Body Politic and Individual Liberty: Intimate Injustice

Abstract

One of the characteristics of a liberal democracy is one in which individual liberties are protected against violations from agents of both state and private powers. The Moroccan state as a ‘cautious democracy’ largely provides a set of fundamental principles for this protection of individual liberty and covers almost all human rights contained in the Universal Human Rights Declaration. However, the Constitutional protection of rights (as prescribed in the legislative text) is defined by the legal terms and conditions that govern the limits of the enjoyment of that so-called individual freedom. The restrictions that law imposes upon individuals could only be justifiable in this case within a ‘Contractarian’ ethical framework that strikes a balance between liberty and security. Now, would that by any means violate the individual rights of those Moroccan citizens who shall enjoy their basic rights and total freedoms to which all humans are considered entitled? The state (as a majority rule) has definitely an obligation towards individuals to ensure that their rights are exercised free from coercion. However, would an individual in this case as a member of the body politic accept to adopt the values of the dominant group (that wields political power) and exchanges his/her freedom for security? In this paper, I draw on Social Contract theory to explain the boundaries of an individual right and what can legitimatize the authority of the state over that individual and how would a change in the Social Contract as a conceptual tool between “the ruler” & the “ruled” help configurate or reconfigurate the ideals behind democracy. Keywords: Body Politic, Individual Liberty, Social Contract, Security, Liberal Democracy.