. He shows those explosive book parcels, attached to the waist of young persons, not with a detonator, but with a network of open possibilities, in an invisible net of perception. The sense of something threatening, like the sight of those young ones with their girdles of explosives, creates an era overflowing with media events, heavily loaded with a symbolic potential that can be turned to something constructive: the aim of the artist. The objects/the language applied by Mounir Fatmi aims at collecting the sediments of such hyper-banalities of journalism, rendering actual events resistant to sense.

If Moroccan authorities turn a blind eye on liberal artistic performances running against the majority of society members in terms of codes of nudity, they do not do the same with respect to the religious conservative have banned the manufacturing, marketing and sale of the burqa, a garment worn by some Muslim women to cover themselves in public.

Djellaba diplomacy or the fetish in diplomacy

In August 2014, Abdelilah Benkirane and his wife were received by the White House at a gala, and the dress of his wife generated much controversy. Dressed in a very sober djellaba, the wife of the head of the Moroccan government posed alongside Michelle Obama for the official photograph with a very simple -far from being royal- traditional outfit. There were two types of reactions in Morocco. The first camp would like her to be embellished in an expensive caftan, with a touch of glamor. The second opinion, which is more conservative, supports this choice of dress on the part of Mrs. Benkirane, who appears so simple, close to people, and represents Morocco as a whole. Instead of asking important questions about the content of the visit of the Islamist prime minister to one of the key leaders of our world, the US president, the attention was shrewdly shifted, perhaps by egomaniac kids jealous of others sharing their care, to a relic, a fetish, an external body not even of the emissary to the white house but of his wife. The Moroccan engineer of public opinion succeeded in erasing -or at least encrypting- the main fact of this occurrence: the encounter between the Moroccan Prime Minister Benkirane and the American President Obama. If we set aside the scheming tactics of the attention monopoly to analyze the epistemic content of the discussions around the Djellaba of the prime minister's wife, we will find that the camp that found it shameful and not to the standards of the occasion, especially that public officials get a financial allowance for clothing, and the camp that defended the cloth correctness used the argument of simplicity. Both camps used the argument of representation. The first one argues that the not-so-bourgeois traditional outfit does not represent what Moroccan couture "really" is, and the second one claims that the simple djellaba represents the massive middle class consumption style of most Moroccans. Both camps ignore the capitalistic nature of Morocco's couture whether traditional or modern and how much poor labor they are expropriating and surplus they are making. If we imagine the encounter of Prime Minister Benkirane a text, its body should surely be the two men and the content

of their discussions, but a Moroccan reading of this text made an external “organ” (the cloth of the Moroccan lady) the “body” of this text⁶. What the Moroccan state apparatus has succeeded in doing is precisely an inversion of values imposed -subliminally- on the two warring camps of a false debate about the “rationality” of a fetish (the djellaba) that became the marker of Moroccan nationalism. The inversion lies in the fact that among the supporters of the simple traditional dress that the wife of the Prime minister we found mainly some “socialist” politicians, like Charafa Afailal, who praised it for its simplicity and the fact that is chosen “with taste” and among the opposite camp we found bourgeois circles saying that it does not “represent” Morocco. The socialists started using an aesthetic value argument while the capitalists started using a representation argument, which refers, and defers, to central planning. The camps found themselves borrowing from their “opposite” repertoire and the prime minister found himself reduced to talking about “his wife.” The foxes that do the grand strategies of the Moroccan political field proceed, in a game theoretical fashion, with a rigueur that opts for iteration and displacement as discursive techniques to delocalize - and destabilize - their opponents with one overarching theme: There can only be one center in Moroccan politics around which other miniscule - or minisculed - particles gravitate.

Governance styles and the Management of Pedophiles

The raping body, or the body of pedophiles and sex offenders, has always been linked to politics in general and to Moroccan politics in particular. We will explore here three cases, one under Hassan II, and two under Mohamed VI.

Under the rule of King Hassan II, Morocco was shaken by a famous affair of a police official named Tabit (the sound of the name refers also to the slang French expression “your cock”) who was arrested for kidnapping and raping girls and executed in September 1993. What came to be known as the Tabit affair actually started in August 1992 when some single Moroccan immigrants were watching a sex video in the outskirts of Milan, Italy. One of the recordings portrayed Moroccan characters, and one of the protagonists of the film turned out to be the own sister of Saïd, one of the spectators of the evening. The young man took leave of his friends and decided, the following day, to return to Morocco, where his family resides. He was beaten by Tabit’s men and was afraid for his life, so he started talking. His 18-year-old sister Khadija met a certain “Haj” in 1991 while waiting for the bus back from Aïn Diab. And then one day she did not return to the parental home. The next day, his mother, who went to all the police stations, learns that his daughter was arrested the day before in the company of several prostitutes. The famous Haj, Mohamed Mustapha Tabit, chief commissioner and powerful boss of secret services in Casablanca, is behind this arrest. She is released and under pressure starts living with the commissioner. When her brother visits her, he is beaten by some people. He decides to leave for Rabat, heading for the Italian Embassy. Using his dual Moroccan-Italian nationality, the young man reveals everything and the Italian official, after receiving a copy of the recording, promises to inform one of his friends in the Moroccan government. This friend is none other than Abdellatif Filali, then prime minister. The latter informs the king, who, after inquiring, quickly decides to put Haj Tabit out of harm’s way. Hassan II, using the incident to purge the police force, decides to entrust the case to a competing body, the royal gendarmerie, led by Housni Benslimane. On the second day of February 1993, without informing the police, a gendarmerie brigade raided Tabit’s apartment. The seized booty was invaluable: 118 videotapes involving more than 518 women and many key personalities of the political, media or financial world (one wonders today where those tapes are. Why was the notorious videotape No. 32 involving prominent political figures, which Tabit constantly demanded of the Court to view, not included in the minutes of the questioning?). His trial, which opens on 18 February, is marked by numerous vices of form. The man is going to be subjected to torture several times and witnesses of the time speak of “an expeditious trial where the commissioner was always summoned to be silent”.

On 15 March 1993, Mohamed Mustapha Tabit was sentenced to death for “indecent assault, defloration, rape with violence, abduction and sequestration of a married woman, acts of barbarism and incitement to debauchery”. Around thirty people are sentenced to various prison terms of up to 10 years. Faced with guns pointed at him, Tabit was saying: “I am condemned for things that everyone does. Except that the people who have been condemned with me have nothing to do with this story.” Two girls through that were presented as innocent students ensnared by Tabit were two young ladies, Sofia Bensouda and Loubna Kamouri Alami, who had a professional relationship with a certain M. F., a notorious pimp who supplied the big kahunas of Rabat in escorts. Despite their status as students at the faculty of medicine in Casablanca, the two girls were not unknown to the world of luxury prostitution. When the police officer showed the two girls videos and their client book, they were terrified and warned their pimp who put his protector, Ahmed Reda Gedira, chief counselor of the late King Hassan II in the loop. This is how actually the Tabit operation is now launched. Ahmed Ouachi, then commissary and chief of security in Casablanca, is punished for not “sanctioning his subordinate” although he had on several occasions addressed reports to the DGSN management to denounce Tabit. All of the defendants will benefit from a royal grace during the year 2000 except for Commissioner Abdeslam Bekkali who died during his detention.

Under the rule of Mohamed VI, two main stories of sex offenders made the news. Saad Lemjarred, a Moroccan popular singer, son of two famous Moroccan artists, was accused of rape in the US as well as in France. The Moroccan King Mohamed VI had awarded him with a prestigious decoration (wissam) and had personally followed his legal case, taking care of legal expenses and his lawyer was expedited to defend the singer. In 2010, he was prosecuted by a New York court for assault and rape. Released on bail before being tried, he took the opportunity to flee the American territory. In May of 2016, the artist was summoned by the Supreme Court of New York State to appear before it within 30 days, an injunction that he had not complied with. The Moroccan king had met him for about twenty minutes in a visit to France in May 2017 and Saad Lamjarred would have thanked the commander of the faithful for being interested in his case and having placed at his disposal the lawyer Eric Dupont Moretti. The Moroccan singer has no right to leave France. On conditional release, he must wear an electronic bracelet while awaiting his passage in court in the rape case against which he is accused of a 20-year-old woman.

Another case is that of the pedophile Daniel Galvan. The Galvan affair was a scandal caused by the liberation of Daniel Galvan Viña, a Spanish-born man born in Iraq, convicted of raping 11 children, aged between four and 15, in Morocco, and sentenced to 30 years in prison in 2011, then freed in 2013 as part of a collective grace in the name of good relations between Spain and Morocco. The King of Morocco, who then withdrew his grace, claimed to ignore the case. On August 2, at the time of the breaking of the fast, a sit-in of about a hundred residents starts in Rabat. The day after, demonstrations were held throughout the country. Two days later, the King withdrew his pardon, and later in the week talked to the families of the victims. The king declared that he had retracted his royal pardon “but the announcement came too late as Daniel Galvan Viña already left Morocco, reportedly on an expired passport, and was back in Spain. Despite the evolution of the scandal, what remained central to the outrage was that this was a decision sealed with the approval of the king, making direct criticism against the king inevitable”⁷.

It is very interesting to compare the sexual governance in Morocco under the two kings through notorious case studies presented above. With few exceptions, Sex was used as a disciplining mechanism under Hassan II while it was a mechanism of pardon under Mohamed VI. One wonders what makes severity the corollary of “abnormal” and criminal sexuality in one era and laxness its outcome in another era. Even when one explores the details of the microphysics of power in these three cases, one will find that in the cases of Saad Lemjarred and Daniel Galvan, the political power always used an argument of “lack of” (lack of proof in the case of Lemjarred and

lack of knowledge in the case of Daniel Galvan) meanwhile in the case of the police official Tabit the famous videotape jeopardizing the “elite” of Morocco indicates a political choice of presence rather than absence as a mode of governmentality⁸. The pornographic videotape in the case of the Moroccan police high officer becomes the equivalent of the Monica Lewinsky blue dress in the case of the US president sex-lover Bill Clinton. Today’s politics in Morocco, to continue the quick analogy with the American political scene, is more like that of Queer Hoover, the FBI’s genius⁹.

Bodies that Rule

We will expose here the use of the body and its parts in Moroccan politics but from the prism of the monarchy to see the different ways in which this central institution adapted (and this work assumes it does) to the use of the body by its dissenters. The central thesis in this work is that if Moroccan dissent uses a holistic approach of the body, meaning that it will posit the body as a whole with a “gathering” omnipotent performing power machine, the Moroccan Makhzen does not oppose to the latter a strategy of negating the body but rather constructs a compartmentalized idea of the body through the focus on - and the visibility of - body parts, that keep changing with each monarch. The question in this section will be: which body part goes with which king?

The king associated with Moroccan independence is Mohamed V who was an interesting figure as he ruled Morocco during the French protectorate but also during “independence”. The body part mostly associated with Mohamed V is the FACE. It was in 1955, right before “independence”, when the Moroccan people, under the influence of a collective hallucination or a real sighting, have seen the image of the king Mohammed V on the moon. It was customary then to diffuse everywhere postcards of Mohamed V by the Frenchman Marcellin Flandrin asking people to fix the image of the postcard long enough before watching the moon to see the king. With a mini optical effect and trickery, Moroccan people witnessed the “Baraka” of the king. There was a printer named Hayotte at the central street who had made a fortune by printing thousands of cartons at three points and fixing them well at nightfall, it was enough to look up and see Mohammed V sitting in full moon. Some movies started recently in Morocco to address this issue¹⁰. The trickster was none other than a faction of the Moroccan nationalist movement¹¹, probably too embedded in Goebbels propaganda, after he sultan exiled by the French, and the device was a picture of the king, a copy of his face. It is interesting that the “real” face of the sultan was searched through a copy of that face. It is interesting that many of the nationalists who were so eager to follow this script, like Abbas El Msaadi, found themselves later assassinated, not far from the same leviathan that they were trying to “moon”. Moroccan film producer Nabyl Lahlou came up with an interesting movie entitled “look at the king on the moon” in which he narrates, not without a twist that would require a pause on its own, this episode of Moroccan propaganda¹².

The Sun and Moon Allegory was used to image a medieval political theory that was espoused by the Roman Catholic Church, referencing the Book of Genesis imagery. The Allegory images authentic spiritual authority as the Sun and any civil, political or secular authority as the Moon. The Moon as dependent upon the Sun for any illumination, merely reflecting solar light and having no light without the Sun, can be another reading of the Mohamed V episode that the Moroccan nationalists wanted just as a head figure.

King Hassan II, who is the second longest ruling monarch in the Alaoui dynasty after Moulay Ismael, has his own body artefact: the RING. It is interesting here to recall the very intimate relationship that king Hassan entertained with the unseen (sorcery, magic....) although he often gave the image of a very modern playboy. Not far from Harry Potter, the Moroccan palace, under the Hassan II, had its wizards. A magician by the name of Lhaj Lahbib gained his stripes thanks to his legendary closeness to the deceased king. He himself had made the famous rosary and the ring

from which Hassan II never parted until the latter's weird disappearance after his death. Haj Lahbib's mini-mausoleum is today a place of contemplation in Tanalt, located some 200 km to the south of Agadir.

If the classical reading of the ring bestowing power on a monarch has been championed, one can, at the image of the first reversal of the conventional readings above, is to depict Hassan II as superman through his ring, one can recall here one of the most popular movies of the decade *Lord of the Rings* to operate an inversion of readings of the ring in the Hassan II episode. First, wizard Gandalf could not take the ring himself, since as a wizard he will wield too much power with it. So the first alternative reading here is "Hassan II is not a wizard" and also "Hassan II will not wield too much power". A third alternative reading is that "the king is not Frodo" because Frodo was carrying the ring without wearing it, except episodically. In the novel, Gollum bites off the finger on which Frodo is wearing the ring and falls, clutching the ring, into the lava below a cliff, while Frodo survives. The ring disappears into the sea of fire in the novel and disappears in Hassan II's funeral. Aragorn is crowned king so if we keep the parallel, the disappearance of king Hassan's ring will have another reading: "Mohamed VI is Aragorn."

King Mohammed VI did not use a body organ like his grandfather or a body accessory like his father (the organ representing the body in the first one and the magical extra representing omnipotence in the second) but introduced weakness as a variable of power in the same way in which Moroccan mystics chant "with weakness we have gained all power". In fact, King Mohammed VI appeared in July 2015 with a crutch in the Moroccan province of Mohammedia, where he initiated the construction work of a training complex. It was the second time that the king appears in crutch. In November 2012 in Nador, the Moroccans were astonished to see the sovereign walk painfully with a crutch, during an official activity. Unlike the two other examples, a limping king would come to use the body in a different way by having recourse to an "extra" synthetic body part. Like a cyborg, the "healing" and the "healed" are fused in monarchical politics. The strategic foxes that are constantly drawing the contours of the Moroccan political circus never cease to impress us. One should recall Shakespeare's Macbeth analyzing Scotland as a wild and savage place ruled by a weak king (Duncan) who trusts his warrior thanes. It is interesting to note that in Morocco, when we had an omnipotent king (Hassan II) relying on a fortifying gadget (the ring), there was much chatter about a very powerful minister of ministers (Driss Basri) who ruled over other ministers, meanwhile when Mohamed VI used the cane (a sign of a weak body) no person came to occupy that role¹³. Canes originated out of the male psyche, which connects carrying a stick with power. Kings carry scepters, since Merlin carried a wand and Moses used a staff to part the waves. Another important factor in reading the "cane" script is the intimate relationship that Morocco's current king has nurtured towards handicapped people and special needs in general since he was a crown prince. In light of his alignment with a fringe-weakened part of society, the king's appearance with a bodily "shortage" stops being a surprise. What is interesting here is that the dissenting discourse starts also using the special needs in crafting its rhetoric. Mohamed Alliouine, a Moroccan American dissident on a wheelchair sending fiery messages to Mohamed VI from the scene in front of the White house about political issues such as the Rif struggle. If the monarch uses disability as a ruling tactic, its opponents start using the same category to strip it from its "humanitarian" essence. Not only that weakness and disability become legitimate political categories in the screen of Moroccan politicians, but the "handicap" becomes a political category that finds its way to the Moroccan political sphere like when the former Moroccan Prime Minister Abdelilah Benkirane faced the famous "blockage" during months preceding his removal in forming a government. The solution of that blockage is in itself indicative of these bodily strategies. El Othmani, his rival and colleague in the PJD party, was chosen as a prime minister asked to form a government and the blockage disappears. This new prime minister is the cane that is supposed to heal, the extra gadget that operates in lieu of the original organ. To Zemzmi's organic carrot mentioned above, the Moroccan

leviathan opposes the orthopedic cane, a synthetic gadget supposed to communicate strength through weakness.

The body has gone a long way in Moroccan politics from being the exclusive domain of royalty to a conduit of resistance by the masses. The dialectic of power in Morocco between the monarch and his enemies - and this work assumes no popular consensus around the monarchy - has found the body and its artefacts at the center of Moroccan politics. From the whole to the parts, the strategies of power find themselves shifting. The nude has become an important category in Moroccan modern politics in the era of Mohamed VI specifically, first by using the erotic as a category to alienate Islamism and second by using it to strip rebellious forces of their symbolic power like the famous “leaked” video in which Nasser Zefzafi, the leader of the Rif social demands movement in 2017 who have been stripped from his clothes and questioned by the Moroccan authorities. This video shows the leader of the Rif protest exhibiting parts of his body, as to show that he was not tortured. Nudity comes, as Agamben states, after sin. It “presupposes the absence of clothing, but it does not coincide with it. The perception of nudity is linked to the spiritual act that the scriptures define as ‘the opening of the eyes’. Nudity is something that one notices, whereas the absence of clothes is something that remains unobserved.”¹⁴ Precisely, the video of Zefzafi was aiming at “opening the eyes” to a false reality, a dajjalic ones that masks excessive treatments. What is interesting here is the prevalence of theology because the instant that sparked Zefzafi’s arrest was his speech at the Friday sermon in a mosque, and the introduction of nudity was precisely to emphasize this theological element because it is linked, in Moroccan collective psyche, to the story in the Quran of Adam and Eve and their expulsion from Paradise. The sub-text of the leaked video of Zefzafi is nudity as a reminder of expulsion. Through the body, Moroccans have narrated a script of injustice and suffering, and their rulers have equally marked their territory in scripts that we need constantly to decipher in order to comprehend the dialectics of Moroccan bodily encounters.

Notes

¹ Foucault, Michel (1977). *Discipline and Punish: the Birth of the Prison*, New York: Random House, p.55

² <http://www.cuttingedge.org/news/n2293.cfm> accessed May 25 2017

³ <https://audioboom.com/posts/5217049-the-abduction-of-mehdi-ben-barka>

⁴ <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/death-on-the-costa-lifts-veil-on-moroccos-royal-court-544274.html>

⁵ <http://www.elmundo.es/elmundo/2004/08/23/espana/1093294353.html>

⁶ See Abdelilah Bouasria, “A CADA BAILARINA SU ZAPATEO: EL SUFISMO MARROQUÍ FRENTE AL MAKHZEN Y LA CONSTRUCCIÓN DE UNA POLÍTICA DEL MESTIZAJE” in *MODERNIDADES AFRICANAS: ENTRE EL EUROCENTRISMO, EL ISLAMISMO Y EL CAPITALISMO CONFUCIANO*, CLAUDIA BARONA CASTAÑEDA, MARCO ANTONIO REYES LUGARDO, INDIRA IASEL SÁNCHEZ, TEC de Monterrey, **Tirant humanidades**, Ciudad de México, 2017

⁷ <https://www.mamfakinch.com/mediums-of-outrage-curzios-political-cartoons-on-morocco/>

⁸ For a more elaborate analysis of this dynamic of Absence\Presence in Moroccan Politics, see Abdelilah Bouasria, *Sufism and Politics in Morocco: Activism and Dissent*, Routledge Studies in Middle Eastern Democratization and Government: 2017 (Paperback)

⁹ For more on that read Claire Potter’s *Queer Hoover: Sex, Lies, and Political History*, (2006). Division II Faculty Publications, Paper 21, <http://wescholar.wesleyan.edu/div2facpubs/21>

¹⁰ <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Kb6l15vWha0>

¹¹ <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5p2EfWEONwY>

¹² <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=E47At207QkA>

¹³ Some people might argue that Majidi or El Himma play that role but we are far from omnipotent executive figures like Oufkir, Dlimi or Basri.

¹⁴ Giorgio Agamben, *Nudities*, Stanford University Press: 2011, 58-59

Security, Migration and Refugees

Patricia Bauer

Mediterranean Security: New Trajectories after 2011

The Arab Spring not only set off trajectories of democratic change but also trajectories of intensified insecurity. Having triggered violent conflicts within MENA, it also led to a partly or full breakdown of state structures in several countries and thus prepared a fertile ground for a further flourishing of Islamist terrorism and migration throughout the region. The EU has since then refocussed on these complex security issues and has developed strategies intended to address a broad spectrum of root causes. Still, this topical thematisation of complex security issues stands in sharp contrast to a distinctly traditional risk analysis and catalogue of instruments for attending these issues found in the EU's strategy documents. This article provides an account of the problems of adjusting security thinking to the complex risks posed by terrorism and argues that the EU, despite confronting the most topical security issues in the Euro-Mediterranean region, migration and terrorism, until now has fallen short of developing an adjusted and comprehensive risk analysis that could instruct effective and cooperative security measures.

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Mediterranean Security: New Trajectories after 2011

Introduction

The Arab Spring has created manifold new challenges, not only for the Middle Eastern and North African (MENA) countries. The European Union (EU) as a direct neighbour of MENA has been impacted by the fundamental changes in the region, too. Although plenty of encouraging developments towards societal and political change take place in MENA, the destabilisation of existing government structures and the re-stabilisation of authoritarian systems both have contributed to a change in perception of the region. On the one hand, violent confrontations and failing states in Syria, Libya and Yemen have favoured the spreading of Daesh and other terrorist cells in Syria, Iraq, the Arab peninsula, Sinai, Libya and the Sahel whose ubiquitous attacks – together with the civil wars – contributed to the generation of refugee and migrant flows throughout MENA and into Europe. On the other hand, not only violent conflicts and terrorist activities but also peaceful demands for reform in MENA face persisting or restored authoritarian systems. These respond indiscriminately with restrictions of civic and civil society rights and repression of political opposition. Policing often makes no distinction between terrorist and protest activities, bolstered by states of emergency, raising frustration and injustice within societies, thus creating a fertile recruitment ground for terrorist groups.

These developments have also had their impact on the European Union with increased and uncontrolled streams of migrants from MENA seeking refuge and security from prosecution. Simultaneously, terrorist atrocities with Islamist background have spread from MENA to Europe. Consequently, the EU undertook a massive re-orientation of EU politics and policies, in particular in 2015 and 2016 with a clear focus on security. The reformulation of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) in 2015 (European Commission, 2015b) with a focus on security is embedded into accompanying EU policies on the *leitmotifs* of terrorism and migration the EU Agenda on Migration (European Commission, 2015a) and the EU Agenda on Security (European Commission, 2015c). The overarching framework of the EU's Global Strategy (High Representative, 2016) was consecutively adopted in 2016. Thus, the Arab Spring has triggered a security trajectory in EU politics. The security discourse established by this trajectory focusses on Islamist terrorism and migration and considers the Euro-Mediterranean region as central.

Security is a multi-faceted and highly contested term, traditionally taken to refer to the survival and safety of states and societies. Following the 1994 UNDP Human Development Report (UNDP 1994), and due to increasingly complex perception of inter- and transnational exchange and interconnectedness many scholars (see: Paris 2001, Dunne & Wheeler 2004, Glasius & Kaldor 2005, Flechtner 2006, Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy 2006, Kaldor 2007, Acharya 2011, Hampson 2012) have critically discussed and extended the concept of national security to a broader idea of human security. Whereas the first relies on the traditional national means of power to provide safety from aggression, the latter takes into account the manifold risks of human life and flags up development and aid policies as well as democratisation efforts as means to achieve a less risky global environment. The European Union, since its first Security Strategy of 2003 (Council of the European Union, 2003), has been leaning towards to a broader and human security oriented concept of security. Now focussing on the complex security issues of terrorism and migration, it continues to recognise a broad spectrum of root causes behind these security issues. Still, this topical thematisation of complex security issues stands in sharp contrast to a distinctly traditional risk analysis and catalogue of instruments for attending to these issues found in the EU's strategy documents.

This article argues that the EU, despite confronting the most topical security issues in the Euro-Mediterranean region, migration and terrorism, until date falls short of developing an adjusted and comprehensive risk analysis that could instruct effective and cooperative security measures. The article explores the pitfalls of the security dilemma put forward by terrorism and migration in the Euro-Mediterranean region. It reviews the state of play in political initiatives and contrasts these with an anatomy of the threat posed by terrorism and migration, thereby attempting to clarify the preconditions for reflection and decision-making on security issues when facing complex regional threat structures.

Conceptualising Security in the Euro-Mediterranean Region

The European Union's (EU) long-standing relations with its Southern Mediterranean neighbours (also called the MENA countries or MENA region) currently face increasing security challenges. The escalation of terrorist attacks and the refugee crisis associated with migration flows significantly dominate the security discourse inside the European Union since late 2014. The awareness of the constant possibility of new terrorist attacks on EU territory¹ strongly contributes to a general sentiment of insecurity.² Moreover, the Dublin regime was actually suspended by re-introduced border controls at the peak of the migrant and refugee flows during 2015. Though migration and refugee issues have different scope and normative substantiations, both are often mixed in the domestic discourses on security and Islamist terror. Furthermore, populist movements campaigning against open and liberal societies use terrorism and migration for advancing their xenophobic and neo-nationalist agendas throughout Europe.

In the southern Mediterranean, most states have seen themselves struggling with similar problems for a considerably longer time. Islamist terrorism had its first prominent appearance with the murder of the Egyptian President Anwar El Sadat in 1981. From that point on, Islamist movements were subject to state suppression in the Southern Mediterranean authoritarianisms.³ Additionally, the region's security landscape has been massively shaped by the Israel-Palestine conflict as a persistent issue of violence for the whole region since 1948. Also, migration from sub-Saharan Africa and Syria have afflicted the region for a good while.

The recent "securitisation" – as understood by Buzan (1991) and Wæver (1995) – of migration and refugee flows in the Mediterranean, and the perception by the EU of a ubiquitous terrorist threat have aligned the security perceptions of the Southern Mediterranean countries and the European Union. Considering the inter-regional and non-state character of currently prioritised security risks and threats, a cooperation between the Southern Mediterranean countries and the European Union would be the logical consequence. Sharing burdens to minimise risks and to fight threats effectively would contribute to a more resilient and sustainable Euro-Mediterranean security system. However, beyond speech acts in documents and at official events⁴, the EU's security activities can be characterised as incidental, emergency-driven and mainly unilateral. It can be doubted if the quality of security measures in place meet the substantial core of perceived security challenges. Concerning migration, rescue actions, fences, and deportations only fix symptoms but not the root causes of the problems, and coincidentally shift responsibilities and burdens to the Southern Mediterranean partner countries. As to countering terrorism, even a common definition of terrorism is missing, as are structured approaches to fight terrorist hot spots. Thus, the heightened awareness of migration and terrorism as the currently most important security issues stands in sharp contrast to the insufficiency of the problem-solving approaches.

There is some merit in the argument that the complex character of migration and terrorism as security issues in the Euro-Mediterranean region challenges our understanding of security, and consequently the political actors in the Euro-Mediterranean region, to provide adequate answers.

Conceptually, security is strongly connected to the nation state and its power as acting entity, even in approaches challenging classical realist positions (see Buzan & Wæver, 2003; Morgenthau, 1948; Keohane, 1984; Deutsch, 1954; Rosenau, 1966; Nye, 1968; Keohane & Nye, 2012; Wendt, 1992; Whitman, 1998; Mearsheimer, 2001; Owen, 2004) where the monopoly of violence is represented and exercised by the military and the police as instruments countering transgressions against the state. The security dilemma in international relations consequently consists of a spiral of state actions to provide security that end up in increased international arms races, tensions and higher security risks. However, this traditional, state-centered idea of international security is increasingly contested, both by trans-national and trans-regional terrorism that addresses sub-national entities and daily societal life, and large-scale migration that challenges understandings of identity and images of society. Both of these fundamentally challenge our understanding of security provision. The scenario of an adjusted security dilemma consequently does not consist of states only, but of states taking security provisions and non-state actors frustrating these measures by attacks below the threshold of state-owned means of violence.

In addition, the more security provisions and the tighter the grip on citizens, the more probable it will become that citizens will turn against the state. Thus, the hasty reactions to build military coalitions to fight terrorism in Syria, and to proclaim the state of emergency in several European as well as Southern Mediterranean countries raise the question whether police and military are the appropriate instruments for addressing these challenges. Insecurity on societal structures, future images of society, attacks on citizens and festival-goers are only partially manageable by the instruments of state power. On the contrary, citizens' rights to lead an undisturbed social life that is subject to protection of fundamental rights and non-interference by the state is at stake. Stricter security measures for public life, military on the streets and increased virtual surveillance and border controls mainly affect the freedoms of the citizens. Their usefulness for fighting terrorism and migration as security risks has not been proven, but in the case of authoritarian rule they support the repressive character of the state. In this perspective, existing responses on terrorism and migration establish a new security dilemma where security provisions result in less freedom for the citizens. Moreover, states enter a game of cat-and-mouse with human traffickers and terrorists without clear perspective of effectiveness of state measures.

Consequently, the complex character of risks and threats of terrorism and migration carry an enormous challenge when trying to properly define the security dilemma and the core of the threat, in order to develop appropriate answers. Although there might be a common understanding of terrorism and migration as security threats, from a security provision perspective it is far from clear what means will be used to counter which threat on what level. If conventional policing and the use of military only symbolically address the problem, what will be the appropriate means to counter the threats originating from terrorism and migration? Where the root causes of threats lie in deprivation, reduced chances in life, injustice, corruption and lack of freedom, military deterrence and threat as well as increased surveillance appear unsuitable. Hence, it seems highly advisable to develop a detailed analysis of the risk of terrorism and migration in order to identify the appropriate means to address them.

So far, the instrumental layout as well as the conceptual scope of security approaches are highly heterogeneous. First, European and Southern Mediterranean countries have security concepts with noticeably different scopes: Whereas the EU has developed a multifaceted security concept that encompasses human security components as well as economic security, as laid down in the European Security Strategy of 2003 (Council of the European Union, 2003) and in the recently approved Global Strategy (High Representative, 2016)⁵, the Southern Mediterranean countries have maintained a more traditional concept of national and military security. In fact, during the past decades, the Mediterranean served more as a dividing rule than a common ground when

conceptualising security for the different actors, and thus the European Mediterranean security region even lacks a common concept of security (Bauer, 2013). Second, the available instruments of military action strangely mismatch with guerilla-like or small committer group structures of modern terrorism. Military fighting of terrorism consequently is very limited and can only be effective where terrorism has a territorial base. Police surveillance has its limits in capacity and information flows. In terms of fighting migration, instruments of development aid unfold a more sustainable impact than policing and military. Third, the time framework of short-term vs. long-term effective instruments is another major challenge for tackling the root causes of terrorism and migration. Whereas the root causes of Islamic terrorism lie in the lack of opportunities in European as well as Southern Mediterranean societies due to authoritarian rule (in the South) and societal marginalisation (in the North), multi-layered development issues and manifest conflict situations are the main triggers for migration. All these issues need a medium- to long-term strategy to be addressed with instruments mainly relying on economic aid. These instruments are part of the long-standing development policies of European countries and the EU, but their vital role for security has not been included into security policies.

To conclude, the problems of conceptualising security in the Euro-Mediterranean region nowadays have to rely on a profound problem analysis that allows to re-construct an adequate security dilemma and to identify the appropriate instruments and their causal and timely priorities. In order to get a better insight, we will have a look into the recent developments in the Euro-Mediterranean relations and the recent reform of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) and contrast these with the nature of threat by terrorism and migration.

Security in Euro-Mediterranean Relations

Discussing the Euro-Mediterranean cooperation, it is worth noting that the discursive predominance of migration/refugee management and counter-terrorism strongly influence the balance between different objectives within the Euro-Mediterranean relations. Since its beginnings, the European relations with Arab and Southern Mediterranean countries work on the basis of an inherent tension between value-based and interest-based objectives (Attinà, 2003). Structural patterns of cooperation are dominated by the normative recommendations of the European Union concerning democratisation, good governance, respect for human rights and the rule of law towards authoritarian-ruled partner countries. But at the same time the promotion of economic opening and liberalisation of markets as well as collaboration in the security sector have been prominent interests of the European Union (Bauer, 2015; Hinnebusch, 2015). Asymmetric achievements in the different sectors have consequently attracted manifold criticisms of the ineffectiveness of the EU in democracy promotion (Cavatorta & Pace, 2010; Pace, 2009). While the Arab Spring provided the starting point for a highly optimistic democratisation agenda of the EU in 2011 by flagging up a “Partnership for Democracy and Shared Prosperity” (European Commission & High Representative, 2011), the setbacks and regressions since then have led to a busy string of reformulations of the neighbourhood policy (European Commission, 2013; European Commission & High Representative, 2012, 2013, 2014). For the time being, this resulted in a reform document published in late 2015 that for the first time strongly emphasised the security dimension of the Euro-Mediterranean relations (European Commission & High Representative, 2015).

Concerning the domestic conditions in the Southern partner countries, the Arab Spring set off a revolutionary wave of demonstrations and protests in the Arab world, starting on 18 December 2010, which forced authoritarian rulers to leave power in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, and Yemen. Additional uprisings occurred in Bahrain and Syria, with the latter escalating into full-scale civil war. A number of countries have also seen serious protests, ranging from Algeria, Iraq, Jordan, and Kuwait, to Morocco. While some observers early in the protests had drawn comparisons between

the Arab Spring and the Revolutions of 1989 in Eastern Europe, the disenchantment with reactionary powers (in Egypt), authoritarian learning (in Morocco and Jordan), civil war (in Syria), state failure (in Libya) relate to a more pessimistic assessment of the achievements of the Arab Spring. In short, the Arab Spring protests have added cracks to authoritarian systems in the region, but only Tunisia ended up on a volatile pathway of transition to democracy. In other countries, political rule as well as security deteriorated and nourished terrorist movements as well as uncontrolled migration and refugee streams throughout the Euro-Mediterranean region (Asseburg & Wimmen, 2016; Cammack & Muasher, 2016; Seeberg, 2015). Moreover, terrorist atrocities help legitimate the suppressive measures against political opposition in learning authoritarianisms (Heydemann & Leenders, 2011) and thus contribute to the stabilisation of authoritarianism in the Southern Mediterranean region.

In the context of these turbulent developments, the reformed ENP's emphasis on stability and security appears as a consistent framework for the Euro-Mediterranean relations. Although far from being suspended, more value-oriented topics of cooperation like democratisation, good governance and human rights currently play a subordinate role compared to the objective of the stabilisation of the region. The High Representative of the EU, Federica Mogherini, explained the rationale of the ENP as follows:

"We are confronted with threats that are global and have to be tackled by the international community in a united way. We have to build together a safer environment, try to solve the many crises of our common region, support the development and the growth of the poorest areas, and address the root causes of migration." (European Commission, 2015b)(European Commission 2015)

Hence, concrete measures on counter-terrorism and migration/refugee management are in line with the recent reform of ENP. Not only is the EU's refugee deal with Turkey (Chatham House, 2016) an example for the re-arrangement of EU objectives, but also the persistently good relations to the various authoritarian regimes in the region. The EU's reformed Mediterranean agenda in the ENP thus speaks a clear language of "Realpolitik", primarily committed to tackle terrorism and migration/refugee issues as rooted in its Southern neighbourhood. Due to the very mixed and distressing fallout of the Arab Spring, this realist turn might best tackle both problem complexes that have gained enormous momentum for the EU: On the one hand, the various changes of the political landscape of the Arab world by revolutions, upheavals, and civil wars and on the other hand the persistence of authoritarian structures in many parts of the region.

The EU's ambition to focus on security and migration in the context of the Euro-Mediterranean region established as a political goal since the civil war in Syria and the breakdown of Libya have set off migration flows to the EU (Frontex Risk Analysis Unit, 2017). The dissolution of government control in parts of Syria, Libya and in parts of Egypt's Sinai also fostered the thriving of Daesh and the many associated Islamist terror cells, exporting terror to Europe or serving as examples for terrorist mobilisation inside Europe. Although the problems migration/refugees and terrorism pose for politics in Southern Mediterranean as well as European countries are very similar, effective cooperation is still a challenge: Refugee flows as well as terrorism are by definition transboundary problems. The territorial limitations of nation states in national security issues and the increasing trend of abstention of EU member states from common EU solutions in migration issues thus constitute major obstacles to tackle the problems adequately. Within the European Union, cooperation on terrorism and migration is embodied in EuroPol and Frontex. Both agencies have very limited authority and rely on cooperation with the EU member states and third countries.

Euro-Mediterranean Challenges by Terrorism

Terrorist attacks in the Euro-Mediterranean region since 2014 have been motivated mainly by Islamist extremism. The most prominent common reference point for terrorists in Europe and the Arab countries is Daesh in Syria and Iraq, with additional branches in the Maghreb and in Libya. Simultaneously, diverse factions of al-Qaida and associated terror cells are continuing to be active not only in Pakistan and Afghanistan but also in the Sinai, the Sahel and in Syria. More loosely connected terror groups, spread as far as Mali and Nigeria in sub-Saharan Africa, identify with Daesh too. Daesh is a product of two historical developments, first, the downfall of Saddam Hussein, the defeat and subsequent dissolution of his army from 2003 on, and, second, the civil war in Syria in the wake of the protests of the Arab Spring. By the establishment of Daesh, Islamist terrorism has reached a new stage of ubiquity in the Euro-Mediterranean region. A first feature is the non-determined territory and target. Whereas the violent arm of the Muslim Brotherhood, the Hisbollah, and the Taliban targeted regimes in the Middle East in their immediate proximity with an agenda of regime change, Daesh thrives as an umbrella for attacks against subjectively ascribed non-Islamic lifestyles throughout the Euro-Mediterranean region. Main features are the adaptation of a fundamentalist ideology and simple and easy-to-access armament. The targeting of public gathering spaces makes it very difficult to identify perpetrators and to prevent attacks. The string of attacks now stretches from Paris, Brussels, Würzburg, Berlin and London to Sousse, Cairo, the Sinai, and Iraq. Hence, Islamist terrorism has extended its threat potential by the extension of its sphere of action and the incalculability of the location of a next strike.

Since the Charlie Hebdo attack in Jan 2015 in Paris, consecutive atrocities have more and more disconnected themselves from a clear image of the adversary. Remembering al-Qaida's targets of 9/11 in 2001, the New York Twin Towers were targeted as symbols of Western capitalist lifestyle and the Pentagon as centre of warfare of the US, the anti-model of Islamist ideas of the state. With Charlie Hebdo, a determined form of satirical magazine representing the freedom of the press in Western societies became object of Islamist terrorists. The causal connection between the claimed insult of Islam by Charlie Hebdo's caricatures and the Islamist attack on the editorial office might have made sense to the assaulters, and works in a similar way as the aggression on a Jewish kosher supermarket on the same day (Minkmar, 2015). The following attacks – just to list a few: in Sousse and Paris 2015, Brussels and Würzburg 2016, London and Cairo 2017, see the full scale: (Foster, 2017; The Guardian, 2015) – loosen the causal chain of between justification and actual attack. Even when common sense deeming this unacceptable and misled, the causal reasoning why certain targets have been selected has become impossible to follow since the only reason is what an individual attacker chooses to be manageable by him or her. This “free-style” terrorism only needs the “othering” of the majority by the attacker and is thus more robust since it is accessible for less well-trained committers and difficult to foresee for police forces.

Another important feature of this form of terrorism is its low-tech character. Shooting from moving cars or from motorcycles with AK47's resembles more a 1930s Chicago mafia method than an elaborated plan of action. The trend to even simpler axe and knife attacks, and using cars and vans as weapons does not even require the acquisition of illegal explosives or weapons. In every case, simple weapons are easy to obtain and to handle. This low-tech feature of more and more atrocities is in sharp contrast to the advanced means of recruitment and communication used by terrorist groups in the 1970s and 1980s. Islamist terrorism is thriving amongst young Muslim people regardless of region who are heavily attracted especially to Daesh's concept of terrorism. Since 2014, an increasing number of young people not only from Arab countries but also from Europe have been traveling to Syria and Iraq to join Daesh. This new form of recruitment has been highly efficient since it feeds off the recent technological state of the art in communication. This implies that recruitment is no longer bound to face-to-face communication at a certain location but

is substituted by all modern forms of social networks and communication. Not only recruitment profits from such network-based forms of communication and leads to a nearly never-ending string of fresh recruits for Daesh. Electronic communication is also used for counselling. The German police found out that the axe attacker in a German train close to Würzburg received advice by SMS until very briefly before the attack. Interestingly, the sender was located in Saudi-Arabia, which supports the argument that networks and communication are de-localised and work over long distances.

The formation of Euro-Mediterranean terrorist networks is also due to the fact that in many parts of the region young people have not the best prospects. The recruitment of young people seems to be inversely related to their societal perspectives. The resumes of many young terrorists have been affected by histories of petty crime and drug dealing, a hint that certain groups of society might be more vulnerable than others for recruitment. Recently, more attackers seemingly have used the uncontrolled migration influx into Europe to unfold their activities. The mix of deprivation due to lacks of expectation in their home countries, traumatisation by war and violence (in particular in the case when refugees are recruited) and the promise of personal significance seemingly create a strong incentive for young Muslims. Moreover, the entangled situation of huge amounts of migrants and refugees coming to Europe and the forms of recruitment of terrorists have helped to build up structures of terrorist activities that use the gaps of surveillance and lacks of counter-terrorism exchange and control in Europe to carry out attacks.

European countries like France, Belgium and Germany have responded to these challenges by expanding their national security measures, bringing more police and military on the streets and intensifying border controls. Nevertheless, the exchange of national authorities on active networks is at a very early stage, and the collection of information is spread within different national authorities. At the time of writing, Europol exchange is still rudimentary, and in the Mediterranean, Frontex is more engaged in humanitarian action than in proper border control. Steps towards cooperating with Libya's coast guard for tracking down human traffickers, and gaining support for a treatment of migrants in MENA that follows human-rights standards have not been implemented yet – also due to the fact that Libya is not a functioning state. In varying coalitions, European countries have also taken part in the military activities to fight Daesh in Syria and Iraq, which seems to have led to a rollback of Daesh's territorial scope. However, Syria remains the bone of contention between Western countries and Russia with a solution to the war far from being agreed.

In Arab countries, the situation is different to the European one: the security forces of Jordan, Egypt, Algeria and Morocco, for example, have increasingly been labelling political opposition as terrorist movements (Abdel-Baky, 2016). On the background of experiences with the Muslim Brotherhood and its different branches in other Muslim countries as well as non-religious youth protest movements that have led to the upheavals of the Arab Spring, authoritarian regimes apparently have “learnt” that it helps to criminalise opposition activities. In combination with the economic downturn after the Arab Spring and the diminishing chances of employment for young people (‘The Arab winter’, 2016), the potential for protest as well as terrorist mobilisation increases. Consequently, in most Arab countries “... it has become harder to find a job and easier to end up in a cell.” (‘The ruining of Egypt’, 2016). Even in Tunisia, supposedly on its delicate pathway to democracy, the Daesh recruitment per capita is the highest in the Arab world (Gall, 2017; Taylor, 2016). This fact supports the thesis that deprivation and traumatisation by exposure to violence play a major role in recruitment. The tough reaction of Arab countries by new legislation, military trials for civilians and indiscriminate arrests so far have not proven fruitful. Moreover, terrorist networks have established themselves in parts of Arab countries. Aside from Syria and Iraq, in Egypt, the police and military are leading a “war against terrorism” on the Sinai Peninsula to regain full control of the state territory where different al-Qaida and Daesh cells are active. Parts

of the Libyan territory are controlled by Daesh, dispersing over the border to Tunisia. Algeria is confronted with the impact of the situation in Mali and the Daesh in the Sahel branch. In addition to these more recent transboundary terrorist groups, Arab regimes have to tackle security challenges from long established merely national resistance: for example, Hisbollah in Lebanon, Islamist groups in Algeria and Shia groups on the Arab peninsula.

Thus, the situation in Arab countries is even more complex and volatile than in Europe, and many of their problems have begun spilling over to Europe. The dynamics unfolded, especially by Daesh, created highly delocalised threats due to the fact that the civil war in Syria and the falling apart of Libya have created new spaces of manoeuvre for terrorist movements. Even concerning more conventional problems, the account is not encouraging: Any solution for Syria is blocked by the discord of Russia and the West, and the fragmentation of Libya's territory is not actively approached by an international initiative either. In a nutshell, the fight against terrorism in the Euro-Mediterranean region is highly fragmented. European countries have no established procedures to cooperate on counter-terrorist measures or investigations. The Arab countries, much heavier affected by terrorism, only sporadically cooperate with European countries (as witnessed after the Sousse attacks in Tunisia) and have no established structures for cooperating with each other. Although commitment to counter-terrorism is a high priority throughout the Euro-Mediterranean region, counter-terrorist performance lags far behind its objectives.

Challenges by Migration and Refugees

In international relations, migration and refugees have been seen as a humanitarian challenge for a long time. The persistent flow of migrants from Syria, MENA in general and sub-Saharan Africa and Afghanistan through the Mediterranean area to Europe is a challenge that has raised the highest EU attention since 2015. According to the UN refugee agency, in 2016, 5,000 people have lost their lives trying to cross the Mediterranean. It is likely that the true figure of fatalities is even higher, as many deaths are not recorded. Whereas rescue actions by the EU and NGOs has been in place for about ten years, the political and security impact of migration and refugees has been flagged up only since 2015. In its Agenda on Migration (European Commission, 2015a), the European Union couples the humanitarian aspect with issues of border control and border security, and criminal aspects of human trafficking. The most interesting development is the outspoken security component the Agenda on Migration opens up:

“... migration will become a specific component of ongoing Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) missions already deployed in countries like Niger and Mali, which will be strengthened on border management.” (European Commission, 2015a: 5)

This means that migration and refugee issues are now subject to the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), and the efforts not only target the neighbouring MENA countries but the “neighbours of the neighbours”, too. By addressing the neighbours of the neighbours, the EU mingles refugee/migration issues, traditionally an issue of Justice and Home Affairs, with CSDP and development policy. For the instrumental equipment, this promises interesting constellations where military training for border control can be combined with traditional aid policy. The European Union has not yet published a rationale of what instrument should be employed for which challenge. Here, the security problem of migration is even more blurred than the terrorist issue. On the one hand, illegal migration is an issue of European law enforcement, on the other; the European Union mainly stresses the criminal activities of human traffickers as target for EU action. In addition, migration is treated in a framework of EU aid policy where aid seemingly is understood as upgrading of circumstances of life and economic support as well as enforced policing and border control.

Concerning the MENA region, many root causes for migration are similar those of terrorism: The breakdown of Libya made it obvious that the authoritarian regime of Muammar ElGhadafi played the role of a buffer for the European countries. Hence, the fragmentation of Libya created a massive problem of controlling the southern routes of migration to Europe. The Libyan route, also known as the Central Mediterranean Route, is, to date, together with the Eastern Mediterranean Route, the most frequented pathway through the Mediterranean (Frontex Risk Analysis Unit 2017, 18 ff.). Efforts by the EU to encourage the formation of an effective coast guard in Libya have not been successful so far. The biggest root cause for illegal migration to the EU is the refugee crisis created by the civil war in Syria. Though, refugee and humanitarian problems first hit Syria's neighbours, like Lebanon, Jordan, and Turkey, displacement of Syrians currently is the dominant problem in the Euro-Mediterranean region. The huge amounts of refugees absorbed in Lebanon, Jordan and Turkey put up challenges for society and economy. With the opening of the Balkans route to Europe, Austria, Germany, Denmark and Sweden got a taste of these challenges. The uncontrolled influx of refugees led to a de facto suspension of the EU's Dublin agreement and Schengen regime. The political split inside the European Union about amounts and distribution of refugees has provoked cracks in the European integration process in general. Due to a missing common denominator on the treatment of refugees and migrants, the EU countries have re-nationalised the subject. Consequently, the influx of refugees is so far limited by the national measures of the countries along the Balkans route, typically by closing their borders. The securitisation of migration and refugees experienced an additional spin by the fact that terrorists moved from Europe to training camps in the Middle East and back as well as inside the European Union. Thus, migration and terrorism are drawn into the discourse on the freedom of movement that has been led within the EU. In this perspective, migration contributes to the threat deriving from terrorism and freedom of movement. As a consequence, this argument, again, ends up in recommendations for national security measures, like empowerment of the police by upgraded armament and staffing, constraints of civil liberties (in particular, surveillance of communication) and harder laws for foreigners (tagesschau.de, 2016).

The violent fallout of the Arab Spring and the migration flows in their aftermath have provoked the securitisation of migration. This is best represented by the multifarious approach of the European Union: the instrumental scale encompasses humanitarian and development aid as well as security trainings in third countries. The complexity of the EU policy makes it very difficult to identify the security risks and thus conclude on concrete measures. As far as migration and terrorism are interfering, the security dimension of the issue appears with a clearer layout. When it comes to measures on non-security relevant migration, the statements of the EU become more sketchy and inconcrete. This points on the general problem of securitising migration. An adequate treatment of the problem of migration beyond security issues is not offered by the concepts of the EU.

Conclusion

This article explored the conceptual problems of the security trajectories set off by the Arab Spring. The topical issues in the Euro-Mediterranean region are terrorism and migration. Both issues have witnessed a massive securitisation discourse during the last five years. Consequently, a political adaptation of risk analysis should bolster the measures to address these problems. Since terrorism and migration address societies and not states, an adjustment of the central security dilemma instructing the actions would be in order. Consequently, a political adaptation of risk analysis should bolster the existing measures to address these problems. The exploration shows that it is quite demanding to move reflection away from the state's means of power and as a consequence adjust the instrumental approach. The history of existing initiatives shows that the European Union has taken new challenges into account but never abandoned traditional security

thinking. Although the EU works on a broad approach of security, encompassing development and human dimensions, its instruments represent a quite traditional understanding of how security can be provided. In particular, the conventional forms of policing and military engagement the European Union falls short of a credible and effective approach to match and fight the obscure structures of terrorism. In the case of migration, the enhanced securitisation of the subject deserves fundamental criticism. A core of threat or risk is difficult to identify, and only matches security-relevant aspects when conflated with terrorist activities very few migrants actually engage in. A major challenge for any strategies based on seeing terrorism and migration as security issues lie in the consequences of badly adapted instruments for civil and human rights. Virtually all government measures intended to counter terrorism strongly affect welfare, freedom and human rights of citizens to some degree. Whereas military intervention against Daesh obviously affects the population in the targeted areas, police surveillance of citizens and other measures challenges fundamental rights, and similarly, treating protesters indiscriminately as terrorists in MENA countries and exposing them to police violence not only affects their rights but also fuels resentment, resistance, and in some cases, the very terrorism these measures were originally intended to fight. In conclusion, it has become clear that the instrumental approaches currently favoured both by the EU and the MENA countries represent highly inadequate responses to the level of complexity and security risks raised by terrorism and migration.

Notes

¹ For an overview on Islamist motivated atrocities on European soil since 2014 (starting in May 2014 in Brussels/Belgium and finding its preliminary end with the attacks in Barcelona/Spain and Turku/Finland in August 2017, see the Wikipedia article on “Islamic terrorism in Europe (2014–present)” on: [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Islamic_terrorism_in_Europe_\(2014–present\)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Islamic_terrorism_in_Europe_(2014–present))

² Official risk assessments in the EU do little to dissuade such sentiments. One example is the UK Foreign Office’s ranking of 43 different countries under high risk of terrorist attacks. This list includes Belgium, France and Germany amongst the top 15 countries with “high” terror risk (Guardian, 15 July 2016).

³ For an extensive discussion on Arab authoritarian rule see: Heydemann 2007, Heydemann & Leenders 2011, Schlumberger 2007, Albrecht 2012, Volpi 2013, Hinnebusch 2014.

⁴ As *pars pro toto*, see the webpage of the European Union External Action Service on MENA that assembles a busy line of activities on Tunisia, young people in the Mediterranean, the Syrian war, the situation in Libya, the Middle East conflict, and more (see European External Action Service, 2017).

⁵ For a detailed critical analysis of the EU Global Strategy of 2016 see Selchow, 2016; Smith, 2016.

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Mohammed Yachoulti

Syrian Refugees in Morocco: Realities and Prospects

Despite the absence of official figures, UNHCR-Morocco claims that 1,763 Syrians (453 families) were registered in Morocco as asylum seekers in 2015. In fact, this number does not represent all the Syrian refugees in Morocco who have entered the country illegally across the border with Algeria. For some Morocco is seen as a major jumping-off point to reach European shores, while for others it is a final destination. In both cases, Syrian refugees- like other undocumented communities – live in precarious conditions and face many problems. This fact makes Morocco susceptible to both local and international criticism. Given the inchoate nature of the Moroccan state, its changing profile of migration, its growing importance in managing refugees in particular and irregular migrant community in general, the pressure of civil society concerned with the migration issue, the daily tragedy of migrant deaths in the Mediterranean Sea, this paper attempts to investigate the problems facing these refugees after Morocco's regularization program of 2014. The focus is mainly on issues related to registration, integration, support and the lack of national asylum systems consistent with international standards. Based on interviews with documented and undocumented Syrian refugees, civil society actors, government officials and stakeholders, this paper argues and recommends that the Moroccan government, stakeholders and UNHCR should work together for the sake of developing fair and efficient legislative and administrative frameworks for these refugees. This should be complemented by preparing infrastructure for new emergencies.

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Syrian Refugees in Morocco: Realities and Prospects

Introduction

Since its independence in 1956, Morocco has emerged as one of the world's leading emigration countries. Up to 4.5 million Moroccan emigrants are dispersed all over the world, especially in Europe (De Haas, 2005). This process of migration has undergone diverse changes over time. Its dynamics, being internal or external, have usually responded to national and international socio-economic and political imperatives (Sadiqi & Ennaji, 2004) and has always been characterized by a diversity of motivations and destinations. While Morocco has been a country of emigration throughout most of the twentieth century, this profile began to change in the 1990s when sub-Saharan immigration to Morocco began to increase. The frequent civil wars and subsequent economic recessions in several sub-Saharan African countries, in addition to the political turmoil and instability in some other North African countries, have made Morocco a safe haven for many immigrant communities. Some use Morocco as a point of transit to Europe, while others have found it easier to stay and reside in Morocco.

The Arab spring, in its turn, has had a great impact on the migration profile in Morocco. Indeed, it has become a destination of refugees from the Arab countries that have witnessed conflicts and the political unrest in the beginning the early spring of 2011 within the context of the Arab Spring. For example, Morocco has become a target destination for many Syrians seeking protection from the hell of war. For some, like the case of more than 40 000 Sub-Saharan migrants, Morocco is seen as a major jumping-off point to reach European shores while for others, it is a final destination despite the obstacles and struggles they face to start over. This paper aim is to investigate the problems facing the Syrian refugees, namely after Morocco's regularization program of 2014. The focus on Syrian refugees is motivated by three reasons. First, unlike irregular Sub-Saharan Migrants, Syrian refugees have always been protected against deportation in Morocco. In other words, the government is offering its territory as a haven for this migrant population even if they have entered or are staying on Moroccan soil illegally. Second, whether documented or not, Syrian refugees are found everywhere, mainly in big cities. Their life is determined by a daily routine; they have favored locations and schedules for begging and usually brandishing their passport as a testament to refugee status. Finally, since the beginning of the Syrian conflict, Morocco has been one the few Arab countries which has adopted a humanitarian approach by regularizing the status of more than 5000 of Syrian refugees in 2015. Therefore, the aim is to look at what Morocco has done or prepared to help these refugees and what obstacles they still face on its soil, namely after the 2014 regularization program.

Indeed, this paper is part of a larger research project on refugees in Morocco. The field work of this project is still a work in process. For the purpose of this paper, I have relied on data collected through interviews with Syrian refugees in the Fez-Meknes region. I have interviewed 22 Syrian refugees living in the region of Fez-Meknes; one of whom is an undocumented male. The respondents included 15 women, two children and five men. The questions concerned personal stories and accounts of their journey to Morocco in general, their living conditions before and after the regularization program, their status in Morocco after being documented, the obstacles they face and their future prospects. The next phase in the whole research project is to conduct more interviews with Syrians living in other regions of Morocco to see if there are other perspectives and obstacles. I will also conduct interviews with civil society actors working with migrants and refugees, and government officials and stakeholders concerned with this issue of migration and asylum seeking to find some answers to the problems and obstacles these Syrian refugees face and why the issue of refugees and asylum seekers is still problematic in Morocco.

In addition to the interviews I have conducted, I used reports prepared by national and international bodies and institutions concerned with the situation of migrants in general, and Syrian refugees in particular. These reports are of two types. The first type are the periodical reports prepared by UNHCR-Morocco on the status of Syrian refugees after 2014 regularization program. The second type are the parallel reports prepared by national and international civil society actors submitted to the United Nations Human Rights Committee on human rights on the sixth periodic report of Morocco on the implementation of international covenant on civil and political rights in September 2016. I have looked mainly at the Amnesty International report submitted November 2016, the joint report prepared by a group of human rights organization, which is submitted and coordinated by “*Organisation Marocaine des Droits Humain*” (Moroccan Organization of Human Rights) submitted on 19 December 2016¹, the report submitted by the “*Conseil national des droits de l’homme*” (National Council of Human Rights - CNDH) on 20 September 2016 and the report submitted by the “*Coordination Maghrébine des Organisations des Droits Humains*” (Maghreb Co-ordination of Human Rights Organizations) on 17 September 2016². I have also used recommendations and concluding observations of the human right committee of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights on the sixteenth report of Morocco published on 16 September 2016.

Apart from the introduction and conclusion, the paper is organized in four sections. The first section is a review of literature on refugees in Morocco. The aim of this section is to investigate the existing literature on refugees in general and Syrians in particular in Morocco. The second section traces the existence of refugees in Morocco before the 2014 regularization program. The objective behind this exercise is to trace Morocco’s tradition and policies of hosting refugees. The third section provides notes on the 2014 regularization program with the aim of narrating the story of the program and identifying both its criteria and beneficiaries. The last section lists the main findings and conclusions of the paper.

Literature Review on Refugees in Morocco

Within the migration-asylum nexus, a difference is usually made between migrants who have fled their country due to war, violence, and torture and migrants who are migrating due to bad economic living conditions in their country of origin. To this end, the fear of being persecuted or tortured in the land of origin is what distinguishes a refugee from other migrants. This is made clear in the definition provided by the 1951 *Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees*. According to the second part of Article 1 of the Convention, a refugee is a person who “owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country....”

By the same token, the Convention of the African Unity (AU), hereafter referred to as the ‘AU Convention’³, which is supplementary to the Refugee Convention, states the following:

“The term ‘refugee’ shall also apply to every person who, owing to external aggression, occupation, foreign domination or events seriously disturbing public order in either part or the whole of his country of origin or nationality, is compelled to leave his place of habitual residence in order to seek refuge in another place outside his country of origin or nationality” (African Union Convention. Article 2).

The difference between the two conventions is that in order to be a refugee under the Refugee Convention, one has to have personally experienced persecution in one’s home country and the state failed to protect the person. The AU Convention, on the other hand, includes people who fled

war or other violence in their home country, not specifically directed to a person or specific group of which the individual is a member. In Morocco, the UNHCR uses the AU Convention as a supplementary to the Refugee Convention. This enables UNHCR to support refugees who fled because of war and conflict, not explicitly directed at them personally. Following the same perception, this paper uses the definition adopted by UNHCR in Morocco as it is more inclusive and suited to the Syrians living in Morocco.

Literature and field research on the legal, economic or social problems faced by refugees in general, and Syrian ones in particular, in Morocco are scarce if not absent. Actually, the existing writings are limited to a few documents published by United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (known as UNHCR) or reports drafted and released by some national and international civil society groups. This may be attributed to three factors. First, though it is an old phenomenon in Morocco, the phenomenon of refugees and asylum seekers has always been very limited, as the political atmosphere in the neighboring countries has continuously determined it. Second, nowadays, given the increasing flows of migrants because of political and economic instability both regionally and internationally, as well as the intensification of border controls, the boundaries between irregular migrants and refugees are not well established, as both use the same routes and networks to access Morocco. Finally, Moroccans are not used to the concept of refugees as there has never been a refugee camp neither in the country nor nearby⁴. Therefore I did not include the camps in Algeria because the definitions provided in this paper do not apply on that category of people living in those camps. Further, most of the returnees to Morocco are living peacefully and hold positions in the public sector. Some of them served or still serve as governors. The limited number of refugees⁵ who live in Morocco live in cities like Rabat, Sale and Casablanca with Moroccans and other migrants. Added to this, since the early 2000s and because of the fear of attracting more refugees, the Moroccan authorities have always refused to acknowledge the existence of refugees on Moroccan soil.

However, despite the absence of literature and field research on this type of migrant population in Morocco, refugees from different corners of the world, usually fleeing wars and personal persecutions, have always sought shelter and protection in Morocco. The subsequent section will trace and investigate this fact.

Refugees in Morocco before 2014

Despite the changes that have occurred in the last couple of decades, Morocco has a long tradition of hosting refugees. The first king of Morocco Moulay Idriss I was a refugee who fled the Abbasid persecutions. He found asylum in Morocco around 788 A.D. Similarly, the country has received several Jewish and Muslim communities expelled from Europe and Andalusia in the 14th century (Elmadmad, 2004). Later, “during the 19th and 20th centuries, Morocco has been a country of asylum for Algerians escaping from French occupation, for Spanish fighting against the Franco regime and for many European citizens escaping persecution in the socialist countries of the Eastern Europe” (Ibid p. 101).

Since the mid-1990s, however, the face of migration in Morocco has been changing. More specifically, the country has experienced a growing number of new arrivals from Sub-Saharan Africa, namely from regions which suffer armed conflicts and human rights abuses like Ivory coast, Nigeria, Mali and the Democratic Republic of Congo. The country has also received refugees from Palestine, Iraq and Syria but their numbers have always remained limited.

Throughout history, the policy of asylum in Morocco has been based on Moroccan hospitality and the Islamic law of asylum and customs of receiving aliens. In Islam, following *Aya*

6 of *Surah AT-Tawba* (Repentance Chapter)⁶, forced migrants who are in need of protection should be granted protection (refuge or asylum) if they seek it. Specifically, *Aya* 6 of the chapter encourages Muslims to offer protection to non-Muslim asylum seekers or escort them to where they can feel or be safe as a way of introducing them to Islam.

In addition to being an Islamic country, Morocco has passed laws and ratified international conventions relating to refugees and their rights. The first law in this regard is the law on civil conditions of foreigners passed in 1913, during the French colonial rule. The law considered refugees as “favored foreigners” that needed special treatment (Li Rosi & Ryan, March 2010). Following its independence in 1956, Morocco has not only signed but also ratified all the major international and regional legal instruments relating to refugees and human rights. On 7 November 1956, Morocco signed the 1951 Geneva Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and subsequently ratified the associated 1967 New York Protocol on 20 April 1971. It also ratified the 1969 Organization for African Unity Convention governing the specific aspects of refugee problems in Africa and signed other international human rights treaties, which articulate a respect for refugee rights⁷.

On 29 August 1957, the government passed the decree no. 2.57.1256 governing refugee affairs and established the Bureau of Refugees and Stateless Persons (known in French as “Bureau des réfugiés et des apatrides” - BRA). This set out terms of application of the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and dealt with the problem of Algerian refugees. The BRA was put under the authority of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to assist and protect refugees. By means of the decree, the office provides asylum according to the premises of 1951 Convention and its 1967 Protocol, and issues refugees with what is necessary for them to assume civil life (i.e. identification papers and permits to reside and work on Moroccan territory). The decree further created an Appellate Authority (Commission de Recours) to re-examine rejection of requests for asylum. The Authority is chaired by the Minister of Justice and consists of representatives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the UNHCR, and the BRA. However, in 2004, the BRA was closed down and so has the legal procedure to process asylum application and grant refugees a refugee status. It was not until September 2013 that the office was reopened as the first stage in implementing the King's instructions for a new immigration policy. During this period, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees has been the sole agency to recognize refugees as such and to distinguish them from asylum seekers and other migrants. But the recognition of refugee status by UNHCR has no official weight for Moroccan national authorities as they do not automatically get a stay permit from the Moroccan authorities and don't benefit from all rights normally associated with the refugee status of the 1951 Geneva Convention. To note, “refugees recognised as such prior to the decision to suspend the activities of the BRA have been able to get residence permits and enjoy the right to stay, the right to work, and a number of other economic and social rights” (Ibid, p.18).

In 2003, a new law regulating the entry and residence of foreigners in Morocco was passed. The law no. 02-03 on the entry and stay of foreigners establishes conditions by which foreigners may legally enter Morocco⁸. The law stipulated that foreigners who wished to enter Morocco would be required to present themselves at border checkpoints. In the event that border authorities refused entry, applicants were required to contact and notify the person who had invited them, their country's embassy, or an attorney of their choice. Migrants who were unable to fulfill this provision could be jailed or fined if found attempting to enter the country illegally. The 2003 law also increased legal penalties against anyone facilitating or organizing irregular entry into or exit from the country. Despite its restrictive measures on the entry and stay of foreigners in Morocco, the law contains important provisions prohibiting the expulsion of vulnerable migrants. These include refugees with proper documentation from the United Nations High Commissioner for

Refugees (UNHCR), pregnant women, and minors. Article 26 of the law states that migrants recognized as a refugee under the 1951 Refugee Convention will be cared for in a way that is written down in the 1951 Refugee Convention. Unfortunately, this article of the law has sometimes remained ink on paper as some civil society organizations have repeatedly documented violations of the legal protections of these groups (GADEM, 2010).

Recently, unlike in other countries of the MENA region, the 2011 Arab Spring in Morocco did not turn into a revolutionary uprising but resulted in a new constitution that was enacted to placate critics of the government. Under chapter II titled fundamental freedoms and rights; the second part of Article 30 says that “Foreigners under [Moroccan] jurisdiction [ressortissants étrangers] enjoy the fundamental freedoms recognized to Moroccan citizens [feminine] and citizens [masculine], in accordance with the law”. It also says [...] “The conditions of extradition and of granting of the right of asylum are defined by the law” (Constituteproject.org, 2012 p. 11). Interestingly, by means of this Article, the constitution has included migrant population with all its categories in the Moroccan social contract. Furthermore, because of the absence of a law on the right of asylum and the conditions, migrant associations, human rights advocates and NGOs concerned with the issue of migration use the article of the new constitution as a powerful legal tool to support requests for increased refugees and migrants’ rights.

Generally, based on this brief review of the different laws and policies that targeted refugees and asylum seekers, it is safe to conclude that despite having a long tradition of hosting refugees, Morocco has always lacked efficient policies that better address this category of migrants. Several factors explain this fact, the most important of which is the limited number of refugees⁹ targeting Morocco and the reluctance of the state, for one reason or another, to encourage the flow of asylum seekers. Still, what is worth mentioning in this regard is the fact that despite “the breaches of the rights of refugees and asylum seekers, the practices of Moroccan authorities are more favorable to refugees than those in the other states of the Maghreb” (Euro-Mediterranean Human Right Network, 2012, p.19). The subsequent section discusses briefly the latest migration reforms instituted by the Moroccan state in 2014.

Notes on 2014 regularizing program

Until 2013, Morocco has been widely criticized by Moroccan, European, and African civil society associations for its harsh security approach towards Sub-Saharan irregular migrants. The country was accused of undermining the rights of migrants and refugees alike at the borders and within Morocco because of the 2003 law and for not instituting the 1951 Geneva Convention to protect refugees and asylum seekers (MSF, 2013). Indeed, because of this continuous criticism, the Moroccan government eventually began to feel pressure to establish a policy of migration that would focus on regularizing the status of irregular migrants and asylum seekers. In 2013, the government made a comprehensive new migration policy public, the first of its kind in the Arab world. The new policy provided a legal basis for regularizing the residency status of irregular migrants living in Moroccan territory. Given that the King Mohamed VI announced the policy, the issue of migration now seemed to be a royal project. In fact, the public regarded the monarch’s announcement in September 2013 as an official shift away from the harsh legal and social attitudes towards irregular migrants in Morocco and the issue of migration and asylum seeking in general.

Based on the recommendations of the report submitted in July 2013 by the Conseil National des Droits de l’Homme (National Council of Human Rights - CNDH) on foreigners and their rights in Morocco, King Mohammed VI chaired a working meeting with Prime Minister Benkirane in order to discuss various aspects of immigration with the aim of developing a new national migration policy. Following the recommendations of CNDH, the King insisted on a humanitarian approach to the

migrants residing in Morocco and stressed the need to tackle networks that traffic and trade in human beings. He also urged the government to devise and implement without delay an appropriate strategy and action plan in partnership with CNDH and the various stakeholders in order to shape an overarching immigration policy.

Later that year, the Moroccan government announced a program to regularize the status of up to 40,000 irregular immigrants as part of a new migration policy that was in compliance with international agreements. The program was launched at the beginning of January 2014 for a duration of 12 months. On 9 February 2015, the government announced that from a total of 27,332 regularization applications received by 31 December 2014 deadline, 17,916 regularizations were approved. It was also declared that the program had benefited nationals from 116 countries, including Senegal (6600), Syria (5250), Nigeria (2380) and Ivory Coast (2281) (Morocco World News, 9 February 2015). Interestingly, despite the restrictive nature of the criteria for regularization approval (for instance, applicants should have lived for at least five years in Morocco; lived together with a Moroccan spouse for at least two years; or have been employed for at least two years), it is worth noticing that the regularization program has included 5250 Syrian refugees. This fact shows that Morocco has developed a humanitarian approach towards this category of migrants by offering them its territory as a haven, even if not all of them meet the requirements set by the program. Still, the questions that pop up in this regard are: What status is given to these documented Syrians? And what type of documents or residence card have Syrians been given by the Moroccan government? The answer to these questions and others will be sought in the next section.

Obstacles faced by Syrian refugees in Morocco: Findings and Analysis

Based on the interviews conducted and on the results of the reports consulted, I have come to the very interesting findings that describe the status and living conditions of Syrians in Morocco. These findings are linked to different stages of their movement from their home country to their arrival to Morocco. Given the fact that the research is still a work in progress, these obstacles faced by Syrians are categorized according to their type and nature.

1. Problems associated with the chaos in the MENA region

The majority of the Syrians now living in Morocco have entered the Moroccan territory from the Algerian boarder. The Moroccan-Algerian borders are closed, but human traffickers can easily transport Syrians and other irregular migrants from the Sub-Saharan countries across. Syrians arrived in Algeria's airports because there are no visa requirements between Syria and Algeria. Along with some other citizens of countries in MENA region, they did not initially need visas to enter Morocco, but as the kingdom faced increasing threats from terrorist activity in the region, officials chose to impose visas as a precautionary measure. Since June 2014, Syrians who could not get the visa to enter the country legally are smuggled by cars to Morocco by human traffickers, a fact that exhausts them financially. As they move in families, each member should pay between 1000 to 2000 Moroccan Dirhams to arrive in Oujda.

Most Syrian refugees I have interviewed in the Region of Fez-Meknes said that they chose Morocco as a target destination because of its stability. They also chose it because it is an Islamic country that shares almost the same language and cultural values as Syrian society does. Despite the obstacles they face to start over, most if not all of them said that they are settling in Morocco until the war ends. A young female from Homs said "I am waiting for the death of Bashar Al Assad in order to go back home". Concerning the undocumented refugee I interviewed, he said he is planning to leave Morocco soon. He said that he fled to Morocco because of its proximity to Europe. For him, Morocco is only a bridge to reach the European continent to achieve a new and better life.

2. Problems associated with registration/documentation

Although it has committed itself to “regularize” the status of more than 5000 Syrians recognized by UNHCR as refugees, the Moroccan government has not granted them a refugee status. Syrian refugees are only given a permit that grants them free movement within the Moroccan territory and allow their children access to education. However, this type of card prevents them from being legally employed and therefore achieve their self-sufficiency and local integration. Remarkably, from the perspective of the vulnerable female Syrian refugees I have interviewed, being allowed to stay and live in Morocco is an end in itself. Hassiba a woman in her 40s from said that “the king of Morocco made us a favor because he let us feel as if we were Moroccans”.

3. Problems associated with the absence of infrastructure and social services for this category of vulnerable migrant population

Providing refugees with social services is left to charitable wishes and occasions. There are no established reception centres for refugees and asylum seekers to ensure that basic needs are met. Therefore, like other undocumented communities, they resort to informal channels to survive. The majority of them are found begging in the street, mainly next to traffic lights usually brandishing their passport or holding banners as a way of distinguishing or identifying themselves. When asked about the methods of paying the rent, Syrian refugees living in the city of Meknes had different answers but all highlighted that paying the rent is one of the main problems they have to face, especially regarding the lack of an income. Some said they are able to pay it through borrowing from their relatives who arrived to Morocco before the beginning of the revolution in Syria¹⁰, while others depend on financial assistance provided by UNHCR. However, the majority reported that begging in the street and next to traffic lights is the only means that secures the chance to pay the rent. Mainly females and children exercise this activity. In case of the inability to afford it on due time, the young female from Homs confirmed that Moroccans in general and the landowners are very helpful and generous; she said that “the landowner is a very kind man, and he can wait for us to pay him for three months”. Another 40 years old woman from Alep who did not mention her name said “when Moroccans show they care for us, hope comes back to our hearts”.

As for the education of children, I interviewed a widow woman from Homs who said she has seven children. She confirmed that her school-aged children are all enrolled in a public school. One of her children happened to be with her when I was interviewing her. His name is Hozaifa and he is 14 years old. Hozaifa himself said “Yes, I attend a school which is very good; I don’t need transportation since I attend a public one, I have never been afraid or isolated in school, but I have to escape school from time to time so that I can help my family to get by”.

4. Problems associated with the security approach adopted by the state towards the Syrians

Though not officially declared, the treatment of Syrians in Morocco is sensitive from a security perspective. The Syrian Ambassador was expelled from Morocco immediately after the upsurge of the crisis in Syria (July 2012) and in December 2012, Morocco hosted a meeting of the “Friends of Syria”. Consequently, President Al-Assad issued negative statements about Morocco’s top leadership. (UNCHR Morocco Update, December 2015). Added to this, in July 2015, a Syrian with a fake passport was arrested at the Mohammed V airport in Casablanca. He was intending to create a terrorist cell affiliated with the Islamic State in Syria. This security concern of the Moroccan state explains the sluggishness of the government to speed up the adoption of a draft law No. 26-14 on the right of asylum and the conditions for its authorization and which was presented in closed session to the government council on December 16, 2015.

Further, the security approach adopted towards Syrians has gone beyond taking precautions and fighting terrorist attacks to reach the religious stability of the country. The interior ministry, following a message published on March 4 by the Islamic affairs department relating to the attitude of “certain Syrian nationals [...] who are causing disruption to mosques and the faithful” (cited in Morocco World News, March 14, 2014), issued a communiqué threatening them with expulsion if they persist begging in front of mosques. The communiqué which was announced on 14 March 2014, made it clear that authorities will resort to the “immediate expulsion of any offender in accordance with the law [02-03, 2003] relating to the entry and residency of foreigners in the kingdom of Morocco” (Ibid). The message of Islamic affairs ministry reported that Syrians were “going to certain mosques in huge towns where they are saying things that should not be said in places of worship” (Ibid). Though the message did not specify these deeds, Moroccan newspapers explained this with the state’s fear of and precautions against the infiltration of *Shiite* doctrine into Morocco’s Mosques. Daily Al-Sabah newspaper, for instance, speculated that the government was worried that *Shiite* presence and practices may slip in the Moroccan mosques and thus destabilize its internal *Sunni* religious unity (Cited in Morocco World News March 14, 2014).

5. Problems associated with the determination of refugee status and the registration of new-borns

Added to the aforementioned obstacles and problems, investigated reports prepared by national and international civil society actors¹¹ reveal other obstacles that these Syrians in particular and other refugees or asylum seekers in general still face.

For example, the human right committee of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights in its concluding observations on the sixteenth report on Morocco, published on 16 September 2016, stated that the Moroccan state lacks procedures and offices for the determination of refugee status at points of entry into the country, including at airports. In other words, a foreigner who is refused entry into the Moroccan territory and who expresses his need to request asylum cannot have his request registered. This may be attributed, as already declared, to the reluctance of the state to encourage the influx of other refugees. Another legal deficiency in the Moroccan legal system reported by the same committee is traced to the absence of laws that could grant the refugees in general and Syrians in particular the right to register their new-borns. This is due to the fact that Moroccan nationality is not transmitted automatically by default to children of foreigners born on Moroccan soil. The impact of this legal barrier appears mainly when their children seek to apply to higher education institutions. In other words, the children of refugees and asylum seekers can register for primary and secondary schools, but application to higher educational institutions is prohibited as their stay in Morocco is considered illegal (Euro-Mediterranean Human right Network, 2012). In case they want to study at any Moroccan university, they face the problem of quota, as the tertiary education institutions admit only a maximum of five per cent foreign students. Added to this, the fact that the Syrian embassy is closed in Rabat makes the problem more complex to children born in Morocco, as they are not registered neither as Syrians nor as Moroccans. Consequently, they will be denied to go anywhere else, except to Syria if they want to go back there in the future.

Based on these findings, despite Morocco’s recent efforts to contain the issue of migrant population in general and Syrian refugees in particular and its long and rich tradition of receiving refugees, not to mention the fact that it is a signatory of conventions and international human rights treaties which articulate a respect for refugee rights, the country still lies behind concerning providing a comprehensive legislative and institutional framework that pertain refugees, asylum seekers and their protection. Therefore, the status-quo puts the Syrians in a vulnerable situation.

On the other side, however, following the attitude of the Moroccan state towards the Syrians living in its territory, one could say that it is characterized by mixed feelings. On the one hand, Moroccans along with their government are very sympathetic towards them. This appears mainly in the generosity of the Moroccans towards them, and the fact that Syrians are not only protected against deportation but are also privileged in the 2014 regularization program. On the other hand, precaution and vigilance still overwhelm the treatment of the Moroccan state to these refugees. In other words, though not officially declared, the Moroccan state fears both the possible existence or entry of terrorists affiliated with the Islamic State in Syria to the country and penetration of *Shiite* practices that may destabilize the internal *Sunni* religious unity of the society. This, in fact, explains why Morocco is still hesitant and reluctant to implement and complete the Migration reforms it has launched recently.

Conclusion

Like most Arab countries, Morocco has become a destination country for Syrian refugees who are fleeing war and seeking protection. In this paper, I set out to find obstacles facing Syrians living in Morocco after Morocco's regularization programme of 2014. Data collected through interviews and investigated reports have shown that these refugees still experience many constraints that prevent them from building up a sustainable livelihood. These constraints are mainly due to the absence of an institutional framework that pertains refugees, asylum seekers and their protection. Therefore, this paper recommends that the Moroccan government, stakeholders and UNHCR should work together for the sake of developing fair and efficient legislative and administrative frameworks for these refugees. In other words, the asylum system in Morocco needs fundamental modifications that are based on humanitarian rather than security approaches for the sake of enabling asylum-seekers and refugees in general better protection under international refugee and human rights laws.

Notes

¹ The group is coordinated by Organisation Marocaine des Droits Humains and includes the Organization Justice, Mouvement ANFASS Démocratique, Association des Jeunes Avocats au Maroc, Fédération Nationale des Associations Amazighes

² The Association Marocaine des Droits Humains, The Ligue Marocaine de Défense des Droits Humains, The Association de Défense des Droits de l'Homme au Maroc, The Forum Marocain pour la Vérité et Justice, The Observatoire Marocain des Prisons, The Organisation pour les Libertés de l'Information et d'Expression, The Instance Marocaine des Droits Humains, The Association des Travailleurs Maghrébins de France, The Association des Marocains de France and The Collectif Marocain des Instances des Droits Humains

³ It was adopted on 10 September 1969 by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government and entered into force on 20 June 1974.

⁴ There are only unofficial camps where irregular migrants live like in Oujda and Nador

⁵ Only 850 immigrants considered asylum-seekers by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees when the Moroccan government announced a program in 2013 to regularize the status of up to 40,000 irregular immigrants

⁶ The *Aya* says "And if any one of the polytheists seeks your protection, then grant him protection so that he may hear the words of Allah. Then deliver him to his place of safety". The translation is retrieved from <http://www.comp.leeds.ac.uk/nora/html/9-6.html>

⁷ These included Convention of the elimination of all forms of racial discrimination, Convention on civil and political rights, Convention on economic, social and cultural rights, Convention on the elimination of all forms of discrimination against women, Convention on the elimination of all forms of torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment and Convention on the rights of the child among others.

⁸ Indeed, law no 02-03 was the first legal framework designed to manage regular and irregular migration in Morocco. The purpose of the law was twofold: first, to manage migration at the borders by controlling the entry and exit of all migrants and second, to ensure that “legislation on this issue is in accordance with international conventions on the rights of migrants and foreigners [of irregular status], and also respects Morocco’s commitment towards its partners in fight against emigration.”

¹⁰ Many Syrians came to Morocco before 2011 to look for job opportunities or to set up a project. Most of them work in the field of agriculture and well drilling. The majority of them speak the Moroccan Arabic dialect (*darija*) and are quite well integrated in the Moroccan society. Some of them are married to Moroccan women.

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Esra Tasdelen

Syrian Refugees in Turkey: A Tale of Two Countries

This paper focuses on migration, displacement and the refugee crisis in the post-2011 MENA region by describing the challenges faced by approximately 2.5 million Syrian refugees in Turkey. The text points out and deconstructs some negative stereotypes and beliefs that have emerged in the Turkish public sphere regarding the refugees' presence in the Turkish social, economic and cultural realms. In describing the challenges faced by the refugees, the paper draws on the reports of NGOs, international organizations and think tanks that focus on human rights and that advocate refugee rights in the MENA region. By contextualizing the refugee crisis, the paper shows the most prominent issues of migrant life in Turkey and problems with transitioning into a new culture. Finally, this study points out to possible solutions and recommendations to overcome these challenges.

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Syrian Refugees in Turkey: A Tale of Two Countries

Syrian Refugees in Turkey: A Tale of Two Countries

This paper focuses on migration, displacement and the refugee crisis in the post-2011 MENA region by depicting the recent history of the mass movement of more than 2.5 million Syrian refugees into Turkey (specifically in the post-2011 period). First, I will delineate the major milestones in the Syrian refugee influx to Turkey after 2011. This will be followed by the description of the efforts of the Turkish government to incorporate, assist and help resettle Syrian refugees. The paper will then point out to the roles that international organizations such as UNHCR have played in the refugee crisis. After giving a brief history of the Syrian refugee influx into Turkey, the paper will give an overview of Syrian refugees' lives in Turkey and deconstruct some negative stereotypes and beliefs that have emerged in the Turkish public sphere regarding the refugees in the Turkish social, economic and cultural realms. By focusing specifically on urban areas in Turkey where the refugees have resettled and are more concentrated, I will show the major challenges faced by the refugees while striving to construct new lives as “strangers” in a new land.

In describing the challenges faced by the refugees, the paper will draw on the reports of NGOs, international organizations and think tanks that focus on human rights and advocating refugee rights in the MENA region. By contextualizing the refugee crisis, I will point out to the most prominent features of migrant life in Turkey and problems with transitioning into a new culture. This paper will then point out possible solutions to overcome these challenges and take a brief look into the near future with some suggestions about the integration of the refugees into a new culture.

The history of the Syrian refugee crisis in Turkey

The narrative of Syrian refugees in Turkey began in April 2011 when the first refugees started crossing the border. Prior to 2011, the relations between Turkey and Syria had been improving to the point that “Ankara began discussions on a free trade zone with Syria, Lebanon and Jordan.”¹ After 2011, though, the relations began to sour as the Turkish government and Ministry of Foreign Affairs became increasingly critical of Bashar Al-Assad's policies and his human rights violations.²

Turkey, a country at a crossroads between Europe and Asia, and neighboring many countries in Eastern Europe and the Middle East simultaneously, has been a place of refuge for refugees of other countries of origin as well, throughout the course of the 20th and 21st centuries. Among those who have sought refuge in Turkey were those of Iranian, Kurdish, Iraqi, African and Asian origins.³ Despite the fact that some of these refugees were headed towards European countries and were utilizing Turkey as a transitory route, Turkey's role as a country of refuge in the MENA region cannot be overemphasized.

By October 2011, Turkey had declared “an open door policy towards refugees fleeing Syria and extended to them a legal framework known as “temporary protection.””⁴ This was the start of an unprecedented influx of refugees into the country, and for the second year in a row in 2016, Turkey has acted as the global top refugee-hosting country, with the total number of Syrian refugees exceeding 2 million people.⁵ This major influx of refugees has brought with it new challenges and responsibilities for the Turkish government, the refugees themselves and the international community.

From a legal standpoint, the “*en masse* asylum cases are defined by UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) Executive Committee decisions and general humanitarian law.”⁶ Turkey has also developed a new legal decree to deal with foreigners coming into the country called ‘Foreigners and International Protection Law’ in 2014.⁷ With the efforts of UNHCR and government policies, several refugee camps have been established, especially along the Syrian border (in Southern Turkey) near the cities of Hatay, Gaziantep, Kilis, Mardin and Şanlıurfa. Most of these refugee camps have been described as having very good infrastructure⁸ and access to facilities when compared refugee camps in other countries, and even European countries. Looking at the UNHCR mid-year report, we can conclude that the refugees in other MENA region countries face several added challenges: Large-scale evictions in Lebanon, active conflict and cholera in Iraq, detention of children in Egypt, and child labor in Jordan.⁹

However, many studies confirm that “Turkey will nonetheless continue to face social, demographic, ethnic and sectarian pressures created by the largest refugee flow in the country’s modern history.”¹⁰ What started as a temporary offer of shelter and safety became a prolonged and multifaceted refugee influx that necessitates a long-term plan and effective policies by the Turkish government to provide health, education and employment opportunities for the refugee population.

Not all of the Syrian refugee population lives inside the camps. “The majority of Syrian refugees- an estimated 76 percent – are in fact outside these well-maintained camps and lack formal access to assistance for shelter, health and food.”¹¹ These refugees stay mostly in the urban areas of Turkey and have become very visible in Turkish public life, leading to several negative stereotypes and stigmata associated with the Syrian refugee population, particularly in the last few years. Xenophobic and racist attacks against Syrian refugees were fueled by claims that the Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan could potentially extend Turkish citizenship (and eventually voting rights) to the refugees. In the summer of 2016, neighborhoods housing large numbers of Syrian refugees in cities such as Ankara, the Turkish capital, were attacked and their shops burned.¹² Syrian refugees were accused of living off government aid, disrupting the ethnic, social and sectarian balances in cities and threatening the traditional Turkish family structure, specifically in cases of polygamy.¹³

By 2013, Syrian refugees were increasingly visible in the urban realm: In the streets of cities such as Istanbul and Ankara. Especially Syrian women and children, unable to be gainfully employed in a foreign country, became the vulnerable face of the refugee crisis. Some of them turned towards begging on the streets, and a lot of children were exploited as sources of cheap child labor in several different cities, especially in textile factories.¹⁴ The lack of education and access to proper healthcare facilities led to these children being named Syria’s “lost generation”.

Providing proper education for the refugee children remains as one of the most important challenges that the Turkish government faces in dealing with this crisis. “Owing to language barriers, the majority of refugee students outside of Turkey’s camps, accustomed to studying in Arabic, struggle to engage in meaningful learning inside Turkey’s public schools. The lack of adequate Turkish language training not only stops many from accessing public education but also hampers the integration process.”¹⁵ In addition to the language barrier, the question of adapting a curriculum to the needs of the Syrian refugee children also arises. Since the refugee crisis has proven itself to be a more lengthy process that will span at least a decade, the Turkish government needs to develop a concrete plan to properly integrate Syrian children into Turkish society through education. Likewise, access to health care systems and shelter also needs to be coordinated and standardized among refugees living both in camps and outside.

One issue that the Turkish government needs to address is developing permanent resettlement plans for the refugees. As more and more refugees started moving into Europe, especially after 2013, the Turkish government and the European Union have been trying to set up 'deals' in which the Turkish government would receive some financial aid from the EU and would keep the refugees within its own territory in return.¹⁶ In October 2015, the Turkish government put forward some conditional clauses for this deal with Angela Merkel, the chancellor of Germany, to take place. One important condition was the lifting of the Schengen visa requirements for Turkish citizens. The fact that this condition was put forward in order for Turkey to readmit some refugees who were denied entry into Greece caused lots of criticism in the Turkish public sphere. Op-ed pieces severely criticized the Turkish government for 'trading' the lives of the Syrian refugees in exchange for the financial aid they would receive from the EU and the lifting of visa requirements for Turkish citizens.¹⁷ European countries have also been blamed for the pushback regarding the Syrian refugees flowing into Europe: "It will be important to carry out these promises, especially, given the context where some member countries have pushed back Syrian refugees and the EU has built a reputation as 'Fortress Europe' with its broader policy to block out migrants and asylum seekers from reaching Europe."¹⁸

In closing, it is important to look ahead and identify the challenges of this unprecedented humanitarian crisis that has profoundly affected the MENA region in the post-2011 period. One significant challenge is the financial burden that the refugee crisis has put on the Turkish economy. "As of April 2014, the Turkish government has spent more than \$2.5 billion hosting Syrian refugees with Turkish civil society spending an additional estimated half a billion while receiving less than \$200 million USD in international support."¹⁹ The "open door policy" of the Turkish government has led to the country receiving a disproportionately large number of refugees, especially when compared to other countries of the MENA region. Turkey, as a developing, "semi-peripheral" country, needs more financial aid and support from international organizations and NGOs in dealing with the refugee crisis. In making sure, the Syrian refugees are resettled and their basic needs such as health, shelter and education are met, the Turkish government need not stand alone. The Syrian refugee crisis demands a better coordination between the Turkish government, international NGOs and the governments of EU member countries to work collectively towards more permanent solutions. In addition to this, EU countries need to work towards changing public opinion and pushback attitudes towards Syrian refugees, and officially recognize the reality of changing demographics of a Europe in transition. The conflict that has been going on since 2011 in Syria has meant a huge humanitarian cost to both the country itself as well as its neighbors and the rest of the world. Any major powers involved in the Syrian conflict, including Turkey, should strive for the end of the conflict and a peaceful Syria in the near future.

Notes

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² "Türkiye-Suriye ilişkileri", The Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkiye-suriye-siyasi-iliskileri-.tr.mfa>

³ Irregular Migration and Asylum in Turkey, Celia Mannert, New Issues in Refugee Research, UNHCR, <http://www.unhcr.org/3ebf5c054.html>

⁴ Kirişçi, Kemal. "Syrian refugees and Turkey's challenges: Going beyond hospitality." *Washington, DC: Brookings Institution* (2014), 1

⁵ <http://www.unhcr.org/uk/statistics/unhcrstats/576408cd7/unhcr-global-trends-2015.html>

⁶ Kirişçi, 8

⁷ <http://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/eskiler/2013/04/20130411-2.htm>

⁸ “How to build a perfect refugee camp”, <https://www.nytimes.com/2014/02/16/magazine/how-to-build-a-perfect-refugee-camp.html>

⁹ UNICEF Mid-Year Syria Crisis Report, August 3, 2017, <http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/download.php?id=13844>

¹⁰ Çağaptay, Soner, The Impact of Syria's Refugees on Southern Turkey, July 2014, p 2 http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/uploads/Documents/pubs/PolicyFocus130_Cagaptay_Revised3s.pdf

¹¹ Kirişçi, 15

¹² <https://www.evrensel.net/haber/285296/ankarada-suriyelilere-irkci-saldiri>

¹³ Kirişçi, 29

¹⁴ “Çocuk mülteciler Türkiye'de tekstil atölyelerinde çalıştırılıyor”, BBC Türkçe, October 24, 2016. <http://www.bbc.com/turkce/haberler-turkiye-37748847>

¹⁵ Ahmadzadeh, Hashem, et al. Ensuring Quality Education for Young Refugees from Syria (12-25 Years): A Mapping Exercise, Ed. Dawn Chatty, 2014

¹⁶ ‘AB ile kıran kırana pazarlık’, <http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/ab-ile-kiran-kirana-pazarlik-30323399>

¹⁷ ‘Avrupa’ya vize kolaylığı ne uğruna?’, <http://bianet.org/biamag/insan-haklari/155240-avrupa-ya-vize-kolayligi-ne-ugruna>

¹⁸ Kirişçi, 40

¹⁹ Ibid, 41

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Countering Radicalization: A Public Health Approach

Acts of terrorism within the global community are oftentimes perpetrated by homegrown, well-educated young people, rather than by foreign 'Islamist groups'. Recent cases of terrorism and radicalization of 'mainstream' individuals, specifically seen in the United States and Europe, have sparked urgency to investigate this issue. Consequently, a process of radicalization was proposed to explain how ordinary people can be recruited and persuaded to sacrifice their lives. However, counterterrorism approaches rooted in the criminal justice system have not prevented radicalization. In fact, there is evidence that these approaches were grossly shortsighted and extremely counterproductive; they may have even provoked community resistance against authorial cooperation and did very little to disrupt terrorist organizations' recruitment strategies. Due to the ineffectiveness of currently utilized security systems, new approaches to counter-radicalization must be explored. Addressing new initiatives that extend beyond the criminal justice system and instead treat this matter as a public health crisis where causes are carefully researched and effects are reversed will benefit counter-radicalization efforts. The solutions are therefore implemented as part of public health policy practice where radicalization is treated as a disease that is in need of eradication, not where the radicalized is quarantined and punished. A public health approach will foster social inclusion and social justice, destigmatize 'suspect communities', and identify and address grievances. This introduces the possible role of leaders in sociology, psychology, and other behavioral sciences in developing new collaborative measures towards radicalization prevention. Rather than rely on the evidently ineffective punitive system already in place, a public health approach offers opportunities for multi-purpose programming, mitigating risk factors, and nurturing strong identifications with healthier influences. This paper proposes public health research and practice to guard against radicalization and identify means to future prevention.

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Countering Radicalization: A Public Health Approach

Introduction

Acts of terrorism within the global community are oftentimes perpetrated by ‘homegrown’, well-educated young people, rather than by foreign ‘Islamist groups’. Recent cases of homegrown terrorism and radicalization of ‘mainstream’ individuals have sparked urgency to investigate this issue. Specifically, the rise of ISIS, and the recent attacks in San Bernadino, California and Orlando, Florida have sparked urgency to investigate this issue (Weine, Eisenman, Kinsler, Glik, & Polutnik, 2016). The United States has listed violent extremism and radicalization as a top national security priority (National Strategy for Counterterrorism, 2011). However, the current counterterrorism and counter radicalization security approach utilized by the United States has proved ineffective in countering radicalization. In fact, there is evidence that these approaches were grossly shortsighted and extremely counterproductive; they may have even provoked community resistance against authority and did very little to interfere with terrorist organizations’ recruitment strategies.

Due to the ineffectiveness of currently utilized security systems, new approaches to counter-radicalization must be explored. This paper proposes public health research and practice to guard against radicalization and identify means to future prevention. By addressing new initiatives that extend beyond the criminal justice system and instead treat this matter as a public health crisis, carefully researched approaches will benefit counter-radicalization efforts.

Oftentimes, researchers disagree on the agreed upon definitions surrounding this issue. While most researchers agree that terrorism has various contributors, conceptualizing terrorism is where difficulties arise. Specific definitions, on the one hand, predefine the subject of interest, as well as ways in which the subject can be studied. But some researchers believe that the idea of terrorism is an ambiguous social construct, “inherent of possessing a true definition” (Foster & Butler, 2008). Terrorism and counterterrorism strategies, however, will not be discussed further in this paper. Instead, radicalization and counter radicalization techniques will be further explored in this report.

Radicalization and Counter-Radicalization

The term ‘radical’ can mean “extreme, creative, or politically subversive without necessarily being criminal, illegal, or a threat to society” (Bhui, Hicks, Lashley, & Jones, 2012). However, more recent research studies have begun to address the idea of violent radicalization. Radicalization itself is defined as the “social and psychological process of increasing commitment to extremist ideology”, while violent radicalization is marked by “increased radicalization through involvement with a violent non-state movement” (Bhui, Hicks, Lashley, & Jones, 2012). Those who are coined ‘radicalized’, are often motivated by specific ideologies related to political, historical, social, and cultural contexts. Since 9/11, these terms have been applied to Islamist extremist groups involved in terrorist activity across the world (Bhui, Hicks, Lashley, & Jones, 2012).

While radicalization is contextualized by situation, many believe that religious ideations play a role in acts of terrorism, or religiously inspired terrorism. In an increasingly interconnected world due to the effects of large-scale globalization, some see these effects as a threat to religious groups, and that it may contribute to the extinguishment of religion as a whole (Kosseim, 2011). Specifically, globalization presents real and current threats to Muslims’ traditional ways of life through the spread of westernized and democratic values and ideations. A sense of powerlessness,

fear, and injustice in Muslim communities has been seen through these effects of globalizations (Kosseim, 2011). However, while the rapid spread of new information and technology may pose threats to the “validity of religion”, specifically Islam, radical ideologies are not sparked solely through the vendettas formed from the global threats to religion (Kosseim, 2011). It is inherent to understand these common misunderstandings of radicalization to truly foster development of effective counter radicalization techniques.

Two independent studies conducted by the RAND Corporation and New America Foundation examined homegrown radicalization and radicalization in the U.S. (Khalil, 2012). Since 9/11, 176 individuals have been identified as being in plots involving homegrown terrorism in the U.S (Khalil, 2012). This number in fact represents a small number when compared to the number of murders a year (Khalil, 2012). However, two studies found that nearly half of these cases occurred between 2009 and 2010, a time when the geopolitical landscape of the 9/11 era was shifting and Al-Qaeda was noted as becoming strategically weaker (Khalil, 2012). However, the incidences of spouts of homegrown terrorism were increasing at a time when they should have been decreasing. Some of these homegrown cases included the November attack at Fort Hood by US Army Major Nidal Malik Hasan and the June attack against military recruiters in Arkansas by a Muslim convert returning from Yemen (Khalil, 2012). In 2010, there was the thwarted attack by Faisal Shahzad in Times Square, the arrest of Najibullah Zazi, who plotted to blow up New York subway stations, and the case of Jihadi Jane—a white female convert from Pennsylvania who conspired to kill a Swedish cartoonist (Khalil, 2012).

Identifying and understanding the term radicalization and its various forms leads to the question, how does one become radicalized, or what are the factors that make someone more apt to be radicalized than another? Research suggests that a main cause of homegrown radicalization is the inability of individuals to undergo an integration and assimilation process that would successfully enable them to become or reintegrate as productive members of their “host” society, leaving them susceptible to the negative influences of extreme ideations (Kosseim, 2011). In general, radicalization and recruitment reflect processes of “push and pull” factors that act upon vulnerable youth and young adults (Weine et al., 2009).

Significant push factors recorded to have contributed to community and family challenges included experiences such as war exposure and forced migration prior to coming the United States (Weine et al., 2009). Other push factors include “poverty, war-related traumas and losses, inadequate schooling, and exposure to radical ideologies” (Weine et al., 2009). These factors can then contribute to feelings of resentment, despair, and spite. For example, poverty marks a “breeding ground” for political extremism, and economic and social declines have been shown to contribute to patterns of extremism (Kosseim, 2011). Poor economic conditions enable terrorist recruitment and organization, which stem from inequality, segregation, and exclusion (Kosseim, 2011).

Feelings of alienation within a community have been the most common factor amidst individuals involved in extremist behavior (Kosseim, 2011). More importantly, lack of trust in a community can only exacerbate these feelings of alienation. In particular, when individuals feel targeted by law enforcement, or more generally the purported leaders of their community, these feelings of resentment only increase (Kosseim, 2011). Oftentimes, law enforcement may inherently consider specific individuals as being part of “suspect communities”, based upon their race, religious affiliation, or ethnicity (Kosseim, 2011). When this label is assigned by an authoritative figure to an individual, this may lead the individual to feel targeted and less apt to feel like an integral part of society. As a result, dissent and spite towards these authoritative figures and society overall fester from this isolationism.

The Somali-American Case Study

Pull factors also play a significant role in the vulnerability and development of radical ideations. Notable pull factors, for example a foreign invasion of one's home country, is often associated with the rise or escalation of terrorist violence (Weine et al., 2009). For example, researchers draw attention to the radicalization of pull factors related to the Ethiopian invasion of Somalia from 2006 to 2008 (Weine et al., 2009). Between late 2007 and fall of 2008, "an estimated 18 or more Somali-American adolescent men living in the Minneapolis area fled their homes to Somalia to join militant extremist training camps led by the Al Shabaab extremist organization" (Weine et al., 2009). Political instability in Somalia, the 2006 invasion, social difficulties in US refugee communities, family instability, and local networks, all carefully exploited by extremist recruiters, "created contextual risks of violent radicalization" amongst those resettled Somalis in the U.S. as children and adolescents (Weine et al., 2009).

Many Somalis in Minnesota live in low-income housing in impoverished communities, with a neighborhood in Cedar-Riverside even being referred to as "Little Mogadishu" (Weine et al., 2009). In the center of this community, over 3,000 Somalis live in a large, urban, high-rise known as the "Towers" (Weine et al., 2009). This area is highly impoverished, geographically isolated from the city, and crime-ridden with "drugs, gangs, and drive-by shootings" (Weine et al., 2009). Specific events of violence have been incredibly demoralizing to the Somali community and especially youth, including some of those who have been radicalized. Ubah Shirwa, publisher of *Haboon*, a Somali magazine in Minneapolis, stated, "the divisions that existed in Somalia exist here, and they are focused on the politics back home" (Weine et al., 2009). The existence of so many divisions has hindered access to community-level support as well as community collaboration with social services, health services, and law enforcement.

Counter-Radicalization Strategies and Approaches

Efforts to not only minimize the potential for radicalization and its adverse effects on individuals, but to understand motivations of terrorists and the pathways leading to violent radicalization have led to the development of counter radicalization strategies and techniques. Counter radicalization is defined as the "intentions to prevent social or political radicalization, to prevent violent radicalization, or to disrupt involvement in terrorism of those already radicalized" (Bhui, Hicks, Lashley, & Jones, 2012). Evidence suggests that a useful focus to have is on young people who are vulnerable to radicalizing influences because of isolation and marginalization (Bhui, Hicks, Lashley, & Jones, 2012). It is important to find ways of preventing vulnerable individuals in a community from developing sympathies for violent extremist ideologies based on perceived attacks on their identity group. To ensure public support for social cohesion and public safety, analyses suggest that it is important to engage people from all political, religious, and demographic backgrounds (Bhui, Hicks, Lashley, & Jones, 2012). Based off what is known so far about homegrown terrorism, preventive interactions should focus on how "negotiations of personal identity, social exclusion, and marginalization can generate grievances" (Bhui, Hicks, Lashley, & Jones, 2012).

Differing national approaches to counter radicalization strategies outline several core elements: hard power characterized by securitization or justice based counter and de-radicalization systems; and soft power characterized by social or community based counter and de-radicalization arrangements (Taylor, 2015). What differs amongst these specific national policies is the varying degree each country places on either soft or hard power approaches. (Taylor, 2015). For example, the UK demonstrates a soft-powered community integration approach. The UK's "Channel Project", a community outreach program established as part of its counter-terrorism strategy, CONTEST, has

proven successful “in encouraging police to detect individuals at risk of radicalization and develop interventions accordingly” (Kosseim, 2011). The strategy heavily stresses factors related to building relationships with Muslim community leaders and authoritative figures (Kosseim, 2011). The development of a successful strategy depends on establishing an integrated society defined by participation, integration, and a sense of co-existence among Muslim and British communities.

The Australian approach to counter radicalization efforts has maintained a balance between both soft and hard power strategies. It emphasizes the importance of community driven “counter violent extremism measures to “curtail radicalization with the added need for rehabilitation programs for extremist offenders” (Taylor, 2015). The plan closely parallels the UK “prevent strategy” in terms of its inclusion of soft power features. However, it “errs on the side of caution”, seeking to firmly and appropriately apply security and law enforcement responses on programs that promote social cohesion (Taylor, 2015). With this additional component, the Australian approach combines the both soft power and hard power tactics.

The United States approach to countering extremist ideology is broadly presented in the 2011 National Strategy for Counterterrorism. The U.S. approach can be defined as “leaning strongly towards a securitization stance” (Taylor, 2015). The United States’ Plan, deemed Countering Violent Extremism (CVE), has been predominately conducted by law enforcement through a criminal justice framework (Weine, Eisenman, Kinsler, Glik, & Polutnik, 2016). The criminal justice system approach assumes that the legal system can prevent terrorism by criminal intelligence and a tailored judicial system rather than through engagement with other bodies of theory and practice (Weine, Eisenman, Kinsler, Glik, & Polutnik, 2016). The general approach has sought to achieve its goals internationally through “interventions by the armed forces and intelligence services”, and domestically through the Department of Homeland Security and local enforcement agencies (Taylor, 2015).

Since the attacks on September 11th, 2001, terrorism and counterterrorism have loomed over the national security policies of the U.S. with the security environment being defined by the threat of global terrorism. This security environment, referred to as the “9/11 decade”, was driven by the belief that “al-Qaeda inspired terrorism, Islamic militancy, or violent jihadism” was the single greatest threat to the West (Khalil, 2012). After 9/11, the U.S. government developed a National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, stating that combating terrorism and securing the U.S. homeland was of the “utmost priority” (Jenkins, 2011). In the immediate aftermath of the attacks, the Bush Administration instated its “War on Terror”, a struggle against international terrorism against “premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents” (Jenkins, 2011). The FBI utilized a “forward-learning” approach to terrorism, focusing on the overall mission to prevent future attacks. By focusing heavily on concerns of state sovereignty, the government overlooked where national action may have been necessary. Washington turned over almost all allied offers of military aid in Afghanistan, limited peacekeeping forces to the city of Kabul, and invaded Iraq despite the advice of several important allies and surrounding states (Jenkins, 2011).

Consequently, the past decade has witnessed a series of shifting U.S. policies, from the aggressive initial advance of the Bush Administration, to the careful calculated retreat of the subsequent Obama Administration. As a result of the end of the 9/11 decade and the rise of the Arab Spring in 2011, there has been a sudden eruption of democratic movements throughout the Arab world (Jenkins, 2011). The Obama administration’s counterterrorism strategy was the nation’s first policy to focus on “al-Qaeda’s ability to attack the United States from within” (Kosseim, 2011). This policy focused on homegrown threats in order to establish effective counter terrorism and radicalization strategies (Kosseim, 2011). The strategy called for building a “culture of resilience”

in the United States that “combines interagency coordination and an emphasis on Muslim-Americans as welcome members of society who help prevent terrorism” (Kosseim, 2011).

The National Strategy for Counterterrorism focuses on allowing the administration to partner with communities to prevent violent extremism (Kosseim, 2011). The attacks on September 11th concluded that it is important to identify terrorist inspired threats when radicalization begins in order to intercept plots before attacks occur (Kosseim, 2011). The most recent publication of this security policy highlighted “community-based approaches, priority goals, and guiding principles” for combating radicalization and violent extremism in the U.S. As President Obama identified, building resilience was the main goal, and taking defense against radicalized ideologies is supported by community-based outreach programs that aim to educate families, local communities, and organizations with the necessary information to prevent radicalization (Kosseim, 2011).

Many individuals in the Muslim community remain skeptical about the real objectives behind these ‘community outreach’ programs, however. They believe that these outreach programs portray distrust between Muslim-American communities and law enforcement, and that they are implemented as a way to “spy” on Muslims, further categorizing all Muslims as threats to society (Kosseim, 2011). At the 2015 White House CVE Summit, research noted an increase in pushback amongst community members who felt the “government programs conduct illegal surveillance and stigmatize Muslim Americans” (Weine, Eisenman, Kinsler, Glik, & Polutnik, 2016). Distrust, followed by a “lack of cultural awareness among law enforcement officers and officials, language barriers, and concerns about immigration status” are some of the main difficulties that arise from these programs (Kosseim, 2011). Creating and maintaining positive, working relationships with community residents remains the objective of law enforcement agencies, while still maintaining their value for prevention efforts and traditional control.

CVE has been commonly criticized by civil rights organizations and community members as being a government program that is taking away people’s freedoms, the majoring criticism being the emphasis on securitization and use of law enforcement (Weine, Eisenman, Kinsler, Glik, & Polutnik, 2016). Some even argue that this approach has done nothing in terms of reducing radicalization, and may in fact create a further divide between the government and the Muslim community (Taylor, 2015). As a consequence of the first wave of CVE programs in both the U.S. and UK, many Muslim communities were being relegated to ‘suspect communities’, and an exclusive emphasis on the criminal justice system strategy may have in fact impeded prevention (Weine, Eisenman, Kinsler, Glik, & Polutnik, 2016). The concern here is that current approaches to counterterrorism among law enforcement may lack fundamental knowledge about community and family processes in refugee and immigrant groups that, if effectively approached, could significantly mitigate the risks of radicalization and recruitment (Weine et al., 2009).

Many global databases on violent radicalization and terrorism are being compiled, but they are generally very restricted due to various forms of bias and other limitations. Some of these limitations include:

- “1) Most terrorists are not legally processed for terrorist offences but for other related offences, and most terrorism data are outside the realm domestic criminal justice systems.
- 2) Data collected are also subject to politically determined priorities given much of it is collected by government agencies, and most data sources are not routinely available for researchers
- 3) Most research is based on secondary or tertiary source data that do not meet academic standards” (Bhui, Hicks, Lashley, & Jones, 2012).

From this data, it can be implied that terrorist acts are classified as distinct from criminal acts. While criminal justice agencies deal with and document terrorism, feedback and evaluation of counter-radicalization programs are neither easy to undertake nor readily available. Terrorism databases do not include “measures of risk factors for violent crime and radicalization”, which are more common in populations (Bhui, Hicks, Lashley, & Jones, 2012). These programs and surveillance systems can only generate evidence and outline patterns of incidents by collecting a wider range of relevant variables.

Although actual cases of terrorism are well documented retrospectively, “issues of design and sampling also play an important role in population-based analyses of data relevant to identifying precursors of terrorism” (Foster & Butler, 2008). Social, cultural, religious, political, economic, cognitive, and other factors controlled or ignored in experimental studies vary between populations. Analyses that take into account these factors are important, as other broader political, cultural, religious, ethnic proxies can “mask” significant intragroup differences (Foster & Butler, 2008). Close attention to these differences can lead to the development of effective and targeted approaches about the origins of terrorism, particularly “in designing interventions to control precursors to terrorism, as well as control of terrorist outbreaks” (Foster & Butler, 2008).

Counterterrorism policies, however well intentioned, have not inspired confidence or contracted support. For example, counterterrorism initiatives by the British government stigmatized and alienated Muslim communities in the UK by treating them as “a conspicuous religious group that was under scrutiny”, rather than as allies in the development of a preventive strategy (Bhui, Hicks, Lashley, & Jones, 2012). Currently, the prevalence of such discipline-specific approaches, along with a lack of integration into a unified framework, has made for incredibly ineffective counter strategy approaches and this fragmentation continues to hinder its progress (Bhui, Hicks, Lashley, & Jones, 2012). These policies have been seen as unjust, and have actually damaged social cohesion by isolating religious groups (Bhui, Hicks, Lashley, & Jones, 2012).

In the case study of the Somali-Americans, “fragmentation of family and community structures when moving from Somalia to refugee camps, resettlement in the US, feeling trapped between cultural identities, and mistrust from law enforcement” all can be identified as risk factors for violent radicalization (Bhui, Hicks, Lashley, & Jones, 2012). Proper identification of these risk factors beforehand could have led to the development of specific community-appropriate interventions. This case study shows that violent radicalization can be an outcome of a complex combination of social, political, cultural, historical, and individual factors. Therefore, new approaches to counter-radicalization must be explored. Addressing new initiatives that extend beyond the criminal justice system and instead treat this matter as a public health crisis, where causes are carefully researched and effects are reversed, will benefit counter-radicalization efforts.

The Public Health Approach

Public health refers to all organized measures (whether public or private) to “prevent disease, promote health, and prolong life among the population as a whole” (Weine, Eisenman, Kinsler, Glik, & Polutnik, 2016). Its activities aim to provide conditions in which people can be healthy and focuses on entire populations, not on individual patients or diseases (Weine, Eisenman, Kinsler, Glik, & Polutnik, 2016). Thus, public health is concerned with the total system and not only the eradication of a particular disease. Public health concerns also include protecting against environmental hazards, preventing injuries, promoting and encouraging healthy behavior and environments, responding to disasters and assisting communities in recovery, and assuring the quality and accessibility of health services (Weine, Eisenman, Kinsler, Glik, & Polutnik, 2016). Policies and practices in public health are effective if there is an adequate definition of a problem,

an identified cause of the problem, and a specific target population that then guide the prevention and intervention planning (Weine, Eisenman, Kinsler, Glik, & Polutnik, 2016). This prevention intervention is thus believed to be linked to a very specific understanding of risk and protective factors, which can be targeted for change. These might include social, familial, personal, organizational, and structural factors (Weine, Eisenman, Kinsler, Glik, & Polutnik, 2016).

Public health professionals carry out their work through many relevant approaches, including “developing and implementing community-based programs, administering services, conducting research and evaluation, and recommending policies” (Weine, Eisenman, Kinsler, Glik, & Polutnik, 2016). By examining factors from multiple perspectives, these approaches make public health a potential framework for understanding the multiple aspects of violent radicalization. Moving CVE into a public health framework is different from finding roles for public health as a profession. Each community should find its own leadership as it develops, and CVE initiatives may come from faith-based, civic engagement, mental health, social services, or other sectors, not necessarily from public health (Weine, Eisenman, Kinsler, Glik, & Polutnik, 2016).

The public health perspective asks the fundamental questions: Where does the problem begin? How could we prevent it from occurring in the first place? To answer these questions, public health uses a systematic, scientific approach for understanding and preventing violence (Public health approach to violence prevention, 2015). By defining the problem at hand, identifying risk and protective factors, developing and testing prevention strategies, and assuring widespread adoption, the public health process ensures that all components of the strategy “fit within a particular community context and have the desired effect of preventing violence” (Public health approach to violence prevention, 2015). Many organizations and systems are involved in these steps along the way. While violence prevention practitioners may not be involved in all steps, they are necessary to assure the desired impact on community health is helpful in selecting and developing prevention strategies (Public health approach to violence prevention, 2015).

From a public health perspective, primary, secondary, and tertiary prevention strategies can be examined to explore the whole system. Primary prevention is oftentimes the most cost-effective strategy, but tends to be the least well-funded and most difficult to implement successfully (Foster & Butler, 2008). Primary prevention is designed to test interventions that keep individuals from known risks for disease (Foster & Butler, 2008). It often “involves communication through the mass media and education, and emphasizes peer-to-peer intervention” (Foster & Butler, 2008). Secondary prevention is more targeted, and allows interventions to focus more on a smaller number of more specific individual profiles. However, it proves difficult in changing existing behavior and exposures rather than keeping individuals from developing them in the first place (Foster & Butler, 2008). The secondary intervention results in better-defined goals in measuring outcomes, but also “directly confronts long-entrenched traditions and practices” (Foster & Butler, 2008). Tertiary prevention generally involves surgical and pharmaceutical interventions, but can also include rehabilitation and behavior alterations after diagnosis (Foster & Butler, 2008). More money tends to be spent on tertiary prevention rather than on primary or secondary prevention, yet tertiary prevention also has the highest rate of mortality (Foster & Butler, 2008). The cost-effectiveness of each category depends on the kind of terrorism involved. Some terrorist sites could be significantly reduced in incidence by primary prevention, while other could be most impacted by secondary prevention measures geared towards specific kinds of terrorist threats (Foster & Butler, 2008). Other kinds still for which there are no strong contributors and no reliable screening tests may only be addressed by tertiary prevention (Foster & Butler, 2008).

How would we proceed if terrorism was a disease? A public health model can help us think about terrorism as a basic research problem to be translated into therapeutic and preventive

applications rather than primarily as a policy or political problem (Foster & Butler, 2008). By examining prevention and treatment techniques for conditions like cancer and HIV, different models for conceptualizing terrorism can be explored (Foster & Butler, 2008). This leads to the question, is terrorism more like cancer or more like HIV? Cancer and HIV are two different kinds of diseases with different casual factors and implications. Cancer is a category that “includes multiple kinds of diseases that have multiple contributors”, while HIV is a category of “closely related viral strains that constitute a single contributor to the development of AIDS” (Foster & Butler, 2008). Assessing these models could potentially lead to more effective strategies in understanding and responding to significant threats posed by terrorism, from the identification of factors that produce terrorist acts, to the implementation of informed measures for the prevention and control of terrorist activity (Foster & Butler, 2008).

If terrorism is more like cancer, then it should be treated in terms of multiple phenomena with different combinations of causes both within and across its various subtypes (Foster & Butler, 2008). This suggests the importance of careful attention to local contexts in which terrorism arises. A focus on risk factor prevention can reduce contributors to terrorism if it is approached through this model (Foster & Butler, 2008). If there are multiple types and subtypes of terrorism each with multiple combinations of contributors, then prevention and control are much more difficult tasks requiring the support of a more intensive and diverse basic research infrastructure, and complete eradication is unlikely (Foster & Butler, 2008). Early detection based on social or other kinds of markers could yield ambiguous results, mandating increasing improvements in various kinds of surveillance systems to “observe direct evidence of the growth of terrorist cells” (Foster & Butler, 2008).

If it is more like HIV, however, terrorism can be treated as a common phenomenon with similar causes wherever it occurs (Foster & Butler, 2008). It can also be conceptualized as a phenomenon that rapidly can become an epidemic if risk factors for those contributors are not controlled. A focus on risk factor prevention along with the development of an early detection test “based on the natural resistance of healthy social processes to the terrorist virus” could significantly contain its spread (Foster & Butler, 2008). Therapies to control the mortality of terrorist infections could reduce mortality, and the ultimate goal of eliminating terrorism, “much in the same way smallpox has been eliminated”, could be envisioned (Foster & Butler, 2008)

Given this contrast, it is likely that manifestations that are categorized as terrorism have the potential to be most closely exemplified by both cancer *and* HIV. For example, some specific terrorist organizations rely on the spread of particular ideological beliefs to recruit new members, which can be compared to the spread of HIV (Foster & Butler). On the other hand, other types of organizations have existed for multiple generations so that membership can be predicted partially based on contextual history, as is the case of cancers that have familial syndromes (Foster & Butler). What this suggests is that there is a need for multiple conceptions of definitions and a string of different prevention strategies that are capable of combatting these various forms of terrorism.

The World Health Organization’s Violence Prevention Alliance provides a public health framework to identify and investigate the causes and consequences of violence (Weine, Eisenman, Kinsler, Glik, & Polutnik, 2016). Similar approaches are used by the Centers for Disease Control (CDC) in the U.S. (Weine, Eisenman, Kinsler, Glik, & Polutnik, 2016). A similar approach can be applied to violent radicalization. Aspects of violent radicalization and group cohesion are becoming a relevant health and social issue, and the International Classification of Diseases and CDC now have codes for deaths and injuries from terrorist acts (Weine, Eisenman, Kinsler, Glik, & Polutnik, 2016). This offers a system of monitoring closely aligned to other public health surveillance

programs (Weine, Eisenman, Kinsler, Glik, & Polutnik, 2016). It may offer a method to look objectively at global terrorism-related deaths and circumstances under which they occur. It could also potentially make “the most severe effects of violent radicalization easier to monitor” and relate these to other contextual and demographic data (Weine, Eisenman, Kinsler, Glik, & Polutnik, 2016). The CDC’s Ten Essential Public Health Services are as follows:

- “1) Monitor health status to identify and solve community health problems
 - 2) Diagnose and investigate health problems and health hazards in communities
 - 3) Inform, educate, and empower people about health issues
 - 4) Mobilize community partnerships and action to identify and solve health problems
 - 5) Develop policies and plans that support individual and community health efforts
 - 6) Enforce laws and regulations that protect health and ensure safety
 - 7) Link people to needed personal health services and assure provision of health care
 - 8) Assure competent public and personal health care workforce
 - 9) Evaluate effectiveness, accessibility, and quality of personal and population-based health services, and
 - 10) Research for new insights and innovative solutions to health problems”
- (Weine, Eisenman, Kinsler, Glik, & Polutnik, 2016).

This ten step process could thoroughly improve the scope of developing counter radicalization strategies and should be considered when trying to formulate new approaches.

When developing a new counter radicalization strategy, however, it is necessary to examine the various risk and protective factors that exist. As discussed previously when describing the push and pull factors towards incidences of radicalization, significant risk factors occur when young people face transitions, such through education, place, family, and religion. Social isolation, exclusion, grievances regarding discrimination, unemployment, international conflict, and identity marginalization are all significant risk factors that can push individuals to become involved in radical activity. To combat this, several protective measures can be taken to mitigate the pull towards radical behavior.

Such protective factors are focused in methods of social support, social cohesion, feelings of safety and security in neighborhoods, integrated cultural identity, employment success, access to democratic means for negotiating needs and opinions, and access to critical religious leadership that can moderate and inform on legitimate religious perspectives (Bhui, Hicks, Lashley, & Jones, 2012). Maintaining a positive regard for authorities and overall healthier influences appears to be an important protective factor against violent radicalization in the first place; therefore, nurturing strong identifications with healthier influences is likely to be as important as minimizing contact with gangs, cults, and networks associated with violent radicalization (Bhui, Hicks, Lashley, & Jones, 2012).

This idea of social inclusion and cohesion has been further explored in studies of psychosocial approaches to extremism. Psychosocial approaches are used in a broad range of humanitarian, public health, and mental health services, including recovery from trauma, and the prevention of HIV infection and violence (Weine et al., 2009). The psychosocial perspective prioritizes community and family both as “levels of analysis and intervention”, and focuses on community and family strengths and resources (Weine et al., 2009). This focus on strengths contrasts approaches that focus primarily on deficits, as is often characteristic of more clinical psychiatric approaches that center on the assessment and treatment of conditions (such as post-traumatic stress disorder) (Weine et al., 2009). The approach is also concerned with the dynamics of community development, the family life cycle, and child development (Weine et al., 2009). From a methodological standpoint, the psychosocial perspective lets those inside an experience

characterize their needs, meanings, and strengths in their own words. For example, these approaches draw upon “ethnographic research methods to gather knowledge related to resettled refugee youths’ views of their families, peers, communities, and schools”, and then use that knowledge to develop the narrative scripts that are included in interventions (Weine et al., 2009).

The psychological perspective has been expressed through theoretical models, intervention strategies, and best practices. The Psychological Working Group, defined the “psychological well-being” of an individual in terms of three core domains: human capacity, social ecology, and culture and values (Weine et al., 2009). These domains have been used to map the human, social, and cultural capital available for responding to disasters and other adversities, so as to guide service organizations to develop programs and policies (Weine et al., 2009). Despite the promise implied by such perspectives, the psychological approach has not been rigorously studied as clinical mental health interventions (Weine et al., 2009). In part, this is because the complex and adverse real-life situations where psychosocial work takes place pose significant challenges for the design and execution of research. However, research is increasingly emerging in this area, including studies that

- “1) Elucidate the basis for helping refugees and migrants through care, prevention, and access interventions; and
- 2) Investigate the social and cultural processes shaping refugees’ and migrants’ services experiences” (Weine et al., 2009).

Why is a psychosocial approach so unique in the context of efforts aimed at preventing radicalization and recruitment? Where counterterrorism researchers have often focused on understanding why some people become or stop being terrorists and on identifying the risk factors, a psychosocial approach focuses on systematically influencing family and community “protective resources” in real world community settings so as to enhance resistance to recruitment and radicalization in the first instance (Weine et al., 2009). Several points illustrate how this work could be approached, based upon the available evidence from the previously mentioned Somali-American community, as well as evidence from effective prevention interventions in public health that have diminished risk behaviors through changing community and family processes (Weine et al., 2009). These considerations correspond to the situation of US Somalis, but are also applicable to other refugee and immigrant groups.

Community-based interventions to combat radicalization and recruitment among refugee youth and young adults in the USA must be targeted, effective, and adaptive enough to overcome the risks, processes, and adversities that contribute to radicalization and recruitment to terrorism (Weine et al., 2009). Psychosocial perspectives that have achieved social and behavioral changes in other areas (most notably public health) can help to “elucidate multilevel prevention strategies” that, if properly informed, may lead to effective and sustainable interventions to combat radicalization and recruitment (Weine et al., 2009).

The Norway Action Plan

In Norway, one of the smallest countries in Europe in terms of population, problems with hate-related crimes and right-wing extremism have been addressed by a combination of many of these discussed measures (Holmes, 2009). Compared with other countries, more weight has so far been put on preventative measures rather than on reactive approaches (Holmes, 2009). On July 22, 2011, Norway witnessed one of the worst terrorist attacks in recent history, even though the number of right-wing activists was low in comparison with most other European countries (Holmes, 2009). Different approaches have been developed to prevent street violence, harassment, and

similar hate-inspired acts on the local level, and to prevent further large-scale terror attacks committed by individuals with clear ties to right-wing extremist groups (Holmes, 2009). A strategy that has successfully been implemented in many Norwegian municipalities is social intervention, which is aimed at “reintegrating perpetrators of hate crimes and participants in extreme groups” into their communities (Holmes, 2009).

The threat to Norway from Islamist terrorism has largely been more theoretical rather than literal. Despite this, Norway has developed a small-scale counter-radicalization program guided by the country’s experience with far-right violence and agitation during the 1990s (Lorenzo Vidino & James Brandon). During this period, Norway developed a wide range of measures to tackle neo-Nazi groups, principally aiming to undermine their recruitment abilities and encourage existing members to leave the groups (Lorenzo Vidino & James Brandon). Further pre-emptive work was carried out to reduce grassroots susceptibility to Neo-Nazi and racist messages (Lorenzo Vidino & James Brandon). This work was led by the police and had a strong emphasis on local community policing. This program is generally regarded as highly successful, leading to the virtual collapse of organized neo-Nazism by 2010 and the dramatic decline of neo-Nazi and related racist violence (Lorenzo Vidino & James Brandon).

Norwegian right-wing extremists, during the first half of the 1990s were poorly organized, and the pool of talent and skill they could draw upon was limited (Holmes, 2009). Very few had more than a basic education, and many of the participants had troubled or even criminal backgrounds. These right-wing groups emphasized physical training, and were “ideologically oriented and not as visibly uniformed” (Holmes, 2009). Extremism reached its peak in the mid-1990s and began to decline in the early 2000s, partly due to a function of preventative measures that were implemented in the municipalities (Holmes, 2009). But while on the national scale the problem of rightist extremism has been minor since the turn of the 21st century, right-wing extremist groups have been active in a few Norwegian communities, attacking immigrants and threatening political opponents (Holmes, 2009)

Throughout Scandinavia, crime prevention policy combines “suppression and formal and informal control” with measures designed to reintegrate perpetrators into society (Holmes, 2009). An important solution to the problem of right-wing extremism has been to reform rather than punish. In 428 Norwegian municipalities, the agents responsible for preventative work against racism and right-wing extremism are predominantly municipal units (e.g. schools, child care service, outreach workers, and youth clubs), local police, political parties and their youth affiliates, anti-racist organizations, sport clubs, and religious groups (Holmes, 2009). Municipalities enjoy great freedom in self-organizing preventative work, and can decide which methods and measures to employ.

While the approaches that were implemented during the late 1990s and early 2000s can be fruitful when the goal is simply to limit recruitment to a local group or milieu and to facilitate disengagement, it does not necessarily prevent the kind of “lone-actor” terrorism (Holmes, 2009). Intervention is most effective when the problem is limited and potentially manageable. When an easily identifiable but relatively small group is emerging in a local community, it may be possible to prevent it from attaining a “critical mass” (Holmes, 2009). A group with 30 to 40 participants will normally be noticeable within a community, and therefore will find it easier to recruit individuals looking for action. It may also attract like-minded individuals from other parts of the country or abroad, both for social gatherings and for training. Before such a group grows too large, efforts should be made to dismantle it. This goal can be accomplished by encouraging wavering young people to disengage, while sending hardcore offenders through the court system and to prison (Holmes, 2009). Youth in general may be repelled from the scene by public demonstrations

against it; meanwhile, those already engaged may be deterred by “empowerment conversations” with the preventative police (Holmes, 2009).

While some Norwegian communities have found it impossible to dismantle extremist groups completely, these communities still may succeed in reducing groups’ membership to a handful of people (Holmes, 2009). The group will then no longer be a well-recognized public actor, and so the attractiveness to such groups will hopefully decline. In this way it will lose its power to win over new recruits. It is noteworthy that when the members of extremist groups grow older, their interest in recruitment may also decrease (Holmes, 2009). Adult men between will be much less interested in bringing teenage boys into their circle of friends, “unless of course the men happen to be deeply dedicated activists” (Holmes, 2009). In regards to younger members, several techniques aimed at re-integrating them into the community, such as by cutting their ties to the right-wing extremist movement, have been successful (Holmes, 2009).

For example, parent’s groups were created to establish a supportive network for wavering young individuals and other parents in similar situations (Holmes, 2009). Parents often feel helpless and perplexed when their children take part in the activities of an extremist group. Because it is so defaming to be in this situation, parents may find that they have no one with whom they can discuss it candidly with. These parent groups were first established in Oslo and Kristiansand in the late 1990s, when the local right-wing scene there had reached its peak (Holmes, 2009). The strategy was successful, since many new recruits to extremist groups are still young enough to listen to what their parents say. The parents in these groups not only shared information about their common predicament, but also “established reasonable rules governing their children’s attire, music, and outdoor activities” (Holmes, 2009). One important goal of such groups is to “support parents who resolve not to turn their backs on their children”, even those who commit violent crimes or acts (Holmes, 2009). If parents reject their offspring, the latter probably will look to the care and support of the extremist group. The formation of parental groups assumes that parents remain interested in the welfare of their children, but success requires that “parents possess personal qualities, resources, and values that they can draw upon to turn wayward children around” (Holmes, 2009).

A study of the members of right-wing extremist groups in Kristiansand revealed that some of the most active participants had been severely neglected by their families in the past (Holmes, 2009). In fact, some had parents with addictions and severe psychiatric problems; while others had parents had already passed away. While these scenarios contradict the use of the previously mentioned parent groups, an alternative support system may be found in those outside the family unit who are willing to establish ties to “at-risk youth by listening to them and eventually winning their trust” (Holmes, 2009). These individuals may be able to support young people when they begin to tire of the extremist associations or question their ideology (Holmes, 2009). Sometimes these individuals may belong to the local community. For example, in the small town of Brumunddal, a prominent business leader who already knew some of the youth who were involved stepped up and vowed that they not end up as outcasts (Holmes, 2009). He gave some of the boys both care and attention, and even offered them jobs in his company. This businessman played a major role in weakening the racist scene in Brumunddal (Holmes, 2009).

An alternative method is the deliberate establishment of outreach projects, units, or practices that will foster the development of personal ties between ordinary community members and active extremists, racists, or gang-members (Holmes, 2009). Professionals within these programs can build personal relations with some extremist ringleaders. In similar programs in Kristiansand, these professionals have helped find them housing and work, or resume their education (Holmes, 2009). Their contribution may be as simple as assisting young people in

obtaining drivers' licenses, which in turn can give them access to full or part-time jobs (Holmes, 2009). The theory here is that positive changes in their situation will either “transform the attitudes of at-risk youth, or at least reduce their willingness to participate in violent acts” (Holmes, 2009). It is important that at-risk youth maintain ties to the community. This response to extreme behavior demonstrates a completely different strategy than the “kick-them-out” approach favored by some members of the anti-fascist movement in Norway (Holmes, 2009).

The important component of the inclusion strategy is that many participants in extremist groups, including even prominent leaders, actually want to leave. They may feel as though everyone is against them; tire of constant conflicts with their enemies and associates; long for a more normal life; or start to question the group's ideology (Holmes, 2009). Yet at the same time, they are unsure how to sever their ties with the group, since it fulfills many of their needs. Without outside assistance, they may be unable to remove themselves from their current situation (Holmes, 2009). In many respects, their predicament resembles members of criminal gangs, sectarian groups, or underground terrorist groups “seeking to break free from their entanglements” (Holmes, 2009). They may need help establishing new social support systems, or at least a chance to establish personal relationships with potential mentors (Holmes, 2009).

Municipalities confronting right-wing extremism for the first time are usually uncertain about what to do in these situations. As a consequence, the central government of Norway decided to establish a pool of experts, “The Interdisciplinary Advisory Service for Local Action against Racism and Xenophobia” (Holmes, 2009). This advisory service consisted of a “dozen researchers and practitioners, including police officers, social workers, educators, and conflict mediators” (Holmes, 2009). Together, they offered expertise to municipalities that had to deal with problems for which they may have originally been unprepared for. Usually a team of two advisors would help the agencies analyze the problem properly, evaluate its severity, and offer advice as to what sort of responses might be effective (Holmes, 2009). In 2010, the Norwegian government highlighted the role of schools to teach tolerance and include students of all backgrounds (Holmes, 2009). Schools play an important role in signaling the intolerance of ideologies that “dehumanize refugees, homosexuals, and political opponents, thereby legitimating violence against them” (Holmes, 2009). In Norway, schools educate students in the values of democracy, teaching them to interact with one another in respectful ways, and enabling them to develop “multi-cultural understanding, ethical sensitivity, and social competence” (Holmes, 2009). The expectation is an education and foundation of citizenship will help prevent radicalization.

Several informal methods have also been taken to mitigate the effects of right-wing extremist activity and involvement. “Night-walking”, for example, has been used as a measure to exercise a kind of soft social control (Holmes, 2009). Some right-wing extremists have been known to make spaces unpleasant and unsafe for immigrants, and even local citizens, to pass through. Since the early 1990s, parents throughout Scandinavia have volunteered to walk through the central business district, the suburbs, and other “hot spots” on Friday and Saturday nights to prevent heavy drinking, drug use, and violence among young people (Holmes, 2009). In most of the communities with a visible racist or right-wing extremist group, “night-walking” has been temporarily strengthened by mobilizing large numbers of parents to join informal patrols (Holmes, 2009).

As a strategy towards hindering further radicalization of at-risk Muslim youths and averting hate crimes in general, a series of dialogue meetings in the Literature House in Oslo was started in 2009 (Holmes, 2009). These meetings usually involved experts on political speakers. The debates have focused on hate against Muslims or Jews, freedom of speech, and the role of religion in the public arena. The meetings are very important as forums where a variety of experts, authors, artists,

and political activists can meet and share or oppose each other's views, and thus it paves the way for a democratic forum for debate (Holmes, 2009). However, it is not yet clear that this approach would work as well if one invited right-wing extremist youths or members to a debate of this kind (Holmes, 2009).

The Norway Action Plan also outlines several law-enforcement strategies to combating right-wing extremism. Preventative policing has played a major role in responding to violent and extremist groups in Norway. The country has a “long-established system of community policing along with a highly liberal criminal justice system” (Holmes, 2009). One important tool in the preventative police officer's tool kit is the “empowerment conversation,” which has been run by local police since 1998 (Holmes, 2009). Both the at-risk individual and his or her parents are obliged by law to meet at the police station “if the police are informed that the individual is engaged in unlawful activity” or “becoming involved with a problematic group or criminal gang” (Holmes, 2009). The purpose is partly to warn the young individual and the parents about the consequences of committing crimes and being associated with an unfavorable group, and partly to discuss what can be done to prevent the individual from traveling further along this path (Holmes, 2009).

In many ways, Norway is an unusual case. For counter-radicalization work, there is a high degree of trust between the populace and the police, which makes it much easier for programs like the Norway Action plan to function relatively free of controversy (Lorenzo Vidino & James Brandon). Norway's work shows in particular that counter-radicalization efforts can be included in ordinary policing work for little or no extra financial cost; that sober public messaging on terrorism and radicalization can win over Muslim communities and make them active partners in counter-radicalization; and that interventions can head off problems at an early stage (Lorenzo Vidino & James Brandon). It also shows that long-term police work – over a wide range of subjects “such as crime, delinquency, and drugs” – can also produce benefits in terms of countering extremism and radicalization (Lorenzo Vidino & James Brandon).

Other Potential Partners

There is emerging consensus that prevention against violent extremism should involve a core group which develops and partners with a broader network of mental health, public health, and education professionals, and other community advocates so as “to facilitate help seeking and referrals and to insure that services are relevant to the population needs” (Foster & Butler, 2008). Community partnerships in public health, at their best, bring more than just representative voices to the table. They recognize the breadth of stakeholders contributing to community health from social and health services to private business and media (Foster & Butler, 2008). Public health involves diverse disciplines relevant to CVE such as psychiatry, psychology, sociology, communications, education, and public policy (Foster & Butler, 2008). Public health educational expertise can contribute to trainings, workshops, and resource development to professionals who work in relevant settings (Foster & Butler, 2008).

Partnerships strengthen the way that non-governmental and community organizations and government (e.g. local public health departments) work together to identify strategies and resources, helping sectors integrate CVE into their activities and “work as teams to develop an integrated prevention and intervention plan, clear roles, and responsibilities for each stakeholder” (Foster & Butler, 2008). From the public health perspective, enhancing organizational partnerships extends beyond “increasing and enhancing the linkages and collaborations between government and non-governmental organizations”; a public health approach encompasses improving partnerships between NGOs in the community regardless of governmental involvement. Public

health professionals can also teach community leaders how to develop and sustain collaborations and obtain additional resources from external organizations (Foster & Butler, 2008).

Research suggests that more specific prevention strategies that emphasize inter-agency coordination may yield more effective outcomes (Kosseim, 2011). The federal government can foster partnerships to support communities through law enforcement, the private sector, and other associations to prevent violent extremism and combat radicalization. Although each discipline will not need the same level of detail in receiving and disseminating information, the “foundation of intelligence-led policing, community policing, and collaborative practices” are essential (Kosseim, 2011). The need for a two-way educational process is necessary for understanding the operations of each entity and how each can enhance operations with the other (Kosseim, 2011).

Preventing radicalization must begin at the local level by supporting local organizations programs that address radicalization and violent extremism. Counter-radicalization efforts vary from counterterrorism initiatives, and require greater cooperation between a vast range of other “government and state departments”, as well as other “civilian agencies in hopes of developing a citywide counter-radicalization program” (Kosseim, 2011). Education is intrinsic, and cooperation with educational and social services may further the initiative to educate the public about the radicalization process, what is being done to prevent it, and how ordinary citizens can assist with counter-radicalization efforts (Kosseim, 2011). Implementing a wide range of programs in cooperation with organizations that promote immigrant integration and civic engagement, including those responsible for addressing community safety issues, may help prevent radicalization that leads to violent extremism. Building partnerships and providing community support is part of combined efforts based on mutual trust and understanding.

Conclusions

Addressing violent extremism requires significant new initiatives that extend beyond criminal justice and are a part of public health policy and practice. A public health approach creates opportunities for multi-purpose programming, where addressing violent extremism can become part of a broader platform for addressing other youth well-being concerns, such as involving identity, mental health, and gender violence. Also, a public health approach may be able to avoid the stigma associated with criminal justice engagement perceived as identifying a suspect community (Foster & Butler, 2008). Lastly, a public health approach may open up other approaches to organizing and funding CVE programs, by leveraging existing public health resources.

Furthering progress in accomplishing this policy shift toward public health will require additional efforts. First, addressing violent radicalization should be grounded in solid theory, which should include public health. Second, addressing violent extremism needs policymaker and practitioner champions not just from law enforcement but also from public health as well as mental health, education, youth advocacy, and faith communities (Kosseim, 2011). Finally, evaluations of initiatives to address violent extremism and scientific investigations of violent extremism should employ progressive public health scientific approaches.

Applying a public health approach to the prevention of violent radicalization in the population will include a search for risk and protective markers that can be a focus of interventions to minimize recruitment to violent radicalization (Weine et al., 2009). A public health approach has the potential to foster social inclusion and social justice in communities that feel threatened by terrorism, to help “destigmatize suspect communities”, and to identify and address common issues of grievance or marginalization (Weine et al., 2009). In addition, a public health approach can facilitate the identification of factors to protect individuals from induction into violent ideologies during critical development periods.

Given the recent shift in the political climate and various executive orders stigmatizing Muslims and Arabs, it appears that the United States will only continue on this punitive path. Now more than ever, the U.S. must do away with the ineffective and reactive security approach, and instead further education and prevention strategies that promote inclusion and understanding amongst vulnerable individuals. For future research, it is paramount to “identify the possible independent variables that are associated with the increased probability of radicalization in certain communities such as marginalized communities, diaspora communities, and ideology” (Weine et al., 2009). The importance of understanding the core of the radicalization process demands the necessity to question and debate the concept of violent radicalization at the theoretical level and the empirical level. The motivation for an individual or group to commit extremist violence or terrorism is not grounded in a single ideology, but selectively demonstrate their commitment from different clusters of belief systems, and must be effectively understood and evaluated.

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Identity, Conflicts and Reconciliation

Martin Pabst

The Confessionalisation of Conflicts in the Arab World – Syria, Lebanon and Iraq

Conflicts in the Arab world are often referred to as “ethnic conflicts” or “religious wars” and assumed to be unavoidable. When viewed from this standpoint, Arabs are the sworn enemies of Kurds and Iranians, Muslims are fierce opponents of Jews and Christians, and Sunni and Shiite Muslims are in a state of constant feud. However, other observers refute the claim that the conflicts have an underlying ethnic, religious or tribal motivation. They believe that existing resentments are simply being exploited in the struggle for power, expansion or control over resources. Using the examples of Syria, Lebanon and Iraq – countries which are highly fragmented into many ethnic, religious and tribal groups –, this paper investigates whether and to what extent ethnic, religious and tribal identities determine the actions of the protagonists in these conflicts. It argues that group cohesiveness traditionally plays a significant role in Arab societies. Group membership serves as an important social identity and has been reinforced by historic developments, e.g. by the Ottoman millet system. But it does not automatically result in a political identity. Divide and rule politics of both colonial governments and post-independence authoritarian rulers have, however, politicized these social identities in the 20th century. Population groups were played off against each other, and political and economic privileges were awarded to certain population groups. The resulting tensions contributed to the present wars in Iraq and Syria.

Since new borders and new states are not the most promising solution, the present national states must accommodate their different subgroups, respect their identities and distribute resources and services equally.

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The Confessionalisation of Conflicts in the Arab World – Syria, Lebanon and Iraq

Introduction

Armed conflicts in the Arab world are now often referred to as “sectarian conflicts” and assumed to be unavoidable. However, other observers refute this claim. They believe that existing resentments are simply being exploited in the struggle for power, expansion or control over resources. Using the examples of Syria, Lebanon and Iraq, my paper investigates whether and to what extent ethnic and religious identities determine the actions of the protagonists and which solutions could guarantee sustainable peace.

First, we must go back into history in order to understand today’s armed conflicts and their characteristics. In Europe, in the wake of the Peace of Westphalia in 1648, sovereign territorial states began to take the place of supranational empires. The 19th century saw the spread of the idea of the nation state, in which the nation and its people identify with the polity. The nation state seeks to create a homogeneous body, a “cultural nation”, based on a common ethnic, linguistic or cultural foundation, or on the citizens’ will, a “willed nation” (Winkler, ²1985, pp. 7-9). In Europe, group identities were weakened by means of administration and laws, the nation state’s ideology, the language policy, the educational system and through compulsory military service, sometimes even by force.

The Arab world followed a different pattern. With the exception of Morocco, the inner Arab Peninsula and Oman, this region was formerly part of the Ottoman Empire. Today’s Lebanon, Syria and Iraq – all former Ottoman territories – are extremely diverse in ethnic, religious and tribal terms and have strong, overlapping group identities (Hourani, ²2000, pp. 261-384). Over the ages, individualism has been afforded little significance in these societies. People are part of an extended family, and also of a tribe, a religious group and an ethnic/linguistic/cultural community. Group identities continue to carry great weight, despite the fact that individualism is beginning to take hold among today’s youth. Religious groups have particular significance because of their political role over past centuries. They have become important political and social frameworks for identity.

In the Ottoman Empire there was no nation, just a Muslim “nationality”, along with “millets” (self-administered and additionally taxed non-Muslim religious communities). This system allowed the communities to live peacefully side-by-side for many centuries (Steinbach, 1996, pp. 66ff.). Religious communities did not only provide identity, but also cared for the solidarity and survival of their members. The reach of the government was limited in the Arab provinces, so in times of economic need, war and natural catastrophe people fell back on their religious or tribal communities. Their members lived in particular areas, villages or urban districts; they married each other, were given jobs by their friends and family and helped each other in times of need. Today, religious communities in this region still provide their members with solidarity and help when times are hard. Furthermore, the fundamental lack of individual and civil rights means that religious and tribal communities are vital for lobbying the government on issues that affect their members. It is also the failure of the state and its government, which strengthens sectarian identities.

Divide and Rule

When the power of the Ottoman Empire began to fade in the 19th century, the European powers tried to fuel tensions between the different population groups in order to destabilize the

rule of the sultan. Christian and Jewish minorities benefited from this external support, but their privileged status bred resentment among the Muslim majority population (Pink, ⁵2005, p. 734f.). In turn, as the 19th century drew to a close, the Ottoman government sought to cling to power by adopting the same policy of divide and rule. In Lebanon, Sultan Abdul Hamid II set the Druze against the Catholic Maronites, in Syria the Sunnis against the Alawites, and in Iraq the Sunni nomads against the Shiite arable farmers (Werner, Markow, 1979, p. 215).

When Greater Syria was subdivided among France and Britain, divide and rule was again employed. France cut off the Lebanon from Syria with the aim of building a Christian dominated clientele state. In remaining Syria, it created autonomous regions and mainly recruited Christians and Alawites for administrative and military functions. In Iraq, the British collaborated with the minority Sunni elites and imposed a foreign Sunni royal dynasty. They recruited Kurds and Christian Assyrians to the armed forces and used them to suppress uprisings. To the Shiite majority, these groups appeared as henchmen of the British Mandate (Boveri, 1938, pp. 138-143, 435-455). Unlike Syria, Iraq was an artificial construct, as political, economic and social links between the Ottoman provinces of Mosul, Baghdad and Basra had been marginal. The Kurds who were living in Northern Iraq showed little loyalty to Iraq from the start and displayed separatist aspirations (Fürting, ⁵2005, p. 517). The prospects for the future Iraqi state were bad from the beginning, but British politics made it worse. Eyewitness Margret Boveri wrote in 1938: “(...) when the new state of Iraq was to be built, the enmity between Sunnis and Shiites was so deep and insurmountable that it often threatened to tear the young nation apart.” (Boveri, 1938, p. 151).

Nation building as Part of Pan-Arab Nationalism

Then Pan-Arabism arrived. In 1963, the nationalist Baath Party came to power both in Syria and in Iraq. Following the European model, pan-Arab nationalists aimed to set up first independent “cultural nations” and then unite them at a later stage. At least in theory, Pan-Arab nations encompassed all religious and tribal streams under one common roof and destiny. Only ethnic-linguistic minorities did not fit into that scheme. Therefore, Kurds in Syria and Iraq were marginalized or even forced to assimilate. This pressure created tensions and even armed resistance (Bretholz, 1960; Tibi, 1971, pp. 149-198).

Syria made some progress in nation building in the sixties, whereas in Iraq sectarian interests continued to prevail behind the façade of Pan-Arabism. The Sunni minority remained in fact privileged, and the Shiites were second-class citizens. Lebanon’s story was completely different. Here, Ottoman group particularism was elevated to the organizational principle behind the state after it gained independence. Lebanon was set up as a consociational democracy without majority rule, based on 18 recognized religious communities. Parliamentary seats as well as the highest governmental positions and many other posts are allocated proportionally. To some extent, the constitution is a continuation of the Ottoman millet system, but the Sunnis are no longer afforded their previous privileges (Felsch, 2010, pp. 379-398; Harris, 2012).

Tensions between population groups increased during the 1970s in Syria and Iraq, when pan-Arab nationalism in Syria and Iraq was in fact replaced by the rule of small cliques. In Syria, Hafiz al-Assad relied on his clan and his religious group, the Alawi sect. He also courted other religious minorities such as the Christians, Druze and Shiites and gave them positions in his government, civil service and army. From the Sunni camp, he co-opted the merchant classes and the conservative clergy (Kraitt, 2013). In Iraq, Saddam Hussein created a ruling clique supported by his family clan, his tribe and Arab Sunnis, who make up one quarter of the population of Iraq. Saddam Hussein also co-opted Arab religious minorities such as Christians and Mandeans (Baram,

2003). Both regimes rested on religious minority groups and employed a divide and rule strategy by distributing privileges along sectarian lines.

After the fall of Saddam Hussein, the U.S. occupiers failed to initiate the building of an Iraqi nation that encompassed all its various groups. New political parties were largely founded based on ethnic, religious and tribal affiliations. The Bush government neglected Senator Joe Biden's proposal of a federation (Biden, Gelb, 2006). Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki turned the former ruling system on its head. Now the Shiite majority discriminated against the Sunni minority in all aspects of government behind the façade of a democratic state. After 2003 tensions in Iraq escalated into a state of permanent armed conflict between the Sunni minority and the now-dominant Shiite majority. Salafist and Jihadist groups supported from the Sunni Gulf states carried out targeted brutal campaigns against Shiites, provoking acts of revenge by the other side. The Kurds were able to be granted autonomy in Northern Iraq because of US support and working on extending it still further (Allawi, 2007; Buchta, 2015, pp. 181-288).

The Sunni-Shia Divide

During the last 30 years, tensions between Sunnites and Shiites have increased. There is resentment and prejudice between these two streams, yet there are many places where Sunnis and Shiites have coexisted peacefully for centuries. Now their relationship is increasingly influenced by the geopolitical antagonism between Saudi Arabia and the Iran (Black, 2007; The Sunni-Shia Divide, 2014). Following the success of the Islamic Revolution in Iran in 1979, the rivalry between the two countries became religious as well as political. Both countries sought to become the leaders of the Gulf region and the leaders of the Muslim world. Militant Anti-Shia propaganda, which is deeply rooted in Wahabism, serves Saudi Arabia as a means to mobilize Sunnis against the regional rival Iran. In the past, Saudi-Arabian government agencies as well as private institutions did not shy away from financing and arming militant Sunni Islamist groups in numerous countries.

In many places, the political and ideological struggle for power between the Saudi and Iranian camps has succeeded in poisoning relations between Sunnis and Shiites. Violent attacks are on the increase, mostly carried out by fanatical Sunni activists. For their part, senior Shiite clerics such as Ali al-Sistani of Najaf have repeatedly and successfully called on the followers of their own branch of Islam to exercise restraint. But repeated attacks by Salafists and Jihadists in recent years have also resulted in the formation of increasingly fundamentalist and violent Shiite militias (Nasr, 2007, particularly pp. 175-178).

Developments since 2011

The "Arab Revolt" contributed to the increase of religious and ethnic tensions. Initially, the Syrian protest movement was striving for political freedom and better economic opportunities. It was dominated by the disadvantaged Sunni majority, but was also joined by representatives from minorities. During the protests, demonstrators chanted "We are all Syrians, we are united" and "No to sectarianism" (Helberg, 2012; Putz, 2012; Yazbek, 2012). However, the strategy of the Syrian government was and still is to present the protest movement as an insurrection by radical Islamist Sunnis in order to create fear amongst the country's minorities. This divide and rule strategy has been successful as the overwhelming majority of Syrian Alawites, Christians, Druze and Shiites have remained loyal or at least remained neutral. However, the opposition groups have also contributed to the growing sectarian character of the conflict. Resistance groups mobilized their followers by sectarian propaganda, as evidenced by the decidedly Sunni names given to many of the new militias. Battle-hardened radical Sunni groups such as Liwa al-Tawhid and Jabhat al-Nusra began playing an ever more prominent role, while slogans such as "Christians to the Lebanon,

Alawites to the coffin” could be heard being chanted at rallies. The appearance of Daesh represented an additional and, as yet, unprecedented level of sectarian radicalization.

There were a number of reasons for this particular development. The Syrian government itself contributed to the rise of Islamic extremism when it released numerous Sunni Islamist prisoners and began to focus its attacks more strongly on secular rather than Islamist resistance groups. Their rationale was that a fear of Sunni Salafists and Jihadists would force the West to decide the government was the lesser of two evils. Secondly, a clear picture of the enemy increased the combat strength of both sides and confessional aspects became increasingly important. This made it also easier for government and opposition alike to attract external support. By adding a confessional aspect to the image of the enemy, external actors such as Iran, Turkey, Qatar and Saudi Arabia were able to recruit fighters to join the conflict in Syria as a front for their own political ambitions.

The confessionalisation of the conflict was also a direct result of the unending civil war. The only way that people could survive the daily attacks and destruction of their way of life was by falling back on the support of their communities. Feelings of confessional hatred and revenge were fueled by the brutal war crimes committed on civilians solely on account of their religious affiliations. As we saw in the Balkans in the 1990s, ethnic and religious “cleansing” is also a popular tool for realigning and consolidating territorial boundaries. Iraq had to go through similar developments during the last years (Buchta, 2015, pp. 257-380).

The Situation today

In the Arab world, group identities are strong social identities, but not necessarily political identities. However, by exploiting them for power, privilege and military victory, they have become more and more politicized. Flight and expulsion have led to huge population movements that will be largely irreversible. The virtual “segregation” of the various groups and the resulting hatred makes it unrealistic to expect a return to the multi-religious and multicultural status quo of the past. New systems of government have to be found that will make it possible for people to enjoy a permanent, peaceful coexistence.

Which is the solution for sustainable peace?

It is increasingly being stated that the young nation states of Syria and Iraq have failed and that the best solution is now to redraw state boundaries along religious, ethnic or tribal lines (Peters, 2006; Hermann, 2014; Trofimov, 2015; Williams, 2016; Chulov, 2016). It is, however, hard to imagine that representatives of Arab governments and population groups could ever come together at a peace conference and amicably agree on redrawing the borders. Border changes are either the result of military victories or are imposed from outside. Both of these scenarios sow the seeds of future conflicts. A restructuring of the Middle East would also be problematic because of the region’s overlapping identities. Which principle should be employed? Division along religious lines would seem to be the easiest, but this would result in splitting mixed Sunni/Shiite tribes. On the other hand, population groups such as the Kurds tend to define themselves in ethnic and linguistic terms, not in terms of their religion. The principle of separation also goes against the centuries-old tradition of coexistence in the Middle East. It could only be realized with the aid of yet more painful population movements. Finally, it should be borne in mind that secession may lead to drawn-out conflicts about borders and resources.

It is also doubtful whether new states created on the basis of group identities could lead to peace. Of course, it would mean that different population groups would have their own “homeland”, but this would still result in the new and old states having minorities. What is more, the groups are

not homogeneous. Christians in the Middle East are divided into a dozen different denominations with their own strong identities. Peoples such as the Kurds e.g. have a strong sense of being one nation, but they are still divided into numerous clans, tribes and religious affiliations. Another possible solution would be a Pan-Islamic Commonwealth. Islamists want to see all Muslim states unite based on the Ummah. There are a number of possible models for this solution, from a confederation to a caliphate (Schlicht, 2010). However, Shiites and non-Muslims would not be equal members of the Ummah. At best, they would be tolerated as protected minorities, or they may be discriminated against or even persecuted. Islamic systems therefore only have limited capacity to resolve conflicts between groups. It is also doubtful as to whether and to what extent it is possible to combine democracy and Islamism.

Conclusions

In Lebanon, Syria, and Iraq, there are strong and multiple group identities. There has been a 150-year-old history of divide and rule, and the Syrian and Iraqi centralized nation state has badly failed. Unfortunately, there is also no real alternative to the nation state. Border changes are not helpful tools. Therefore, in Syria and Iraq, the nation state must be reformed in order to accommodate group identities. The following systems may be alternatives:

- a federal state with provinces enjoying certain powers,
- territorial autonomy for a particular population group,
- a second parliamentary chamber accommodating group interests,
- radical decentralization and self-administration of different groups (Karabulut, Örtülü, 2015),
- consociational democracy without majority rule.

All the above systems have their pros and cons. A federal system may reduce the dominance of a larger population group in a state, yet at provincial level there may still be tensions between different groups. Territorial autonomy favors a particular population group, which of course may lead to resentment among other groups. Radical decentralization and self-administration of groups may weaken the capacities of the center and impede nation-wide policies. Consociational democracy, as it is practiced in Lebanon, without majority rule explicitly involves all population groups in the political process and prevents the largest group from outvoting other groups. However, consociational democracy can be very bureaucratic and time-consuming, making it difficult to decide quickly.

Regardless of how Syria and Iraq will choose to restructure themselves, one thing is clear: they will have to take into account the complexity and the strength of group identities and guarantee that all citizens feel represented in the state, its institutions, and in the distribution of national resources.

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Yahya Yechouti

Perspectives on Arab Muslim Identity (En)Countering Globalization and Change - “The Arab Spring” and Morocco as a Case-Study

On account of the ground-breaking events ranging from the fall of the Berlin Wall and the announcement of the “end of history”, through the engulfing trend of globalization that ensued, to the theory of the Clash of Civilizations and its neo-conservative proponents in the 90s --vindicated among other things, some might argue, by the cataclysmic attacks of New York in 2001-- this paper explores broadly, given the urgency of the events, how the Arab-Muslim world is witnessing a pace of political, economic, and cultural changes during these last thirty years never seen before, culminating ultimately in what is known now as the “Arab Spring” and a complete reshuffle of the MENA region.

These changes have been affecting a lot of aspects of our lives, and ultimately our identities and the way we relate, we exchange and we interact with the rest of the world as Arabs and Muslims. Special emphasis is put on the case of Morocco since this country stands out, given its “resilience” to... change, preferring stability and homeopathic doses to radical change. Ultimately, the aim of this essay is to put the Arab Spring in retrospective, six year after it started...

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Perspectives on Arab Muslim Identity (En)Countering Globalization and Change - “The Arab Spring” and Morocco as a Case-Study

Things fall apart; the centre cannot hold;
Mere anarchy is loosed upon the world,
The blood-dimmed tide is loosed, and everywhere
The ceremony of innocence is drowned;
The best lack all conviction, while the worst
Are full of passionate intensity.
“The Second Coming” W.B.Yeats

Introduction

Whichever way we look at the state of the Arab Muslim world today, one cannot but acknowledge that something is not going right about it, to say the least, which entails the question: are we at the beginning or at the end of a cycle?¹ Though there is about a century difference between the time when the Irish poet W.B. Yeats wrote his poem: “The Second Coming,” probably as a dirge for the decline of European civilization, I find it summarizes well the current state of the MENA region. Of course our decline did not start with the wave of terrorism that has been sweeping the region for more than a quarter of a century now, the 9/11 attacks certainly marked a turning point in the precipitation and escalation of this decline. We thought we had seen the worst with the misappropriation of Arab land by colonial powers, and especially the “Nakba”/catastrophe of the 1948, but seemingly that was but the “tip of the iceberg.”

Different readings can be made of what is now known as the Arab Spring, chronologically a misnomer since the events in Tunisia and Egypt started in winter, but probably an optimistic metaphoric label in the tradition of other historic events that brought prosperity and peace to other regions in the world². Anyway, today, and six years after it started, the Arab spring looks more of an autumn rather than a spring.

Indeed, the Arab world is in turmoil, statues are crashing to earth. The optimists spoke of an Arab spring, an Arab revolution; the conspiracy theory holders spoke of a hidden agenda manipulated by imperialist forces so as to have free access to Arab land and resources. The pessimists, from the very beginning, admitted that even though the movement might be genuine, its outcome would result only in worse conditions and chaos, something that many people believe is being vindicated when we look at the current state of the Arab world.³

Whatever the attitude, this uprising was one of those rare defining historic moments that have huge direct repercussions on the people and the region involved, and indirectly on the rest of the world. The redistribution of the cards between the actors at play is conspicuous and still unfolding, and we can bet that this process is not nearing completion anytime soon.

We believe that what is at stake is huge enough to prompt a serious reconsideration of our beliefs, ideologies, attitudes. It is a paradigm shift that puts into question our founding myths, our identities as Arabs, Muslims, our notions of nation, country, state, “Umma”.

Indeed, and at various degrees, not one single country in the Arab world was spared from the winds of change that were (and still are) blowing on the whole region. The movement was so abrupt and quick that no one seemed to be able to hold or refrain it. Why at that very moment? And

then, what about that reaction of the West? Was the "surprise" genuine, as many Western leaders wanted us to believe at that time, or was it simply another Frankenstein that had escaped the leash?⁴

The French historian Alain Garrigou, in an article in *Le monde diplomatique* entitled "1948, le printemps des peuples," draws an interesting parallel between what is going on in the Arab world and what happened in 1848 in Europe.⁵ He details how Europe's "spring" started with a "simple" incident at the gates of the French monarchy's palace in Paris, and how the French prime minister at the time ordered the royal guard to fire against the insurgents. This ended with the insurgents radicalizing their movement and ultimately propagating it to the rest of Europe. Some years later, and fearing the repercussions of the movement on their own existence, the European monarchies united in a counter-revolutionary movement that crashed the European "spring". This reminds us of what happened in 2011 when many Gulf monarchies (Bahrein, UAE, Saudi Arabia, etc.) united against the insurgents in their respective countries and in the region as a whole.

Before going further, I would like to shed light now on what some might consider as polemical aspects of the title of my paper. First, the word Arab is problematic in a country like Morocco where half of its population is not Arab, where a minority goes further and considers the Arabs as invaders. The word Muslim again is problematic: does it refer to the person born from Muslim parents but who might not know much about his/her religion or its rituals, or shall we consider a Muslim only the one who prays, fasts, and observes the five pillars of Islam? In this case we will exclude about half of the Moroccan population as being non-Muslim. In other words, and far from being limited to its religious dimension, the word Muslim seems more and more amalgamated with social and/or ethnic identities.⁶

Identity is precisely *the* word to stop at for analysis since, first, it is one of the key words of this essay, and since it is such a complex and polysemous term. So, which identity are we referring to? The social, the political, the economic, the ethnic, the racial, or all these together?⁷

The legitimacy of these questions lies in the fact that these identifications-questions remain what Limame Barbouchi calls "mere articulations,"⁸ especially at a time when identity has become transient in a world reduced to a "mere village." Different cultures are getting into direct contact and interaction resulting in the emergence of new identities, or to use a more "fashionable" word, dear to the postmodernists, "hybrid identities".⁹

For example, what made the world define the phenomenon that took place in this region as "the Arab spring?" Is it a question of concomitant borders, but borders, as we all know, are artificial and were most of the time imposed by the former colonising western powers. There are nations without borders and borders without coherent nations.¹⁰ Or, was the Arab spring due to the fact that a majority of the inhabitants of this region speak Arabic? Or because of the historic background of this region, or simply because the regimes of this region happen to be all autocratic with a long history of oppression and denial of human rights for their people?

What I am endeavouring to convey is simply that notions that we might take for granted could prove to be very complex and misleading. This is worth our introspection because what you could hear, read, or see sometimes among the protesting Moroccan movements, part of the "20th February" Movement in Morocco and part of the awakening taking place in general in the Arab world, was just full of confusion and misconceptions. But perhaps the most original and even "dangerous" aspect of these movements, another might say, is their self-proclaimed righteousness and the refusal to accept any dissonant opinion.

Indeed, the "20th February" Movement militants belong to different factions that are in utter opposition when it comes to their ideologies/identities, from ultra-Marxist-Leninists to ultra-religious, all walking together in public marches and demonstrations, claiming a refusal of tyranny and injustice, but conspicuously contradictory about the ultimate society they aim to achieve.

This polarisation is reflected even in the intellectual circles that try to defend respectively the "chapel"/group they represent. Here is for example an interesting interview with Tariq Ramadan and Abdelwahab Meddeb in *Le Monde* entitled «De la charia à l'islamophobie, de l'homosexualité au statut de la femme», held in April 2011, and how each one of these two Arab intellectuals holds quite opposing positions as to what defines the identities of the youngsters who protested in the "Arab Spring." While Ramadan acknowledges that the movement is certainly not *Islamist*, he rightfully condemns those who claim it to be *anti-Islamic*. On the other hand, A. Meddeb openly rejects any religious dimension of the movement and defines it rather as a humanist movement. He maintains that it is not post-Islamic but beyond Islam:

“C’est ainsi que je qualifierai ce qui s’est passé en Tunisie et en Egypte. La question du référent religieux ne s’est pas posée. Ces événements n’ont rien à voir avec l’identité religieuse ou culturelle. Les gens se sont révoltés contre une situation où l’*habeas corpus* n’était pas respecté. Le minimum de l’intégrité de l’individu n’était pas assuré. Ce soulèvement s’est fait au-delà des identités. Ce n’est pas parce qu’on est musulman qu’on proteste mais en tant qu’opprimé. La protestation s’est exprimée au nom de l’humanité bafouée. Dès qu’on évoque l’espace du sud, on a le prurit du référent qui engendre la différence. C’est d’ailleurs un réflexe occidental que de voir quelque chose d’islamique dans tout événement qui provient des territoires dont la religion dominante est l’islam. Seule a été invoquée la liberté comme principe qui appartient à l’homme, au droit naturel. Certes la culture et la religion de ces pays n’ont pas entravé cet appel à la liberté. Aussi ces mouvements n’étaient ni islamistes, ni islamiques. Ceux qui se sont soulevés ont réclamé leur autonomie d’individu et le droit qu’ils ont sur leur pays, cela même qui leur était refusé par les prédateurs qui les dirigeaient. Ceux qui ont eu l’audace de manifester en affrontant la mort défendaient et réclamaient une même chose : être un homme libre. Ces Arabes auraient pu être des Chinois ou des Birmans. Leur seul référent était le droit à la liberté, à la dignité, à la justice que tout humain revendique. Cela excède la dichotomie Islam/Occident.”¹¹

On the other hand, this polarisation could be simply part of the normal course of any movement born in undemocratic environments with a predominance of the leader’s unique opinion and voice. That is why some analysts consider that in spite of these shortcomings, they consider that this is the Arab world’s exit *into* history. “[A]n exit from a sterile closed place into a land of painful and consequential choices,” a shift from the status of subjects to the status of citizens.¹²

Professor John Keane, from the University of Sidney, is among the analysts who consider the Arab awakening as a unique movement for which there is a need to coin a new word: “refolution” instead of revolution. He argues that:

“A new word is needed to describe these remarkable events of recent months. They can be called ‘refolutions’, radical refusals of the old choice between reform and revolution and the familiar revolutionary logic of using violence to capture and dismantle the imagined heartlands of state power.”¹³

It should be said, however, that the transformations that have begun in the Arab world in recent years are admittedly still in their infancy. Nobody knows what would happen next; only a divinity could predict with certainty what the near-distant future holds. That, of course, is the trademark of revolutions. “[T]hey unchain struggles for freedom and power manoeuvres that inject great uncertainty into the world.”¹⁴

Islam and the Arab Spring

The Arab uprising has created, among other phenomena, a paradigm shift at the level of religion. In spite of the fact that the majority of Islamists went during the start of the Arab Spring *sotto voce* about their old claim for a return of the peoples to Islam as *the* solution to the Muslim world's backwardness and underdevelopment, they came to the fore only after the Arab spring's "dissidence" youth toppled the old regimes. A new spirit was in the air; a quite optimistic one that celebrated the camaraderie of the youth crowds in the Arab streets.¹⁵ Arshin Adib-Moghaddam considered that the emancipatory movements in the Arab world represent an inner shift in the self-understanding of Islam - one that promised to overcome an era of false polarities and dogmas.¹⁶ Many scholars started speaking about a "postmodern Islam", a radical departure from the deterministic, totalitarian "Islamism" of previous generations. One has only to review what some Islamists used to say about "democracy" --as being the invention of the West in order to trick Muslims into abandoning their political system based on "Shura"-- and how they all (excluding very few ultra-radicals of course) accept now the term as relevant and suitable for an equitable and just society.

Arshin Adib-Moghaddam then went on to insist on the postmodern Islam, which was floating freely on the world-wide-web, and linked it up with the universal move towards democracy, social equality and resistance to political tyranny.

Even at the level of discourse, the moderate Islamists have adopted a new one and do not necessarily consider using French as a sign of alienation (for example Morocco's former prime minister, A. Benkirane, and his "original" communication, a mixture of Arabic -classical and dialect- and French). In this emerging discourse, prescriptions such as "Islam is..." and "Islam must be..." were succeeded by formulations such as "Islam may add..." and "Islam could be...". This is a profound shift, one that was discernible in many speeches and attitudes of the leaders of the "Ikhwan Brotherhood" in Egypt, the Al-Nahda party in Tunisia and the PJD Party in Morocco. Some of them have also learned the "Realpolitik" and the necessity to compromise while in government.¹⁷

Arab Muslim Identity after 9/11

After the 9/11 events, the Madrid and London attacks, the election, twice, of a neoconservative president, George Bush Jr. and his team at the head of the most powerful country in the world, after the zeal and violent reaction of Muslim masses to the publication of denigrating caricatures of the prophet Mohamed by a Danish cartoonist, the turmoil over the place of Islam vs secularism in the West, and the trivialisation of certain words and concepts like crusades, clash of civilizations, fundamentalism, islamophobia, etc., many people think that the prophesy of the French intellectual André Malraux, "the 21st C. will be spiritual of will not", has proven right.¹⁸ Given the influence and impacts the Arab uprising was having worldwide, including countries as powerful as France (les indignés), Spain (the Indignados), China, Russia and even the US (Occupy Wall Street), I was among those who thought (and we were many) this is the 1st time since the collapse of the last major Muslim empire (the Ottomans) the Arabs Muslims have been taken as role models.

In the excitement of the moment, we went further by thinking that Andre Malraux was wrong in his prediction and thought he would have been better inspired if he had said: "the 21st C. will be revolutionary or will be not." We were also very excited to prove wrong the theorists and often partisans who tried pseudo-scientifically to prove that Islam is inherently incompatible with democracy, that it was simply pure racism to announce that Arabs "naturally" accept their leaders' violence and oppression because it is an integral part of their culture, (Bernard Lewis, Richard Perle, Paul Wolfowitz...). We were so proud to show the world that the Arab world is far from being

monolithic, and that uprising has proven that we are like everyone else, we can accept a certain amount of injustice, corruption, oppression, but there are limits... In other words, we were excited to prove that the above theorists' theses were shattered by this uprising.

Of course, and given the state of the Arab Muslim world now, these theorists might be laughing at us by saying: "we told you so, your religion and your culture are incompatible with democracy. To this we might retort, simply and humbly, the aftermath is not known yet, but without doubt, the future will be different because of globalisation, the digital revolution and social networking, (the latter has proven to be the most populous, powerful and influential cyber country in the world with more than a billion and a half people subscribing to social networks like Facebook, Twitter, and Youtube.

Indeed, this leads us to talk about the other significant illustration of the Arab Muslim Identity change seen at the level of how New Technologies and Communication (NTC) as well as globalization have completely integrated the Arab Muslim citizen within the postmodern world. As Fatima Mernissi remarked in an interview in 2006,

"The satellite channels have strengthened a pan-Arab space of reception that has become a unique transnational market. The old information networks characterized by a propaganda function have been replaced by others, with new professional guide-lines conforming to the international standards. In addition to the spreading of satellite dishes which tower even on the balconies of Casablanca over the shanty town, since the 80's cyber cafes have increased in number and represent the new frontier of the communication in the Arab world."¹⁹

But perhaps more significant are how have these phenomena revolutionized the leader-citizen relationship in this part of the world. The case of the former Libyan dictator, Muammar Gaddafi, is a case in point. Having always been out of History, he could not foresee the great tide of change that had already swept away two of his former colleagues. He simply turned mad, both figuratively and literally. Figuratively against the "ungrateful" Libyans, and especially at the idea that he, the king of Kings, the most senior Arab leader, the founder of the Great Jamahiriya and author of the "unparalleled Green Book," is challenged by some "rats, cockroaches and drug-addicts," meaning those who dared revolt against him.

Gaddafi could not understand the Tunisians for whom, he had publicly declared, he felt pity because they were unable to realize the "blunder" they were committing by dismissing their "good and genius" leader Ben Ali. Some days later, he reiterated the same attitude towards the "unconscious" Egyptian people for overthrowing their president Husni Mubarak.

If he never expressed any sympathy or any remorse towards his own population --that he was indeed ready to massacre had he not been stopped by Nato,-- there is but one explanation for this attitude: this man did not realise the world has changed, and that the digital revolution and globalisation have heralded a radical change for humanity; in other words and once again, this man was simply living outside history (Bachar El Assad of Syria is another notorious example).²⁰

Conclusion

So what are we to make of the current state of the Arab-Muslim world six years after the start of what is now known as the Arab Spring? My initial question about cycles at the beginning of this essay was obviously a rhetorical one. I feel however that we are at the beginning of something new where, far from finding the right answers, we are at l(e)ast putting the right questions; we are at a moment where we are more and more prompted to identify and question our beliefs and assumptions as well as their "universality." Arab and Muslim intellectuals are defending sometimes

quite opposing positions in their analysis of what defines this movement known as the Arab Spring. While some claim it is an "Allaho Akbar" free movement, and detach it from any religious referent, most claim it to be a movement born within an Islamic soil not in contradiction with the Islamic version of democracy and freedom.

Anyway, and as I wrote in a previous essay:

"Muslims in general and Arabs in particular are on the front line. Known for their conservatism and emphasis on tradition, they are being stigmatized day in day out. The alarming proportions of islamophobia are just unprecedented and the economic downturn since 2008 is making things far worse. What is more is the fact that this might be just the beginning. If things do not brighten up, and Heaven forbid, this economic recession lingers on for some more years, I shudder at the gloomy prospects awaiting us and especially awaiting the large Muslim Diaspora living in majority Christian countries."²¹

The recent events of the Arab Spring, and above all the digital revolution and its repercussions on our identities and lives, are some of the new elements and challenges that every analyst, scholar, or simply Arab Muslim citizen has to reckon with if he or she is to understand the mechanisms shaping the world after 9/11.

Notes

¹ Whichever way we look at it, I personally feel that we are at the beginning of a new cycle of change, which cannot but be positive, following the old adage: every crisis is an opportunity! The mistake that a lot of people commit is to expect this change to be quick with few sacrifices. Many Arab people indeed judge that since a lot of countries that went through this experience have failed in establishing democratic regimes and bringing prosperity to their people, they believe that the movement is a complete failure, forgetting, however, that the majority of the major historic revolutions did not benefit their people instantly or shortly after, but had to go through a lot of internal crises, civil wars, exactions, etc. before ultimately reaping the first fruit of the revolution; the French, the Bolshevik, and more recently, the Iranian revolutions are a few examples in this regard.

² Michael Zantovsky, in an article titled : "1989 and 2011: Compare and Contrast," declares that the "Arab Winter" as a label for the movement would not do, and declares that the Arab Spring borrows from a European coinage, first employed as "the Spring of Nations" in reference to the revolutions and revolts across Europe of 1848, which brought to many parts of the continent the ideas of independence, self-government, and participatory rule. The other well-known use is that of the Prague Spring of 1968, which meant a breath of fresh air from the long Communist winter. The events of 1989, which brought down the whole totalitarian house, were on the other hand never referred to as a spring, perhaps because then there was a complete seasonal change. In *World Affairs*, Vol. 174, No. 2 (Juy/August 2011), pp. 13-24. (Sage Publications, Inc. in collaboration with JSTOR.)

³ Check footnote n° 2.

⁴ It is notorious that the former colonizing powers left after making sure they had put in control indigenous servants/pawns to ensure their interests would remain secure. These pawns have been sometimes so servile that they exceeded the expectations of their "masters". Sometimes, nonetheless, the West creates what it thinks would be a docile pawn only to discover later the pawn has rebelled and turned against its master. Oussama Ben Laden is a good example.

⁵ Alain Garigou , *Le MONDE DIPLOMATIQUE*, May, 2011.

⁶ This seems to be also the case of the word "Jew".

⁷ The Oxford dictionary defines identity as "distinguishing features" and "determining characteristics". The former may include a person's name, photo or signature, whereas the latter may include aspects of gender, ethnicity, nationality, religion and so on.

⁸ Limame Barbouchi, "Disseminating Structures, Structuring Minds: Identity as a mere articulation," in proceedings of the international conference : "Discourse in / and Cultures in Contact" held on December 22-

23, 2010, in Faculty of Letters Saiss-Fez, Morocco, and published in Conferences and Colloquia Series, 2014. pp. 75-80.

⁹ The study of identity has indeed triggered in different fields of academia and scholarship a remarkable debate that has led to question concepts such as nation, state, culture, etc. --concepts that sometimes pose also some difficulties of translation into Arabic. Barbouchi corroborates further by saying that in addressing this issue of identity, "one will recognize that what people say about their identities is a mere articulation; it is an articulation that is filtered through language to give us a sense of belongingness and thus a sense of Being." Ibid, p. 75

¹⁰ We think here of the Kurds, the native Americans, the Amazigh, the former states of the USSR or of Yugoslavia.

¹¹ "This is how I will describe what happened in Tunisia and Egypt. The question of the religious referent did not arise. These events have nothing to do with religious or cultural identity. People revolted against a situation where the habeas corpus was not respected. The minimum of the integrity of the individual was not assured. This uprising took place beyond identities. It is not because we are a Muslim that we protest but we do as an oppressed people. The protest was voiced in the name of humanity being flouted. As soon as one evokes the space of the south, one has the pruritus of the referent which generates the difference. It is also a Western reflex to see something Islamic in any event that comes from territories whose dominant religion is Islam. Freedom alone has been invoked as a principle, which belongs to man, to natural law. Certainly, the culture and religion of these countries did not hinder this call for freedom. So these movements were neither Islamist nor Islamic. Those who have risen have demanded their autonomy as individuals and the right they have over their country, even that which was denied to them by the predators who directed them. Those who had the audacity to manifest while confronting death defended and demanded the same thing: to be a free man. These Arabs could have been Chinese or Burmese. Their only referent was the right to freedom, dignity, justice that every human claim. This exceeds the Islam / West dichotomy. (my translation) " *Le Monde*, 4 avril, 2011, Interview held by Nicolas Truong. http://www.lemonde.fr/idees/article/2011/04/27/de-la-charia-a-l-islamophobie-de-l-homosexualite-au-statut-de-la-femme_1511640_3232.html.

¹² This could be corroborated through the example of Israel, a very young state made of ultra religious and ultra-liberal groups of different, and often very distant origins, but which still form one of the rare "democratic" countries in the region, at least from the perspective of the Western countries; since we Arab-Muslims consider it rather a racist and segregationist state in its dealing with its Arab-Israeli citizens.

¹³ "Refolution in the Arab World," 28 April 2011. (www.opendemocracy.net)

¹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵ Of course, a lot has changed about this moderate Islamic discourse since the advent of Daech, which is a huge backlash against all the progress made.

¹⁶ "Post modern Islam and the Arab revolts" 7 March 2011 (www.opendemocracy.net)

¹⁷ From the very beginning of taking office, Benkirane insisted "we haven't been elected to control people's way of dressing, or impose an ethics police that gauge their behavior." (from an interview on Moroccan TV right after the PJD party won the legislative elections in Morocco in November 2011, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=u15mh2DDqPQ>) The Annahda Party's leader Al Ghannouchi in Tunisia was very pragmatic and smart when he accepted to compromise with liberal movements to form a coalition, avoiding the Egyptian scenario at the time of former president Morsi who refused compromise resulting in his ousting and imprisonment, something which a lot of Muslim Brothers acknowledge now was a mistake on the part of their leader.

¹⁸ I must humbly admit here that I was probably wrong about what I wrote in an essay during the full swing of the Arab spring by the end of 2011, in which I expressed my disagreement with Andre Malraux and suggested that the "right" prediction about the 21st Century should have been instead: "the 21st C, will be revolutionary or will be not." My excitement was further exacerbated when I watched a major Egyptian journalist of Aljazeera channel at that time (Yousseri Fouda) announcing live on TV and from the famous Tahrir square in Cairo that this Arab uprising is an "Allahou Akbar free" revolution, (that was the case at least in Tunisia and Egypt before the collapse of the two regimes; I added that the unofficial Islamist "Al Adl Wal Ihssan" party in Morocco kept a low profile in the street protests led by the "20th February" Movement. My purpose was to prove that Arab Muslims could prove their humanness and dignity without necessarily relating them to religion.

¹⁹ "The New Arab Mass Media Vehicles of Democracy," Interview with Fatima Mernissi, Francesco Alfonso Leccese in *Oriente Moderna*, Nuova serie, Anno 25 (86), Nr. 2 (2006), pp. 345-356 Published by: Istituto per l'Oriente C. A. Nallino (URL: <http://www.jstor.org/stable/25818068>)

²⁰ How lucky was that Arab leader who, at the beginning of the eighties, announced on public TV that had he found himself cornered, and had he had the assurance that two thirds of the population remained faithful to him, he admitted he would not have hesitated to sacrifice the other third (meaning about ten million people.)*

²¹ "Lest You Misunderstand Me... The Issue of Identity and Stereotyping in a Globalised Muslim World," a paper delivered in an international conference held on December 29-30, 2010, in Faculty of Letters Saiss-Fez, Morocco.

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Aziza Brigui

Testimonies that Matter: On Writing Torture in Morocco

The paper's main contention is the relationship between the act of narration and its contribution to the transitional justice in Morocco, especially in relation to justice, memory and responsibility in post-transitional phase. I argue that the question of memory and truth is an essential aspect in the struggle for the democratization process. The paper engages with the transition from "traumatized" memory to "performative" memory as acts of performance¹ in post-memory phase. How "telling" and "narrating" past violence is a historical tale against forgetting and collective amnesia; the enactment of lived violence of memory is a form of acts of performance, representation, and interpretation. Against this background, the paper's main question is how prison narratives can act as "sites of memory"? These narratives produced by these "agents of cultural memory" as tortured beings become active producers of words and narratives to reposition victims' truth within counter-publics. To this end, this paper engages a debate on how prison narratives/literature in Morocco can help in the construction of a basis for cultural resistance. The paper tries to analyze five different categories of testimonial narratives², mainly those of women, soldiers, left-wing opponents, ex-agents of intelligence in addition to fictional works. Arguably, these narratives/testimonies not only provide a collective catharsis effect for the future generations in general and the victims/survivors of political violence in particular; they also help tortured victims assert, reconstruct their own identity and regain lost dignity through liberation of their voices. In this sense, these narratives destabilize and challenge "a hidden machinery of oppression" reflected in state violence as a political practice operating within a hegemonic structure to deny political victims of arbitrary detention and violence rights and destroy their ability to act.

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Testimonies that Matter: On Writing Torture in Morocco

Introduction

Carceral memorial writings in Morocco historicize state violence and torture against political detainees by conveying prisoners share of frustration, trauma, broken dreams and suffering for half a century under the reign of Hassan II; prison writers developed new expressive tools to convey the unspeakable in their experience. They published their memoirs in form of autobiographies, cartoons, and newspaper articles. Although the first writings before the 90's were smuggled to Europe for publication. Moroccan political activists have finally the opportunity to recover themselves through the "catharsis" of writing painful memoirs gleaned from these notorious "lieux of disappearance"¹.

The paper engages with the transition from "traumatized" memory to "performative" memory as acts of performance in post-memory phase. How "telling" and "narrating" past violence is a historical tale against forgetting and collective amnesia; the enactment of lived violence of memory is a form of acts of performance, representation, and interpretation. They require agents and specific contexts. They can be conscious and deliberate; at the same time, and this is certainly true in the case of trauma, they can be involuntary, repetitious, and obsessive. Against this background, the paper's main question is how prison narratives can act as "sites of memory"? The victims re-appropriate prison as site of memory. It is argued that a major purpose of sites of memory is "to stop time, to block the work of forgetting and they all share "a will to remember"². By publicizing the extreme physical disintegration and exposure to horrid torture within the confines of secret prisons and detention centers, the prisoners are attempting to share with readers how inhumanly appalling to be a political prisoner under a dictatorship whipped into a frenzy of paranoid accusation and viciousness as a result of political dissidence. Henceforth, bearing witness, especially in the shadow of horrible authoritarianism, is the most effective way to validate and bring into public scrutiny the horrendous impact of torture and incarceration. These narratives produced by the "agents of cultural memory" as tortured beings become active producers of words and narratives to reposition victims' truth within counter-publics.

The main contention of this paper is to engage a debate on how prison narratives of the past can help to construct a basis for cultural resistance. Narratives, not only provide a collective catharsis effect for the future generations in general and the victims/survivors of political violence in particular, but they also help tortured victims to assert, reconstruct their own identity and regain lost dignity through liberation of their voices. In this sense, these narratives destabilize and challenge "a hidden machinery of oppression" reflected in state violence as a political practice operating within a hegemonic structure to deny political victims of arbitrary detention and violence rights and destroy their ability to act.

Narrating Torture of the Years of Lead in Morocco

Morocco's time under the rule of King Hassan II, from 1961-1999, are known as the "Years of Lead". The Years of Lead literally refers to the bullets fired at Moroccan citizens by government officials meant to protect their interests, in assassinations and suppression of protests.³ Figuratively, the term recalls Moroccans' terror and victimization at the hands of the regime, and a dark period in the country's history that should not be repeated. Approximately 50,000 people were victims of the regime's repression, indicating that it was a systematic issue rather than a sporadic one.⁴ In other terms, this means that not only on individuals can be blamed for human rights abuses. Rather, the entire system of the *Makhzen*⁵, or the apparatus of government officials, advisors, and political police surrounding the king, cultivated a culture of repression and terror in order to

enforce the regime's power. Journalists and human rights investigators who attempted to bring to light the regime's abuses were intimidated by the regime to leave Morocco overlook its problems.

After this violent period of Moroccan history, the regime began to make changes in the 1990s due to a combination of domestic and international pressure. Hassan II survived two coup attempts in 1971 and 1972, and experienced growing dissent within the ranks of the military and political parties. In response to this, he began to incorporate more of the oppositionist and leftist parties into governance. In addition, the end of the Cold War brought a new focus to human rights abuses throughout the world.⁶ The work of Amnesty International and other international human rights organizations illuminated the human rights violations of Morocco and placed growing pressure on the regime to respond in order to maintain good relations with other countries. In response, Hassan II acknowledged and closed some secret prisons, including the infamous Tazmamart, acknowledged and released several political prisoners, and allowed freer political discourse. In addition, Hassan II made public statements using the rhetoric of democratization and human rights, and attempted to deny his knowledge and involvement in the human rights violations by blaming them on the broader state apparatus and rogue figures within the police and military. In 1990, the king established an advisory Council on Human Rights (CCDH), which acknowledged the disappearances for the first time in 1999 by confirming the fates of 112 people.

Mohamed VI established the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (IER)⁷ to remedy state violence individually and collectively and to reconcile Moroccans with this violent past. Apart from its mandate, the IER had a profound effect on opening public discourse and providing closure to victims. According to Fadoua Loudiy, "the project of transitional justice has energized public discourse about the past, the present and the future of Morocco by breaking up the chains of silence and fear surrounding this gruesome period of the country's history."⁸ The victims' testimony created a collective, public memory that can remind Morocco of its past and dissuade it from repeating it. The commission's acceptance and acknowledgement of the truth of victims' testimony also had a therapeutic impact on victims, whose stories have been denied by the regime for so long. For the first time, Moroccans could speak about these events without the fear of retaliation.

Narrating Torture

Ahmed Marzouki's *Tazmamārt: Cellule 10* (Casablanca: Tarīk Editions, 2000); Muḥammad al-Rays's *Mudhākīrāt Muḥammad al-Rays, min al-skḥīrāt ilā Tazmamārt: tadhkīrat dhahāb wa' iyāb' ilā al-jaḥīm* (*Memoirs of Muḥammad al-Rays, From Skḥīrat to Tazmamart: A Round Trip Ticket to Hell*), trans. 'Abd al-Ḥamīd Jamāhīrī (Casablanca: Afriqia al-Sharq, 2002); Tahar Benjelloun's *That Blinding Absence of Light*, trans. Linda Coverdale (New York: New Press, 2002) and *The Last Friend*, trans. Kevin Michel Capé and Hazel Rowley (New York: New Press, 2006) are a few examples for testimonies. The major concern of most of these texts however is the infamous secret prison in Tazmamārt in which those who willingly or unwillingly participated in the failed coups against the late king Hassan II in 1971 and 1972 spent 18 years in cells barely large enough for them to get in. They were never allowed to leave those dungeons and were barely kept alive by small portions of stale bread and coffee. During the years they spent in this prison, the existence of which the Moroccan authorities denied until the 1990s, those who survived the ordeal were subjected to extreme methods of torture. For 18 years, they never left their cells, they never saw the sun, they got the bare minimum necessary to keep them alive and they never received any medical care. Only one prisoner, Lieutenant Mbarek Touil, who was married to a United States citizen, was given exceptional treatment after the US Government intervened with the Moroccan authorities — he was allowed, after 1985, to sit in the courtyard during the day on some occasions.

These inhumane conditions of arbitrary detention produced a generation of victims of grave human rights violation who resisted torture and violence through writing and telling what happened. They wrote against amnesia and oblivion. They exorcised the pains and the sufferings of a whole generation against oppression. Dealing with these testimonial narratives, testimony here takes the dimension of a contestation of memory. Testimonies as lived experiences were transformed into history where textuality and history coexist as past and present. These testimonies are active products of contested meanings, narrators and storytelling as a healing therapy and a witness to atrocities. Writing about violence is writing against forgetting. Narrativizing the experience of detention can be compared to the rite of passage from oblivion, ahistoricality and amnesia into positionality in history, to be respected, remembered, and celebrated.

In one of the testimonies, Ali El Manouzi narrates the story of a whole family who was tortured and imprisoned. Sietske De Boer devoted a book on the sufferings of this family.

“[I]t has been almost thirty years that we hope for a sign of life from Houcine, our eldest son, who disappeared in the beginnings of the 70s. It was when Morocco was shaken by coups d'état, uprisings, and a barbaric repression. I myself, my seven brothers, and my seven sons were in the resistance against injustice and repression...we have paid a high price. My brother Brahim was executed because as commander in the army he participated in an attempt against the king. My son Houcine is perhaps dead these past thirty years without us being able to bury him in the family circle. All the men in the family have, at least once, most of us more often, seen the inside of a prison cell...we carry forever these scars.”⁹

Victims were not soldiers who participated in the coups, but also political activists and their families. Their villages or cities of origin were tortured too. It was a collective punishment.

Testimonial narratives were not only told by direct or indirect victims but also by perpetrators and agents of administration. Ahmed Boukhari, a former secret service agent, granted interviews to French and Moroccan newspapers detailing a world of secret detention centers, torture, and disappearances during the decades of the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s. In his book “Le secret”, he writes:

“I chose to speak. For a long time I wanted to burst out with the truth, reveal the techniques of the Moroccan secret service, tell about the kidnappings and disappearances. In 1972 already, I was in Paris intending to shout the truth. Then I became afraid. For myself, but mainly for my family. Repression swept heavily over Morocco and I gave up having my voice heard. In 1983, a new stay in France. But the time had not yet come to open sensitive files. It was necessary to wait. It was difficult for me to reveal all; I had kept the secret so long.”¹⁰

However, the only agent that dared to tell this testimony is Ahmed Boukhari, others refused. One of the criticisms levelled against the Truth and Commission in Morocco is that the victims were not allowed to name and shame their perpetrators. Writing testimonial narratives becomes the only means to reach truth and reconciliation.

Another writing of torture and suffering is “Les Jardins du Roi” by Fatima Oufkir¹¹. She was the wife of the General Oufkir, one of the plotters in the coup. Her testimony is a narrative about her childhood, how she met with Oufkir, resistance against colonialism, the reign under Mohamed V, political opposition in Morocco, life in the palace and what is interesting is her probing into the psychology of her husband, the feared General Oufkir which she describes as a loveable man who loves his country. She tells how he played an important role in the return of Mohamed V after his exile. The art of narrating based on what remained in the individual memory and how to make it a

shared history. It is a testimony of a wife who suffered and spent more than fifteen years in various secret prisons all over the Moroccan desert living under inhumane conditions while being innocent, because of what her husband did. Her children and she were tortured and prohibited from life and freedom. This is a narrative of how traumatized memory can humanize the past to go beyond torture and violence.

Her daughter, Malika Oufkir, describes in her testimony “Stolen Lives” the difficulty to witness the fate of one’s family. She perceives her testimonial work as a contribution to shape the Moroccan collective memory. She writes:

“It’s not easy to witness the truth but I am sure that many of us through their witness are going to build their country more than destroy it...it is to tell him (Hassan II) the truth...because nobody in his life was allowed to tell him really who he was. And the second thing maybe the only question, why?”¹²

It is a direct confrontation with the person, in her opinion, who was responsible for their torture and oppression. Malika Oufkir’s testimonial narrative bears witness to human rights violations during the years of lead. It also brings to the fore her jail experience as a female gender, whose self was silenced and fell into oblivion. She experienced a remarkable metamorphosis because of her continuous resistance and struggle for freedom. The narrative exemplifies her recollection of past memories from a female perspective to legitimize her political agency. The latter will enable her to come to terms with the past and contribute to reconciliation phase in the country, which she used to hate. Now, she willingly aspires to take part in shaping and building the new democratic history of Morocco.

In Fatna El Bouih testimony of her incarceration as a political detainee during the years of lead, she narrates the tales of a group of Marxist students in a secret detention center in Casablanca known as Derb Moulay sherrif. Her testimony is writing about disappearance, repression and torture; Fatna and her comrades were subject to severe torture by their perpetrators; it is the story of many women who suffered prison, torture and arbitrary detention as political dissidents. To testify is to resist and confront the challenge of how to witness the atrocities of state violence, the moral and historical burden of shattered memory; of how a personal memory can contribute to the collective memory and of how history, as a science of the past, deals with memory as history. “We will not surrender, we won’t give in”¹³, Fatna writes. How can we trust this personal memoir as representative of the whole generation? Who has the right to tell or narrate? Is it authentic or subjective? Historians rely on documents not memory. Can traumatized memory be trusted? These questions are entries into how resistance against systematic forgetting through narrativizing and plotting violence can contribute in building a complete story in post-memory phase. Novelizing the years of lead is what Tahar Benjelloun did in his fiction, *That Blinding Absence of Light*, based on a real story told to the writer about the prison experience in the infamous prison of Tazmamart published in 2002 is a telling imagery whereby prison equals darkness and telling is bringing light. This is an interesting move from testimony to performance, to imagination and to the work of post-memory searching for the truth; it is the duty to recall, to remember and narrate the national history. Taher Benjelloun’s novel tells about resistance under inhuman conditions in Tazmamart through a monologue of hallucinations of a prisoner.

“Faith is not fear, I told myself. Suicide is not a solution. An ordeal is not a challenge. Resistance is a duty, not an obligation. Keeping one’s dignity is an absolute necessity. That’s it, dignity is what I what we have left. Each of us does what we can to preserve his dignity. That is my mission. To remain on my feet, be a man, never a wretch, a discharge, a mistake. I would never condemn those who cannot bear what is inflicted on them, who end by breaking under torture and letting themselves die. I have learned never to judge people.”¹⁴

“Tazmamort” is another resistance to torture; this book uses a strong imagery of death but writing the book and telling the story of survival is a very challenging act to official history, which denied even the existence of this prison. These are historical memories, prison writings, refusing oblivion and loss. Some victims insisted to write to avoid madness after years of disappearance and torture but others refused to write and preferred silence as a powerful imagery for strength and refusing the victimized position¹⁵. Mohamed Raiss, Block 1, Cell Number 14 describes his cell in this prison in the following words:

“[M]y cell was approximately three meters long and two meters wide, all of it reinforced concrete, without windows, only seventeen small holes perforating the wall, onto an interior corridor...there was no mattress, no insulation, no pillow. In the left corner a small hole served for the toilet.”¹⁶

To survive in this hell, Ahmed Marzouki tells how they created a language called «Tazmamarti» as a secret and resisting form of language.

“[V]ery quickly, some months after our arrival in Tazmamart, there was necessity to have a mutually intelligible language only among us. [...] When corruption started to function in the prison, we succeeded in bringing radios and transistors which we listen to everyday. [...] Our secret communication language was very indispensable so that the guards will not understand us. [...] We refer to Amnesty International as Amina, Basri Driss as Bissara.”¹⁷

Despite these conditions of imprisonment, resistance and adaptation were key to survival of some victims.

The struggle of a woman is the story of Aida Hachad in Kabazal¹⁸ and “hungry mouths¹⁹” who narrates their stories despite its horrifying scenes. This work and others are inspired by the stories of the victims²⁰. These new appropriations of victims’ stories are needed not only in fiction but in digitized forms because it will incite reflection on the performativity of this part of Moroccan history²¹. These struggles of women as either victims or family members of victims are dialogic performances²², in the sense that truth is not a given element but rather a reproduced and discovered through struggling to find what happened. Why it happened? Why it happened to us? The victims discover while fighting to explain their destiny the truth about prisons, detention and later their narratives reveal reliable truths for historians.

Al-Shāwī’s *al- Sāḥatu al-sharafiyyah (2005)*²³ relates the prison experience of a group of young Moroccans who have been incarcerated for their political views. The text bears the imprint of the life of the author himself who was imprisoned because of his political affiliations and his progressive opinions. Even though the major focus of al-Shāwī’s narrative centers on the experience of imprisonment and the lack of individual freedoms, the text starts with a detailed and realistic description of life in a remote village called Barāndah. Sa’d al-Abramī, the first-person narrator, seeks refuge in this village after being freed from years of unjust incarceration and torture. There is a need to narrate the atrocities of imprisonment relying on a liberated memory not a traumatized one. The pristine and ostensibly quaint nature of the setting is meant to provide both a stark contrast to the prison environment and at the same time a new space for Sa’d where he hopes to recuperate a self-damaged by years of torture and dehumanization.

Khadījah al-Marwāzī’s “Sīratu al-ramād” (2000)²⁴ chronicles the lives of several Moroccan revolutionaries who dreamt of a brighter Morocco and a brighter future only to end up spending the better years of their lives incarcerated and tortured. One of the first women to write about the

events and consequences of ‘the years of lead’ was al-Marwāzī. She offers a fresh perspective to prison writing, focusing on the role of women in the fight against oppression, injustice, and discrimination. Even though al-Marwāzī eschews providing specific dates in the narrative, from the events the text describes it covers also the same period and circumstances as al-Shāwī’s text, namely, the political and social turmoil in Morocco during the 1970s and 1980s. Al-Marwāzī’s also starts by an attempt to escape a traumatic past populated with painful prison memories of brutal torture and subhuman treatment. After being freed from prison, Mūlīn heads for the sea hoping that its openness and vastness will help him forget the painful and constricting images of confinement. *Sirat al ramād* relies on memory as a device through which the reader has access to the prison experience.

Performing Horror and Memory

The story about the past includes what happened in the site of memory. Through various means and arrangements, there is an attempt to transmit the forms in which State Terrorism manifested itself, imagining the audiences that might visit the place. Abdelatif Laâbi writes in his 1982 French language novel “Le Chemin des Ordalies”, a memoir of his imprisonment and torture:

“She who was the greatest storyteller of your traditional culture was only so because she lived permanently under the oriental sword of Damocles. You write or you are killed... you will know that this is the voice of history speaking. It refers to one of its most brutal laws: all silence is death by default.”²⁵

Scheherazade, this mythical figure who escapes death by telling/inventing entertaining stories every night is against the myth of the silent woman²⁶ is one of the most striking images in Fatna El Bouih’s prison memoir. El Bouih and her comrades used to communicate through using fingers like pens to write on their hand palms to transmit messages of hope and encouragement.

“...Listen to the voice of the south wind, the south as the voices of people and social movements of liberation, the voices of women, the south as Morocco. A new voice comes from the harem, a new voice, a new harem, a new Sheherazade, who emerges from silence to go beyond history to where women are deprived of all power, to dig to the bottom of this harem to change the current of history. Sheherazade has spoken and a miracle has been produced.”²⁷

Despite the rule of silence in jail, they broke the rules and communicated to stay alive and survive. In chapter 16 titled “a prisoner gives birth to a free person”; Fatna tells the story of one of the inmates (not a political prisoner) who gave birth to a child. That is the imagery of free man in the title. What is more, prison and incarceration enable them using such various strategies as hunger strike to attain the freedom they were aspiring for. She asked lot of questions in the last lines of the chapter when she was meditating about her situation in prison:

“A world without compassion, pitiless, unjust and prejudiced. What kind of justice throws a woman in her (referring to the inmate who gave birth to a child in prison) situation into the world of prison? What benefit could they possibly be seeking?”²⁸

For Fatna and her comrades the prison has awakened a feminist consciousness against inequalities and injustices outside the prison.

Not only these political memoirs of prison are political critiques against injustice and arbitrary detention, but they are also critics of social injustices against women who chose to invest in politics, a male-dominated sphere. The icon of the feminist movement and women political prisoners is Saida Menebehi, the martyr, who died in prison because of hunger strike wrote her

poems on the walls of her cell and posthumously compiled in a book²⁹ by her family. Her poems were celebrated in public universities as poems of resistance. Her poems were passed from generation to generation of students and activists and used to be performed inside universities in students' gatherings or protests. Saida celebrated love for her lover in her poems, in one of her moving poems, she describes prison for the future generations in these words:

<p><i>« La prison, c'est laid Tu la dessine mon enfant Avec des traits noirs Des barreaux et des grilles Tu imagines que c'est un lieu sans lumière Qui fait peur au petit Aussi, pour l'indiquer Tu dis que c'est là-bas Et tu montres avec ton petit doigt Un point, un coin perdu Que tu ne vois pas Peut-être la maitresse t'a parlé De prison hideuse De maison de correction Où l'on met les méchants Qui volent les enfants Dans la petite tête s'est alors Posé une question Comment et pourquoi Moi, que suis plein d'amour pour toi Et tous les autres enfants Suis-je là-bas Parce que je veux que demain La prison ne soit plus là. »³⁰</i></p>	<p><i>"The prison is ugly you draw it my child with black marks for the bars and the grills you imagine that it's a place without light that scares little ones also, to show it you say that it's over there and you gesture with little finger to a point, a lost place that you don't see. Maybe the teacher talked to you about it The hideous prison the correctional facility Where mean people are put Who steal children In your little head you asked the question how and why me, who is full of love for you and all other children Am I over there Because tomorrow I want The prison to no longer be there"³¹</i></p>
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Menebhi's poems are visualized images to tell and narrate about their horrific experience of detention. Women's writings of prison endorse both the individual fate and the collective cause. At the personal level, they tell their own family stories and how they are fighting against tradition and patriarchy that relegates women to second-class citizens. However, they endorse the social and political problems of Morocco, by empowering women to become free from patriarchy³². A central theme in Menebhi's prison testimony is a commitment to her feminist cause. She admonishes women to continue their struggle against the socio-political and gendered hurdles impeding women to voice their beliefs and restricting their existence to silence and bestial life:

*"Nous, nous continuerons
A combattre, à refuser
Jusqu'à l'abattoir et nos têtes
Sous la lame
Et jamais, jamais
Dans nos yeux ils ne verront la crainte
Jamais la maladie du silence
Ne nous atteindra
Vous mes sœurs
Troupeaux de bêtes
C'est cela que vous leur semblez
C'est cela que vous considèrent
Et moi, les mains liées*

*La gorge nouée, la nausée me prend
De tous les fascistes et leurs pions.*³³

The autobiographical testimony represents the voicing and resurrection of a female voice that has been muted and silenced. As a work of memory, it contributes as a crucial piece to decipher the puzzle of human rights' violations in Morocco. It is an eyewitness account of the years of lead in Morocco from a female perspective which creates an oppositional discourse to state political violence and oppressive patriarchy. More importantly, it ensures that Saida's past memory does not fall into oblivion³⁴.

In one of the strongest testimonial narratives of the years of lead, Letter From Morocco by Christine Daure-Serfaty, one chapter handles the issue of how do we deal with the past? By telling the story of Rachid Ben Aissa who died in the prison of Tazmamart, she draws a portrait of herself.

"Rachid Ben Aissa died in 1988. As he was dying, he said: "I want my drawing to make it out of here," as if by releasing the picture to the world, he would, in a way, gain his own freedom. His drawing did make it out and was shown more than once on television. The UN high commissioner for human rights made sure that it was displayed for all visitors to see at the hall of nations in Geneva. At least that's something."³⁵

Surviving and projected memory, testimonial objects and images are the landscapes of postmemory according to Marianne Hirsch (2012). These are alternative histories and counter-memories that the national archives should take into consideration when dealing with the violent past. The Moroccan journalist Abdellatif El Azizi (cited in Susan Slymovics 2012) asked El Bouih in his December 2009 interview: "Yet, we hear less and less from you? Has the activist become tired?" El Bouih replied by pointing to her memory work in the creation of a concrete locus for public attention:

"When you catch activism early in your youth, it is difficult to be cured of it. The work of memory undertaken by committees such as the ERC is colossal. We wanted the state to recognize violence against women. Today, it is done. But we do not want to limit ourselves to a stance of denunciation."³⁶

The performance of human rights in Morocco and mainly the work of memory has to engage seriously in postmemory to shift from personal to a broader cultural, collective memory for a more nuanced and just understanding of the past in order to bring live to the present and to the future.

Conclusion

Memory serves both to deal with a damaging past and as a necessary step toward reinventing the self. Refusing to be silenced, these texts courageously open up past narratives and histories for re-interrogation and reinvestigation. Prison writing in Morocco has been a multiform corpus in recent years, the parameters of which are not easy to define. Whereas the study of these autobiographies displays an apparent unity in the choice of the topic and in the long-lasting experience of pain shared by the victims, it does not elude this difficulty.

Since 1999s, the writers Abdellatif Laâbi, Ahmed Marzouki, Abdelfettah Fakihani and Jaouad Mdidech, who endured the period known as the "Years of Lead", have published some of the most compelling testimonies of our time. Topics explored in their "prison literature" include the deprivation of civic rights, imprisonment, and torture. What is reported and documented today reveals how information on incarceration was manipulated, manufactured and repeatedly erased.

Exposing the hidden stories of the Lead Years provides a means to articulate the past, founding a new collective consciousness for contemporary Morocco.

The rise of the prison literature as a fully-fledged genre in Morocco is inextricably entwined in the political. When Morocco, in the aftermath of Hassan II's death and the subsequent enthroning of Mohammed VI, decided to subscribe to a process of transitional justice, trying to come terms with the horrors that marred post-independence era so as to establish peace, no one would have predicted that there would be an abundant literature, both fiction and non-fiction, on the experience of imprisonment on account of one's political and ideological leanings. These prison narratives have come to form a new genre in the Moroccan literary scene known as prison literature.

Political prison experience is part of the taboos that have long and heavily weighed on Moroccan postcolonial society. Narrating one's own prison experience as a former detainee caught up in the political events of the past was a marginal developed endeavor before the 1990s. The texts analyzed in this article tell the experience of the Years of Lead. They represent an important body of work in Moroccan literary production of the 2000s, certainly since the death of Hassan II in 1999. These texts open the pages of these troubling years to construct a critical retrospective on the recent past. In order to deliver himself from his suffering, the Moroccan citizen must know this past. Today, in order to achieve this goal, a critical history is developing. Other writers are dramatizing, screening and performing these narratives. How will the Years of Lead be presented by different texts, which relate prison experiences to political events? How will the "pathological memory" inherited from these dark years in Morocco be slowly transformed into a more nuanced form? These questions should be probed into for future research to bring forward new perspectives to the analysis of testimonial works of memory.

Notes

- 1 Brahim El Guabli, "The Hidden Transcript of Resistance in Moroccan Tazmamart Prison Writings", in *The Arab Studies Journal* 22. 1(2014), pp. 170-207.
- 2 Sites of memory are "where cultural memory crystallizes and secretes itself". Pierre Nora, "Between Memory and History: Les Lieux de Mémoire" *Representations* 26 (Spring 1989),p.19.
- 3 This phrase has been used by the politicians and human rights activists in Morocco to refer to the years of repression, detention, forcible disappearance and torture dating from 1956 till 1999. See also Fadoua Loudiy, Transitional Justice and Human Rights in Morocco: Negotiating the Years of Lead (New York: Routledge, 2014), pp.61-68 and Aziza brigui Testimony in The Public Sphere: Women and Prison Narratives in Morocco (Lambert Academic Publishing: Germany, 2012).
- 4 Susan Slymovics, The Performance of Human Rights in Morocco (Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press , 2005), pp .13-131.
- 5 This word literally means storage room, but in Moroccan Arabic refers to the central authority of the monarch.
- 6 Fadoua Loudiy, Transitional Justice and Human Rights in Morocco: Negotiating the Years of Lead ,p.6.
- 7 Equity and Reconciliation commission was established by a royal decree in 2004. It was labeled in French "L'instance de l'équité et réconciliation (IER)".
- 8 Fadoua Loudiy, *Ibid.*
- 9 Siester De Boer , Années de plomb: Chronique d'une famille marocaine (Editions le Fennec : Casablanca , 2005),p. 102 .
- 10 Cited in Susan Slymovics, The Performance of Human Rights in Morocco (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2005), p.49.
- 11 Fatima Oufkir, Les Jardins du Roi: Oufkir, Hassan II et Nous (Le Livre de Poche: Paris, 2001).
- 12 Malika Oufkir and Michele Fitoussi, Stolen Lives: Twenty Years in a Desert Jail, trans. Ros. Schwart (New York: Hyperion , 2001) , p.135.

- 13 Fatna El Bouih, Talk of Darkness, trans. Mustapha Kamal and Susan Slyomovics (Austin : University of Texas at, 2008),p.45.
- 14 Tahar Ben Jelloun ,That Blinding Absence of Light ,trans. Linda Coverdale (New York: Free Press, 2002).p.37.
- 15 Any reference to the fieldwork is Aziza Brigui's doctoral dissertation. In my fieldwork I met with ex-victims of incarceration who refused to tell or write their testimonies; they chose to continue their battle of democracy and human rights through investing in civic engagement. Some political detainees refused even individual reparation by the Moroccan reconciliation and truth commission (IER). They refused to take money for incarceration or as family members of political detainees as a gesture of the refusal of the process of reconciliation and as sign for the continuity of their activism for human rights.
- 16 Aziz Benbine, Tazmamart (Editions Denoël: Paris, 2009).
- 17 Ahmed Marzouki, Tazmamart: Cellule 10 (Casablanca: Tarik Editions, 2000).
- 18 Abdelhak Serhane, Kabazal: les emmurés de Tazmamart :mémoires de Salah et Aïda Hachad (Tarik Editions :Maroc, 2003).
- 19 This is an imagery used by Dina Al-Kassim in her paper "Archiving Resistance: Women's Testimony at the Threshold of the State" in *Cultural Dynamics*, 20.2(2008) ,PP .167–192.
- 20 This is a new phase in dealing with prison literature whereby writers reconstruct or adapt victims' narratives into fictionalized novels or short stories. There is a new novel published by Wafa Malih in Arabic titled (An Akoun), 2014, Dar Al Aman, Rabat.
- 21 Valerie Orlando, *Francophone Voices of the New Morocco Film and Print: Representing Society in Transition* (Palgrave Macmillan, 2009).
- 22 In the sense used by Bakhtin (1981)
- 23 Abd al-Qadir Al-Shāwī's, *al- Sāḥatu al-sharafīyah* (Square of Honor) (Casablanca: Fenec publications, 2005).
- 24 Khadijah Al-Marwāzī, *Siratu al-ramad* (Biography of Ash) (Casablanca: Afriqia al-Sharq, 2000).
- 25 Translated by Glacier Osire in her book Universal Rights, Systemic Violations, and Cultural Relativism in Morocco (Palgrave Macmillan: New York, 2013),p.61.
- 26 Suellen Diaconoff, *The Myth of The Silent Woman: Moroccan Women Writers* (University of Toronto Press: Canada, 2009)
- 27 Cited in Susan Slymovics, *Ibid.*, p. 147.
- 28 Fatna El Bouih, *Ibid.*, p.59.
- 29 Saida Menebhi, Poèmes, lettres, écrits de Prison (Rabat: Éditions Feed-Back, 2000).
- 30 Saida Menebhi, *Ibid.*, p.42
- 31 Translation cited in Valérie K. Orlando, "Feminine Spaces and Places in the dark Recesses of Morocco's past: the prison Testimonials in Poetry and Prose of Saida Menbehi and Fatna El Bouih" in the *Journal of North African Studies* 15. 3 (September 2010):282-283.
- 32 Valerie Orlando, Nomadic Voices of Exile: Feminine Identity in Francophone Literature of the Maghreb (Ohio University Press: USA, 1999).
- 33 Saida Menebhi, *ibid.* ,p.55.
- 34 This idea from a personal interview with Khadija Menebehi, Saida's eldest sister (Personal Interview 2011 by Aziza Brigui, author). Family members of victims of state repression during the years of lead devoted all their lives to the cause of their sons, daughters or husbands in prisons. The family movement of the prisoners and the disappeared gave birth to the issue of truth about the past to be debated publicly in Morocco.
- 35 Christine Daure-Serfaty, Letter From Morocco (Michigan State University Press: USA, 2003),p.58.
- 36 Susan Slyomovics, "Fatna El Bouih and the Work of Memory, Gender, and Reparation in Morocco" in Journal of Middle East Women's Studies 8.1 (2012): 37-62.

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Meriem El Haitami

State-Sponsored Sufism and Political Expression in Morocco

As a result of the 2003 Casablanca terrorist attacks, Morocco initiated a series of religious reforms to counter emerging forms of extremist ideology. In addition to reorganizing religious councils and structures to promote the practice of 'moderate' Maliki Islam, Sufism has since become cited as a key element of Morocco's religious identity and has earned the country a reputation of 'exceptionalism'. Sufism has also resurged in the political scene as a response to challenges posed by political Islam and played a significant role in supporting the regime during the 2011 uprisings. This article therefore explores how the Sufi narrative has been instrumental in re-appropriating and re-inventing a Moroccan brand of Islam that seeks to establish religious homogeneity in the country, and thus maintain socio-political stability. That said, the centralized control of the state becomes challenged as the public space continues to be redefined through the emergence of counter-publics that have enabled alternative spheres of expression. I argue that the adoption of Sufism as a counter-response to religiously-oriented political dissidence serves the purpose of alienating expressions that fall outside of state-sanctioned perceptions of socio-political action. This paper therefore raises the question of whether the construction of a Sufi-oriented Moroccan Islam has possible implications for meaningful reforms or it offers slim prospects for genuine political and civil reforms.

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State-Sponsored Sufism and Political Expression in Morocco

Sufism, known alternatively as the spiritual or mystical expression of Islam, seems to first have been present in Morocco in “the beginning of the eleventh century”¹ and has greatly influenced the development of Moroccan Islam. Sufi orders have throughout the centuries, played a critical role at the intersection of politics and religion in Morocco. Founded around charismatic leaders believed to have special blessing (*baraka*), Sufi orders began to have a significant social and political role. In addition to being important centers of ritual devotion and scholarly exchange, Sufi orders served as networks for socio-political mobilization. Some challenged the ruling authority, manifested political ambition and established connections with colonial powers, while others demonstrated committed support to the state. In his article, entitled “The second coming of Morocco’s ‘Commander of the Faithful’: Mohammed VI and Morocco’s religious policy”, Abdelilah Bouasria says:

“The Moroccan monarchy has long used Sufism as a political card. Historically, its relations with Moroccan Sufi orders waxed and waned according to the resources available to each side. The Nasiri Sufi order fought with the Alaoui dynasty and was the source of its growth. On the other hand, the Cherkaoui order saw its brotherhood destroyed by the makhzen and its leaders arrested. Neither was the stance of a sultan towards Sufism always black and white. For example, Sultan Moulay Slimane (1792-1822) was reputed to be a Wahhabi adversary of Sufism. Yet, he became a friend and mentor of the Sufi saint Ahmed Tijani (1735-1815). Similarly, the current Moroccan monarchy protects and defends the Boutchichi order while it wages a non-declared war against al-Adl wal-Ihsan.”²

The political role of Sufi orders has, however, regressed in the colonial period because of the French manipulation and appropriation of some Sufi orders, in addition to the anti-Sufi tendencies of the Nationalist Movement, which had a Salafi orientation. The latter’s critique of Sufism continued in the postcolonial period and engendered an ideological confrontation between Salafism and Sufism. With the rise of Islamic sentiments in the first decade of the twenty first century, Sufi orders emerged on the scene as a new and powerful religious and political force and succeeded to recruit youth massively, especially the Qadiri Boutchichi order, which emerged as the spiritual arm of the political elite. Fait Muedini explains that the order’s numbers have risen since the 1960s, with an overall membership said to be around 15,000 persons, which by 2009 has risen to 100,000, according to media estimates. In addition, the Boutchichi order has become known for its increasing membership among the elites and youth of Morocco.³

Morocco’s inclusion of Sufism as a form of ‘peaceful Islam’ in its religious bureaucracy has been essential to its efforts to present itself as a moderate state and support religious alternatives to the ideological forms of Islam. Abbas Boughanem, an expert in Islamic movements and Sufism, argues that the state is promoting Sufism as an educational rather than a religious trend “because Sufis are generally not interested in politics and are totally involved in their rituals, they can teach people who follow them some kind of political passivity”.⁴ According to Boughanem, Sufism encourages religious practice without showing opposition to the regime.

Furthermore, Rashid Moqtader, an expert in Moroccan Islamic movements, holds that the Moroccan government deals with emerging powers depending on the nature of those powers and their influence in the political scene. Moqtadir explains how the state uses one power against another, citing its support for Islamists in 1970s in order to counter the growing influence of leftist trends as well as the empowerment of Salafi movements to fight opposition parties like the Justice and Charity group, which was known for its Sufi disposition. For Moqtader, the decision to use Sufism to curb the influence of Jihadi movements and political Islam is also related to the strategy

followed by the United States since the September 11 attacks: “in addition to military incursions, the United States has been resorting to Sufism to fight al-Qaeda and similar organizations throughout the Muslim world.”⁵ Vish Sakhthivel further explains that the utilization of Sufism as a cure-all against extremism has attracted Western governments’ attention and has particularly aided Morocco’s broader objective of promoting its counter-terror credentials and positioning itself as a key ally. She notes that while the shift from Sufis’ repression to their cooptation/utilization began in the 1990s for domestic political ends, further geopolitical implications made themselves apparent after 9/11 and the subsequent U.S.-led “War on Terror.”⁶

Further, the 2011 uprisings have triggered dramatic changes of political dynamics in the MENA region. Although Morocco managed to survive the Arab Spring, it could not entirely avoid its turmoil. A number of protests took place in major cities, led by the February 20 Movement. These uprisings, however, did not seem to affect Sufism’s relationship with the state. After King Mohammed VI responded by drafting a modified constitution, Sufi orders emerged on the scene of these happenings to show support for the new constitution. The Qadiri Boutchichi order, which urged its followers to march in the streets in favor of the constitution, was especially supportive.

The instability in the Sahel region after the overthrow of the Gaddafi regime in Libya in 2011 and the French military intervention in Mali in 2013 has also contributed to the increasing role of Morocco in the region as a mediator of moderate Islam. Morocco’s use of religious diplomacy or ‘soft power’ not only seeks to promote security in the region by tapping in to spiritual values, but arguably consolidates political and economic hegemony. Sufi networks have emerged again as important actors in conferring legitimacy to Morocco’s political ambitions in the Sahel and West Africa, especially the Tijaniyyah Brotherhood, which is a legacy of the longstanding Moroccan-West African relationship and a subject of contestation between Morocco and Algeria. Today, increasing numbers of followers of the Tijaniyya regard the Moroccan king as a spiritual leader, and the Moroccan city of Fez as an important pilgrimage center.

Despite its political baggage, the Sufi narrative continues to infuse the various domains of the public sphere and promises to curb extremism as well as the ideological projects of Islamist and Salafist movements—whether moderate or oppositionist—even though these have been a constituent of the religio-political sphere since the end of the 1970s. Using one narrative against the other serves the primary purpose of maintaining political stability; the latter, however, has proven ineffective in addressing socio-political grievances. The state instrumentalizes the Maliki-Sufi brand of Islam to alienate dissident voices, while promoting apolitical subjectivities. The latter categorizes and reduces Moroccans’ religious expression to a rigid binary of the ‘good’ Sufi-Maliki and ‘bad’ politically oriented Muslim, which is highly problematic. In the framework of the state’s counter-terrorism strategy, such binary classifications do not consider the diversity of repertoires of public reasoning and expression, but rather rely on branding people as ‘moderate’ or ‘extremist’ to justify modes of state control over the public space. Groups that are seen as more political or manifest patterns of opposition to government policies are criticized or handled with coercion. However, ‘moderate’ Muslims who conform to state-approved religious expression, and manifest more apolitical attitudes, are viewed as good and compliant subjects.

This dichotomy was however disrupted in the context of the Arab Spring, that proved the failure of using Sufism to contain Islamist and Salafist trends. In addition to co-opting the Islamic political party of Justice and Development, that emerged victorious in the 2011 legislative elections held in the wake of a constitutional review led by King Mohammed VI, to reduce emerging tensions. Morocco’s subsequent policy has comprised the co-optation of Salafist leaders by affording them expanded participation in political life, while they maintain loyalty to the regime. Co-opting Salafism serves the double purpose of de-centralizing the authority of Islamists within the

government and maintaining a state-approved political diversity, as well as neutralizing Salafist leaders and using them as viable elements in its fight against extremism.⁷ Abdel Hakim Abu al-Lawz, an expert on Salafist movements, however, thinks that the state is not betting entirely and strategically on these leaders to resolve the Salafist jihadist issue once and for all.⁸ The political inclusion of Salafism remains a cautious measure, participation in mainstream politics is limited to pro-regime Salafis, and the creation of full-fledged Salafist political entities is surely not a viable option for the time being.⁹

As a conclusion, although the Moroccan religious sphere is pluralistic to a significant extent, it is also deeply centralized and institutionalized. Morocco comprises competing expressions, the authority of which is determined by what the state favors as more legitimate. It is therefore important to ask whether Morocco's strategy of using one religious expression to counter another is the antidote to extremism, or whether it informs further ideological polarization and marginalizes socio-political reform to security measures.

Notes

¹ Cornell, Vincent. 1998. *Realm of the Saint: Power and Authority in Moroccan Sufism*. Austin: University of Texas Press. P. 4.

² Bouasria, Abdelilah. 2013. "The Second Coming of Morocco's 'Commander of the Faithful': Mohammed VI and Morocco's Religious Policy." In Bruce Maddy-Weitzman and Daniel Zisenwine, eds., *Contemporary Morocco: State, Politics and Society under Mohammed VI*. London: Routledge. P. 45.

³ Muedini, Fait. 2015. *Sponsoring Sufism: How Governments Promote "Mystical Islam" in their Domestic and Foreign Policies*. Palgrave Macmillan US. P. 77.

⁴ al-Ashraf, Hassan. 2010. "Morocco Fights Islamist Extremism with Sufism." <http://www.alarabiya.net/articles/2010/09/26/120366.html>.

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ Sakthivel, Vish. 2016. "The Flawed Hope of Sufi Promotion in North Africa". <http://www.fpri.org/article/2016/12/flawed-hope-sufi-promotion-north-africa/>

⁷ Stitou, Imad. 2015. "How Morocco plans to contain its Salafists". <http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2015/06/morocco-salafist-sheikhs-regime-isis.html>.

⁸ Ibid.

⁹ "Morocco's "Management" of the Salafi-Jihadists". 2016. <https://chronicle.fanack.com/morocco/society-media-culture/society/moroccos-salafi-jihadists/>

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